July 25. 1947 Reference As made to the request of of Senator Hickerlooper's staff for information in the Bureau's possession on General Thomas Farrell, Allen Dulles, and Georges P. Doriot, who are being considered by the Senator for appointment on a staff of consultants for the Congressional Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. There are attached memoranda on each of these individuals based on a review of our fales. The Bureau has never made any investigation of General Farrell or Allen

Bulles and the information contained in the blind memorands is based solely on information received by us from other sources.

Georges F. Dorlot was under intensive investigation by the Bureau in 1942 and 1943 at the request of General Strong, then head of G-2. General Strong believed that Boriot was possibly transmitting secret War Department information to the Vichy French. The investigation failed to reveal that he was doing ac M. MALDROOM: 39063 ENVIONIBLE

10-4-10 # 406048 RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that these memoranda be referred to Assistant Director Michals for consideration with reference to furnishing them to Senator Michalcoper.

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Attachment

Mr. Ladd

V. P. Keny

CONTENTRAL

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6/19/49

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ENTRAL.

July 25, 1947

Allen Welsh Dulles



According to "Who's Who," Dulles was born in 1893 in Watertown, New York. He received an A.B. degree from Princeton University in 1916 and an LL.B. degree from Georgetown University in 1926. He resides with his wife and two children at 239 East 61st Street, New York City.

Mr. Dulles taught English in Allahabad, India, for one year after which he entered the diplomatic service in 1916. He was first assigned to the Secretary of the Legation in Vienna, Austria, and in 1917 was transferred to Berne, Switzerland. In 1918 he was in Paris with the American Commission to Megotiate Peace and War; subsequently, he was assigned to Berlin, Germany. He served with the American Commission in Turkey in 1920. After having been assigned in Washington with the Department of State from 1920 to 1922, Mr. Dulles was made Chief of the Bivision of Near Eastern Affairs; he held this position until 1926. He was a United States delegate to the International Conference on Arms Traffic in Geneva, Switzerland, in 1925 and was a member of the American Delegation to the Preparatory Armament Commission which was held in Geneva in 1926; he was Legal Advisor to the American Delegation at the Three-Power Haval Conference in Geneva in 1927.

In October, 1926, Dulles resigned from the State Department and went with the law firm of Sullivan and Cromwell, New York City. Among other corporations, he is listed as a Director of the J. Henry Schroder Banking Corporation, New York City.

According to his own statement while in Berne, Switzerland, during World War I, he set up a political espionage system which accomplished gone (62-64427-255)

Relations; member of the Executive Council of the American Society on International Law; and a member of the Board of Directors of the New York County
Lawyers' Association. He was also listed as holding membership in various

Civis organizations in New York and Washington, and affiliated with the

Mr. Tolson Republican Party and the Presbyterian Church.

Dulles is the author of a recent 207-page book entitled "German Mr. Cerson Underground" published by the MacMillan Company. Orville Prescott, in an Mr. Hondon article in the New York Times dated May 6, 1947, had the following to say

Mr. McGuire

Mr. Quinn Tem

FIGURE 28 THE THE BEARING

Miss Gandy ....

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regarding Dulles and his book "German Underground:" "Allen Welsh Dulles is a distinguished lawyer and diplomat who was head of our Office of Strategie Services in Switserland from 1942 until 1945. It was his task to find out all he could about the German underground. He found out a lot, became acquainted with several of its leaders who crossed the border into Switzerland. and has put into his book as complete an account of the various elements which made up the German underground as is possible in a short space....\* (62-83338)

An article entitled "American Big Business and the Future of the Reich" appeared in PM on Warch 19, 1945, and contained the following comment concerning Dulles: "To a large extent, the personnel chosen by the State Department, the Army, OSS (Office of Strategic Services) and FEA (Foreign Economic Administration) to plan the future of Germany is being drawn from those circles in big business, finance, and the corporate bar which did & great deal of business with the Reich before the war.


"Here are a few hitherto undisclosed examples. Allen W. Dulles of Sullivan and Gromwell is in Switserland, where we have been trying to stop the leak of German capital abroad. Important agencies are depending on Dulles to advise them on facts and policies in connection with German finance and industry. Sullivan and Cromwell is our leading corporation law firm and before the war served many corporations and banks dealing with the Reich.

\*Bulles is also a director of the J. Henry Schroder Banking Corporation of New York, the American branch of an old British banking house of German origin, whose operations helped Hitler obtain raw materials and foreign exchange before the war.

"Another director of the Schroder Bank, Samarkand-born V. Lada-Mocarski, has just been appointed vice consul in Zurich by the State Department after many months in the super-secret OSS, where he was an adviser on German matters .... (66-16238)

The Daily Worker of July 23, 1945, carried an article which stated that "almost every key man in the Office of Strategic Services has direct or direct connections with large international industrial and banking interests." This article described Allen W. Dulles as a director of the J. Henry Schroder Banking Corporation and a brother of John Foster Dulles who is a staunch supporter of Thomas Dawsy. (62-64427)

Johannes Steel's Report on World Affairs dated February, 1947, stated as follows: "The diplomatic pouches of the American and British delegates to Hoscow are heavily laden with plans and suggestions made by American and British capitalists and bankers. They have a firm grip on the direction of American foreign policy through the influence of such dominant personalities as John Foster Dulles, who is the key man in this situation.



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Dulles, a senior partner in Sullivan and Cromwell, one of the world's most powerful cartel law firms. The present situation is the culmination of plans made as early as 1943. At that time Allen Dulles, backed by more than fifty of the largest British and American industrial and banking corporations, went to Switzerland to get in touch with German industrialists who were then making plans to get out from under in the face of the coming collapse of the Third Reich. The Germans re-established old contacts with their British and American colleagues through Swiss banks. This was not difficult to arrange since Dulles, on behalf of the Office of Strategic Services and the Foreign Economic Administration, was asked specifically to find cut about the flow of German capital into Switzerland.

Banking Corporation of New York. This corporation is a branch of the British banking house of Schroeder, which in turn has had corrections with the Cologne bank of Baron Schroeder, the financial backer of Hitler. Before the war, the London Schroeder Bank was instrumental in giving the Hazis Sinancial assistance and helping them to get much-needed raw material from England and Scandinavia. London Schroeder has always been the bridge between the financial City of London and the heavy industries of Western Germany.

been in London, Paris, and Switzerland on behalf of the cartels represented by his law firm. He also visited the Rubr and Rhine industrial districts, and had exhaustive talks with the leaders of the Dritish and American military administrations, as well as with German Andustrialists and bankers. The success or fallure of the Moscow Conference may well depend upon the extent to which their views — transmitted through the Dulles cartel and banking group — have played a part in determining the attitude of the increase delegation which General Marshall is taking to Moscow. Since that delegation will probably be composed of the same kind of personnel that Byrnes took to Moscow, Marshall will find his task extremely difficult, if not impossible...."

Dulles has been described as an expert on Eugoslavian affairs and in 1943 was listed in the official organ of the imerican Friends of Tugoslavia, Incorporated, as one of the Board of Directors of that organization. Reportedly, the purpose of this organization was to help all Tugoslavians without regard to religious, racial or political background. (200-180760-5)

According to an article appearing in the New York Times dated February 1, 1943; this organization was formerly endorsed by the them Undersecretary of State Summer Welles. (100-182760-1)

According to available information, some individuals on the West Coast who were active in the American Friends of Tugoslavia, Incorporated, were closely associated with followers of the Communist Party line.

(100-1827602 — Bradley Crum-Prosident of San Fran. Chapter of National Lawrers Child was on Board of San Fran. Chapter of above organization. He was also a friend of George Anderson, Communist lawyer, and other known Communists).



FEREN

Allen W. Dulles is listed as a member of the Board of Directors of the Woodrew Wilson Foundation, 45 Bast 55th Street, New York City, which publishes a pamphlet entitled "United Nations News." The purpose of this publication is stated as "to furnish unbiased news and reporte concerning UN activities." According to a War Department source, several members of the Board of Directors of the Woodrow Wilson Foundation have been previously cited by the House Committee on un-American Activities as commented with Communist controlled and infiltrated enterprises. (100-347117-2) (page 2)

According to a reliable source, in 1939 Dulles was contacted by an individual who was alleged to have been engaged in German espionage activities; however, this source had no information which reflected that Dulles had any knowledge of this individual's alleged espionage activities

(Gerhard Westrick, 65-10325-165)

## Books a the Times

#### By ORVILLE PRESCOTT

N July 20, 1944, Col. Count Claus Schenk von Stauffenberg carefully placed his brief case against a leg of the map table in Adolf Hitler's secret East Prussian headquarters. He then got up and left the room and waited outside a little distance away. He had better cause for hope and fear and desperate excitement than most men who have ever lived,



Welsh Dulles

for his brief case contained a time bomb which he expected would blow Hitler to atoms in a few minutes. The explosion came as expected and blew the wooden walls out of the building, killed four unimportant persons and only scratched and bruised the Nazi tyrant. A minute before, Hitler had got up and walked to the other side of the room to consult a wall map. Assassination harder than it looks: in fact, it is almost

18 : ie in a police state ruled by a dictator ogne 11. frightened and as carefully guarded as

gift J to the second of two books about the Gerunderground, which tried on several occaions to kill Hitler, is published. Both books conrain much information which has never been available in such detail before. Both are less dramatic and less interesting than would seem possible. It is all a matter of presentation. Obviously nothing could be much more hair-raising than to conspire against Hitler, with his top generals, under his very nose. But a severely factual account that leaves out most of the emotional tension and most of the personal touches that could characterize the persons concerned makes pretty dry fare. And that is what both these books are. The first in order of "ublication and the more complete is "German, "Underground," by Allen Welsh Dulles. The exond and slightly more personal is "They Almost Killed Hitler," by Fabian von Schlabrendor it as told to Gero v.S. Gaevernitz.

#### Author-Spied on Underground

\Allen Welsh Dulles is a distinguished lawyer and diplomat who was head of our Office of Strategic Services in Switzerland from 1942 until 1945. It was his task to find out all he could about the German underground. He found out a lot, became acquainted with several of its leaders who crossed the border into Switzerland, and has put into his book as complete an account of the various elements which made up the German underground as is possible in a short space. , , , ,

GERMANY'S UNDERGROUND. By Allen Welsh Dulles, 207 pages. Macmillan. \$3.

†THEY ALMOST KILLED HITLER, Based on the personal account of Fabian von Schlabrendorff; prepared and edited by Gero v.S. Gaevernitz. 150 pages, Macmillant \$2.50.

According to Mr. Dulles, the anti-Hitler conspiracy did not begin until 1938. After that it always existed, but it never grew to large proportions. Courageous men participated who came from every walk of life, and several thousand lost their lives. But little was accomplished. All plans centered around killing Hitler and enlisting sufficient army support to seize power. Several attempts to kill him failed. Twice before his final attempt Count Stauffenberg himself took bombs into Hitler's presence, and then took them out again because he hoped to liquidate Heinrich Himmler and Hermann Goering also. Numerous generals hesitated on the brink of joining the conspiracy without ever giving it their full support.

The two principal leaders of the German underground were Col. Gen. Ludwig Beck and Carl Friedrich Goerdeler, the Mayor of Leipzig. Beck was the organizing head. He was aided by high officers on the Eastern Front, in the Home Army and in the Intelligence Service. A group known as the Kreisau Circle, which centered around Count Helmuth von Moltke, worked out a post-Hitler political program of Christian Socialism. Some Socialists, Communists, clergymen and professors cooperated also.

#### Bomb Placed in Plane a Dud

"Germany's Underground" makes clear that all the brave and honest Germans were not either dead or in concentration camps or in exile in 1944. But it does not attempt to be an apology for the Germans. A pitifully small number out of Germany's millions ever felt strongly enough even to conspire. And of these most were soldiers who did not feel strongly enough to conspire until it was plain that Germany had lost the war.

"They Almost Killed Hitler" is the personal story of Count von Schlabrendorff, one of the major military leaders in the underground, written by Gaevernitz, an American OSS agent, as it was told to him by Schlabrendorff. It bears an introduction by Maj. Gen. William J. Donovan. Although it is a personal story, much of it is as impersonal a record of the same men and events as Mr. Dulles' book. But where it concentrates on its hero's own experiences it comes Secretary or dramatically to life.

It was Schlabrendorff who made one of the most daring of all the attempts to kill Hitler. In March, 1943, Hitler was lured from his own headquarters to those of the Central Army on the Eastern Front. He came with his own cook to prepare his food, his own physician to taste each dish before he dared to himself, wearing a safety cap lined with three and a half pounds of steel plating. Just as Hitler entered his private plane on leaving, Schlabrendorff handed in a time bomb wrapped to look like a package of brandy bottles. "It was a great nervous strain to remain quiet at this juncture," he says with some feeling. But when the bomb failed to explode Schlabrendorff flew to Hitler's headquarters and got it back before it was unwrapped!

Future historians of Germany under Hitler are going to have to consult both of these volumes, for they are the raw material of history.

Mr Posen . Ma. Pracy Mr. Coronn Mr. Egan .... Mr. Garnes .... Mr. H. rho Mr. Hendon ..... Mr. Pennington ..... Grinn Tamm.



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Office Memorandum • United States Government 用OI/PA 作力 December 19, 1950 APPEAL # CIVIL ACT. # FROM: Glavin DATE 10/18/85 INITIALS IVIN SUBJECT: ALLEN WELSH DULLES, AGE 57 SUMMARY MEMORANDUM ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT. -3 w WHERE SHOWN diverwise. . . BIOGRAPHICAL DATA 54 is OAm BIRTH. EDUCATION. MARITAL STATUS: Allen Welsh Dulles, was born at Watertown, New York, April 7, 1893. (At the age of 8 he evinced an interest in foreign affairs, when he wrote a fictional narrative based on the Boer War, then being fought. | He attended school in Auburn, New York and the Ecole Alsatienne in Paris, France. He obtained a B.A. degree from Princeton University in 1914. He then traveled in the Far East and for a year taught English in Allahabad, India before returning to work for his M.A. degree which he received from 'Princeton in 1916. He obtained a LL.B. degree from George Washington University in 1926. He married Clover Todd on October 16, 1946, and has two children by this marriage, a daughter; Joan, and a son, Allen 10-4-00 PM ACKGROUND:

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OF A DECLASSIFIED BY SA ALMIEHL arry Lotte

OF A DECLASSIFIED BY 25% I STATE OF Allen Dulles was one of the five children of Allen Macy # 3 FA Macy. FAMILY BACKGROUND: and Edith (Foster) Dulles. His father, a Presbyterian Minister, was the nephew of John Welsh, envoy to England during the Hayes Administration. His maternal grandfather, John Watson Foster, was Secretary of State under President Harrison and the author of a number of books on diplomacy. Classified by HOME AND OFFICE ADDRESS: Declassify of OADR 10/18/60 Allen Dulles resides at 239 East 61st Street, New York 21, New York. His office address is 48 Wall Street, New York 5, New York.

DECLASSIFIED BY 3906 TELLY SOUTH ST. OF A Let. 91 OF A Let. 1910 OF A Let. 91 OF A Let. 1910 OF A Le Mr. Dulles is a Presbyterian. He is a member of the 390

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following clubs: Century Association, Down Town Association, Piping Rock (New York); Metropolitan, (Washington, D. C.). He is a member of the New York Lawyers Association and Chairman of

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December 19, 1950

the International Law Commission. He is Director and President, Council on Foreign Relations, New York.

#### CAREER OF ALLEN W. DULLES, 1916-1940

#### U. S. DIPLOMATIC SERVICE:

Mr. Dulles entered the U.S. Diplomatic Service in 1916. On May 17, 1916, he was appointed Legation Secretary and assigned to Vienna, Austria. He was transferred to Berne, Switzerland, 1917. He served as a member of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace at the Paris Peace Conference in 1918-1919. Subsequently, he was appointed to the American Embassy in Berlin and made First Secretary of the Embassy.

He was next stationed with the American Commission in Constantinople from October, 1920 until April, 1922, at which time he became Chief of the State Department's Division of Near Eastern Affairs, with his headquarters in Washington, D. C. During his four years in Washington, he was a delegate to two Geneva, Switzerland conferences: The Arms Traffic Conference, 1925; and the Preparatory Disarmament Conference, 1926.

In 1926, he was offered the post of Counselor to the United States Legation at Peking. It was an increase in rank but not in salary. He was making \$8000.00 per year at that time, had received his law degree that year, so he resigned due to the inadequate salary.

#### JOINS LAW FIRM OF SULLIVAN AND CROMVELL:

Following his resignation from the Diplomatic Service, Mr. Dulles joined the New York law firm of Sullivan and Cromwell, in which his elder brother, John Foster Dulles, was a partner. In 1927, Allen Dulles acted as legal adviser to the American delegation at the Three Power Naval Conference. He was legal adviser to the delegations at the Geneva Disarmament Conferences of 1932 and 1933.

#### POLITICAL ACTIVITY:

Seeking a political office in 1938, Dulles became a candidate in the New York Republican primaries for a U. S. Congressional nomination; he was defeated by his veteran Republican opponent, John O'Connor. The following year, he

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assisted locally in raising funds for the 1940 Willkie Presidential campaign in which he acted as Eastern Director of the Naturalized Citizens Division of the Republican National Committee. Allen Dulles was referred to as a "Dewey speech-writer" on one occasion in the Washington Daily News, (October 29, 1948)

(All of the preceding information was taken from Who's Who in America 1950-1951, and Current Biography, March, 1949, pages 13, 14.)(94-3-4-115-53)(Washington Daily News, 10/29/48)

# BUREAU FILES REFLECTING CAREER AND ACTIVITIES OF ALLEN WELSH DULLES

1940 - 1950

#### FBI CONTACTS WITH DULLES:

3/5/42 On March 5, 1942, Allen Welsh Dulles called at the New b7D York Office to see the late Assistant Director P. E. Foxworth. Mr. Dulles told Mr. Foxworth that he was maintaining an office at 630 Fifth Avenue, New York City. and

and stated he worked very closely with

He further advised Mr. Foxworth that he worked closely with representatives of Czechoslovakia, Poland and other subjugated countries which have representatives in the United States.

Mr. Dulles stated his primary interest at that time was the analysis and evaluation of political information concerning continental Europe and the Near East. He was not interested in any domestic material whatever. He offered his services to the FBI and in return asked that if anything came along which the FBI thought would be of interest to him, that he be advised. Mr. Foxworth toldhim that would be done.

Mr. Dulles further told Mr. Foxworth that at times he might want to request the search of names through the FBI records and he was invited to send such requests directly to the Washington Headquarters.

Mr. Dulles stated that he did not feel that the British had in every instance, furnished all of the information in their





PSFORETDecember 19, 1950 Memorandum to Mr. Nichols possession to Colonel Donovan's organization, and it was his opinion they had furnished only that which they wanted us to know. He stated he was going to watch this closely, and that while he was cooperating very closely with the British, he did have in mind the fact that they might not be cooperating as closely with us as they should. (62-64427-255)On March 12, 1942, the New York Office advised the 3/12/42 Bureau, in the G case, that SAC A. M. Thurston had contacted Commander Vanderbilt and Colonel G. Edward Buxton in the New York office of the Coordinator of Information, and ascertained that L residing at a rooming house at 18 East 64th Street, New York, New York. A few hours following Mr. Thurston's contact with Colonel Buxton, he was contacted by Mr. Allen Dulles who, as a special representative of Colonel Donovan, had recently taken offices at 630 5th Avenue, New York. Mr. Dulles advised Mr. Thurston that **b**6 he had been in contact with and he offered to bring him b7C to Mr. Thurston's office for interview. The SAC further advised that on March 9, 1942, Mr. Dulles, whom he identified as a special accompanied by employee of the Coordinator's Office, brought Mr. Thurston's office where he was interviewed. Prior to the actual interview, Mr. Dulles related that had been turned over to him by his British friends. Mr. Dulles furnished Mr. Thurston with very detailed information concerning employment in Germany and confided that , who was extremely anti-Nazi and who had been secretly collaborating with the British Intelligence Service. Mr. Dulles informed Mr. Thurston that the British, as well as the Coordinator's Office, were of the opinion that both could be trusted implicitly. Mr. Dulles stayed throughout the interview and after the interview was over, engaged in general conversation with Mr. Thurston concerning **b**6 Mr. Dulles further stated he had been instructed to make b7C available to the Bureau for assignment in the event his services were needed. He stated that



had advanced the idea that if he were to examine the photographs which appeared on visas of European refugees, he might possibly

be able to identify some German intelligence agents.

Memorandum to Mr. Nichols

On this occasion, Mr. Dulles cooperated fully with the FBI.

(65-41748-1)

4/27/42 On April 27, 1942, Mr. Foxworth, of the New York Office, advised the Bureau that he had received a letter dated April 24, 1942, from Mr. Allen W. Dulles which read as

follows:

"We have received a telegram from Tangier. dated April 21, 1942, stating that an Axis agent, in Tangier, receives money every month from Brandeis Investment Company, Omaha, Nebraska. You may wish to investigate the source of these funds."

Mr. Foxworth stated that a copy of this letter was being furnished to the Omaha Field Division for appropriate action.

(100-98431-1)

5/7/42 On May 7, 1942, the New York Office sent to the Bureau a memorandum regarding various Croatian organizations in the United States, together with a copy of "Outline of Postwar New World Map." New York advised that this material had been furnished to the New York Office by Allen W. Dulles of the Office of the Coordinator of Information, New York City.

b6 b7C

(65-30311-239)

5/28/42 On this date, the New York Office advised the Bureau that SAC Thurston had contacted Mr. Allen Dulles to advise him of the activities of Internal Security -G, who was then employed in the Office of the Coordinator of Information and Mr. Dulles told Mr. Thurston this was the second complaint he had received concerning activities. He further stated he would question concerning these charges upon return to New York. On May 26, 1942, Mr. Dulles addressed the following memorandum to Mr. Thurston:

"I appreciate the word you passed on to us with regard to While he has proved of value to us as a gatherer of news, I believe that he has allowed himself to become so involved in the internecine struggles in the Yugoslav community here, that his usefulness as a news gatherer is at





December 19, 1950

an end and we	propose to	terminate ou	ir connection
with him.	I am still	inclined to	have con-
fidence in	s good t	intentions a	id sincerity,
if not in his	discretion,	and I belie	eve that
certain enemie			e been doing
their best to	undermine h	im."	

(100-92511-3,5)

6/10/42 On this date a memorandum was prepared for Mr. Lada
stating that Mr. Allen Dulles had been present in
the office of on May 8, 1942,
when was interviewed regarding some subjects b6
in an espionage case. After the interplew with
Mr. Dulles was interviewed and he discussed very freely his
knowledge of Spanish activities in this country and New York. b71
and advised he was a equainted with the subjects,
and Espionage-S. He identified these individuals
as being informants on Spanish activities in this country and
stated that was in this country illegally. Mr. Dulles
also advised that he was in close contact with Mr. Foxworth of
the New York Field Division and all information regarding
espionage activities obtained by the New York office of the
Coordinator of Information was being turned over to Mr. Foxworth.

(65-59140-3)

A letter from Assistant Director P. E. Foxworth to the Bureau on this date stated that Mr. Dulles had delivered to him a copy of a letter addressed to Mr. Dulles by Lieutenant Colonel Wardman Park Hotel. Washington, D. C. The letter from Lieutenant Colonel listed the names of certain persons who were performing work for the Donovan organization and Mr. Dulles said that in some instances those people did not themselves know the identity of the government agency for which they were working. Mr. Dulles furnished Mr. Foxworth with a list of those employees in order that the FBI might have it available in the event any impersonation cases arose.

(62-64427-383)

9/11/42 On this date the New York Office forwarded to the Bureau an envelope and letter written in longhand for comparison with the previous handwriting of letters written by an



SERRET December 19, 1950

unknown subject in an Internal Security - Sedition case. The letter and envelope had been turned over to the New York Office by Mr. Allen Dulles, Office of Strategic Service, New York City.

(100-74840-155)

10/21/42 The New York Office advised the Bureau on November 21, 1942, that SAC Thurston had learned from Mr. Allen Dulles that was engaged in a project for the Donovan organization writing thumb nail biograph of all prominent officials of the Nazi Regime. Mr. Dulles furniother detailed information concerning as the New York Office was investigating at that time on an Espionage - case.	ies Shed
(65-18253-54)	b
On this date a report was submitted by the New York Of on Espionage - G. This investigation predicated upon a complaint made by Mr. Allen W. Dulle and of the Office of Strategic Service.  Suspician was aroused against because he showed unusual interest in ship movements and was thought to possibly be a Germ espionage agent.	was es
(65-49773)	
2/20/47 Allen Dulles was listed as a confidential informant in the report of SA dated February 20. 1947, at New York in the case involving Espionage - R. In this instance. Mr. Dulles furnished information to the Agent concerning subject of an Espionage - G case which had some tie-in with the case.	]
(100=348393-12)	b7C
of Senator Hickenlooper's office, called A Nichols on July 21, 1947, and asked if the Bureau had any data on Allen Dulles, General Thomas Farrell and Georges F. Doriot, who were being considered by the Senator for appointment on a staff of consultants for the Congressional Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. Mr. Nichols told him that there was some talk around town that Dulles was very close to Kentner and Alsop, the columnists, but we would check our files and see. On July 25, 1947, the desired information in the form of a summary was furnished to	ír.

December 19, 1950



#### DULLES COMMITTEE, CIA SURVEY

Mr. E. A. Tamm advised the Director on March 3, 1948, that told him that former Agent Art

Thurston had told him he resigned from the Central b7C

Intelligence Agency in disgust; that shortly after he returned to his home in Indiana, he was contacted on behalf of Secretary Forrestal who indicated he desired to be advised as to the reason for Thurston's resignation. Thurston was highly critical of the inefficiency and ineffectiveness of CIA and its dominator, the "brass." Forrestal talked to Admiral Souers and Souers selected a committee to conduct a study of CIA and submit a report to Forrestal. Allen Dulles was one of the three men named on this committee.

(62-80750-635)

7/8/48 A memorandum from Mr. Ladd to the Director dated
July 8, 1948, contained material of interest concerning
the survey being made of CIA by Allen W. Dulles, M. F.
Correa, and William H. Jackson. This report contained much data
concerning conferences held between the State Department and CIA,
but at no time throughout the entire report was any reference made
to the FBI.

(62-80750-722)

July 27, 1948, it was stated that a series of articles had been published in the New York Times by Hanson Baldwin criticizing the FBI. Apparently this series also criticized CIA. Agent DeLoach discussed a letter of protest the Bureau was preparing to send to the New York Times at which time Colonel Galloway advised that Hanson Baldwin, without any doubt whatsoever, had received all the information contained in his articles from Allen Dulles, Chairman of the committee which was at that time surveying CIA. Colonel Galloway stated the reason he knew this was that Dulles had questioned him along the same lines of the articles that had appeared under the name of Hanson Baldwin.

(100-79595-11)

11/4/48 A memorandum from V. P. Keay to H. B. Fletcher dated November 4, 1948, dealt with, "Activities of Dulles Committee, Information Concerning." Portions of it



December 19, 1950

are so pertinent it is deemet advisable incorporate them herein, as follows:

> CIA, on October 28, 1948, advised Agent DeLoach that he had recently been interviewed by a representative of this Committee, particularly along the lines of present cooperation between the FBI and CIA. stated that during the interview he was questioned explicitly as to the failure of the FBI to provide CIA with the names and sources of foreign personalities in this country who had been interviewed regarding domestic intelligence activities, vet had not been referred to CIA by this Bureau. stated that the Dulles, Committee representative did not state this fact in so many words; however, he ascertain from the conversation that someone in CIA, more than likely a representative of the Contacts Branch, had definitely misconstrued cooperative efforts between the FBI and CIA. advised that he did not know the identity of the individual giving this erroneous information; however, the Dulles representative had definitely received that viewpoint because of the manner in which he led the interview. Agent DeLoach at this point questioned as to any dereliction of the FBI in this regard. He replied that he personally had supervised the alien program dealing with the contact of these individuals for purposes of foreign Intelligence, and that he was of the opinion that cooperation between the FBI and CIA had been perfect. He stated he knew of no isolated examples of any dissension whatsoever.

Mr. Key further remarked that the Contacts Bureau of CIA was overstaffed; there was evidence of "empire building; that it was believed a representative of this Branch had advised a Dulles representative of certain facts which definitely did not represent the existing cooperation between the FBI and CIA.

It was recommended that Agent DeLoach discuss the matter with Admiral Hillenkoetter. The Director said:

> "I concur & further think we should contact someone at once with this Committee and definitely set them right in a forthright manner. H.

(62-80750-813)

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SECKET December 19, 1950

11/12/48 On this date Allen Dulles wrote the Director stating the Intelligence Survey Group would soon conclude its survey of CIA. Before concluding the report he wanted the Director of CIA and other members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee to meet with the Committee to make suggestions and recommendations. He invited Mr. Hoover or any designated FBI representative to meet with the Committee in Washington on November 22 or 23, 1948. On November 15, 1948, the Director replied to Mr. Dulles that inasmuch as it was not felt any particular contribution could be made by a Bureau representative, none would appear before the Survey Group.

(62-80750-812)

1/27/49 In a memorandum from Mr. Ladd to the Director on January 1, 1949, a summary of the Dulles report to the National Security Council on the Central Intelligence Agency was set forth. All of the specific criticisms of CIA were set forth in this summary, as well as matters specifically involving the FBI. One of the measures suggested to improve coordination in domestic intelligence and counter-intelligence was that the Director of the FBI be made a member of the Intelligence Advisory Committee (5-1)

According to the Dulles report, "the fact that the FBI is primarily concerned with security and law enforcement matters may result in a failure to exploit intelligence responsibilities and may create difficulties in resonciling the intelligence with the security interests."


The line of reasoning in the report was that the FBI is essentially a police organization, works on an individual case basis, and does not study, coordinate, or evaluate the overall intelligence situation in the United States (5-1)(u)

There was some discussion of the necessity for CIA establishing closer liaison with other governmental agencies, including the FBI, although it was indicated that this discussion concerns itself more with the set-up within the CIA than with the actual liaison activities outside. (5-1) (4)

(62-80750-881)

3/14/49 On March 14, 1949, Mr. Hoover personally prepared a memorandum for the Attorney General on the Dulles Committee report on CIA. It is felt that this is of particular importance





in this memorandum and it is quoted in full as follows:

"I am reliably informed that a Committee consisting of Allen W. Dulles, W. H. Jackson and M. F. Correa after a study of the work of Central Intelligence Agency submitted a report upon the work of the Central Intelligence Agency and a national organization for Intelligence to the National Security Council. This report was submitted the first part of this year. At no time has this Bureau been supplied with a copy of the report though I understand that its contents deal in some detail with the work of the FBI in the Security field and the relationship of the FBI to the Central Intelligence Agency and the over-all problem of Intelligence. The members of the Committee preparing this report did not make any detailed study of the FBI's work in this particular field nor did they contact the FBI for any detailed information as to the FBI's activities along these lines. Nevertheless, I am reliably informed that this report contains. as I have indicated, frequent reference to the FBI's activities and such references are not predicated upon factual material and are not in many respects accurate.

"Since this report is receiving careful consideration by the National Security Council and no doubt certain steps will be taken thereon affecting the over-all problem of Intelligence which certainly would affect the Federal Bureau of Investigation I do think that a copy of this report should be submitted to this Bureau in order that it may review it and make such comments upon it as are appropriate. I think it is basically unfair and unsound to take action upon what is really an ex parte report in the Intelligence Field without having the benefit of the views and comments of the Federal Bureau of Investigation which is charged specifically with the coverage of domestic intelligence. It is aggravated even more by the fact that the comments contained in the report pertaining to the FBI are not, as I have stated, factual and are in many respects inaccurate.

TEP SECKET

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5/25/50 The Washington Post dated May 25, 1950, carried an article entitled "Allen Dulles Likes Plan - General Clay and Others Praise Post Proposal." The article dealt with the fact that General Lucius Clay and others had endorsed the proposal of The Washington Post for a "Commission on National Security." Allen W. Dulles, described as a high-ranking officer in the United States Office of Strategic Services in World War II, and brother of John Foster Dulles, was quoted at length as to his comments concerning the "Commission on Internal Security." Mr. Dulles concluded his interview with the following words concerning the FBI:

"One final word. Any such commission as proposed should not interfere in any way with the FBI and should not have overlapping functions with the latter as I feel strongly that the FBI merits our gratitude and deserves our support."

(94-8-6-A)

#### OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

## OSS ACTIVITIES OF ALLEN W. DULLES

According to Current Biography, Dulles got into OSS because:

"A number of the clients of Sullivan and Cromwell during the prewar years were European Firms, including several in Germany. Thus, when in World War II General William J. Donovan chose as leaders of the Office of Strategic Services men who had a knowledge of European finance and 'strategic areas' (introductory section of 'Cloak and Dagger'), Dulles was among them. Before this in 1941 he had been sent on a Government mission to 'de-Germanize the Bolivian air lines.'

"From October, 1942 until V-E Day, Dulles was Chief of the OSS in Switzerland, and until late November, 1945 he headed the OSS mission in Germany. As the OSS director in Switzerland, he had an important part in the events, labeled 'Operation Sunrise' in ,

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intelligence parlance, which led to the surrender of German troops to Northern Italy in 1945.

#### WARTIME DECORATIONS

"Dulles' wartime decorations include the Medal of Merit and Presidential Citation, the Medal of Freedom, the Order of Maurizio e Lazzario from Italy, and the Medal of the Legion of Honor, rank of Officer, from the French Government."

> (March, 1949, Current Biography. 94-3-4-1115-53, page 13)

#### DULLES FURNISHED INFORMATION TO THE FBI

9/10/42 On this date, Lieutenant Colonel nicated with Mr. Allen Dulles at the New York Office of OSS concerning the seizure of an American merchant ship, the "Silvapalna" and asked him for any particulars Mr. Dulles might give him concerning the ship and its crew. He referred to his previous letter to Dulles of August 3, 1942, requesting information on this and forwarded Mr. Dulles all the details he had received concerning this ship. On September 14, 1942, Mr. Dulles answered and stated that OSS investigations confirmed L and that OSS had circulated information to the FBI and ONI and furnished a list of the members of the crew of the "Silvapalna" who were presumed to have been captured.

(100-162169-1)

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#### DAILY WORKER ARTICLE

An article appeared in the July 23, 1945, issue of the Daily Worker entitled "Reveals Big Business 7/23/45 Domination of OSS. The article went on to relate that almost every key man in OSS had direct connections with large international industrial and banking interests. article named various key OSS executives, then showed the tieup between the executives and certain banking and industrial interests. It cited Allen W. Dulles as the "brother of John

TOP SEXED Cember 19, 1950

Foster Dulles, 'Dewey's brain-truster,' associated with Sullivan and Cromwell, New York law firm, and a Director of J. Henry Schroeder, Banking Corporation and the Schroeder Trust Company, is head of the OSS Office in Europe, now basing his activities in Germany."

(62-64427-A)

## DULLES ADVOCATED INTERVENTION IN RUSSIAN SPHERE

8/10/45 In a Safehaven Report dated August 10, 1945, discussion was had concerning Hungarian assets and related that a former Hungarian Minister to Switzerland had told of discussions on the subject with Allen Dulles and Dulles was alleged to have suggested the need for American intervention in the Russian sphere and to have suggested that a Swiss holding company be formed by American-Hungarian interests to hold title to all possible Hungarian assets.

| Claimed that he had been advised by an associate of Dulles that American authorities b7C look with favor upon such arrangements."


#### DONOVAN PRAISES ALLEN DULLES

9/19/45 In a letter dated September 19, 1945 William J.	
Donovan, Director of OSS, wrote to	
a member of the OSS mission in Switzerland	
	06
letter: "Along with Allen Dulles, they and you should take great h	7C
satisfaction in a signal contribution to the realization of peace."	,, ,
"They" in Donovan's letter referred to Paul Blum in	
connection with their work among the Japanese group in Switzerland.	

(100-346290-27,p.20)

DULLES IMPORTANCE OVERRATED IN GERMAN CIRCLES (\*) (U)

11/9/45 On this date, SA J. A. Cimperman wrote to the Bureau concerning Espionage - G. He enclosed a copy of an interrogation report on this b7C subject which had been made available to him by G-2. On page 60 of this report the following information is contained: "As far as PW was able to establish, Dulles was a member of the Office of Strategic Services, which was run by the American Colonel Donovan, and as such was considered to be working for the American Intelligence Service. PW seems to be of the opionion



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that Dulles' importance from a political point of view was overrated in German circles... It was a fact that Dulles made every effort to establish contacts wherever he could in Germany, ostensibly in connection with peace feelers, but PW's opinion was that other motives lay behind these approaches... It was ascertained by a V-man of the Swiss Referat that Dulles was in touch with Catholic circles in Germany through the former Reichskanzler Wirth, who was living in Switzerland ... In addition to this V-man, Prince Hohenlohe and his secretary had discussions with Dulles. secretary was, at his own request, introduced and described to Dulles as a type of extreme Nazi." (PW refers to (PW refers to who was referred to throughout the report as a prisoner of

(65-55559)

ALLEN DULLES FURNISHED INFORMATION TO HIS BROTHER, JOHN FOSTER DULLES

10/11/46 A memorandum on this date from SA E. G. Fitch to Mr.	
Ladd indicated that information had been obtained from	
MID concerning Colonel Clark of	<b>b</b> 6
MID advised that indicated he felt all of the	b7C
intelligence agencies in the government should get behind General	
Vandenburg of CIG. was an official of the CIO, who	
advised Agent Reynolds that it was his desire to make the faciliti	
of CIO available to the MID for the purpose of obtaining intellige	nce
in foreign countries.	
Donovan was Director of OSS, he made all information available to	
Allen Dulles who in turn made all information immediately avail-	
able to his brother, John Foster Dulles.	

(100-344378-19)

DULLE'S ORGANIZED ACTIVITIES IN EUROPE AGAINST THE COMMUNIST PARTY

9/20/49 On this date an article appeared in the Daily Worker stating that Dr. Tibor Szonyi, 4th defendant in the Budapest Treason trial, admitted on September 19. 1949, that he had plotted at length with Allen Dulles of OSS to set up an underground to overthrow the democratic peoples' governments in Eastern Europe... He said he made contact with Dulles in Switzerland in 1944 when the latter was



I SECKE European Director of OSS. He further stated that "in 1944, when it was clear that some parts of Europe would be liberated by the Soviets, Dulles concentrated on organizing spies among the groups in Switzerland from these countries. They were to organize activity against the Communist Party at home," according to Szonyi.

Szonyi further stated that "Dulles explained his program at length. He said that because those eastern countries, which would be liberated by the Russians would be led by the Communist Parties, work must be done within the parties." He said that Dulles sent him about \$1,000.00 before he left Switzerland and subsequently he and others received 200 and 300 Swiss francs from Dulles occasionally.

(64-200-249-A)


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#### POLITICAL REPORT ON HUNGARY

7/25/49 The semi-annual Political Summary Report on Hungary for the period January 1 to June 30, 1949, prepared by the Second Secretary of the Legation states on "Considerable publicity has been given to speeches and articles of Allen W. Dulles, who directed OSS operations from Switzerland during the war, and to the descriptions of United States employment of dissident refugees and 'fascists' now at liberty, as allied agents working within their respective governments, all as American espionage agents, the purpose being to prove that American missions abroad exist solely for reasons of espionage." (109-12-249-543, pp.37,38)

#### TRIAL OF LASZLO RAJK

9/16/49 On this date the trial of Laszlo Rajk began at 9:00 a.m. The trial was rather lengthy with numerous defendants testifying. Laszlo Rajk was the first defendant to take the stand. He pleaded guilty to all charges. A long list of persons were named in articles on the Rajk trial appearing in the Polish One of those names was Allen Dulles. He was mentioned by Szonyi as having criticized agents from Trotsky elements among immigrants and political refugees in Switzerland. He allegedly received information from Szonyi's group in various ways, one of them being that all material for the American Intelligence was



December 19, 1950 Memorandum to Mr. Nichols

sent to CICMIL, head of the Jugoslav Military Mission and he in turn would send it to OZNA, Jugoslav Intelligence in Belgrade. From there it would go to LATINOVICZ, then to LONPAR and then to Dulles. According to Szonyi, Dulles and Tito discussed working together on several occasions; they would work against Russia and Communist Parties. Further on during the course of the trial, a man named testified. He went into details to point at that the Americans succeeded in getting Szonyi's group behind the Soviet Army and into Hungary. stated that a representative of Tito and Rankovic, who stayed in Switzerland at that time, established good relations with OSS leader in Europe, Allen Dulles. He cooperated with him. At that time, Allen Dulles directed this spy group through Yugoslavia with the assistance of LONPAR. He went on to furnish intimate details of how the operation was carried out. (65-58835-4, p.13 and serial 3, p.11)

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NOEL HAVILAND FIELD WORKED WITH ALLEN DULLES

10/8/49 The New York Herald Tribune on October 8, 1949, carried an article stating that Noel Haviland Field, labeled as "Red" by Chambers, had not been heard from since June. The article related that Field was a former State Department official and brother of Herman H. Field, the architect who mysteriously disappeared at the Warsaw airport August 22, and he also had vanished behind the Iron Curtain. It was felt that both men may have fallen into the hands of the Russian Secret Police. Field's wife reported the disappearance of Herman H. Field when he failed to arrive at Prague Airport on a plane scheduled to bring him from Warsaw. Field was with the State Department's Division of Western European Affairs from 1930 to 1935. During the war he worked with Allen W. Dulles, then head of OSS in Switzerland, as a contact with the Communist underground in Germany. (105-2175-A)

#### FURTHER DATA ON THE MYSTERY OF THE FIELD BROTHERS

10/21/49 According to an article appearing in the October 21, 1949, issue of the Evening Star, the mystery of the two Field brothers, Herman and Noel, had become the number 1 riddle in the chain of suspicious dilemma that had broken in in Europe concurrently with the Titoist heresy. "In both cases a crooked line of evidence leads straight into the jungle of



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Cominform versus Titoist politics. The article related that Laszlo Rajk, Russian selected First Minister of the Interior in Hungary, who had been recently executed, was said to have had contact with Earl Browder, Allen W. Dulles of OSS and Noel Field of OSS, at the time OSS was working in Switzerland.

(100-32881-A)

SZONYI REFERRED TO DULLES
AS EUROPEAN CHIEF OF THE
AMERICAN ESPIONAGE ORGANIZATION

12/16/49 In a report on Hermann Haviland Field dated at Cleveland,
December 16, 1949, it was stated on page 11 that Dr.
Tibor Szonyi was an American spy who had established
contact with one of the leading officers of the American Espionage
organizations, Noel H. Field, and then with his superior, Allen
Dulles, who was European Chief of the American Espionage organization,
the Office of Strategic Services. This information was brought
out in the indictment presented by the Hungarian state prosecution
in the trial of Laszlo Rajk. (100-32881-58)


### ALLEN DULLES AND NOEL H. FIELD

In the December 25, 1949, issue of the Worker, an article appeared entitled, "U.S. Agents Inherit Gestapo Role." The article related that Noel H. Field, the missing Director of the Building Plans of Cleveland College, evidenced an extraordinary interest in city planning in Eastern Europe, "but the web of spy activity, running from Allen Dulles, head of OSS, to Noel Field, Herman's brother, now raises new speculations on the possession of these plans." The plans referred to were an elaborate set of plans and maps of Warsaw, which Field had shown to some of his friends in Cleveland during his two year stay there.

Noel Field played his part in this, (the recruiting of spies and terrorists in Switzerland), according to another defendant at the Hungarian trial, Dr. Tibor Szonyi, who testified: "Allen Dulles showed me, as a means of terrorizing me, the receipt I had signed on a previous occasion for Noel H. Field, the leader of the relief organization I had mentioned before, for a subsidy I had received."

(100-32881-67)





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#### "WHY NOT AN ANTI-COMINFORM"

In the January, 1950, issue of Plain Talk Magazine, 1/50 page 29, an article appeared entitled "Why Not an Anti-Cominform" by Siegfried Wagener. The article stated the Anti-Cominform would work under strictly American control and direction. We have men like Colonel Heber Blankenhorn who helped foment the German Revolution of 1918 and who was prevented from repeating his performance in 1944; Major General William J. Donovan of the erstwhile Office of Strategic Services; his associate, Allen Welsh Dulles, who kept his finger on the pulse of the abortive anti-Hitler rebell ion in 1944, and a number of others .... "

#### ASSOCIATES AND CONTACTS

#### WESTRICK CONTACTED DULLES

6/29/40 According to a report submitted by the New York Office on June 29, 1940, a technical surveillance was maintained on Dr. Gerhardt Alois Westrick, Espionage, and during the course of his stay in New York City, he contacted Allen Dulles on one occasion but there is no evidence in the file to show that Dulles knew him or knew anything about him.

(65-10325-37, p. 6A)

#### SPONSORED VISA OF ALFRED WEISS

It was reliably reported in February, 1941, that one Alfred Weiss had remarked that his visa had been extended 10/21/41 to March 11, 1941, and that if his visa were not extended for the second time beyond March, 1941, he would simply stay "because the Americans cannot deport anyone." It was also reported in June, 1941, that Alfred Weiss, 306 West 46th Street, New York City, a correspondent of the Swiss Telegraph Agency of Bern, Switzerland, and a member of the Association of Foreign Press Correspondents in the United States, was refused an extension of his visitors visa. It was alleged that the Swiss Consul told the Association of Foreign Press Correspondents that it would be best if Weiss were deported. However, the Swiss Minister is believed to have interceded in Washington, D. C. on Weiss' behalf on the instructions of the Foreign Office of Switzerland. The Swiss Consul

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is reported to have asked the Secretary of the Association of Foreign Press Correspondents to write him, the Consul, a personal letter requesting that the Swiss Government refrain from backing such a person as the above-mentioned Weiss.

61-7566-2762)

It was reported to the Bureau that an article in "The Communist," a magazine published by the Communist Party of the United States, for October, 1939, was entitled "The Plunder of Austria," under the name of one Alfred L. Weiss. (61-7566-1898)

On October 21, 1941, the name of appeared on the State Department form as seeking a temporary visitor's visa for business. The father of this individual was Alfred Weiss, whose original immigration visa application was sponsored by Allen W. Dulles. (40-17545)

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SPONSORED IMMIGRATION VISA

9/17/42 was a French national who entered the United States in October, 1940. She was in some manner associated with the Free French Movement in New York City during the year 1942 and she was sponsored by Allen W. Dulles and William Nelson Cromwell, both of whom were reported to have had contacts with individuals believed to be engaged in espionage activities, although it appeared that Mr. Cromwell and Mr. Dulles were persons of financial and social prominence and it was entirely possible that the contacts these men had with suspected individuals was without their knowledge of the character of the contacts. Committee examining the visa of resolved their doubt in favor of the internal security of the country as there was a hostage situation in this case since the applicant had a brother in French Morocco who was a Lieutenant Colonel in the French Army. The Committee felt that this woman would suffer no hardship through being maintained in her temporary status and it was felt her activities could be more closely surveilled if such became necessary. War, FBI, and Navy voted unfavorably on this application. (40-35274)





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AND	
9/17/42 The visa of these two individuals received considerable action by the Committee examining the visas, because the woman had been the	b6
, whose international law firm maintained	b70
and his associate, Allen W. <u>Dulles</u> , and regardless	¥ g
of the social and financial standing of and Dulles,	
they were in no position to determine the character of their	
contacts and since all doubts had to be resolved in favor of	
the internal security, ONI, FBI, and War Department representative	S

NORBERT ANDREW BOGDAN,
OFFICER CANDIDATE - ESPIONAGE

recommended unfavorably in this case.

On this date, MIS forwarded to the FBI a report on Norbert Andrew Bogdan, an officer candidate who had been investigated on a charge of espionage at the request of the Director of Intelligence of the 4th Service Command. The name of Allen W. Dulles appeared on page 4 of this report as a reference but he was not contacted during the course of the investigation. It was brought out during the course of the investigation that Bogdan was a Vice-President of the J. Henry Schroeder Banking Corporation of New York, which had formerly carried on extensive business with German financial investments. It has been previously brought out in this memorandum that Allen W. Dulles was connected with the J. Henry Schroeder Banking Corporation.

(100-64082-21)

(40-34540)

DULLES CLOSE CONNECTION WITH GENERAL WILLIAM DONOVAN

1/14/47 In a memorandum from Mr. Ladd to the Director on this date, it was stated that General William Donovan sponsored Allen W. Dulles for the position of Executive Director of CIG and that if Dulles should succeed in getting the job, he would undoubtedly be a "Charlie McCarthy" for Donovan.

(62-81909-11)





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CONTACT WITH GERHARDT WESTRICK -SECURITY MATTER - G

0n this date Gerhard Westrick submitted a memorandum concerning his trip to the United States in 1939, and during the course of this memorandum, mentioned that during the first days of his stay in the United States, he was invited to tea by Allen Dulles, and to the best of his recollection, he did not see him again. Westrick also stated that John Foster Dulles told him soon after his arrival in New York quite openly and in a friendly way that he regretted the fact that he could not concern himself with Westrick during Westrick's official stay in the United States. There is no indication in the file to show that Allen Dulles had any idea of the background of Gerhardt Westrick or his alleged espionage activities.

ASSOCIATION OF WITH ALLEN DULLES

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4/5/48			document			
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smuggled	to Geri	many.	app	roached B	uehrle and	stated
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nis relat	ions w	ith=Allen	W. Dulles	were suc	h that no	favor would
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the truth	of ni	s statemei	its about i	Mr. Dulle		(PS) (U)
				(0	3-69488-17	1,1,10

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#### GENERAL DORIOT WAS INFORMANT FOR ALLEN DULLES

5/27/48 In a memorandum from the SAC, Boston, to the Director on this date, information was furnished concerning General George Doriot, who had been interviewed by and SA

and Internal Security - R." The Bureau had instructed the Agents to contact General George Doriot as a prospective confidential informant.



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General Doriot informed the Agents that a man named might furnish pertinent information concerning  Blumenfeld. He said that	
later known as the Council of Republics. He was allegedly deeply sympathetic to the United States because of her participation in the liberation of France. He was recommended by General Doriot to Allen Dulles of OSS, and acted as an informant for Dulles during the war years. Doriot suggested Dulles could be contacted for a further evaluation of might well be approached successfully on the problem	t
	06
DILLIES! OPTHION OF	o7( o7)
10/20/48 In a report submitted by SA  New York, on October 20, 1948, concerning Nicolai  Malaxa, Internal Security - R, Edward G. Miller. Jr.  a partner in the law firm of Sullivan and Cromwell, told  that he had received unqualified approval from the  State Department for his firm to represent Malaxa. Allen Dulles, however, a member of the same law firm, told Lehman Brothers of New York City that he did not like Malaxa because he felt Malaxa was accustomed to buying influence and was attempting to use John Foster Dulles, (his brother), to get special favors.	

(100-344488-96, p.58)

#### DULLES ATTACKED BY COMMUNIST NEWSPAPER

The New York Times of August 3, 1949, carried an 8/3/49 article datelined at Prague, Czechoslovakia August 2, 1949, entitled, "Americans Called Plotters by Czech." The article stated that publicist, Andre Simone, made a charge in the Communist newspaper "Rude Pravo" that the heads of an "Organization X" including Allen Dulles and Cardinal Spellman, had decided to make Archbishop Josef Beran of Prague into a new martyr because they were displeased by recent signs that the East-West tension was relaxing. This article stated that the "Organization X" had organized espionage, sabotage and disturbances in countries that refuse to submit to capitalism and that the organization worked closely with an espionage service said to be headed by Jesuit Father Janssens and controlled by Msgr. Montini of the Vatican. (100-354851-192,p.26)

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#### NOEL FIELD RECEIVED MONEY FROM DULLES


In a report submitted by the Washington Field Office, on this date, entitled "Noel Haviland Field, Internal Security - R," it was stated that an informant advised 1/13/50 that in a communication dated April 15, 1946, from France, information was set forth regarding association with Noel Field; that Field had an office in Geneva and was in communication with Mr. Allen Dulles, head of OSS in Switzerland. It was reported that Noel Field received large sums of money from Allen Dulles, which sums were sent to , who took charge of distributing such funds in the south of France to the "Freiss Deutschland Mettelmeer" Committee to undermine the morale of the German troops.

(105-2175-31)

#### NOEL FIELD CASE

The Washington Post carried an article on September 2, 9/2/50 1950, entitled "East German Reds Purge 6 High Aides. During the course of this article, it stated that the Noel Field case was still a mystery. "Field, reputed to have wide acquaintance with the Communist underground in Nazi-occupied Europe, worked after the war for American charity agencies behind the Iron Curtain ... He dropped out of sight about 15 months ago. Two members of his family vanished while searching for him in east Europe.... The Politburo said Field was a crony of Allen Dulles... Field was alleged to have delivered secret Communist plans from Willy Kreikemeyer to Dulles."

(64-200-232-A)



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#### ACTIVITIES AND ORGANIZATIONS

#### ACCUSATIONS AGAINST DULLES BY MRS. ROBERT THITNEY IMBRIE

2/21/41 Mrs. Robert Whitney Imbrie, 1016 Sixteenth Street, Northwest, Washington, D. C., wrote to Walter Winchell on February 21, 1941 to discuss the murder of her husband Major Imbrie at Teheran. Persia. She said among other things:

> "....it was difficult for one not in on the know to connect up Morrow, Lindberg, Mexico, Dulles - Sullivan & Cromwell, France, National City Bank, Chase Bank, Dodd and Germany with the murder of Major Imbrie in Teheran ... . Villiam Nelson Cromwell is the 'Black Fox' of the Panama Canal Scandal....Sullivan has passed on to his reward....Number one man in S&C (Sullivan & Cromwell) is John Watson Foster Dulles ... his brother Allen Welsh Dulles was Secretary to Robert Lansing during the Paris Peace Conference .... ....All of this period (during the 1920's) Allen welsh Dulles (All In Dull Ass he is dubbed) was on the Personnel Board in The Dept. of State. And the promotions in the Foreign Service is another story. However, Dulles and his side kick Bill Castle have lined The Dept. with their men. brings us to Wallace Murray....Allen Dulles was Chief of the Near Eastern Division, Dept. of State, when Bob (Imbrie) was murdered. He brought Murray back to the Dept. and I quote Murray. 'Dulles brought me back to the Dept. to help fight Mrs. Imbrie. My chief job in the Dept. is to buck Mrs. Imbrie....'" This letter was signed by Katherine Imbrie.

Mrs. Imbrie also sent an advertisement to the publication "Foreign Affairs," the organ of The Council on Foreign Relations. She had encircled the names of Allen W. Dulles and Leon Fraser in red pencil. In longhand she wrote on the ad:

> "Dulles was delegate to the Arms Conf. at Geneva. the most amazing stories is told by 'Bass Drum' Shearer. Heard Dulles switching papers. Dulles resigned shortly after the Congressional Investigating Com. had heard Shearer."

> > (100-13781-1)

#### THE FIGHT FOR FREEDOM COMMITTEE

On this date an ad appeared in the Washington Post titled, "Do You Want Hitler to win?" It was sponsored by The Fight 4-3-41 For Freedom Committee. One of the sponsors of this Committee was Allen W. Dulles, lawyer, New York.

- 25 SEXRET (100-24467-44)

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#### THE AMERICAN FRIENDS OF YUGOSLAVIA, INC.

b6 titled, "The b7C

Report of Special Agent 3-7-44 American Friends of Yugoslavia, Inc., Internal Security-C." Page 10 of this report lists the officials of The American Friends of Yugoslavia, Inc. The address of the National Headquarters at that time was 11 West Fifty-seventh Street, New York 19, New York. On the Board of Directors appeared the name of Allen W. Dulles, 48 Wall Street, New York City.

(100-18\$760-5, page 10)

#### PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT'S SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE

In a letter dated 12-19-45, Special Agent J. A. Cimperman sent in a lengthy report on Dr. Theodore Paeffgen, Espionage-G. On page 25c there is a question set forth which was to be asked of Paeffgen when interviewed. The question was as follows, "In 1943 there was a plan afoot in Amt VI to have Staatsrat Lindemann, President of German Lloyd in Bremen, contact Allen Dulles, Jr., President Roosevelt's special representative in Berne, Switzerland. In bringing about this meeting, Prince Hohenlohe-Schillingesfurst, a friend of was to act as go-between. What did the Germans hope to accomplish by such a meeting?"

(65-56036-2)

DULLES REPRESENTED UNITED STATES AT UNITED NATIONS FORUM

b6

According to a technical surveillance report of this date b7C 1-2-46 of the United Nations Forum. that the United Nations, through its International Affairs Committee in New York, was planning a forum on January 24, 1946 and would like to get a speaker to represent Russia. She stated that Allen Dulles would represent the United States and Mr. Wright would represent Great Britain. The subject for discussion was to be "The Problems Which Face the UNO First."(3)(W)

(65-30092-2259)

#### WOODROW WILSON FOUNDATION

Report of Special Agent Bennett Willis, Jr., United Nations 1-14-47 News, Internal Security-C, stated that the Bureau had advised that the United Nations News, published by the Woodrow Wilson Foundation in New York City, was allegedly a Communist propaganda



enterprise; that the Woodrow wilson Foundation had among its officers and Board of Directors approximately twenty individuals cited by the House Committee on UnAmerican Activities as being connected with Communist-controlled enterprises. This publication began in January, 1946, and it was advertised that it would furnish unbiased news and reports concerning United Nations activities. This Agent reported that the September and October, 1946 issues apparently presented facts impartially but the December issue appeared to devote more space to Russian views on controversial matters than to views of Western Powers. A list of officers and Board Directors of the Woodrow wilson Foundation was sent out and the name of Allen W. Dulles was listed as a member of this Foundation.

(100-347117-2)

#### MOSCOW ATTACKS DULLES

A report from Moscow to the Secretary of State on this date 3-8-47 reported that a large proportion of New Times #9 for February 28 dealt with Germany. One article by A. Leonidov was titled "International Role of Anglo-American-German Schroeder Bank" concluded with an attack on John Foster Dulles stating that his support for a federated Europe plan was a continuation of old business project of Schroeder group. The article further related that Dulles' career as a lawyer in the Republican Party was reviewed together with that of his brother Allen Dulles. It then stated "No one doubted that if Dewey were elected President, Dulles would get the post of Secretary of State. He never misses an opportunity to attack the Soviet Union and slander Soviet peoples in most unrestrained terms. Underlying reason of the dizzy careers of the Dulles brothers is their close connection with Rockefeller billionaires. This gives idea of vastness of capital standing behind Dulles law firm, and gives inkling of reason for Dulles influence in the Republican Party. Ex-diplomat Allen Dulles has for a number of years been legal advisor and one of the Directors of J. Henry Schroeder Banking Corporation-New York, subsidiary of London, Cologne and Hamburg Schroeders."

(109-12-232-116)

### DULLES POSITION ON GERMAN ECONOMY

4-18-47
A report from Moscow to the Secretary of State dated 4-18-47
concerned the April 16 issue of TRUD in which it was stated,
"At Conference American financiers, Allen Dulles said:

'for us it is a question of taking an active part in the restoration
of German economy and controlling it, strengthening economic positions
of USA, guaranteeing American firms suitable advantages. Dulles had
in mind the Ruhr first of all, its transformation into a base for

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domination by American capital in Europe." The article went on to relate other words spoken by Dulles and wound up by stating that such inveterate imperialists as former head of the Steel Trust Ernst Ponsgen and many others have already become entrenched in leading positions in Ruhr industry...etc"

(62-79499-110)

#### MOSCOW ATTACKS AMERICAN INDUSTRIALISTS

Radio broadcast #51 from Moscow to Germany attacked "American profit-seekers." The broadcast stated that, "On the invitation, and following the example of Allen Dulles, director of the New York banking firm Henry Schroeder, 13 well-known American industrial magnates hūrried to Germany because they were obviously afraid of missing the bus. The German monopolists are in fact trying to protect their own economic position at the expense of Germany's future economic independence and intactness. For their own selfish interests they are willing to accept the position as junior partners in the British and U. S. monopolies...etc."

(100-3-81-58x6)

#### DULLES AUTHOR OF BOOK TITLED "GERMAN UNDERGROUND"

5-6-47 In an article in the New York Times dated May 6, 1947, Orville Prescott had the following to say regarding Allen V. Dulles' new book "The German Underground":

"Allan Welsh Dulles is a distinguished lawyer and diplomat who was head of our Office of Strategic Services in Switzerland from 1942 to 1945. It was his task to find out all he could about the German underground. He found out a lot, became acquainted with several of its leaders who crossed the border into Switzerland and has put into his book as complete an account of the various elements which made up the German underground as is possible in a short space..." This book was published by Macmillan in 1947 at a cost of \$3. It was 207 pages in length. There is no copy in the Bureau's Library.

(62-83338-1)

#### ANOTHER MOSCOJ ATTACK ON DULLES

5-27-47 Foreign radio broadcast from Moscow to North America attacked international monopolies especially DuPont and Standard Oil and the invasion of Germany by United States representatives. The article related that during two years of



occupation there had been witnessed a regular invasion of Western Germany by representatives of the United States monopoly concerns. "Nor is it only business relations that are being restored but also that personal union which always connected the most powerful representatives of monopoly capital in various countries. Unquestionably no small part in restoring and strengthening these connections was played by the visit to western Germany of Allen Dulles, the manager of the U.S. banking house, Henry Schroeder and Co."

(100-3-81-45)

#### DULLES GERMAN VISIT ATTACKED BY MOSCOW

7-14-47 A foreign radio broadcast from Moscow to Germany again attacked "monopolistic connection" and stated it was known that during his European tour of that year Allan Dulles, head of the Henry Schroeder Banking Corporation, had also visited the Ruhr; that as a result of Dulles' visit close trade relations with German trade magnates, above all with arch-reactionaries such as Dr. Duisberg, were established. The broadcast went on to say, "Dulles, however, was not an exception. By exploiting old connections with German monopolists and by purchasing masses of German shares at a ridiculous price, U.S. business and financial magnates managed to get partial or complete hold of many German combines, such as I. G. Farbin and Opel, etc."

(65-30519-94)

#### "TO THE BITTER END" A BOOK BY HANS BERND GISEVIUS

On this date Houghton Mifflin of Boston forwarded a copy of the book "To The Bitter End" by Hans Gisevius and 7-24-47 requested any comments on the book the FBI might care to make. Allen Dulles wrote a foreword to this book. This book was reviewed in the FBI at which time it was noted that Allen W. Dulles, formerly of OSS, stated that the author was one of the few survivors of a group of Germans who actively plotted to do away with Hitler. He stated he met the author in 1943 when he was in charge of the OSS in Switzerland.

(62-52647-4: 62-85289-1)

### COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

On this date the Bureau received a mimeographed letter 11-5-47 from the Council on Foreign Relations, 58 East 69th Street, New York 21, New York, stating that twenty-five years before, Foreign Affairs was founded and this letter was an invitation

Memorandum to Mr. Nichols SECKET December 19, 1950

to enroll as a subscriber to this organ and the Council on Foreign Relations. Allen W. Dulles was listed as President of this organization.

(94-3-4-826-2)

#### ARTICLE FROM THE VORKER

2-1-48 An article datelined at Prague, by G. A. Jacks titled "U. S. Sponsors Hitler Tank Marshal" appeared in "The Worker" of 2-1-48. The article related that Allen Dulles, brother of Secretary of State Marshall's advisor, John Foster Dulles, and formerly an agent of OSS in Switzerland, was said to be the author of the new venture which dealt with a Secret Service program laid down by the Americans for Heinz Guderian, Hitler's first tank marshal. This paper stated it had learned reliably that Guderian, who ranked high among German military war criminals, had been entrusted with rebuilding Germany's "Abwehr" (secret intelligence corps). The program called for cooperation with underground Fascist organizations in Europe, the infiltration of the workingclass movement wherever possible and reorganization along former "Abwehr" channels, according to that article.

(65-37193-232-A)

#### USSR PRESS RELEASE

On February 17, 1948, the Embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics at Washington, D. C. issued a press 2-17-48 release indicating that this particular release was the fourth and concluding part of the communique issued by the Soviet Information Bureau at Moscow entitled "Falsification of History" and published by the Soviet Press. On page 58 of this release reference is made to Allen Dulles. Speaking of negotiations which took place between representatives of the Governments of the United States of America and Germany in Switzerland in February, 1943, it has this to say: "In these negotiations, the United States of America was represented by a special delegate of the United States Government, Allen Dulles (brother of John Foster Dulles), who figured under the pseudonym of 'Bull' and had 'direct instructions and authority from the White House.' His German opposite was Prince Hohenloe, a man closely connected with the ruling circles of Hitler Germany, who acted as Hitler's representative under the assumed name of Pauls .... "

(100-3-81-269)

#### TASS ARTICLE ON THE HANSON BALDVIN ARTICLES

7-29-48 An airgram from the American legation in Vienna, Austria to the Secretary of State dated July 29, 1948, stated that IN SECRET

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according to Tass, Hanson Baldwin's article of July 22 in the New York Times reported differences of opinion between the Central Intelligence Office, Army Intelligence, the FBI and certain sections of the State Department. Tass reported that Baldwin's article mentioned other changes which had been made in the general administration of the intelligence service following a study of the American Foreign Espionage System by a special committee; that the financial magnate, Allen Dulles, (brother of John Foster Dulles) was a member of this committee.

(61-6341-44)

### THE DAILY JORKER COMMENTS ON SCHROEDER'S VENTURES

12-24-48 The Daily Worker of 12-24-48 carried an article relating that the Nazi banker Kurt Von Schroeder, in whose home Adolph Hitler made his first contacts with the coal and steel men who financed Nazism's rise to power, had been sentenced to live in comfort on his country club estate. The article related that life on a country estate was Schroeder's chief "punishment." The article attributed this fact to Schroeder's contacts with such men as John Foster Dulles and Allen Dulles. The article related that a top executive of J. Henry Schroeder Banking Firm in New York was Allen Dulles.

(65-55553-A)

## DULLES PROPOSES COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE AND PUBLICIZE COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES

1-29-49 According to an article which appeared in the Forld
Telegram on January 29, 1949, Allen W. Dulles, acting in
his capacity as President of the Council on Foreign
Relations, addressed the annual dinner of the Canadian Society
of New York and stated that legislation was not sufficient to expose
Communist activity: that the people have to have their eyes opened
to the menace by constant publicity; that a permanent non-partisan
federal fact-finding commission should be created to investigate
and publicize Communist activity. Mr. Dulles said the idea was
inspired by the work of the Canadian Royal Commission in its exposure
of a spy ring in Canada. He suggested the commission be called
"Commission on Internal Security." Mr. Dulles said it would operate
only as a fact-finding body and if it turned up evidence warranting
criminal prosecution, that would be turned over to the appropriate
law enforcement agencies.

Mr. Dulles further stated "The Communist works in the darkwe must bring him into the light. Wide popular understanding of the Memorandum to Mr. Nichols

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pattern of Communist intrigue will help to arm our citizens and disarm those who would undermine our society."

(100-3-70-A)

#### GERMAN PAPER ATTACKS DULLES

In Volume 7, #7, March, 1949 issue of Forum Und Tribuene, 3-19-49 New York, an article appeared entitled "The Watch on the Ruhr." The article attacked the American economic policy in Germany and gave details concerning the Henry Schroeder Banking Company, John Foster Dulles and the fact that he was a member of the law firm of Sullivan and Cromwell which is referred to as "the largest and most influential law firm in the world." It stated that when the German members of the Schroeder group saw that Hitler could not win they sought contact with their American business friends. They succeeded quickly in this with the help of the well-known agent Gisevius, the Defense Chief of the Nazi counter-espionage in Switzerland, who with the knowledge of Ernst Kaltenbrunner and with the help of Schacht, established contact with Allen W. Dulles who was also a Schroeder Bank big shareholder and a member of the law firm of Sullivan and Cromwell.

(100-273049-45)

#### AMERICANS FOR FREE EUROPE

A memorandum from Mr. Ladd to the Director on this date indicated that Frank Wisner of CIA and DeWitt Poole advised that they were setting up in New York State a corporation which would be a cover or front for the operations of CIA; that a prior fund-raising committee to be known as Americans For Free Europe would be established and efforts made to have wealthy individuals donate and contribute funds for this Committee, whose objective would be to assist political refugees and to help free people of Europe. They indicated that Allen Dulles would be Chairman of the Executive Committee and possibly Foster Dulles and that General Eisenhower and General Drum had agreed to particiapte in this project.

(62-90001-x)

#### COMMUNIST ATTACK ON DULLES

5-1-49 The New York Times for May 1, 1949 carried an article relating that the newspaper Universal of Roumania charged on April 30 that the United States Information Service in Roumania was a cover for espionage; that even some of the American diplomats were spies. The New York Times referred to the Universal as a Communist paper and stated the article was a violent attack on John

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Foster Dulles as the "American imperialists' trusted man," and that it was significant that his brother, Allen W. Dulles, President of the American Council on Foreign Relations, "directs the espionage that serves the 'cause' defended by his brother."

(62-30395-A)

On this date the Department of State sent to the Bureau 5-2-49 a telegram which had been received from Bucharest, Roumania, relative to the article which had appeared in Universal on April 30. It went into great detail to illustrate that Allen Dulles' activities were very definitely espionage activities in behalf of the United States. It cited as an example that in early March, 1949, a secret meeting of heads of branches of USIS in Europe was held in Rome. The meeting was convoked at the initiative of the United States central espionage service and was held under the leadership of the former head of American espionage . service in Europe, Allen Dulles. Dulles pointed out that in Western Europe USIS representatives must make use of all possibilities to acquire information on situation within left wing parties and situation in unions and then information about PR Soviet elements among the politicians and about signs of anti-Americanism. article went on and on to prove its original point that USIS installations in Eastern and Western Europe were really intelligence agencies and were recruiting spies in the USIS office in Bucharest.

(62-30395-148)

#### "SECURITY WITHOUT WITCH HUNTS" ARTICLE BY ALLEN J. DULLES

5-14-49 An article appeared in the newspaper "New Leader" in New York on 5-14-49 titled "Security Without Witch Hunts" by Allen W. Dulles. The article related to the Royal Commission of Canada which investigated Communist spy activities and the fact that it was not a judicial body in the sense that it laid before the world a judicial presentation of the facts. "There the facts pointed to violation of law, then the legal machinery of justice was set into motion to determine whether a crime had been committed... This result of the Commission's work illustrates one of the difficulties we find today in dealing with the Communist menace. It showed the inadequacy of laws to meet the dangerous techniques which the Communists employ... This does not mean that there are no gaps in our laws which should and can be filled without danger to civil liberties. Both Canada and Britain have long had more effective 'Official Secrets Acts' than we have had here in the United States. These laws have not seriously cut down on civil liberties or the freedom of the press.

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Memorandum to Mr. Nichols

Mr. Dulles then spoke of quasi-partisan bodies with quasi-judicial powers such as the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Federal Trade Commission. He stated that if law violations were discovered as a result of investigations of such commissions the matter would then go to the proper government judicial officers and these commissions could so conduct their proceedings that there need be no premature disclosure which would prevent the proper following up of all criminal leads and clues by the Department of Justice or the FBI:

Mr. Dulles went on to discuss the work of the Canadian Royal Commission and stated, "The success of the Commission's work points to the desirability of creating in the United States a federal agency which we might for convenience call a 'Commission on Internal Security. This would, of course, require legislation. Such a commission could investigate the practices and policies of Soviet Communism stemming from abroad but operating here and fanning out in various channels to threaten our democratic institutions....Such a commission would not replace investigating bodies of Congress which have performed vitally important functions, both in the field of subversive activities and in arousing the public conscience to abuses, public and private."

"The job I suggest for the Commission on Internal Security is not one that can be done part-time, and it is one that should be wholly free from any political bias.... We cannot legislate to meet all phases of the communist danger. We cannot do it, either, by merely banning the Communist party or driving it underground. We cannot meet it by attempting to create a whole new category of crimes and misdemeanors."

"To achieve success the Moscow master-minds of the communist movement often try to remain veiled behind a high degree of secrecy... Moscow has not been able to hide its disappointment over our failure to have a serious depression since the war. We have fooled them so far, but that only means that Russia has postponed certain planned measures. She has not abandoned them.

"These measures short of war, require of us - if we are to protect ourselves - counter-measures which are not limited solely to prosecuting statutory crimes or to attempting to exclude the agents of communist revolution ... The Communist works in the dark - we must bring him into the light... If the tools we possess are inadequate, and I believe they are, we certainly have the ingenuity to create new ones.

"The Canadian authorities - in a bold move which entitles them to the gratitude of the non-Communist world - through the Royal Commission which investigated the communist plot two years ago, have shown us here in the United States a good example. We might well follow this lead and again prove the soundness of the great principle that knowledge of the truth can

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keep us free."

December 19, 1950

(61-5124-A)

AMERICAN COMMITTEE TO AID THE SURVIVORS OF THE GERMAN RESISTENCE INTERNAL SECURITY-C

This organization was founded in January, 1948 by 10-20-49 individuals formerly connected with German finance and industry. The purpose of this organization is sending food packages to destitute widows and orphans of the German Army officers, and those who have been accused of participation in the 1947 attempt on Hitler's life. The letterhead of this organization carries the name of Allen W. Dulles as one of the members of the National Committee.

(100 + 262521 - 2)

### DULLES DENOUNCED BY CONGRESSMAN WOLVERTON

b6 b7C

December 31, 1949 Carl Suarverud wrote a letter to of Vashington, D. C. and discussed therein the Mexican picture. In the course of his letter he stated that Congressman Tolverton of New Jersey was induced to make a speech in the House of Representatives on August 26, 1949, very bitterly condemning the law firm of Sullivan and Cromwell, and Mr. Edward G. Miller, Jr. in particular, together with Allen Dulles, brother of John Foster Dulles, all of the same law firm, for their active labor in what he termed sabotaging the Mexican Oil Loan application. He further stated that immediately after this speech U. S. Senator Dennis Chavez of New Mexico made a 30-minute speech over the Mutual Broadcasting network echoing the very words of Congressman Wolverton.

(64-26028-7)

#### DAILY WORKER ARTICLE

An article entitled "Espionage, Inc." by Arnold Sroog 2-8-50 appeared in the Daily Worker on February 8, 1950. article indicated that Noel Field was the right hand man of Allen Dulles, Chief of the OSS and Field Commander in Chief of Project X. The article discussed Tito's operations and stated that after Tito realized that Germany would lose the war he jumped on the Anglo-American bandwagon. The article related that in 1942 and the beginning of 1943 Tito undertook secret negotiations for a separate peace with the Nazis to form some sort of Balkan federation under Tito; that this discussion was carried on at the same time that Allen Dulles was secretly conferring with the Nazi emissary Prince Hohenlohe on a separate Balkan deal; that Dulles was more or

memorandum to Mr. Nichol CF December 19, 1950

less agreed to the political and industrial organization of Europe on the basis of large territories, on the assumption that a federated Greater Germany (similar to the U.S.A.) with the adjoining Danubian Confederation, will constitute the best guarantee of order and rehabilitation in Central and Eastern Europe.

The article went on to relate that by the end of the war Tito was in the saddle, and his secret deals with the U.S. and Britain were settled, with the leaders of the Soviet Union and the People's Democracies apparently fully deceived by this massive Fifth Column planted in their ranks by Project X.

"Massive as the plan was, its collapse was just as The slick masterminds of Project X knew their onions about spying-but they knew nothing about Socialism or how it was built ...

The author of the article indicated that the plan failed because of a miscalculation in timing; that the key moment was to be timed with a war against the Soviet Union by the United States and world capitalism; that the timing apparently was arranged to coincide with the manufactured war crisis that arose over Berlin in 1948. He wound up his article by stating that not only did Project X collapse but the whole timetable of war was torn to shreds.

(109-12-272-A)

#### INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS INTERNAL SECURITY-C

The organ of this organization is "Pacific Affairs." 3-27-50 The Institute of Pacific Relations is an educationalcultural institution recognized by the Bureau of Internal Revenue as that type of charitable trust to which contributions are recognized as income tax deductions.

The organization is international in character. component parts are councils named for, and representing, each country, with the exception of the Latin American countries, which borders on the Pacific Ocean.

Two governments gave official recognition to the IPR and donated consistently, and comparatively speaking heavily, to its work. These were the governments of Japan and the USSR. bulk of the IPR's funds, however, were received from the charitable foundations such as the Rockefeller Foundation (about \$75,000 per year) and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

In addition, American firms having extensive business operations in the Orient, most notably the Socony Vacuum Oil Company, the U.S. Steel, and various importers and exporters, also contributed substantially to the organization. FOR SXCRET



The IPR gathered information from Government figures, at home and abroad, from scholars in universities and from news correspondents, concerning the social, political and economic situations in the countries which were members of the IPR. This information was in turn disseminated to other members.

Edward C. Carter, the Secretary General, operated out of New York City, He showed outstanding ability as a "con man" and made it a point to travel yearly abroad. He made eight trips to the Soviet Union in twelve years. Carter had ready access to Laughlin Currie in the white House, to Allen Dulles in OSS, and to persons in Military and Naval Intelligence. He reached the point of familiarity where he addressed the Honorable Cordell Hull as "Dear Hull" and Sumner Wells as "Dear Wells."

(100-64700-304)

#### THE VON HASSELL DIARIES

"Plain Talk," February, 1948, page 47, carried an ad on a book "The Von Hassell Diaries (1938-1944)," as recorded by Ambassador Ulrich von Hassell, a leader of the movement. It had an introduction by Allen Welsh Dulles. (NY Doubleday and Co., 400 pages, \$5.00)

(94-36511-77)





STANDARD FORM NO. 64 Office Men wandum UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT Mr. A. H. Belmont DATE: March 13, 1951 V. P. Keay FROM : Clavin SUBJECT: ALLEN DULLES Nichols Rosen Deputy Director Central Intelligence Agency b3 per CIA Nease CIA, informally advised Mr. DeLoach of Liaison on March 8, 1951, that the captioned individual, a Deputy Director of CIA, and a former OSS head, was renting a home at 2420 Dunbarton Avenue, Washington, D. C. stated that Dulles had agreed to allow Joseph and Stewart Alsop, the columnist, to have an office on the first floor of his home. You will recall that in our recent investigation of the publishing of classified information by the Alsops, information was uncovered reflecting the friendliness between William H. Jackson, another Deputy Director of CIA, and the Alsop brothers. Jackson and Dulles were two of the three members of the Dulles Committee who supposedly inspected CIA. These individuals were also linked closely together in OSS days. RECOMMENDATION This is for informational purposes. ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED CDD:pjb RRR. 3/28/51 EX. . 83 INDEXED . 73 15. Hd 35 B 3. DEPL OF JUSTICE 1821 ALLIVED DIRECTOR

## Office Mem

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TO : FROM : SUBJECT:	MR. A. H. ENLMONT  V. P. KEAY PKA -   ALLEN DULLES  Deputy Director  Central Intelligence Ag	B HL INFORMATION OF SEREIN AS UNCLASSED DATE	March 27, 195	Toleon  Clear  Clear  Glav  History  Harbo  Belront
that Al home at Dulles columni This me	Reference is made to 3, 1951, in the above-of len Dulles, a Deputy Di 2420 Dunbarton Avenue, had agreed to allow Jos sts, to have an office morandum also reflected Director of CIA, was fr	aptioned matter which rector of CIA, was washington, D. C., eph and Stewart Alson the first floor that William H. Jac	ch stated renting a and that op, the of his home. ckson, another	tohr
at W.H. s Key Wes	The Director attached adum and made the follow should get this to the st. It should be impresential. H."	when he re	ink Liaison eturns from	b6 b7C
Mr. Bar with th \as extr	from Key West, Florida. tlett at 11:30 a.m., on e confidential informat	March 27, 1951, and ion outlined above.  that he would treat expressed his appreciations.	diately upon h interviewed by d was furnishe this informat	is J
ACTION:	For your information		el	0000
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53 Arn	AV 1.7.	HE		F COLUMN GORY

### Office Memorandum . United States GOVERNMENT

	то	:	MR. D. M. LADD	
600	FROM	ì	A. H. BELMONT	
	SUBJEC	T:	ALLEN DULLES Deputy Director	

Central Intelligence Agency

DATE

DATE: March 23, 1951

With reference to the attached memorandum and the informage tion concerning Allen Dulles and Joseph and Stewart Alsop and the Director's notation that Liaison should informally and confidentially inform of the White House, Mr. Roach was informed today by office that he will not be available until Monday noon.

This will be handled as soon as possible and you will be when it has been done. informed when it has been done.

Called for appointmen

b7C

RECORDED - 73 62-83336

66APR

DERECORDED COPY FILED IN 100-35 CAMP

## Office Memorandum · United STATES GOVERNMENT

			/
TO	:	MR .	TOLSON

DATE: May 5, 1951

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b7C

FROM : L. B. NICHOLS

SUBJECT:

ALL ENFORMATION CONTRINED

While tolking to on other matters, he stated that Allen Dulles was still anxious to meet the Director. wondered if there was any possibility of the Director having dinner some evening with Dulles.

that it was rather difficult for the I told Director to make dinner engagements but the next time Dulles was down to call me and if the Director was in, I knew he would be glad to see Dulles, that I didn't see why Dulles didn't call the Director direct if he had something he wanted to take up with him.

LBN: mb

G. L. R. 3

INDEXED - 41 162 83338-7

MAY 10 1951 . RECORDED - 41

60MAY 17 19517 EX-86

### Office Memorandum · UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DATE: January 19, 1953 I ADD E.O. WISSE H-Belmont (Ma ALE INFORMATI DATE ION8 85 THITTALS MINO WY EXCEPT CIA ALLEN WELSH DULLES THE SHOTH OTHERWASE. Classified by spl bya Imw DECLASSIFIED BY SP 2 ALMIEN 5-10 Agency (CIA), was born on April 7. 1893, at Watertown, New York; educated at Princeton University and George Washington Law School; served in the U.S. Diplomatic Service, 1916-26 and also represented U.S. at conferences abroad; member of law firm, Sullivan and Cromwell, NYC, 1926-1942, 1945-50; acted as Chief of Swiss Division, Office of Strategic Services, 1942-45; employed CIA since 1950 as consultant and since August 24, 1951, as Deputy Director. Applicant investigation conducted in January, 1951, at request of CIA. No derogatory information developed Current rumors at CIA indicate he will replace General Smith as head of CIA; however, opposition appears to be developing in both military and (U civilian circles because (1) he is a civilian and (2) it is alleged he is entirely unfit to collect covert intelligence. Dulles is personally known to the Director. He has generally cooperated with the Bureau and any differences which have occurred have been settled amicably. 1948, he was a member of a three-man committee to survey CIA, which committee issued a report making frequent reference to FBI activities, not predicated on factual material or accurate in most instances. 1950, Dulles commented publicly on a proposed commission on internal security as follows: "Any such commission as proposed should not interfere in any way with the FBI and should not have overlapping functions with the latter as I feel strongly that the FBI merits our gratitude and deserves our support." In April, 1952, he complimented the Director for doing an excellent job stating that he had the greatest admiration for the Director and he knew the Director had made many personal sacrifices for his country. Dulles affiliated with Institute of Pacific Relations and Woodrow Wilson foundation, which organizations reportedly have some pro-Communist membership. Dulles, however, is well-known anti-Communist and has been subject of numerous attacks by Communist press and radio. In 1949, he proposed a commission to investigate and publicize Communist activities. FBI investigations have disclosed Dulles in contact socially with persons allegedly engaged in espionage or subversive activities; however, Dulles apparently had no knowledge of such activities. Joseph and Stewart Alsop, the columnists, in 1951 used lower floor of Dulles' house as office. G-2 source in 1951 reports Dulles was an ambitious, dangerous, scheming Nazi-John Foster Dulles, a brother, was recently investigated by FBI Fascist. in connection with appointment as Secretary of State. Eleanor Lansing Dulles, a sister, has been investigated since November 28, 1952, under Loyalty of Government Employees Program. Reports have been furnished Civi, Service Commission but no decision on loyalty has been rendered. For your information. 12-83358 Recommendation: none. JLQ: EJT: held Nov 18 RECORDED 13 SE

# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

	то :	MR. D. M. LA	DD A D	9	DATE:	January 19	, 1953
	FROM :	MR. D. M. LA A. H. BELMON ALLEN WELSH	T (May &	an adda		* v	
	SUBJECT:	ALLEN WELSH	DULLES -	ah 2 FYLK			Tolsen
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#### Family Background:

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Allen Dulles was one of the five children of Allen Macy and Edith (Foster) Dulles. His father, a Presbyterian minister, was the nephew of John Welsh, Envoy to England during the Hayes Administration. His maternal grandfather, John Watson Foster, was Secretary of State under President Harrison and the author of a number of books on diplomacy.

It should be noted that Allen Dulles' brother, John Foster Dulles, is President-elect Eisenhower's selection as Secretary of State.

The sister of Allen Dulles is Eleanor Lansing Dulles, also known by the name of Mrs. David Simon Blondheim, and is presently employed in the State Department.

#### Residence Address:

Dulles' residence address in New York is 239 East 61st Street, New York, New York. According to the December, 1952, Washington Telephone Directory, his Washington residence address is 1308 29th Street, Northwest.

#### Employment and Public Service:

Mr. Dulles entered the United States Diplomatic Service in 1916. On May 17, 1916, he was appointed Legation Secretary at Vienna, Austria. He was transferred to Bern, Switzerland, in 1917. He served as a member of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace at the Paris Peace Conference in 1918-1919. Subsequently, on October 29, 1919, he was appointed to the American Embassy in Berlin and was made First Secretary of the Embassy. During October, 1920, he was assigned to the American Commission in Constantinople. His next assignment with the State Department was in Washington, D.C., as Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs, which post he held four years commencing on April 14, 1922. During this period of service in Washington, he was a delegate to two Geneva, Switzerland, conferences; the Arms Traffic Conference in 1925 and the Preparatory Disarmament Conference in 1926.

In 1926, he was offered the position of Consular to the United States Legation at Peiping. It was an increase in



rank but not in salary. He was making \$8,000 per year at that time and had received his law degree that year, so he resigned due to the inadequate salary.

Following his resignation from the Diplomatic Service, Mr. Dulles joined the New York law firm of Sullivan and Cromwell, in which his elder brother, John Foster Dulles, was a partner. In 1927, Allen Dulles acted as legal advisor to the American Delegation at the Three Powers Naval Conference, Geneva. He was legal advisor to the delegations at the Geneva Disarmament Conferences of 1932 and 1933. Dulles was also a member of the International Conciliation Committee under the 1928 Treaty between the United States and Albania. He remained with this law firm until 1942.

Following the outbreak of World War II, Dulles joined the staff of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and became Chief of the Swiss Division with headquarters in Bern, Switzerland. He remained with this intelligence agency until its operations ceased in 1945.

From 1945 until 1950, Dulles again practiced law with his old law firm of Sullivan and Cromwell. Late in 1950, he gave up this practice to accept employment with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). A Washington City News Service release of August 24, 1951, reported that Dulles had been named Deputy Director of CIA.

#### Political Activities:

Seeking a political office in 1938, Dulles became a candidate in the New York Republican Primaries for a United States Congressional nomination. He was defeated by his veteran Republican opponent, John O'Connor. The following year, he assisted locally in raising funds for the 1940 Wendell Willkie Presidential Campaign in which he acted as Eastern Director of the Naturalized Citizens Division of the Republican National Committee. Allen Dulles was referred to as a "Dewey speech writer" on one occasion in the "Washington Daily News" (October 29, 1948).

According to Joseph Alsop's column "Matter of Fact" appearing in "The Washington Post" of August 14, 1949, Allen Dulles'

name had been stricken from the list of possible candidates for the head position of CIA being vacated by Rear Admiral Hillenkoeter because of his prominence as a Republican and support of Thomas E. Dewey. (62-80750-A)

#### Miscellaneous:

Mr. Dulles is a Presbyterian. He is a member of the following: Century Association, Down Town Association, Piping Rock (New York), Metropolitan (Washington, D.C.) and Phi Beta Kappa. He is Director and Chairman, Committee on International Law of the New York County Lawyers Association. He is also Chairman of the International Law Commission. Further, he is Director and President of the Council on Foreign Relations, New York, and President, Near East College Association. He has been the recipient of the following decorations: Medal for Merit; Medal of Freedom, 1946; Officer of Legion of Honor, 1947; Order of S.S. Maurizio e Lazzaro, Italy, 1946; and Belgian Cross of Officer of Order of Leopold. 1948.

He is coauthor with Hamilton Fish Armstrong on the books "Can America Stay Neutral," published in 1939, and "Germany's Underground," released in 1947. In addition, he is a writer and speaker on international affairs.

(All of the preceding information was taken from "Who's Who in America" 1950 - 1953, and "Current Biography," March, 1949. 94-3-4-115-53)

#### DETAILS:

#### Bureau Investigation:

The FBI initiated an applicant-type investigation concerning Dulles in January, 1951, at the request of CIA, which agency was considering him for employment as an intermittent consultant only. This investigation did not develop any derogatory information as to Mr. Dulles and copies of reports reflecting the results of our investigation were furnished CIA on January 18, and February 5, 1951. (5-1)

Copies of these reports were also furnished the Atomic Energy Commission on May 27, 1952, upon receipt of a Personnel



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Security Questionnaire from the Commission. In this connection, it was noted that the May 21, 1952, issue of "The Washington Post" announced that he had just been appointed by Secretary of State Acheson to a new committee to study disarmament and atomic energy control. (118-8914; 116-334830; 100-345079-A)

### Rumors Regarding Dulles' Appointment As CIA Director:

By memorandum dated January 1, 1953, Mr. Keay advised Mr. Belmont that Liaison Agent Papich had received information on a strictly confidential basis from James Angleton of CIA to the effect that in the last couple of days he had been informed by General Walter Bedell Emith, Director, CIA, that he may be "eased out" as Director because of strong pressure being applied by General Lucius Clay. Angleton said that Clay, who is acting with the support and guidance of Thomas E. Dewey and followers, is now endeavoring to promote Allen Dulles as head of CIA.

Mr. Keay, by memorandum dated January 8, 1953, informed Mr. Belmont that James Angleton of CIA had advised Mr. Papich of the Liaison Section that following General Smith's return from a conference in New York City, the General had remarked that unless Eisenhower suddenly changed his mind he was to be removed as Director of CIA. Smith stated that the pressure from the Dewey forces was too much to combat. Angleton said that it appears that Allen Dulles will be Smith's successor unless there is some last minute change in Eisenhower's plans.

According to Angleton, Dulles apparently has assumed that he has the directorship cinched since he and Dulles had, on January 7, 1953, discussed future operations of CIA.

The Armed Services, in the opinion of Angleton, are opposing the appointment of Dulles probably because he would be the first civilian head of CIA. However, in order to placate the Military, an endeavor is being made to appoint a high-ranking officer as an assistant to Dulles.

In a memorandum to Mr. Belmont dated January 9, 1953, Mr. Keay advised that Mr. Papich of the Liaison Section had, on that date, been confidentially advised by James Angleton of CIA that there was no doubt that Smith would no longer be Director of CIA although it had been almost a forthcoming conclusion that Dulles would be his successor. Opposition to this proposed



appointment has been mounting in the last couple of days. The opposition, for the most part, is coming from the Military as previously indicated. However, opposition has now developed in civilian circles. The essential complaint of the opposition is that the speciality of Dulles' is political and psychological warfare and that he is entirely unfit for the position of collecting covert intelligence, which should be the primary responsibility of CIA. It is being argued that Dulles' speciality is the very field which has been the source of most of CIA's failings. Angleton felt that Dulles very likely will become Director of CIA but if a decision in this regard is not made in the immediate future "time will run out against him" which may mean that Eisenhower will make a surprise appointment.

In the January 15, 1953, edition of the "Washington Star," Doris Fleeson, in her column, pointed out that there apparently existed a feud between General Lucius Clay and Governor Thomas E. Dewey on most of Eisenhower's appointments. It stated that apparently they were suggesting appointments without consulting one another. The article indicated that Allen Dulles was in line to become head of CIA. However, Clay apparently was not in favor of such an appointment and, not to be outdone, has now put forth the name of General William Donovan, wartime head of CIA's predecessor OSS, for the CIA post. Fleeson stated that objective observers here who know CIA and the National Security Council to which it reports feel this is a great injustice to Allen Dulles. They assert that he is one of the few Americans who understands intelligence work. They recall that he was the only American who was able to penetrate the German General Staff during the War. Some veterans in the field also, according to the article, charge that General Donovan is a one-man operator while Dulles understands and helped shape the present setup — a Presidential creation later ratified and approved by Congress.

#### Relations with the Bureau:

Bureau files reflect that Dulles is personally known to the Director and for the most part has been cooperative and friendly in his relations with the Bureau.

Dulles contacted the New York Office of the Bureau on March 5, 1942, at which time he was employed by the Office of the Coordinator of Information which later functioned as OSS.

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He advised that he was maintaining an office at 630 Fifth Avenue, New York City.

with whom he worked very closely. He also (stated that he worked closely with representatives of Czechoslovakia, Poland and other subjugated countries which had representatives in the United States. He stated that his primary interest at that time was the analysis and evaluation of political information concerning Continental Europe and the Near East and that he was not interested in any domestic matters. He offered his services to the FBI and in return asked that he be advised if anything came along which the FBI thought would be of interest to him. He was assured that this would be done and was invited to send any requests for searches of names through the FBI records directly to the Bureau's Washington headquarters.

Subsequent to that time our files reflect a number of occasions on which there has been a cooperative exchange of information and views. (62-83338-3 pages 3 & 4)

It will be recalled that Mr. Dulles was the Chairman of a three-man committee which made a survey of CIA in 1948. In addition to other observations concerning the FBI which were not accurate, the general line of reasoning as to the FBI and this committee's report is as follows: "The FBI is essentially a police organization, works on an individual case basis, does not study, coordinate or evaluate the over-all intelligence situation in the United States." (118-8914-3)

Prior to July 27, 1948, a series of articles had been published in the "New York Times" by Hanson Baldwin criticizing the FBI and CIA. On July 27, 1948, Liaison Agent DeLoach discussed with Colonel Galloway of CIA a letter of protest the Bureau was preparing to send to the "New York Times" at which time Colonel Galloway advised that Baldwin, without a doubt, had received all the information contained in his article from Allen Dulles. Colonel Galloway stated that the reason he knew this was that Dulles had questioned him along the same lines of the articles that had appeared under the name of Baldwin. (62-8338-3 page 8)

A memorandum from Mr. Keay to Mr. Fletcher on November 14, 1948, advised that it was believed a representative of the Contacts

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Branch of CIA had advised a Dulles representative of certain facts which definitely did not represent the existing cooperation between the FBI and CIA. This memorandum recommended that this situation be discussed with a CIA representative and the Director commented "I concur and further think we should contact someone at once with this Committee and definitely set them right in a forthright manner. H." (62-83338-3 page 9)

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On November 12, 1948, Dulles wrote the Director stating the intelligence survey group would soon conclude its survey of CIA. Before concluding the report, he wanted the Director of CIA and other members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee to meet with the committee to make suggestions and recommendations. He invited the Director or any designated FBI representative to meet with the committee in Washington. On November 15, 1948, the Director replied that inasmuch as it was not felt any particular contribution could be made by a Bureau representative, none would appear before the survey group. (62-8338-3 page 10)

On March 14, 1949, the Director personally prepared a memorandum for the Attorney General on the Dulles Committee Report in which he protested stating in part: "At no time has this Bureau been supplied with a copy of the report although I understand that its contents deal in some detail with the FBI in the security field and the relationship of the FBI to the Central Intelligence Agency and the overall problem of Intelligence. members of the committee preparing this report did not make any detailed study of the FBI's work in this particular field, nor did they contact the FBI for any detailed information as to the FBI's activities along these lines. Nevertheless, I am reliably informed that this report contains, as I have indicated, frequent reference to the FBI's activities and such references are not predicated upon factual material and are not in many respects accurate." The Director further suggested that inasmuch as this report was being given careful consideration by the National Security Council and steps affecting the overall problem of intelligence which would affect the FBI would undoubtedly be taken, the report should be submitted to this Bureau in order that it might review it and make appropriate comments. (62-83338-3 pages 10 & 11)

The May 25, 1950, issue of "The Washington Post" carried an article which dealt with the endorsement of certain high ranking officers of a commission on national security. This

article quoted at some length comments made concerning this commission by Allen Dulles, stating that he concluded his interview with the following words concerning the FBI: "One final word. Any such commission as proposed should not interfere in any way with the FBI and should not have overlapping functions with the latter as I feel strongly that the FBI merits our gratitude and deserves our support." (62-83338-3 page 12)

By memorandum from Mr. Nichols to Mr. Tolson dated January 5, 1951, it was indicated that Dulles was anxious to meet the Director and have dinner with him some evening. (62-83338-7)

The Bureau, in early 1952, received information from an informant, then of unknown reliability but who has subsequently proved to be reliable, to the effect that an official of the Hungarian Legation, Washington, D.C., who, in boasting of his intelligence connections, alleged, among other things, that a brother of John Foster Dulles, probably Allen Dulles, and his wife had been arrested in Hungary in 1947 or 1948. The official boasted that Dulles had been tricked into entering Hungary and because his presence in Hungary was unknown to United States authorities it had placed Dulles in a compromising position in the eyes of Hungarian intelligence officials.

The above allegation, together with several others, was furnished to the State Department and CIA on March 22, 1952, for the purpose of verifying the information in order to establish the reliability of the informant, who was in the process of development. Subsequently, Dulles informed the Bureau that the allegation concerning him and his wife was completely false. The State Department, by letter dated April 15, 1952, was advised that the Allegation concerning Dulles had been proved to be unfounded.

In connection with this matter, Dulles inquired of Special Agent Papich of the Liaison Section if the letter sent to the State Department could be withdrawn by the Bureau and all references to him, Dulles, removed therefrom. Mr. Papich advised Dulles that this probably could not be done and pointed out that the State Department had already been officially advised that the allegations concerning him were without foundation.

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Dulles stated he did not desire to make an issue of the letter and if the withdrawal of it would create a major issue, he believed that the matter should be dropped. (118-8914; 100-354194-1263)

During April, 1952, Mr. Dulles made the following comment concerning the Director to Mr. Papich: "I think that Mr. Hoover is doing an excellent job in handling the many internal security responsibilities which have been imposed upon the Bureau. I have the greatest admiration for Mr. Hoover. He has made many personal sacrifices for his country." Mr. Dulles further advised that he had not personally seen the Director for some time but hoped to be able to have lunch with him one of these days. (62-80750-1816)

On November 18, 1952, the Director wrote Mr. Dulles a personal note concerning his son, Lieutenant Allen Macy Dulles, who had recently been wounded in Korea and was on the critical list due to undergo a brain surgery that morning. (94-5-39904)

On November 20, 1952, Mr. Dulles thanked the Director for his interest and advised that the news was still critical but his son was holding his own. (94-5-39969)



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#### Activities and Organizations



Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR)

Bureau files contain reliable information reflecting that Allen Dulles was a member of the IPR as early as November 24, 1937, and contributed small sums of money (not over \$50) to this organization over a period of years, his last known contribution being in December 1950. Although it is not known whether Dulles contributed any articles to this organization, he was reliably reported to have attended a number of functions sponsored by the organization such as a dinner at the Century Club in 1938, an American group for a Princeton meeting in December 1940 and a dinner in honor of Maxim Litvinoff, the b2 Russian Ambassador, in March 1942.

During the investigation of John Foster Dulles, Allen Dulles' brother, Mr. Edward C. Carter, the former General Secretary of the IPR, advised that he was well acquainted with Allen Dulles and that he, like his brother, had always held the best interest of the United States uppermost. During the same investigation Mr. Clayton Lane, Deputy Assistant Director of the Far East, Mutual Security Administration, Washington, D. C., who became Executive Secretary of the IPR in 1948, advised that during the period from 1948 to 1950, Allen Dulles was interested in Asia and was a member and would make contributions to the Institute and that on one occasion he had suggested to Allen Dulles that he send in a contribution.

(Investigation of John Foster Dulles, blank memo dated 12-5-52)

According to a report on the IPR issued by the Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security in July 1952, it is stated, among other things, that the IPR has been considered by the American Communist Party and by Soviet officials as an instrument of Communist policy, propaganda and military intelligence which disseminated and sought to popularize false information including

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information originating from Soviet and Communist sources. The report further states that a small core of officials and staff members carried the main burden of IPR activities and directed its administration and policies. Members of this small core were characterized in the report as either Communists or pro-Communists.

#### Communist Attacks on Dulles

From 1945 through 1949 numerous attacks have been directed toward Dulles by Moscow and the Iron Curtain countries by means of both the press and radio, as well as by the "Daily Worker" and other Communist publications in the United States. These attacks have alleged that Dulles was an American Capitalist closely allied to German Industrialist cartels; that he directed spy operations in Roumania on behalf of the United States and that he was setting up a secret intelligence corps in Germany through ex-Nazis.

It should be noted that in this connection for a good many years Dulles has been a Legal Advisor and Director of the J. Henry Schroeder Banking Corporation, New York, a subsidiary of the London, England, and Cologne and Hamburg, Germany, Schroeder Banking Corporations. Most of the above-mentioned attacks were directed at Dulles because of his connections with the German branch of this firm.


(62-83338-3)

#### Woodrow Wilson Foundation

Allen Dulles was listed in 1946 as a member of the Board of Directors of the Woodrow Wilson Foundation, 45 East 65th Street, New York City, which publishes a pamphlet entitled "United Nations News." The purpose of this publication is stated as "to furnish unbiased news and reports concerning UN activities." According to a War Department source, several members of the Board of Directors of the Woodrow Wilson Poundation were previoulsy cited by the House Committee on Un-American Activities as connected with Communist-controlled and infiltrated enterprises.

(62-83338-2, page 4)

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Dulles Proposes Commission to Investigate and 'Publicize Communist Activities

According to an article which appeared in the "World Telegram" on January 29, 1949, Allen W. Dulles, acting in his capacity as President of the Council on Foreign Relations, addressed the annual dinner of the Canadian Society of New York and stated that legislation was not sufficient to expose Communist activity; that the people have to have their eyes opened to the menace by constant publicity; that a permanent non-partisan federal fact-finding commission should be created to investigate and publicize Communist activity. Mr. Dulles said the idea was inspired by the work of the Canadian Royal Commission in its exposure of a spy ring in Canada. He suggested the commission be called "Commission on Internal Security." Mr. Dulles said it would operate only as a fact-finding body and if it turned up evidence warranting criminal prosecution, that would be turned over to the appropriate law enforcement agencies.

Mr. Dulles further stated "The Communist works in the dark - we must bring him into the light. Wide popular understanding of the pattern of Communist intrigue will help to arm our citizens and disarm those who would undermine our society. (62-83338-3, page 31 and 32)

Subsequent to Dulles' proposing of this commission, an article appeared in the newspaper "New Leader" in New York on May 14, 1949, entitled "Security Without Witch Hunts" by Allen W. Dulles. The article related to the Royal Commission of Canada which investigated Communist spy activities and the fact that it was not a judicial body in the sense that it laid before the world a judicial presentation of the facts. "Where the facts pointed to violation of law, then the legal machinery of justice was set into motion to determine whether a crime had been committed... This result of the Commission's work illustrates one of the difficulties we find today in dealing with the Communist menace. It showed the inadequacy of laws to meet the dangerous techniques which the Communists employ... This does

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"not mean that there are no gaps in our laws which should and can be filled without danger to civil liberties. Both Canada and Britain have long had more effective 'Official Secrets Acts' than we have had here in the United States. These laws have not seriously cut down on civil liberties or the freedom of the press."

Mr. Dulles then spoke of quasi-partisan bodies with quasi-judicial powers such as the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Federal Trade Commission. He stated that if law violations were discovered as a result of investigations of such commissions the matter would then go to the proper government judicial officers and these commissions could so conduct their proceedings that there need be no premature disclosure which would prevent the proper following up of all criminal leads and clues by the Department of Justice or the FBI.

Mr. Dulles went on to discuss the work of the Canadian Royal Commission and stated, "The success of the Commission's work points to the desirability of creating in the United States a federal agency which we might for convenience call a 'Commission on Internal Security.' This would, of course, require legislation. Such a commission could investigate the practices and policies of Soviet Communism stemming from abroad but operating here and fanning out in various channels to threaten our democratic institutions...Such a commission would not replace investigating bodies of Congress which have performed vitally important functions, both in the field of subversive activities and in arousing the public conscience to abuses, public and private."

"The job I suggest for the Commission on Internal Security is not one that can be done part-time, and it is one that should be wholly free from any political bias...We cannot legislate to meet all phases of the Communist danger. We cannot do it, either, by merely banning the Communist Party or driving it underground. We cannot meet it by attempting to create a whole new category of crimes and misdemeanors."

"To achieve success the Moscow master-minds of the Communist movement of ten try to remain veiled behind a high degree of secrecy... Moscow has not been able to hide its disappointment over our failure to have a serious depression since the war. We have fooled them so far, but that only means that Russia has postponed certain planned measures. She has not abandoned them.



IN SECRET "These measures short of war, require of us - if we are to protect ourselves - counter-measures which are not limited solely to prosecuting statutory crimes or to attempting to exclude the agents of Communist revolution ... The Communist works in the dark - we must bring him into the light... If the tools we possess are inadequate, and I believe they are, we certainly have the ingenuity to create new ones.

"The Canadian authorities - in a bold move which entitles them to the gratitude of the non-Communist world - through the Royal Commission which investigated the Communist plot two years ago, have shown us here in the United States a good example. We might well follow this lead and again prove the soundness of the great principle that knowledge of the truth can keep us free." (62-83338-3 pages 33, 34 and 35)

National Committee for a Free Europe

During the Spring of 1949, representatives of CIA advised that they were setting up in New York State a corporation which would be a cover or front for the operations of CIA; that a prior fund-raising committee to be known as Americans for Free Europe would be established and efforts made to have worthy individuals donate and contribute funds for this committee, whose objective would be to assist political refugees and to help free people of Europe. This committee was actually set up as the National Committee for a Free Europe and Allen Dulles has been listed as an officer of this committee. It is also noted that Presidentelect Eisenhower has participated in this project.

(62-83338-3 page 32 and 105-13327-22)

American Committee to Aid the Survivors of the German Resistance

This organization was founded in January, 1948, by individuals formerly connected with German finance and industry. The purpose of this organization is sending food packages to destitute widows and orphans of the German Army officers, and those who have been accused of participation in the 1947 attempt on Hitler's life. The letterhead of this organization carries the name of Allen W. Dulles as one of the members of the National Committee.

(62-83338-3 page 35)

#### Associations and Contacts:



Joseph and Stewart Alsop:

of CIA to the effect that Dulles had agreed to allow Joseph and Stewart Alsop, the columnists, to have an office on the first floor of his home which he was renting at 2420 Dumbarton Avenue, Washington, D.C.

During the Bureau's investigation of the publishing of classified information by the Alsops, information was uncovered reflecting the friendliness between William H. Jackson, another Deputy Director of CIA, and the Alsop brothers. Inasmuch as Jackson and Dulles were two of the three members of the Dulles Committee to survey CIA in 1948 and had also been linked closely together in OSS days, the Director suggested that this information be furnished the White House by liaison. This was done on March 27, 1951. (62-83338-5)

#### Colonel William J. Donovan:

In a letter dated September 19, 1945, Donovan, Director of OSS, wrote to Robert P. Joyce, a member of the OSS Mission in Switzerland, and had this to say concerning Dulles: during the course of his letter: "Along with Allen Dulles, they and you have taken great satisfaction in a signal contribution to the realization of peace." "They" in Donovan's letter referred to Paul Blum in connection with their work among the Japanese groups in Switzerland. (100-346290-27 page 20)

Mr. Ladd, in a memorandum to the Director dated January 14, 1947, advised that Colonel Donovan had supported Allen W. Dulles for the position of Executive Director of the Central Intelligence—Group (now known as CIA) and that if Dulles should succeed in getting the job, he would undoubtedly be a "Charlie McCarthy" for Donovan. (62-81909-11)

#### Noel Haviland Field:

The "New York Herald Tribune" on October 8, 1949, carried an article stating that Noel Haviland Field, labeled as "Red" by Chambers, had not been heard from since June. The

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article related that Field was a former State Department official and brother of Herman H. Field, the architect who mysteriously disappeared at the Warsaw airport August 22, and he also had vanished behind the Iron Curtain. It was felt that both men may have fallen into the hands of the Russian Secret Police. Field's wife reported the disappearance of Herman H. Field when he failed to arrive at Prague Airport on a plane scheduled to bring him from Warsaw. Field was with the State Department's Division of Western European Affairs from 1930 to 1935. During the war, he worked with Allen W. Dulles, then head of OSS in Switzerland, as a contact with the Communist underground in Germany. (105-2175-A)

"The Washington Post" carried an article on September 2, 1950, entitled "East German Reds Purge 6 High Aides." During the course of this article, it stated that the Noel Field case was still a mystery. "Field, reputed to have wide acquaintance with the Communist underground in Nazi-occupied Europe, worked after the war for American charity agencies behind the Iron Curtain... He dropped out of sight about 15 months ago. Two members of his family vanished while searching for him in east Europe.... The Politburo said Field was a crony of Allen Dulles... Field was alleged to have delivered secret Communist plans from Willy Kreikemeyer to Dulles." (64-200-232-A)

John Galway Foster:

on July 17, 1951, espionage investigations were initiated concerning and John Galway Foster following the receipt of information from of "Newsweek" magazine to the effect that b6 he had been informed by British novelist, that the b7C are among the most important Soviet agents in the United States; further, that Foster, a conservative member of the British Parliament since 1945, had acted as a Soviet agent in close relation with the above-mentioned individuals during the years 1939 to 1944, while he was assigned as First Secretary of the British Embassy in Washington, D.C.

During the investigation of Foster, it was determined that shortly after his arrival in the United States in late 1951, he made a telephone call to the law firm of Sullivan and Cromwell, New York City.

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Dulles was subsequently interviewed relative to Foster, however, he was unable to provide any data which would indicate that Foster was or had been engaged in activities directed against the United States or in favor of the Soviet Union.

These investigations are still in a pending status although to date no evidence has been developed which would indicate that they were engaged in intelligence activities. (65-60261)

Referral/Consult

Heinrich Pfeiffer:

(65,29488-171 page 12)

Bureau files also disclose that Allen Dulles has been in contact with a number of individuals who have, at one time or another, been under investigation by the Bureau for alleged espionage or subversive activities. However, in none of these investigations has there been any evidence developed which would indicate that Dulles had any knowledge of the alleged activities of these individuals. His contact with them appeared to be purely social.

#### Miscellaneous:

In a Safehaven Report dated August 10, 1945, discussion was had concerning Hungarian assets and related that a former Hungarian Minister to Switzerland had told of discussions on the subject with Allen Dulles and Dulles was alleged to have suggested the need for American intervention in the Russian sphere and to have suggested that a Swiss holding company be formed by American-Hungarian interests to hold title to all possible Hungarian assets. "Heinrich claimed that he had been to be the suggested that a Swiss holding company be suggested by American-Hungarian interests to hold title to all possible Hungarian assets."



advised by an associate of Dulles' that American authorities look with favor upon such arrangements." (112-1-268-270


In a letter dated December 19, 1945, Special Agent
J. A. Cimperman sent in a lengthy report on Dr. Theodore Paeffgen,
Espionage - G. On page 25c there is a question set forth which
was to be asked of Paeffgen when interviewed. The question was
as follows: "In 1943 there was a plan afoot in Amt VI to have
Staatsrat Lindemann, President of German Lloyd in Bremen, contact
Allen Dulles, Jr., President Roosevelt's special representative
in Berne, Switzerland. In bringing about this meeting, Prince
Hohenlohe-Schillingesfurst, a friend of Schellenberg, was to act
as go-between. What did the Germans hope to accomplish by such
a meeting?" (65-56036-2)

Referral/Consult

A memorandum dated October 11, 1946, from former
Special Agent E. G. Fitch to Mr. Ladd indicated that information
had been obtained from the

(100-344378-19)

On September 16, 1949, the trial of Laszlo Rajk began at 9:00 A.M., at Budapest, Hungary. Rajk was charged with having engaged in espionage on behalf of the Yugoslavian and American Governments. The trial was rather lengthy with numerous defendants testifying. Laszlo Rajk was the first defendant to take the stand. He pleaded guilty to all charges. A long list of persons were named in articles on the Rajk trial appearing in the Polish Press. One of those named was Allen Dulles. He was mentioned by Szonyi as having criticized agents from Trotsky elements among immigrants and political refugees in Switzerland. He allegedly received information from Szonyi's group in various ways, one of them being that all material for the American Intelligence was



On September 20, 1949, an article appeared in the "Daily Worker" stating that Dr. Tibor Szonyi, fourth defendant in the Budapest Treason trial, admitted on September 19, 1949, that he had plotted at length with Allen Dulles of OSS to set up an underground to overthrow the democratic people's governments in Eastern Europe... He said he made contact with Dulles in Switzerland in 1944 when the latter was European Director of OSS. He further stated that "in 1944, when it was clear that some parts of Europe would be liberated by the Soviets, Dulles concentrated on organizing spies among the groups in Switzerland from these countries. They were to organize activity against the Communist Party at home," according to Szonyi.

Szony further stated that "Dulles explained his program at length. He said that because those eastern countries, which would be liberated by the Russians would be led by the Communist Parties, work must be done within the parties." He said that Dulles sent him about \$1,000 before he left Switzerland and subsequently he and others received 200 and 300 Swiss francs from Dulles occasionally. (64-200-249-A)

On December 31, 1949, Carl Svarverud wrote a letter to of Washington, D.C., and discussed therein the Mexican picture. In the course of his letter he stated that Congressman Wolverton of New Jersey was induced to make a speech in the House of Representatives on August 26, 1949, very bitterly condemning the law firm of Sullivan and Cromwell, and in particular, together with Allen Dulles, brothe

SEXRET

of John Foster Dulles, all of the same law firm, for their active labor in what he termed sabotaging the Mexican Oil Loan Application. He further stated that immediately after this speech, U.S. Senator Dennis Chavez of New Mexico made a thirty-minute speech over the Mutual Broadcasting network echoing the very words of Congressman Wolverton. (64-26028-7)

On January 12, 1951, there was received at the Bureau via liaison an Intra-Department memorandum dated January 4. 1951. from

(5-4)(6)(4)

(105-0-3660)

(105-0-3660)

John Foster Dulles - Brother

Bureau Investigations of Relatives:

As you know, the Bureau has just recently completed an investigation, at his own request, of John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State-designate. Pertinent, derogatory information developed in this investigation reflected that John Foster Dulles was a contributing member of the IPR, which has been previously described, from July 1, 1938, through January, 1951, and that he recommended Alger Hiss, a former employee of the United States Department of State convicted of perjury on January 20, 1950, for a position with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. The investigation also established that he was a well-known anti-Communist and was hated by Communists both here and abroad. (77-54650)

Eleanor Lansing Dulles, also known as Eleanor Lansing Blondheim, Mrs. David Simon Blondheim - Sister

A full-field Loyalty of Government Employees investigation concerning Eleanor Lansing Dulles was initiated on November 28, 1952, at the specific request of the Department of Commerce in connection with her employment by the National Production Authority. Prior to the completion of this investigation, she transferred to the Department of State on December 17, 1952, to a position as International Relations Officer, Bureau of German Affairs, Office of German Economic Affairs.

Investigation reflected that her name appeared on a contact or mailing list of Commonwealth College, Mena, Arkansas, which organization was cited by the Attorney General as Communist; she was listed as a member of the Advisory Committee of the Washington Workers Education Committee, formerly the Washington Committee of the Affiliated Schools for Workers, which organization the Communist Party was interested in according to testimony before the House Committee on Un-American Activities; and she was associated with the IPR, previously described.


As of this date, all investigation, with the exception of some foreign investigation being conducted by the State Department and the Army, has been completed. (121-39513)

ACTION:

None. For your information.

MPK.

SECRET



STANDAND FORM NO. 84 ffice Memorandum • united states government,

MR. A. H. BELMON

ALLEN W. DULLES CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

As you know, newspapers such as the "Washington Post" "Evening Star" and the New York "Herald Tribune" recently printed

articles which have been rather complimentary to Mr. Dulles. In

this connection it might be interesting to note that on January 27,

1953. Dulles indicated to Liaison Agent Papich that he maintains very friendly relations with the Alsops, Constantine Brown, David Lawrence, and with "my newspaper friends in New York City." He stated that a

G. I. R. 3

January 30

few days ago Brown was a dinner quest at his home.

ACTION:

FROM

SUBJECT:

None. For your information.

cc - Mr. Nichols

dassification per OGA 9/7/10 Office Memorandum, united states government THE DIRECTOR. DATE: March 5, 1953 TO EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC D. M. Ladd FROM DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM: ALLEN W. DULLES FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE SUBJECT: EXEMPTION CODE 25X(uc/baw 60324) DIRECTOR CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY لعمو ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED 62.83338 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE. SYNOPSIS: b7C Set forth are pertinent details covering matters discussed by you with Allen Dulles at the Bureau on March 4, 1953.

Briefly, these matters referred to: Soviet political situation; Sam Carp, brother-in-law of Molotov; Jay Lovestone; Rosenberg case; Colonel John V. Grombach; General Clayton Bissell; Technical (A) the United States by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA): **\_** formerly of Atomic Energy Commission (AEC); Loss of high secret atomic energy document; Mocase; General Carter Clarke; and CIA-Bureau relations. It is believed that the meeting should prove beneficial to the Bureau. bl per CIA b3 ACTION: Dulles will be advised regarding the status of the Bureau investigation concerning Sam Carp, brother-in-law of Molotov. The Field is being instructed to interview Carp for the purpose of developing any pertinent information concerning the current Soviet political situation. Classified by Apt bja/Imw CLASSIFIED BY DA ALM \* PER OGA REVIEW Beclassify on: QADR. DECLASSIPY ON: 25X # 366904 The Liaison Agent will ascertain if the "Bissell" reportedly connected with the Ford Foundation is identical with General Clayton Bissell, former head of G-2. 162-83338 APPEAL # CIVIL ACID 350 MAR 18 1953 DATE 7/22/85 INITIALS MW Lived Keey Schwart & PASEL. The Liaison Agent will confer with Colonel Sheffield Edwards, Inspection and Security, CIA, and with Allen Dulles in orde **BASE** 2 SJP:1w PILLIS EJ AND TP3 PASS ALL



Re: Allen W. Dulles, Director Central Intelligence Agency

to make certain that Dulles is fully cognizant of all pertinent information, including documents, relative to the listening device which was found in the American Embassy in Moscow. The Liaison Agent will also make certain that Dulles is aware of recent developments concerning equipment which can be used to counter the listening device

4. The Liaison Agent will endeavor to develop further information concerning the report that General Carter Clarke might become connected with the CIA.

from the French concerning Communism in the United States can be channeled through the Legal Attache at Paris. It is understood that any information given to the French would be of a public source nature.

any other available sources for the purpose of determining the nature of the interest of the Senate Immigration and Naturalization Committee in alien defectors who have been brought into the United States by the CIA.

### DETAILS:

In accordance with your request there are set forth herewith the results of your discussions with Mr. Dulles on March 4, 1953.

- 2



Re: Allen W. Dulles, Director Central Intelligence Agency

## Soviet Political Situation

You will recall that you and Mr. Dulles exchanged comments regarding changes which might take place in Russia in the event of the death of Stalin. Dulles stated that it is the opinion of authorities in his agency that Malenkov would become the head of the Russian Government if Stalin dies. Dulles admitted that one still had to consider Molotov. He pointed out that for several weeks Molotov reportedly has been absent from public affairs in Moscow. There has been no explanation developed for this absence. Dulles stated that his agency feels that the chances of war will be increased in the event of Stalin's death.

## Sam Carp

When referring to Molotov, Dulles inquired if the Bureau has or could develop any pertinent information regarding Soviet political affairs through Carp, whose sister is married to Molotov. Dulles also inquired regarding the Bureau's interest in Carp. Dulles apparently was referring to Sam Carp, who has been the subject of a Bureau investigation. (100-5193)

You will recall that Carp was born in Russia and came to this country in 1917. Molotov married his sister. The Carps are Jewish. In the early 1930's Carp became a Purchasing Agent for the Soviet Government and he was closely connected with some of the Amtorg operations. He has made several trips to Russia. allegedly severed his connections with Amtorg and he was given \$125,000 by that organization. Carp has stated to the Bureau that the \$125,000 was a loan and that he had repaid \$25,000 of the total amount. He admits that he is still in possession of \$100,000. Carp claims that he has little or nothing to do with his sister and he has stated that he would volunteer any information of interest to the Bureau which he might receive. No information has been developed reflecting that Carp has been involved in espionage activities but he is a Security Index subject in view of his relation-ship with Molotov. Dulles will be informed concerning the Bureau's inter<u>e</u>st in Carp. The Field is being instructed to reinterview Carp Lfor the purpose of developing any pertinent information concerning the current political situation in Russia, bearing in mind that Carp may have some interesting observations to make in view of the recent anti-Semetic drive launched by the Russians and because of the current news of the impending death of Stalin.





Re: Allen W. Dulles, Director Central Intelligence Agency

> bl per CIA b3

## Jay. Lovestone

(S)

	You directed Dulles' attention to the fact that although Lovestone undoubtedly possesses knowledge which can be of use to the United States Government, one had to bear in mind that Lovestone was fundamentally a Marxist.	
		/
	He stated that he had no	1
	or that he has engaged in any anti-U. S. activity.	X
		P1 (
	As you know, both Lovestone and	351
ſ	have been the objects of stiff criticism emanating from You pointed out to Dulles that in your opinion it was most	1-4
L	important that ex-Communists make complete and full confessions	
	regarding their past activities. In that way one could best	
	evaluate their potentialities as security risks and their reliability	
	ad both cos. Tothe that care blade the car-communities who fur it is near	
	information piecemeal and was reluctant to furnish names, etc., b7	C
	always leaves a doubt as to where he stands. (4-1)(1) (1)	

## Rosenberg Case

0

You explained to Dulles that Judge Kaufman has afforded Ethel and Julius Rosenberg every opportunity to be saved if they cooperated. You pointed out that Mrs. Rosenberg's mother has been eager to convince her daughter that she should cooperate with the authorities. You called attention to the fact that Emanuel Bloch, lawyer for the Rosenbergs, was a distinct obstacle in establishing any contact with the subjects. You also made reference to information which has been received indicating that the Communist Party allegedly does not desire that the Rosenbergs be executed because such punishment might deter recruitment of Communists in future espionage operations. With regard to establishing contact with the Rosenbergs, you explained that it was undesirable to effect contact between the Rosenbergs and a psychiatrist who testified in the Hiss case. will recall that in a recent letter from to the Attorney General it was suggested that the psychiatrist might be utilized in

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Memo to Director

Re: Alley W. Dulles, Director Central Intelligence Agency b6 b7C

getting to	the	Rosenbergs.											
was		who	tes	tified	for	the	defe	ense	in	the i	$i$ $\epsilon$	SS	
case.										b	1	per	CTA
- Colonel Joh	nn B.	Grombach 6	LIV	Kluk						b	3	To an	-

You will recall that Grombach was the head of a net of agents who collected intelligence information for the Army,

Dulles inquired regarding the Bureau street evaluation of information which has been received from Grombach. You pointed out that since practically all of the information was developed abroad where the Bureau had no investigative facilities and since most of the data pertained to foreign matters, it was impossible for the Bureau to evaluate the information. Dulles may have been fishing for a type of comment which he could use as ammunition against Grombach. As you know, he was advised that the Bureau was in no position to in any way evaluate Grombach's organization or the information produced by the group

## General Clayton Bissell


You will recall that a question came up whether General Clayton Bissell, former head of G-2, was identical with the Bissell reported to be connected with the Ford Foundation. Dulles stated that he was not positive but he thought that it was a Richard Bissell who was with the Ford Foundation. In accordance with your request the Liaison Agent will follow this matter in order to establish the identity of the Bissell connected with the Ford Foundation.

Technical Installations

The matter of the listening device found in the U.S. Embassy in Moscow was brought up by Dulles.

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bl per CIA b3 [U]





bl per CIA b3

Memo to Director

S

Re: Allen W. Dulles, Director Central Intelligence Agency

British technician to come to the United States in order to examine the device and exchange views with appropriate U. S. technicians. As now know, the British interest in the device was called to the which aroup had received a request from the British, but through the Department of State and the British Foreign Office.

The afore-mentioned committee approved a report, which included a description and an analysis of the construction and the operation of the listening device, for dissemination to the British via the Department of State.

You called Dulles' attention to equipment which has been produced to counter the listening device such as the one planted in the Embassy in Moscow. As you know

Dulles expressed ignorance of the existence of such equipment. Apparently his subordinates have not briefed him regarding the matter. This is interesting because

You stated that we should be certain that Dulles had received all pertinent data, including documents, from the Bureau. Colonel Sheffield Edwards of the CIA has advised the Liaison Agent that all of the details, including the documents, have been directed to the attention of Dulles but he apparently has not had the opportunity to study and review the material since his appointment as Director. The Liaison Agent will check with Colonel Edwards and Mr. Dulles in order to make certain that the latter is satisfied that all details and pertinent documents have been made available to him. Colonel Edwards has already advised the Liaison Agent that he will fully brief Mr. Dulles on the matter.

b1 per CIA b3



Re: Allen W. Dulles, Director Central Intelligence Agency

bl per CIA

**b**3

CIA and Subcommittee of Senate Immigration and Naturalization Committee

You will recall that in my memorandum of February 27, 1953, regarding Dulles' proposed visit with you, information was set forth indicating that the Jenner Committee had plans to interview defectors who had been brought into the United States through the CIA.

March 3, 1953, he stated that it was the captioned committee, headed by Senator Arthur V. Watkins, which was interested in interrogating the alien defectors brought into the United States at the instigation of the CIA. Dulles stated that such plans to interview the aliens would undoubtedly be of definite interest to the Bureau and that he personally felt that the interviews could jeopardize sensitive CIA operations. It was his understanding that the committee desired to interview the aliens for the purpose of developing information concerning Communists in the United States. Dulles acknowledged that he had not received any particular inquiry to confirm exactly what that committee had in mind. He stated that he would look into the matter further and furnish the Bureau additional details. Liaison Agent will follow this with Dulles and will also check through other available sources in order to ascertain the nature and reason of the captioned committee's interest in the referenced aliens.

Dissemination of Information to the French Security Services

(s)

bl per CIA

b3

He inquired if it

would be possible to give the French information of a public source nature and he suggested that such data could be transmitted

by the Bureau's Legal Attache. It was agreed ormation of a public source nature would be given to the

As you know, the Bureau's Legal Attache in Paris has from time to time given information of a public source nature to

- 7 -



b1 per CIA b3

Memo to Director

Re: Allen W. Dulles, Director Central Intelligence Agency

	appropriate French officials.
	The Liaison
	Agent will discuss this matter with Dulles. It will be explained
1	to him that the appropriate officials can always channel their requests for information through the Legal Attache.
	their requests for information through the Legal Attache (
	Louis Strauss
	Dulles indicated that he was under the impression that
	Strauss, formerly connected with the AEC, would be returned to that
	agency. Dulles later told the Liaison Agent that Strauss will be acting as a Special Advisor on atomic energy matters for President
	Eisenhower and that later he might return to the Atomic Energy
	Commission. For your information, the Bureau recently received a
1	report from the New York Office indicating that Strauss would be
- 1	acting as a Special Advisor for the President on atomic energy
į	matters: He was offered the chairmanship of the AEC but alleged!
1	he refused due to personal financial reasons.
	Loss of Highly Secret Atomic Energy Document
- 1	by Dr. John A. Wheeler, January 7, 1958
L	
1	As you know, Dulles is aware of the captioned case through
- 1	briefings made before the National Security Council. Dulles stated
1	that he had recently conferred with Gordon Dean of the AEC regarding the possibility
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丄	
	You pointed out the desirability
	of first establishing exactly what information could have been
	conveyed to the Soviets if they have obtained possession of the document. Dulles agreed and stated that he would be conferring with
	Dean again. He stated that he would definitely keep in contact with
	the Bureau regarding any plans
广	Shirl
_	~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
	Mocase
	Dulles expressed a high regard for the information transmit

Dulles expressed a high regard for the information transmitted to the CIA which was developed by the informant in the captioned case.

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b1 per CIA b3



Re: Allen W. Dulles, Director Central Intelligence Agency

## General Carter Clarke

You will recall that information was recently developed indicating that the CIA might reorganize the administration of its counterespionage operations. The CIA has been displeased with the results achieved by the division responsible for counterespionage. This was confirmed by statements made by Dulles.

He stated that consideration was being given to employing General Carter Clarke to head a reorganized division responsible for counterespionage. He stated that Clark is well thought of by many people and in this connection he advised that Senator Styles Bridges is one of Clarke's supporters. Dulles acknowledged that Clarke might have difficulties with officials in the Pentagon because of some past differences. Dulles inquired what the Bureau thought of Clarke. You advised Dulles that while Clarke was assigned in Washington, D. C., he was cooperative with the Bureau.

Clarke was friendly toward the Bureau when he was connected with the Signal Corps and the Armed Forces Security Agency. In 1950 he was transferred to Japan. You will recall that a few months ago information was received indicating that after his transfer to Japan, Clarke allegedly made some remarks critical of the Bureau.

The Liaison Agent will follow this matter with Dulles in order to ascertain if Clarke will be employed by CIA. Efforts will also be made to establish the nature of Clarke's attitude and feelings toward the Bureau.

## CIA-Bureau Relations

Dulles stated that he had the highest regard and respect for the FBI and it was his intention to maintain good cooperative relations. He acknowledged mistakes made by his agency and he hoped that all of them had been corrected to the satisfaction of the Bureau. You will recall that during the course of the interview with Dulles, you tactfully introduced the importance of getting "cooperation from the heart" and not merely "lip service." This statement apparently left a sound impression upon Dulles. After the meeting he commented to the Liaison Agent that he hoped he would be able to convince Mr. Hoover that his cooperation would be "from the heart."



Re:

Memo to Director

Allen W. Dulles, Director Central Intelligence Agency

## COMMENTS:

From the Bureau's standpoint, the Dulles meeting should prove beneficial. He has frequently manifested his respect for you personally and for the efficiency of the Bureau. The meeting definitely put an accent on those feelings toward the Bureau As pointed out before, Dulles will not seek trouble with the Bureau; however, his reputation indicates that he is not a hard-hitting administrator, something which is badly needed by the CIA - a rambling organization with a heavy superstructure. This, plus the fact that he has a tendency to wander off on tangents, will undoubtedly lead to problems for the Bureau from time to time.

You may be interested to know that Dulles was deeply impressed when you inquired regarding his son. He commented to the Liaison Agent that you were certainly most thoughtful to think of his boy.

only brackets page 1 of enclosure classified per OGA 9/7/10
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Washington 25, D. C.

6 May 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: Department of State

Attention: Under Secretary of State

Walter B. Smith

Department of Defense Mutual Security Agency

Federal Bureau of Investigation

General Robert Cutler

SUBJECT:

Local Demonstrations Planned for Secretary

Dulles' Middle East Trip

The attached memorandum is forwarded to you at the direction of Mr. Allen W. Dülles, Director of Central Intelligence, for your information and such action as you may deem appropriate.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE:

Enclosure - 1. 194/90 well and the second

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EXPEDITE PROCESSING

63 JUN 4 1953 12



OCI No. 3697 Copy No. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE 6 May 1953

## LOCAL DEMONSTRATIONS PLANNED FOR SECRETARY DULLES' MIDDLE EAST TRIP

1. Communist agitation in Egypt and India, and demonstrations among the 850,000 Arab refugees, will probably greet Secretary Dulles when he visits the Middle East in May, according to recent reports.

Jordanian refugees are reportedly preparing a memorandum on the demands of Arab refugees to be presented to Mr. Dulles upon his arrival in Cairo. Communists plan to welcome him with a mass protest by the families of political internees; the Egyptian people will be called on to denounce him and dismiss the Nagib regime.

ISRAEL
The Israeli Government has taken unprecedented security measures to ensure the visitor's safety. Possible danger spots, however, are the Israel-Jordanian border and the city of Jerusalem where Arabs or Israeli terrorists may precipitate disturbances.

Communist leaders are reportedly planning a refugee demonstration in the Aqaba area. Communists in Hebron are said to be planning to promote pessimism among the refugees regarding the value of the Dulles trip. They will also stress the fact that the aim of the visit is to establish a Middle East defense organization and will spread the idea that the trip is a failure. Moderate refugee leaders will seek an audience in order to present their demands; they have vetoed a suggested peaceful demonstration, however.

SYRIA

A 5 May report
states that the Communists are planning demonstrations in Damascus and in Beirut, Lebanon.

The commander of the Lebanese security forces advised that there will probably be trouble in Lebanon.

·b1 per CIA b3



62-8333



A mass demonstration by 20,000 refugees is planned for the Dulles arrival in Beirut. It would presumably be similar to one staged during the recent visit of American journalists.

On 20 April, Iraqi Communists distributed pamphlets denouncing the Middle East Defense Organization and attacking the coming visit of Dulles as aimed at "enslaving our nation."

INDIA

In New Delhi, the pro-Communist All-India

Peace Council has issued a circular denouncing the trip, and the council has suggested
public meetings and the adoption of resolutions
urging Dulles not to come.

- 2. Communism is not an immediate threat to the stability of any Arab state, Israel or India. In the past, however, hard-core Communists in Jordan have organized anti-Western and anti-UN demonstrations among the refugees. They have also cooperated with the followers of the ex-Grand Mufti of Jerusalem and the Moslem Brotherhood in organizing terrorist cells in some refugee camps.
- 3. The exploitation of the refugee problem has been made easier by the deteriorating morale of the refugees and the consequent growing unrest. The latter has reached such proportions that many observers believe violent disturbances may develop at any time. They could get beyond the control of the authorities.
- 4. It is believed the security forces of the Arab states are capable of maintaining order and that the governments will wish to prevent any activity which endangers the safety of the visiting group but that they may be insufficiently aware of the need for extraordinary security precautions.

Office Memorandum • united states government July 2, 1953 DATE: MR. A. H. BELMON Harbo P. KEAY FROM Gearty Mohr. Finterrowd ALLEN W. SUBJECT : Holloman RELATIONS WITH ATTORNEY GENERAL BROWNELL Sizoo Miss Gundy -In conversations which Liaison Agent Papich has held with Allen Dulles and James Angleton of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), there is a strong indication to the effect that Dulles meets or confers with Attorney General Brownell at least! once a week. Angleton has advised that Dulles and Brownell visit each other socially and they also have occasion to get together for the purpose of discussing the affairs of the Republican Party. He pointed out that in addition to his duties with the CIA, Dulles still tries to keep a finger in the activities of the Republican Party. ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED ACTION: For your information. G. I. R. - 20 Unrecorded copy filed in 6262-83338 RECORDED 13 38 JUL 8 1953

TO

: Mr. A. H. Belmont

DATE: March 31, 1953

V. P. KEAY

SUBJECT: ALLEN W. DULLES

Director, CIA

Your attention is directed to the attached article captioned "Allen Dulles of the 'Silent Service!" Sunday Department, is in every way complimentary to Dulles. Although he has only been the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) for a few weeks, the author states, "Under his direction CIA has achieved world esteem." The following additional observations are called to your attention:

- Phillips pointed out that the model for an effective and efficient secret intelligence system has always been the "Silent service" of the British Foreign Office.
- 2. He states CIA is certainly "the biggest (if not universally recognized as the best) national intelligence service in the world." He indicates CIA has between 10,000 and 15,000 people on its payroll here and abroad. As you know CIA has always closely guarded such information.
- 3. Much of the article deals with Dulles' OSS operations in Switzerland.

James Angleton of the CIA confientially advised Liaison Agent Papich that the article was bases on an interview which Dulles gave to Phillips. According to Angleton, may of the CIA officials were greatly disturbed over the article because they felt Dulles was "talking too much." Angelton made the observation "you can't mix intelligence operations with public relations and expect good results." He pointed out that Dulles was foolish to publicize he work in Switzerland because in effect, he was admitting that he was an espionage agent and in doing so, he violated laws of the Swiss government.

### ACTION:

None. For your information.

- Mr. Nichols Attachment SJP:mkf

(8) SAPR 27 no deletions per OGA 9/7/10

ORGENET FRED

STANDARD FORM HQ. 64

# Office Memorandum • united states government

	Описе	1V1emoranau	W • UNITE	ED STATES GOVERNI	MENT
y	TO :	MR. A. H. BELMONT	30	DATE: August 4,	1953 Nickal
V	FROM :	v. P. Feder			Glavin Harbo Rosen Tracy Gearty
Ar .	subject:	ALLEN W. DULLES DIRECTOR, CIA	4		Mohr ————————————————————————————————————
Dast	34			m.8	mis.
<b>√</b>	Dulles' f	One item of informamily is the fact t	that	not widely known con Agent has learned th	
1	wα	s in this country j	for a visit in	1952. He is approxi	mately
DC.	29 years	of age and reported	lly is engaged	in the publishing bu	siness
Y.	in Austri	<ul> <li>a. A review of the y information conce</li> </ul>	e Bureau files	has failed to disclo	se any
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	ACTION:	8.5			b6
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EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM: FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDS EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1) DATE 06-18-2010 Der OGA 9/1/10

AIR COURIBR

Date: August 11, 1953

70: Legal Attache

Faris, France

ASS: 4:60 PER John Eager Hoover, Directors OGA Review on 3 Federal Bureau of Investigation

From:

Subject: ALLEN DO LES DIRECTOR OF GIA

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN & WE ASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOULD OF WERWISE.

#366904 6/24/99

For your information, Mr. Dulles departed from the United States on August 9, 1953, and he will spend approximately four weeks in Europe. He will probably establish himself in Switzerland, where he plans to hold conferences with the heads of CIA offices in Europe

The above is being submitted solely for you information.

In the event Mr. Dulles contects you, he should, of course, be courteously received. Should be desire chould, of course, make quali informatio Any other request should be made

- 1 Legal Attache London, England
- 1 Legal Attache Madria, Spain
- 1 Liaison Representative Heidelberg, Germany
- 1 Licison Representative delaburg, Austria

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DATE 7/20/85 BY OPU DE IMW

8/7/53

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. TOLSON

Re: Allen Dulles
Director, CIA

From a confidential source I have received the following information:

About July 30, 1953, the confidential source, along with several other individuals, was having dinner at the Colony House. At the next table was Allen Dulles with an attractive middle-aged woman not his wife. Dulles appeared to have been drinking considerably and was in high spirits, talking in a loud voice which carried to virtually all of the nearby tables. Dulles was discussing the matter involving William P. Bundy of CIA and was commenting what a shame it was about the shoddy way in which Bundy was being treated. He said Bundy was a man who made the mistake in his younger years through making a donation (to the Hiss fund) and as a matter of fact he indicated that "they" had had a cocktail party recently for Bundy and Bundy apparently felt so bad that he did not show up. Dulles also indicated that he thought the United States Government should stop bailing out Great Britain and that he hoped we would not have another Foreign Aid Bill. He made the clear remark that "Churchill is as bad as Stalin."

Dulles in looking around the room spotted Senator Potter of Michigan and made the loud comment that he was going over to see "Senator Moody." He made his way through the tables over to where Senator Potter was sitting and apparently caught himself in time to address the Senator by his correct name. Then Senator Potter introduced his wife to Dulles, Dulles replied, "I am glad to meet you Mrs. Moody."

My source stated it was quite obvious that Dulles had been drinking too much, his voice was too loud and he certainly was indiscreet in what he was discussing at a public place.

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J. P. Mohi

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## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON 25. D. C.

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

G.I.R.- GUG 21 1953

Mr. Tolson Mr. Ladd. Mr. Mege Mr. Glavin. Mr. Harbo. Mr. Tracy.. Mr. Gearty ... Mr. Mohr ... Mr. Winterrowd. Tele. Roem .... Mr. H. Homay .... Miss Gandy.

The Honorable J. Edgar Hoover Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation Department of Justice Washington 25, D.C.

Dear Mr. Hoover:

Since Mr. Dulles is on his vacation, I am acknowledging the summary of pertinent activities of the Communist Party, USA, January 1 to June 30, 1953, which you were kind enough to send over to Mr. Dulles.

I very much appreciate your sending us this highly useful report.

Sincerely,

Fo1 # 366904

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED

ENTIRE DOCUMENT

C.P. Cabell

Acting Director

PER OGA ROLLOW ON STOYLOS

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STANDARD FORM NO. 64

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## Office Memorandum . United STATES GOVERNMENT

TO	:	THE	DIRE	CTOR

DATE:

December 23, 1953

FROM : D. M. Ladd

20/

SUBJECT: FRITZ MOL

Glav	11
/wen	61
Rose	n.

Senator Joseph McCarthy called me on 12/22 and stated he understood Allen Dulles' was working in Austria for CIA, at a salary of \$28,000 a year. He wanted to know if I had ever heard of this.

Tele. Room\_
Nease\_
Gandy\_

After checking I advised Senator McCarthy on 12/23 that the Bureau had information that Allen Dulles who is an Austrian, and who is either in the publishing or newspaper business in Austria; that we have no information as to whether he is

Senator McCarthy thamked me for this information and stated he thought he would merely write a note to b6
Allen Dulles, advise him he has heard arumor that his b7C is working for CIA, and ask for the facts.

DML: CSH

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED BY APU BY A IMW

or is not employed by CIA.

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Office Memorandum UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT 9903 RODING 4/40/48 C.A. #28-18-16 SPY ELW/ME DATE 10/27/29 c.A. #88 November 18. SUBJECT: SPYGLUIKER CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY REACTION TO DIRECTOR'S TESTIMONY BEFORE 10/5/89 c. A. # JENNER COMMITTEE, NOVEMBER 17, 1953 SPACICIAL 6/22/94 C.A. #88-1826 ROMAINS UNCLASSIFIED POR C You may be interested to know that beginning on the evening of November 17, 1953, Liaison Agent Parich received several calls from various CIA employees who called only to express their praise for the Director's statements made before the Jenner Committee on November 17. This reaction is very significant in that there is a strong element in CIA which always has, and probably always will.

hope that the Bureau will suffer some sirings embarrassment.

b7C Among the individuals who care to bicison Agent his. always felt that some of them coul<u>i be included</u> in a group as described above. One individual, who handles liaison matters for CIA, has always given the impression of heing liberal in his views to the point where he are questional the value of loyalty investigations. He is the till who stringly opposed Senator McCarthy and he has indicated a me doubt regarding the true guilt of Alger Hiss. There are many others in CIA who show similar advised the Ligison Agent that he had never seen thinking. the Director in person before nor had he heard him make a sneech. opinion the Director was "terrific" and he had to admit that after listening to the Director he could now understand what had been going on in the Government in past years. he stated that he was giving consideration to writing a tersonal latter to the Director.

James Angleton called and stated " ' in his opinion the Director's speech was one of the most ruts! ... ing made in recent Government history. He stated that he had been in contact with various CIA officials on the morning of Amember 18, 1955, and all were deeply impressed by the Director's delivery, remanulity, and the substance of the statements made. Angleton states that the first few naragraphs of the Directur's statement made up the most cogent declaration of Bureau jurisdiction and restansialities which he has ever read or heard. He admitted that e was already familiar with Bureau responsibilities but he feels that the I.r. otor's etatement presented the Bureau's resition in a manner rebon emerged before. He made particular reference to the excellent language used. Anglot alvised that he was personally recommending it with copies of the Director's testimony be circulated throughout MA.

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Memo to Mr. Belmont

Central Intelligence Agency Reaction to Director's Testimony before Jenner Committee, November 17, 1953

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On November 18, 1903, Allen Dulles, Director of CIA, advised the Liaison Agent that he wished to imposs his sincere admiration for the manner in which the Director presented the Bureau's side of the story. Dulles stated that it was most encouraging to hear a public official hase is statements on fundamental principles and fact and not rest to wally nime calling.

## Comment:

It is the observation of the Linis a Agent that the statement of the Director before the Inner Committee has not only enhanced the prestige of the Bureau with the CIA? I has also assisted materially in orienting the twisted to thing of the CIA people.

## ACTION:

None. For your information.

THE WALL STORES ON THE SECOND SECOND

munists of one of their number accused of spying, Attorney General Brownell disclosed yester-

fir. Dulles is head of the Central Intelligence Agency and formerly was with the Office of Strategic Services.

Mr. Brownell addressed the final session of the National Con-ference on Citizenship at the Hotel Statler. He described how Communists convict those accused of spying on their "confessions" obtained while they are held incommunicado.

The Dulles eyeglasses came up in the trial of Tibor Szoeny, a ledding Hungarian Communist, tried in 1949 with Laszlo Rajk, Mr. Dulles I have never seen him former foreign minister.

Allen Dulles' spectacles figured One Communist custom, Mr. in the trial by Hungarian Com- Brownell explained, is to charge sending reports to Mr. Dulles. The defendant is sometimes asked to identify Mr. Dulles as recipient as "proof."

Mr. Brownell related that the president of the court directed Szoeny to examine three photographs. Szoeny failed to identify one of them. "You don't recognize Allen Dulles here?" the president demanded.

Szoeny made a quick recovery and said, "Oh! yes. I recognize him. At that time he did not wear spectacles."

Szoeny was hanged.

Mr. Brownell added: "During the many years I have known

Tolson Ladd \_ Nichol 12 Clegg Glavin. Harbo .. Rosen. Tracy. Laughlin Mohr .. Winterrowd Tele. Rm. \_ Holloman.

ALL INFORMATION CONTA

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Times-Herald Wash. Post Wash. News Wash. Star

N.Y. Herald Tribune

N.Y. Mirror

Date:

58 OCT 7

Fobruary 3, 1954

Mr. Allon W. Dullos Director Control Intelligence Agency Administration Building 2430 E Stroot, Northwoot Washington, D. C.

Door Mr. Dulloo:

I have heard so many favorable comments on the address which you delivered last Friday to the Women's Forum on National Socurity that I wanted to drop you thio . personal note to emprous my appreciation for your laind. references to the FBI and my administration of it. numorous comments which I have received, you made an excellent procentation and your remarks were most effective.

With boot wiches and kind regards.

Sincoroly youro,

Un Edgar Hoover

Mr. Belmont Mr. Jones

LBN:MP

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Miss Gandy \_

## LICHEN'S FORUM ON NATIONAL SECURITY

REMARKS BY ALLEH W. DULLES, DIRECTOR OF

# HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE TO BY ADUNATION

Mrs. Schill, Mrs. Burdett, and members of the Wemen's Forum on National Security:

I appreciate the opportunity to meet with you today. In coming here
I am breaking a self-imposed rule. As the Director of Central Intelligence
I seek anonymity -- not publicity -- for myself and for the Central Intelligence Agency.

Every rule has its exception. The work of your Forum on Mational Security bears so intimately on many phases of my own work that I am very glad to have this chance to discuss with you some of the dangers to our national security -- dangers which many do not sense because they are cleverly disguised.

It is the job of the Central Intelligence Agency to garner together the facts affecting our national security as best we can find them and then to lay them before the policymakers; the President of the United States, the Secretary of Defense, and the other members of the National Security Council as they may be directly concerned. They in turn decide what to do about these facts.

Among the "facts" which CIA has been uncovering is information on the techniques which subversive Communism employs to weaken the free world.

This will be the subject of what I have to say to you this afternoon. These techniques fall geographically into two main categories -- the domestic and 62-83337

See F

ENCLOSURE

the foreign -- those subversive communistic actions which we have to meet right here at home and those that chiefly affect our Allies and friends in the Free World. And as they affect them, they in turn have an impact on our own security position.

The role of the Central Intelligence Agency in this field relates exclusively to what is being done abroad. Within the United States this is a responsibility of the FBI.

Here at home we are becoming increasingly aware of the dangers of subversive Communism. It is no longer coddled and tolerated. We are fortunate to have in the Federal Bureau of Investigation Mr. J. Edgar Hoover with his great experience and high technical skill. He has been able to make a real contribution, particularly by exposing to the light of day the various organizations and fronts under which Communists masquerade.

You will recall that the Attorney General has published a list of over 200 organizations here in the United States with high sounding names and titles which are nothing more than subversive Communist fronts. You will also recall that the President in his recent speech at the opening of the Congress suggested certain additional measures for dealing with the problem of subversion.

While we still have no right to be complacent about the domestic situation, a far graver situation faces many of the countries of the Free World who have yet to appreciate the real meaning of Communism or to take adequate measures against it in their own countries. As a result, this problem of Communist subversion is an even more dangerous threat to freedom in many of the free countries of the world outside of the United States than it is here at home.

There are cogent reasons for this. Many of the countries of the Free World suffered more grievously than we from the two world wars which we have faced in the last 30 years. Many were devastated by bombing attacks. Some suffered enemy occupations. Others in turn had their social structure and their economic life weakened and imperiled. Take China, for example. In World War II China did not have merely five years of war. It was at war for about 10 years before the Armistice in 1945. That is one reason why so much of China is now behind the Iron or the Bamboo Curtain.

Then also, particularly in Asia, many countries are trying to exercise their newly won independence under conditions which would tax the strength of the most mature democracies. And in the process they have to resist the luring appeals of the Communists with their seemingly easy and utopian solutions for all social and governmental problems.

There is another reason why many of these countries of the Free World are more deeply affected than we. They are nearer to the heart of the Communist subversive machine with its headquarters in Moscow and with branch offices throughout the Communist world in such places as Warsaw, Prague, Bucharest, Peiping, in the Soviet zones of Berlin and Vienna, and on the frontiers of Indo-China and Burma. Land frontiers are more easily crossed and infiltrated with Communist agents and propaganda than great stretches of ocean.

Finally in many of the free countries of the world, particularly in Europe and in parts of Asia, there are well-organized Communist Parties.

These parties take a very active part in the political life of the country. They are recognized and privileged and yet are dedicated to installing a system in which political parties cease to exist. A hard core of well-trained fanatical Communists direct the Party's activities.

I recognize that in these Communist Parties there are many people who would be shocked if they were told that the party to which they belonged was run from Moscow and in the interest of a foreign creed. Nevertheless this is the fact.

These Communist Parties oppose every constructive measure that is introduced, particularly laws which would build up the economic and political life of the country. They are working for chaos out of which revolution may come. In the French Parliament, over the past seven or eight years since the liberation, there have been an average of well over 100 Communists out of about 600 deputies. In Italy the proportionate number of Communists and fellow travelers is even larger.

Just for a mement think what would happen in our own Congress if we had a hundred members whose task was obstruction, the endless prolonging of debate, proposing of amendments to every possible measure, and insisting on days of discussion for all of these amendments. How much constructive work would we then accomplish? Those who criticize the parliaments of other countries should realize that as long as they have this large Communist representation it will be very difficult, if not impossible, for these bodies to meet the needs of representative government and to carry on the processes of governing.

The practical situation is this: The Communists take advantage of all of the privileges and rights which are a part of the System of free government in the Free World, and they abuse these privileges in order to destroy freedom itself.

These are some of the reasons why the Communists abroad have weapons at their command which are more effective than those that they try to use in

this country. Here in the United States measures have been taken to deprive them of their respectability and here, also, they are numerically too weak to invade our legislative bodies.

In addition to their political parties the Communists have other and even more subtle weapons. In some cases they have built up a series of blinds -- camouflaged organizations; -- in others they have penetrated and captured from within a whole series of existing organizations many of which originally had a reputation for respectability. Through these front organizations they carry out their well-known policy; subvert the weak - divide the strong. They hide their affiliation with Moscow while carrying on the Communist line.

Right at the beginning of the Soviet Revolution Lenia gave the key to approved Communist procedure. He said that "the Party must take every advantage of even the smallest opportunity of gaining a mass ally even the fough this ally be only temporary, varietlating, unstable, and unreliable."

And be added, "Those who do not understand this do not understand Marxiam."

Over the years since 1920 Soviet technique has shown vast improvement, and they have developed mass media for propagating their ideas which far exceed the modest beginnings that Lenin advocated.

Here are some other of these Communist front organizations:

The World Federation of Trade Unions, the World Federation of Democratic Youth, the International Union of Students, the International Organization of Journalists, the International Federation of Resistance Fighters, the International Association of Democratic Lawyers, the World Peace Council, and the Women's International Democratic Federation. There are scores of others. These are some of the most important.

Let us look at some of these organizations -- for example, the World Federation of Trade Unions.

Its headquarters are in the Soviet sector of Vienna. It has offices in Peiping, in Latin America, and in Africa as well as in Western Europe. It still controls the powerful CGT in France and the CGEL in Italy as well as many other unions in countries as far distant as Indonesia, for example.

The two unions I mentioned in France and Italy are the largest trade unions in these respective countries, and they tend to dominate the life of the workers in many plants in these countries. They are a formidable threat to the freedom and the development of the free trade union movements in both countries.

The Communist World Federation of Trade Unions claims a total member-ship of some 70 million. One-half of the membership, they claim, lies outside the Iron Curtain dispersed through some 57 countries of the non-Communist world. In many countries they control the most important of the trade unions. Of course behind the "Curtain" there are no free trade unions whatever.

Now let us look at the World Peace Council, enother Communist fromt with an appealing name. You will recall the so-called Stockholm peace appeal which was signed by more than 2 million Americans. This appeal was organized and fronted by the Communist World Peace Council.

Here are some of the seemingly innocent objectives of the World Peace Council as stated at its last meeting in Vienna in December of 1952. It voted to acquaint the churches throughout the world with its stand on disarmament and to seek their approval. It proposed to develop contact with

movements in favor of neutrality in different countries and to find ways of cooperating with pacifist movements; and finally it agreed on the importance of enlisting the support of national independent movements and patriotic sentiments in countries such as Egypt.

How this all sounds innocent enough. It deceives a large number of good citizens even in this country. Yet it is nothing but a Communist plot, spearheaded from Moscow, a part of a system dedicated to aims which are diametrically opposed to the purposes they advertise. In fact the World Peace Council is an instrument to pave the way for aggressive war -- in Korea, Indo-China, and elsewhere.

All of these activities cost money. It is estimated that the last meeting of the World Peace Council in Vienna, alone, cost approximately a half a million dollars. It is quite interesting that the funds for the support of this Congress were drawn from the "Soviet Military Bank" in Vienna. In fact, all of these front organizations are financed with funds from Moscow or funds that are obtained from affiliated Communist organizations in the Soviet World.

We estimate that the average annual expenditure of International Communica on all of their front organizations and their various affiliated activities runs in the neighborhood of 2 billion dollars. They appreciate the value of these propagandist movements and organizations, and they are willing to pay dearly for them.

International Communism particularly appreciates the importance of working with the youth, and for this purpose they have two important organizations -- the International Union of Students and the World Federation of Democratic Youth. These include millions of members from 71 countries --

they claim some 80 millions. They have frequent rallies, the most important of which took place in Berlin in August of 1951. It was a colossal affair, labeled "A Youth Festival for Peace." Over a million Garman youths were transported to Berlin at the expense of their Communist patrons. In addition 25,000 foreign youths were brought to Berlin from all corners of the world. Of course, the entire bill was footed by the Communist governments of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. The cost ran into the millions of dollars.

Fortunately the Berlin Rally had some unpleasant kickbacks for the Communist side. Almost a million of the Communist youths visited the Free Western Sector of Berlin. Probably they went there to jeer but they stayed to wonder. Many of them wanted to stay permanently. They were shown the sights of the free city of Western Berlin.

One of the most impressive sights they saw was the American High Commissioner himself, John J. McCloy. He invited representatives of these youths to visit his office, sought and answered their questions candidly and fully. Word of this extraordinary scene spread through the entire Youth Festival and was an impressive contrast to Communist techniques of preventing a free discussion among the youths at their own rally.

Another front organization is the International Association of Democratic Lawyers. This is one of the few organizations which has its beadquarters outside the Iron Curtain and has found fellow travelers in England and France respectively to act as the President and Vice-President of the organization. It has been used by the Communists to front for their false charges of bacteriological warfare in the Korean War and helped stage the phoney investigation which was made of these now wholly discredited charges.

Maturally the Soviet have not overlooked the vast importance of women's organizations in the field of propagands. Here they have organized the Women's International Democratic Federation. Its charter is a bread one. It pretends to stand for the eradication of Fascism; collaboration for peace; defense of the political, economic, legal, and social rights of women; the safeguarding of public health with particular reference to children; and the preservation of social conditions suitable to the physical, moral, and intellectual development of the young.

In all its history, however, this "front" has never deviated in any respect from the Communist line. At its meeting in Vienna in April of 1952 it came out strongly against "American warmongers". Its monthly bulletin, "Women of the World," is largely devoted to the Communist peace campaign.

It is estimated that it must cost the Communists some 6 million dollars to run the Women's International Federation for a single year and to send its representation from 40 different countries to these various international meetings. Contrast this expenditure with the fact that the Soviet has not to this date contributed a penny to the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund.

I have described only a few of the score of organizations, which are subtly working to spread the Communist doctrines. This will give you some idea of the methods which International Communism is employing, the broad coverage they are giving to their propaganda, and the tremendous financial and organizational effort they are expending to undermine the basis of our free society.

What I have given you is by no means an exhaustive review of the tools the Communists use to delude and deceive the non-Communist world. However,

this may give you an idea of their methods. Each situation, often each country, means for them the employment of a new technique or of a specially adapted form of deception.

The facts I have given you should not be kept secret.

Naturally the Communists do all they can to conceal their connections with these front organizations. They should not be allowed to get away with this hoax and deception any longer. Since they get little local or popular financial support, it is obvious that someone with an ample pocketbook of governmental proportions must serve as the "angel" to keep them going.

Why do they do all this? It is not just propaganda for propaganda's sake; it is the Communist method of reaching out to condition and then control those people who will not buy Communism in the raw. It serves as a measure to neutralize those they cannot quickly make into direct allies.

We all want peace and the reduction of armoments, the extension of benefits to the underprivileged, and an end to old-fashioned colonialism and the like. The Communists are playing the rather unique game of denying these principles everywhere in the sphere of their own control and at the same time deluding people elsewhere into believing that they, the Communists, are the real defenders of these principles in every country of the world.

These techniques I have described are used as the softening process to prepare for the day when the Communists hope to be ready for the "take-over Not so long ago we saw it happen in Czechoslovakia. Not a shot was fired but liberty was destroyed overnight. The softening process had prepared the ground. Each Communist was in his appointed place, each person who had been neutralized by propaganda and deception kept quiet. There was no fight for freedom.

Today it is not the open Communist, the admitted follower of Mark and Lenin, who is likely to trip us up. It is the neutralist, the soft thinkers about agrarian reformers; those who merely decry the methods, but are blind to the aims, of international Communism.

To prepare to meet this danger we are putting our house in order here in the United States. We cannot decide the policy for those in other countries of the world. We can help to unmask the Communist danger. Furthermore we can give one example of a free people who are frustrating the Communist programs while keeping our own freedoms.

To carry out our task as fact finders and to keep our government policymakers advised of what the Communists are doing outside of the United States,
we have gathered together in the Central Intelligence Agency an able staff.
On this staff representative wemen from all parts of the United States are
serving. I wish to pay my tribute to their effective role in the work of
the Central Intelligence Agency in this country and abroad.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office 1	(V1emorandi	<i>lm</i> • Unite	ED STATES G	OVERNME	NT
то :	MR. A. H. BELM		DATE:	September 13	Belmont -
FROM I	R. R. Roach	· · · · ·	les.	b6 b7C	Parsons Rosen Tamm
вивјест:	MRS. MARY BANC INTERNAL SECUR	ROFT - BR	77.3	b7C	Sizoo Winterrowd Tele, Room Holloman Candy
J)	Defendant is 7	made to Bureau	letter dated	August 31,	1954;
The Bure	to Allen Dulles	s, Director of C es reference to Mrs.	the activiti Mary Bancroft	ies of t. who allege	elly
informat reliabil	tion received by lity, indicated t e captioned indi	the Bureau, fro that Allen Dullo viduals.	es was person	nally acquais	nted b6 b7C
much of possibility he person	had reviewed the the information Mrs.  lity that onally had no even	Rancroft. He had worked idence to substitute the manufacture to substitute the manufacture of the manufactur	factual. He pointed out to for British I antiate this.	e admitted k that there w Intelligence He stated ed for the B	nowin; as a but that he
because	in his opinion s	that he would	een strongly advise the Bu of the activi	ureau in wri ities of the	ting subjects
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A.F.F.

December 23, 1953

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MEMORANDUM TO MR. TOLSON:

Sulfa

While discussing other matters with Senator Hickenlooper on December 23, he stated that upon his return from his trip to South America Alan Dulles contacted him about the possibility of issuing a statement on his observations in South America, particularly with reference to Communism. Hickenlooper told Dulles he would do it, but that he didn't have this much information. Dulles stated that he would have his people prepare a statement for him. They have not done so as yet. Hickenlooper told Dulles that he wanted the statement several days prior to its release so that he could go over it very carafully.

I gather from Hickenlooper that he was flattered to be asked to make such a statement, but at the same time is a little quizzcal about what might be in it. I couldn't help but wonder if this might not be a new public relations tactic on the part of CIA to build up committee mental rs of Congress by flattering their ego with publicity. If this be the case it seems like a very smart move.

LBN:ps

Respectful, y,

I. Nicho.s

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-	STANDARD FORM NO. 64
j	Office Memorandum • united states government
+	TO: MR. L. V. BOARDMAN  DATE: September 13, Bendman  1954  1954
	A. H. Belmont  ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED 3-1  Rosen  Tagm
	ALLEN DULLES HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DIRECTOR OF CIADATE 7/20/85 BY ADV. DIALIMW Rolloman Gandy
	On September 10, 1954, I orally advised the Director that Allen Dulles has been in a highly nervous state of mind. This information was developed by Agent Papich.
4	Agent Papich advised that CIA officials whom he has contacted in the past week have all volunteered information to the effect that they had never seen Dulles so nervous and distraught. One official expressed the opinion that the Director of CIA was almost "professionally irresponsible." There was no question that on September 10, 1954, when Agent Papich talked with Dulles, the latter was definitely not himself. In this connection it should be borne in mind that Dulles was preparing himself for the meeting in Denver, Colorado, called by President Eisenhower.
	such as:  1. His health - He continues to suffer with arthritis.  2. Personal family problems -
	Dulles is continually very much concerned over the health of his son who was seriously wounded in the Korean War.
٠	3. The Formosa situation - Dulles was finding it most difficult to get together even with his own people in connection with U. S. policy on Formosa.
	forget. He and his agency were obviously very much embarrassed. So far nobody in CIA has been able to determine exactly what Dulles may have stated to John when the latter visited in the United States. They reportedly held a conference in Dulles home, at which time nobody else was present.
	RECORDED-101 62-83338-19  None. The above is being submitted for year 22 months and in a submitted of the submited of the submitted of the submitted of the submitted of the sub
4	ENT DRECTOR OF LIGHT PLANS
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Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO	:	MR.	A .	$H_{ullet}$	BELMON	HOB
FROM				3.9	ROACH	13)
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SUBJECT: ALLEN W. DULLES

DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

DATE: July 28, 1955

DATE: July 28, 1955

Boardman | Nichols | Belmont | Harbo | Mohr. | Parsons | Rosen | Tamm | Sizoo | Winterrowd | Tele, Room | Holloman | Gandy | Gandy |

Allen Dulles, Director, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), has advised Liaison Agent Papich that he plans to depart for Europe shortly after Congress adjourns. Dulles stated that he will take a short vacation and also avail himself of the opportunity to confer with some of his representatives in Europe.

ACTION:

On previous trips to Europe, Dulles has had occasion to pay calls of a courtesy nature to our Legal Attaches. Therefore, if you approve, there is enclosed herewith a letter directed to Bureau representatives in Europe advising them of Dulles' contemplated travel. They are being instructed to extend the usual courtesies to him and not to get involved in any matters without first checking with the Bureau.

ALL INFORMATION-CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/20/85 BYAPU bya / mw
Enclosure

SJP:fjb

1 - Mr . Belmont

1 - Foreign Liaison Unit

1 - Liaison Section

1 - Mr. Papich

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Belmont Liaison Sect. Mr. Papich

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August 3, 1053

Legal Attache London, England

Director, PAI

ALLER W. BULLES

J. LOL CTOR

CONTRAL INTELLICIBLE AGENCY

Fol # 366904 [] Remain unclassified per OGA

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS VACLASSIFIED EXCEPT 5/20/00 WHERE SHOWN CTHERWISE.

For your confidential information, Mr. Allen W. Bulles, Director, Central Intelligence Agency, plans to make a trip to Aurope within the near future. The will confer with various Old, representatives and it is possible that he may pay a courtesy call at your office.

In the event Mr. Dulles contacts any Bureau representatives, he should be treated courteously and you should make w certain that you do not become involved with him in any matters without first conferring with the Bureau.

1 - Legal Attache Madrid, Mpain

1 - Legal Attache Paris, France Classified by BOLDIA IMW & XR Declassify on

1 - Legal Attache Rome, Italy

VIA SKHY COURTER

2 .- Listson Representative Hetdelberg, Germany

1 - Foreign Liaison Unit (detached)

Cover memo Roach to Belmont, 7-28-55, SJP:fjb:jah. oardman Nichols Belmont Harbo \_ Mohr SJP:fjb:jdd Parsons Rosen . Tamm Sizoo Winterrowd

LEGAT 2 4 AUT - \* VI COMME FRE





THE FOREIGN SERVICE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

The American Embassy

Rome, Italy

Mr. Boardn Mr. William Mr. Belmont Mr. Harbo. Mr. Mohr. Mr. Parsons. Mr. Rosen. Mr. Tamm Mr. Sizoo

Mr. Tolson

Mr. Winterrowd\_ Tele. Room. Mr. Holloman Miss Gandy.

SECRET AIR COURIER

Date:

September 7, 1955

To:

Director, FBI

Legal Attacha Rome, Italy

HI. INFORMATION CONTAINED

Subject:

ALLEN W. DULLES

ARTEIN IS WALLASSIFIED EXCEPT.

WHERE SHOWN THERWISE.

DIRECTOR

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Rebumemo to London of 8/3/55.

On 9/6/55, I had occasion to meet Mr. DULLES. In the course of general conversation, he mentioned that he holds the Director in very high regard, that he has been very pleased with the excellent liaison effected between his Agency and the Bureau by Supervisor Sam J Papich, and that he was pleased to hear from his local representatives about the satisfactory relations existent between his Agency's and our Rome Offices.

Mr. DULLES made no reference of any kind to any specific matter. He said that he was flying to Istanbul-on 9/7/55.

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DECLASSIEY ON. 25X REMAIN CLASS FIED PER OGA REVIEW ON STATION 62-43338-2

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SSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM: AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE

1955

**5**0 OCT 3 1955

October 4, 1955

PERSONAL

Tele. Room

Mr. Allen W. Dulles Director Central Intelligence Agency Administration Building, Room 123 2430 E Street, Northwest Washington, D. C.

ALL INFURMATION CONTAINED HEREIN, IS UNCLASSIFIED 5 BYSPUDjallmw

Dear Allen:

I regretted so much that I was unable to be present at the time you addressed the Annual Convention of the International Association of Chiefs of Police in Philadelphia yesterday. However, numerous individuals commented to me later in the day about the very fine impression which you made, and they all commented on your kindly references to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. I was glad that you saw fit to point out the spirit of cooperation which has existed between the heads of our two respective organizations, and I did appreciate your kindly reference to the action of the President in awarding me the National Security Medal.

As I told you in our all-too-brief visit, I was sorry that you could not wait and drive back to Washington with me. We, at least, could have used this as an opportunity for a good visit.

With best wishes and kind regards,

1220

Sincerely. 151 Edin cc - Mr. Jones Boardman PECORDED - 22 62-83238 Nichols LBN:fc Belmont Harbo . (4) SENT FROM D. O. Parsons . 10 OCT 6 1955 Rosen. TIME 6: 18 Pm. Tamm Sizoo . 10-4-55 Winterrowd

29 PM

# Office Memorandum • united states government

Jim	
TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN STEEL STEEL October 11, Blandman Natholis Blandman 1955	2
FROM MR. A. H. BEZMONT SEE REVERSE SIDE FOR CLASSIFICATION  SEE REVERSE SIDE FOR CLASSIFICATION  SEE REVERSE SIDE FOR Tamm	
DIRECTOR  ACTION  ACTION  Sizoo  Finterrowd  Tele. Room  Holloman	
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY DECLASSIFIED BY 4467	_
to Allen Dulles, Director, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), confidentially advised Agent Papich on the morning of 10-11-55 that Dulles would be transmitting a letter t the Director within the next twenty-four hours. In his letter, Dulles	;0
asked for an opportunity to meet with the Director and discuss proposal pertaining to East-West contacts which might come up at the Big Four Foreign Ministers meeting to be held at Geneva. Switzerland. October 27 1955. According to	
stated that one of the proposals which very likely will receive attention is the matter of increased travel between Russia and the United States. indicate that Dulles was not seeking any assistance or information but merely wanted to exchange views with the Director concerning East-West contact Earman advised that in addition to travel between Russia and the United States. the matter of increased privileges stated that Dulles is not asking for	8.
Director's convenience.	
In connection with the above, Ettention is directed to the memorandum of 10-10-55 from Mr. Roach to me captioned "William H. Jackson, Department of State." Information was set forth indicating that Jackson, recently appointed Special Assistant to Secretary of State, was working on proposals dealing with East-West contacts. The Liaison Section is contacting appropriate sources in the State Department and the National Security Council for the purpose of obtaining all pertinent information concerning proposals which might have an effect on Bureau operations. This is receiving expeditious handling.	Î
ACTION: None. For your information. Liaison is also eheeking at CIA for any specifies Dulles may bring about 183338 1838 (6)	
1 - Mr. Holloman 1 - Mr. Boardman 1 - Mr. Belmont 1 - Liaison Section 1 - Mr. Papich	

October 10, 1955

Mr. Allen W. Dulles Director . Central Intelligence Agency Administration Building, Room 123 2430 E Street, Northwest Washington, D. C.

Dear Allen Dull ES

I thought perhaps you might like to have

a copy of the picture which we had taken together with

Commissioner Gibbons at the IACP Convention.

Sincerely,

ALL INFURMATION CONTAINED

Boardman Nichols Belmont Harbo'. Mohr Parsons Rosen Sizoo . Winterrowd

Tele. Room Holloma p

Office Memorandum UNITED STATES GOVERNME MR. TOLSON 10/5/55 Mr. 12 100 TO -DATE: 327. MR. MASON FROM SUBJECT: PHOTOGRAPHS OF THE DIRECTOR Tele. Room TAKEN AT IACP CONVENTION. Mr. Holloman OCTOBER 3, 1955, PHILADELPHIA Miss Gandy. Attached are prints of two photographs of the Director, taken in connection with his appearance at the IACP Convention, October 3, 1955. The pictures were obtained from the "Philadelphia Inquirer" newspaper. b6 In the event negatives are desired, Special Agent b7C of the Philadelphia Office, can obtain them. RECOMMENDATION None....informative . photos Records (4237).

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	FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIG	GATION	y Belyana
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÷	: '		Mr. Winterrowd
ě	AIR-TEL Transmit the following-Teletype message to:	BUREAU	Tele. Room
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7	SPEECH OF ALLEN W. DULLES		
	CINCINNATI, OHIO		
		- UMba Odwada	301
	Attached hereto is an article from Enquirer, "Cincinnati, Ohio, dated 4/8/56, indice DULLES, Director of the Central Intelligence Age deliver the University of Cincinnati's 1956 UC D 4/20/56, the same day that Attorney General HERB in Cincinnati to speak before the Cincinnati Bar	ating that A ncy, is scheo ay address or ERT BROWNELL	LLEN W. duled to n will be
	The Bureau will be immediately fo newspaper clippings concerning the content of Mr		
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	Special Agent in Charge		^

# CIA Director Is To Speak At UC Anniversary Dinner; 50 Years For Co-Op Plan

Allen W. Dulles, Washington, D. C., since January 1953 director of the Central Intelligence Agency, will deliver the University of Cincinnati's 1956 UC

Day address.

Mr. Dulles' acceptance of the university's and UC Alumni Association's invitation was announced last night by Walter E. M. Fielman, president. The association traditionally sponsors this founder's day event for the university.

The CIA director will be principal speaker at the UC Day dinner April 20 at the Sheraton-Gibson. The affair will be one of the principal events of UC's April 19-25 celebration of the





BOSCH

DULLES

50th anniversary of its co-operative system of technological education.

Mr. Fielman also announced the appointment of Lester L. Bosch as general chairman of the UC Day committee and Harold Nieman, vice chairman. Mr. Nieman, Mr. Bosch, and Mr. Fielman are UC "Co-op" graduates.

President Eisenhower appointed Mr. Dulles to his present position. He had been deputy director. The CIA is charged with the production of strategic intelligence.

Following a year of missionary teaching work in India, Mr. Dulles entered the U. S. diplomatic service in 1916. He held posts in Austria, Germany and Syitzerland and served with Commissions in France, Turkey and Switzerland. He left the diplomatic service in 1926 to practice law in New York City.

During World War II Mr. Dulles returned to Federal Service, serving with the Office of Strategic Services in Switzerland and later heading the OSS mission to Germany. His contributions won him the Medals of Merit and of Freedom from the U. S. government and decorations from the Italian and French governments.

Secretary of State John Foster Dulles is his brother. THE CINCINNATI ENQUIRER
SUNDAY EDITION, 4-8-56
Page 30.
CIA DIRECTOR TO
SPEAK AT U.C. DINNER
APRIL 20.

ALL INFURMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED BY APUBAL



# Office Memora dum · united state government

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Memorandum for Mr. Boardman

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Page 87 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 88 ~ Referral/Direct;

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STANDARD FORM NO. 64 ice Memorandum · united states government May 24, 1956 Mr. Belmon DATE: TO Tolson R. R. Roack bl per CIA Nichols FROM DIRECTOR ALLEN W. DULLES. SUBJECT: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY; HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT Parsons Tamm THERE SHOWN OTHERWISE. Nease Winterrowd Liaison Agent Sam Papich learned from a liaison Tele. Room contact at CIA last night that Allen W. Dullas Director of the Holloman Central Intelligence Agency, has been in two or three days. As you know. ACTION: Any further information of this nature will be promptly Should we learn of the results of Dulles' trip, you will reported. be advised. RRR:mls (5) 1 - Mr. Belmont - Mr. Papich b6 Mr. Roach b7C 62-83338-97 MAY 25 1956 DECLASSIFY ON: 25 [] CLASS: FIED POR OGA REVIEW ON 5/24/00 EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION THORITY DERIVED FROM: FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE Per OGA review EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1) DATE 05-27-2010 letter dated 9/7/10

uner Tillifii sə ibəbb STANDARD FORM NO. 64

FROM:

SUBJECT:

## Office Memorandum • united states government

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DIRECTOR. CIA

DATE: July 20, 1956

Nease

Gandy.

Winterrowd

Tele. Room . Holloman \_\_\_

R. R. ROACH ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

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ALLEN DULLES DATE 719315 RY 2001

The "Washington Daily News" of 7-10-56 carried an article on the society page indicating that Karl Buresch, son-in-law of Allen Dulles, might be the next Austrian Ambassador to the U. S.

On 7-19-56 Dulles advised Liaison Agent Papich that the newspaper story was absolutely false. He stated there is no indication whatsoever that his

son-in-law, an Austrian diplomat, would come to this country as an ambassador. Dulles stated that his son-in-law is actually a very minor official in the

Austrian foreign service and is now stationed in Tehran.

ACTION: For information.

SJP: dje 6 (4) RECORDED 3 JUL 27 1956

1 - Mr. Belmont MDEX

1 - Mr. Papich

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#### The Final and Real Test

Like nearly everybody else, Director Allen W. Dulles of the Central Intelligence Agency still is not quite sure of all the whys, wherefores and bossible consequences of the Kremlin's continuing anti-Stalin campaign. But some of his conjectures—as voiced the other day in a speech to the Los Angeles World Affairs Council—throw at least a little additional light on the great puzzle. And they have the further virtue of serving as a warning against optimistic conclusion-jumping of a kind that might begule the free world into letting down its guard.

It is possible, of course, to read a number of hopeful meanings into what Russia's "collective leaders" are doing to deglorify Stalin and dissociate themselves from him, though they were once his closest and most fawning collaborators. Mr. Dulles believes that they have been motivated only in part by a desire to acquire international respectability; the more basic reason for their action, in his judgment, is that they have been driven to it by domestic pressures. There are now great numbers of edu-cated people in the Soviet Union, and they have grown increasingly critical and restive with the passing of the years So it is not unreasonable to assume that Nikita Khrushchev and company have found it wise and perhaps even imperative to placate this body of opinion by carrying out a "purge of Stalinism". a purge containing a promise of higher standards of living an end to one-man tyranny and steady progress toward genuine individual liberty and democratic government.

However, although the deglorification line ereates serious problems for the internal unity and discipline of the Soviet and international Communist move ment, and although it conceivably may be the forerunner of great liberalizing developments in the USSR, there is a world of difference between a mere promise and its fulfillment. For his own part, while not ruling out the possibility that the Kremlin's present course may lead eventually to good changes, Mr. Dulles is not inclined to be optimistic. As he sees the situation, "A dead and dishonored Staling. is likely to be merely a device with which the long-suffering Russian people are, I fear, to be deceived in their expectation of a freer and better life." He suspects, in short, that Mr. Khrushchev, and the other "collective leaders" are simply doing what they are impelled to do to consolidate themselves. in power; and he also suspects that they may wet harrow down to another one-man tyranny.

In any event, as the CIA director has warned, "The final and real test of the Spylet leaders will remain their willingeness to accept those basic institutional changes that can give the Russian people and the world in general genuine assurance that a one-man or three or fourman, dictatorship cannot again plot in secret the massive domestic or international crimes" carried out by the Kremim under Stalin. In that respect, the changes that are most needed call for the creation of opposition parties, an independent judiciary and a free press-Quite obviously, until such institutions are brought into being in the USSR, there will be a dangerous tyranny overthere, and we and our allies had better not slacken in our armed vigilance against it.

Tolson Nichole Boardman Belmont Mason Mohr Parsons Rosen Tamm Nease Winterrowd Tele. Room \_ Holloman . Gandy

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#### fice Memorandum • united st TES GOVERNMENT

MR. A. H. BELMONT TO

DATE: July 30, 1956

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Nighols

Belmont Mason Mohr

Rosen . Tamm

Nease -Winterrowd Tele. Room Holloman

Gandy

200

Boardman

FROM

MR. R. R. ROACH

SUBJECT:

ALLEN W. DULLES

DIRECTOR

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

On 7-27-56 Colonel Sheffield Edwarfs, Director of Security, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), advised Liaison Agent Papich that Dulles will be leaving on an extended trip which will take him to Europe and very likely the Far East. He is scheduled to depart about August 19, 1956, and will be gone approximately one month. Edwards indicated that during some of this period Dulles will also be vacationing.

#### ACTION:

In the past, Dulles has paid courtesy calls at the offices of some of our Legal Attaches. Although he has never initiated any official business with our representatives, it is nevertheless believed advisable to alert our Legal Attaches in Europe and Tokyo, Japan, concerning Dulles' travel. There is enclosed a letter to the appropriate Legal Attaches instructing them to extend the usual courtesies in the event Dulles contacts them but not to get involved in any official matters without prior check with the Bureau.

IALL INFURMATION CONTAINED Enclosure

1 - Mr. Belmont

1 - Foreign Liaison Unit

1 - Liaison Section

1 - Mr. Papich

no OGA deletions per letter dated 9/7/10

RECORDED 39 62-83338

20 AUG 9 1956

LEGAL ATTACHE LOUDON, ENGLAND DIRECTOR, POI

ALLEN W. DULLES DIRECTOR

CEUTRAL INVELLIGENCE AGENCY

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Market Charles and the Control of th Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), in expected to leave an absence to Intelligence Agency (CIA), in expected to leave an about August 19, 1956, and will be traveling for approximately and month. It is expected that during this period he will

In the event Mr. Dulles contacts your office, you should extend the usual courtesies but you should not get involved in the discussion of any official nattors without first contacting the Bureau.

Madrid

Rome

Bonn

1 – Tokyo

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
1 - Foreign Liaison Unit (detached)

SJP:fjb

Cover memo Roach to Belmont 7-30-56 Captioned as above.

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10-9-56-203 PLEASE WARE SO THAT UP FOL # 366904
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### CIAL WAD WARNS OF RED STRATEGY

A. W. Dulles Says New Plan of 'Parliamentary Conquest' is Aimed at 3 Nations

By C. P. TRUSSELL

special to The New York Times. WASHINGTON, Sept. 1-Soviet peace smiles brought a warning today from Allen W. Dulles director of the Central Intelligence Agency

Mr. Dunes said free people should watch and combat a new Kremlin strategy of "parliamentary conquest." The principal targets, he stated, are Italy, France, and Indonesia. He cited situations indicating important Boviet gains in these fields.

At the same time, Mr. Dulles deplored an apparent free-world indifference to a fact that the Russians could attain controls even with minority conquests in parliamentary bodies.

"Today \* \* \* the danger of parliamentary compromises with the Communists, even in Europe," he stated, "is not to be ignored."

Mr. Dulles spoke frankly in an analysis of Soviet cold-war techniques that surprised many in Washington. The C. I. A. is perhaps the most hush-hush organization in the Government. Even Congressional investigating committees have not yet pried into its secrets where American se-

curity is involved. However, Mr. Dulles responded to a request from the House Un-American Activities Communication analyse current Communist tactics. Such a request had been made to more than 100'

other prominent Government of-ficials, military leaders, educa-tors, journalists, labor officials, business executives and political scientists. Before the committee publishes the full findings it will call in experts on communism from Europe, the Far East and Africa. The panel is headed by Representative Brancis R Wilter, Democrat of Pennsylvania.

Follow Lenin Pattern

The findings of the C. I. A. were made public this afternoon. Mr. Dulles had concentrated 1956 upon the dangers of the Soviet's "parliamentary" approach to conquest. This approach, he said, followed a pattern laid down by Lenin in the Nineteen Twenties.

Communist penetrations into free parliaments to date, he held,

ree parliaments to date, he held, were far more serious than startistic would imply.

In the country, Mr. Dulles brought out, have Communists attained a majority in an parliamentary body. This fact, he contended, has created a complainment that In highly day. elicotto.

"A few years ago ' he report-ed, "I would have thought that Communist parties. would have gr ever again the allies among any non-Communist parties. Today, however, the danger of parliamentary compromises with the Communists, even in Europe, is not to be ignored." Mr., Dulles then reported on

the target spots he cited.

"In Asia," he stated, "this threat is even greater because it is generally less well understood. A recent indonesian Government restricted Communication. ernment permitted Communist influence to reach far into the

Ministry of Defense. More than in Europe the Communist parties have managed in many countries to acquire a danger-ous degree of 'respectability'

and of acceptance as just another political party."

In the "target countries," Mr. Dulles stated, the Soviet penetrations had become "serious."

148 in Office in Italy

"In the Italian Parlis" ant of 590 members," he stated, "there are now 143 Communist members. To these must be added seventy-five Nenni fellow-traveling left-wing Socialists, or a total of 218 who consistently vote and act with the Communists. Together, in the last elec-tions in 1953, their total popular vote was 9,500,000, or 35.6 per cent of the total. Chamber "The French

Deputies presents another situation which the Kremlin may be studying. There are today about 150 Communist members in the Chamber out of a present total of about 600.

"In Indonesia, the Communist party received 6,000,000 votes, or 17 per cent of the total electorate in the elections of September 1955, and they have a representation of thirty-nine members, or fifteen per cent of the total of the Indonesian Assembly?

Despite these official minority representations, Mr. Dulies said, the Communists had "moved

in." Mr. Dulles referred to the recent smile-and-peace pronounce-ments of the Soviet leaders. He

"Translated into a little less flamboyant language this means that the Communists propose to infiltrate our free legislative systems, to take over our parliameritary Governments, and to use freedom which our system of government gives to destroy

all vestiges of that system \* \* \* "The Kremlin leaders have told us what they propose to do. It is up to the leaders of the free world, working together as al-lies and friends, to help to un-cover and to frustrate this Communist design, which otherwise could threaten to wreck the free institutions of many countries and even endanger our own."

Mr. Belmont Mr. Mason .... Mr. Mohr .... Mr. Parsons. Mr. Rosen -Mr. Tamm Mr. Noase Mr. Winterr . Tele. Room Mr. Holloma Miss Gandy... b6 b7C

Ber. Boarding

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EX-108

control through parliamentary means without the need for force and violence.

Didles then points out that the communists have never gained control of any nation through the free electoral process. He points out that the decisive factor in the communist seizure of power in the European satellite nations, with the possible exception of Czechoslovakia, was the presence of the Soviet army in overwhelming strength in those nations. He traces the communist seizure of power in Czechoslovakia and Hungary to show how the communists arrested, blackmouled, and terrorized noncommunist political leaders, thereby eliminating all effective opposition. Dulles then emphasizes that, when the communists gain an effective minority position in any parliamentary body, it is a "sign of danger." He states that, at the present time, the communists have a sizable representation in the parliaments of Italy, France, and Indonesia. He then cites the danger that, once the communists have established themselves as a political factor to be reckoned with, the noncommunists political leaders can be persuaded to join forces with them. In Dulles' view, while the danger of "parliamentary compromises" between communists and noncommunists in Europe should not be ignored, the principal danger lies in the anations of Asia where the communist parties have gained a "dangerous degree of respectability," and where the menace of communism is generally underestimated. Dulles concludes by calling on the noncommunist political leaders of the free world "to uncover and frustrate" this communist program of "subversion and cajolery."

#### COMMENT:

Dulles' comments regarding the communist seizure of power in the European satellite nations agree generally with the findings of the Select Committee on Communist Agression of the U.S. House of Representatives (Kersten Committee) released in 1955

JFC:mih 1 1 1956 OSURE

NOT RECORDED 193,SEP 11 1956

11 SEP 11 1956

b3 per CIA

1 - Mr. Belmont

1 - Mr. Nichols

Memorandum to Mr. A. H. Belmont from W. C. Sulliv	Memorandum	to	Mr.	A.	H.	Belmont	from	W.	C.	Sulliv
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b3 per CIA

Dulles makes no mention of the fact that Soviet leader Nikita S. Khrushchev, during the course of his report to the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU, also stated that in nations "where capitalism is still strong...the transition to socialism will be attended by a sharp class revolutionary struggle."

#### RECOMMENDATION:

None. For the information of the Director and yourself.

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Office Memorandum · UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

	1			
ro : Mr. Tolso	المرسير الم	DATE:	September 5, 19	56
FROM : L. B. Nicl	ppo p	*	Tol son Nichols Belmon	1
SUBJECT:		6,0	Mason Mohr — Parson Rosen Tamm	s
Un-American Act Dulles, Director communists are r obtained a copy of	ference is made to my the statement put out by ivities (HCUA) which had of CIA, regarding Sovie resorting to a parliament Dulles' statement from as a House publication	the House Committed been given it by A et leaders' alerting stary conquest of free the HCUA. The D	the world that the ee nations. We birector noted:	owd Room
another ten days to the statements of released the Dulle from more than 1. Soviet aggression Office advised too the Director gave has not been fixed should the committee addition, arrangements.	lay that there has been the committee separat	committee's pamph as will be ready and by as the first of a se as on various aspect of the Was some thought of rele ely, but a date when this and the Bureau he Director's states de to obtain a copy of	that the committed that the committed eries of statement is of techniques of shington Field easing the statement this may be done u will be advised ment separately.	b6 b7C
cc - Mr. Boardm cc - Mr. Belmont cc - Mr. Jones Followed 9-12-56 JJM:rm, (6)		ONTAINED 176 SEP FIED 13581 SOUDDLIPT	P 7 1956	ORIGINAL FILED IN 61-16-
OSSEP 12 1956	•	· / ·	W. Sandara	

26

Mr. Tolson

September 4, 1956

L. B. Nichol

SUBJECT:

Reference is made to the Washington City News Ticker Winterrowd item dated September 1, 1956, 1:40 p.m., quoting Allen W. Dulles, Tele. Room Director of CIA, as stating Soviet leaders have alerted the world that Holloman Gendy. the communists are resorting to a parliamentary conquest of free nations. The statement by Dulles was put out by the House Committee on Un-American Activities. The Director asked that we get a copy of this publication. Through liaison with the committee, two copies of Dulles' statement have been obtained and are attached, one to the original of this memorandum and the second to the copy designated for Mr. Belmont.

#### Enclosure

JJM:rm ,, (4)

ENCLOSURE

cc - Mr. Boardman

cc - Mr. Belmont, with copy of enclosure

126 SEP 10 958

7 1956

05 SEP 11 1956

Tolson \_\_ Mr. Boardman Mr. Belmont Z Mr. Mason Mr. Mohr Mr. Parsons Mr. Rosen Mr. Tamm . Mr. Nease \_ Mr. Winterrowd . Tele. Room . Mr. Holloman . Miss Gandy .

DIDUDAN

(RELEASE AT 7:00 P.M. EDT) (CIA)

ALLEN W. DULLES, DIRECTOR OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, SAID SOVIET LEADERS HAVE ALERTED THE WORLD THAT THE COMMUNISTS ARE RESORTING TO A "PARLIAMENTARY" CONQUEST OF FREE NATIONS. IN A STATEMENT MADE PUBLIC BY THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON

UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES, CITED ITALY, FRANCE AND INDONESIA AS THE PRIME TARGETS OF THE KREMLIN'S NEW STRATEGY FOR WORLD CONTROL.

HE SAID "THE COMMUNISTS PROPOSE TO INFILTRATE OUR FREE LEGISLATIVE SYSTEMS, TO TAKE OVER OUR PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENTS AND TO USE THE

FREEDOM WHICH OUR SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT GIVES TO DESTROY ALL VESTIGES THAT SYSTEM.

THE COMMITTEE ISSUED DULLES' STATEMENT AS THE FIRST OF A SERIES FROM MORE THAN 120 PROMINENT AMERICANS ON TECHNIQUES OF SOVIET

AGGRESSION. DULLES' STATEMENT WAS WRITTEN JUNE 22.
DULLES, IN AN ANALYSIS OF MORE THAN 500,000 WORDS DELIVERED BY
SOVIET LEADERS AT THE 20TH PARTY CONGRESS IN MOSCOW LAST FEBRUARY, SAID THEY HAVE TOLD US IN NO UNCERTAIN WORDS WHAT THEY PROPOSE TO BO. HE CITED SPECIFICALLY AN ADDRESS BY COMMUNIST PARTY BO HE CITED SPECIFICALLY AN ADDRESS BY COMMUNIST PARTY BOSS

NIKITA\_KHRUSHCHEV. A FEW YEARS AGO," HE SAID, "I WOULD HAVE THOUGHT THAT COMMUNIST

PARTIES IN EUROPE WOULD HAVE GREAT DIFFICULTY IN EVER AGAIN OBTAINING ALLIES AMONG NON-COMMUNIST PARTIES.

TODAY, HOWEVER, THE DANGER OF PARLIAMENTARY COMPROMISES WITH THE COMMUNISTS, EVEN IN EUROPE, IS NOT TO BE IGNORED. HE SAID.

"IN ASIA THIS THREAT IS EVEN GREATER BECAUSE IT IS GENERALLY

LESS WELL UNDERSTOOD, HE SAID. 9/1--PA140P

RECORDED 10 1956

WASHINGTON CITY NEWS SERVICE

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19

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: December 4, 1956

Boardman

Belmont Mason —

Nease

esa

FROM : MR. R. R. ROACH

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED.

SUBJECT:

ALLEN DULLES, DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

DATE 7/03/5 BY OPLOYAL

You may be interested in the following information Tele. Room volunteered to Liaison Agent Papich by Mr. Dulles on December 3, Gandy\_\_\_\_\_\_

Dulles confided that he recently was confronted with a decision as to whether he should submit his resignation to the President as is customarily done by Presidential appointees such as Cabinet officers. Dulles stated that he discussed the matter with Sherman Adams. He told Adams that he personally did not feel that the Office of the Director of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) should be placed in a category of a political appointment. He, therefore, wanted to set a precedent whereby, from now on, the Director of CIA will not submit his resignation after a Presidential election. Dulles did not volunteer any information as to what views may have been expressed by Adams.

Dulles commented to Papich that he was just about finishing 4 years as Director of CIA and that this was the longest tenure of office held by any CIA Director so far. He gave the impression that he took great pride in this particular achievement and he then stated "Of course, I never expect to establish a record like your Director."

Dulles' position regarding the submission of a letter of resignation to the President coupled with his other comments and in light of the spirit in which they were presented, gave the Liaison Agent the definite impression that Dulles personally would like to continue as Director of CIA. This is not surprising because he has always indicated that he liked his job. It would further indicate that to date the White House has not openly manifested any move to get rid of Dulles. Dulles may also be maneuvering to determine just where he stands with the White House.

#### ACTION:

For your information. EX-117

1 - Mr. Belmont

1 - Mr. Roach

1 - Liaison Section

1 - Mr. Papich

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FIR 1

Mr. Tolson Mr. Nichols Mr. Boardman

Mr. Belmont

Mr. Mohr Mr. Parson Mr. Rosen

Mr. Tamm. Mr. Trotter. Mr. Nease ...

Tele. Room. Mr. Holloman. Miss Gandy.

#### STALINISM DEAD, C. I. A. HEAD SAYS

Allen Dulles Lays 2 'Fatal' Errors to New Soviet Team -Givés Yale Lecture

#### By RICHARD H. PARKE

Special to The New York Times, NEW HAVEN, Nov. 27—The director of the Central Intelligence Agency expressed doubt today that the Soviet Union would return to Stalinism. Allen W. Dulles, addressing a Yale Law School audience, said

the new Soviet leaders had made two "fatal errors if they propose to retain the hard dictatorship which the teachings of Lenin and Stalin envisage."

First, he said, they "admitted to respectability the Tito experi-ment in Yugoslavia." Second, he said, they mistakenly believed they could introduce mass education and still "close off their people from access to the realities of the outside world."

#### Sees Conversion of Serfs

"In the industrial and educathinking serfs into human beings.

"They have seen satellites move dramatically toward freein the days of Stalin."

foredoomed to failure."

"Whatever the final outcome Centennial.

in Hungary, those who have sacrificed themselves will not have failed. They have alerted the world once more to the tional progress which they have meaning of Soviet despotism, made," Mr. Dulles said, "they and have struck a blow for freehave gone far towards turning dom which will rank in history with the American and French Revolutions."

Mr. Dulles noted that his dom, and it is not too much to agency had been criticized for predict that the Soviet Union being caught "flat-footed in sit-can never be the same as it was uations such as in the Middle East, Poland, Hungary and the

in the days of Stalin."

Discussing the uprising in Hungary, Mr. Dulles said it showed the people of that country were unwilling to "accept a half-way station toward liberty."

"In so doing," he added, "they have fended to disprove the theory, so long helds that revolt against a tyranny equipped with Lamont lecturer. The lecture the modern weapons of war was foredoomed to failure."

East, Poland, Hungary and the like."

"Such criticisms have to be left unanswered, not because they are justified, but because the information available to us cannot he advertised before the event," he said.

Mr. Dulles spoke as this year's against a tyranny equipped with Lamont lecturer. The lecture was part of the university's observance of the Woodrow Wilson

servance of the Woodrow Wilson

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N. Y. TIMES

52 DEC 10 1956

(P).—Allen W. Dulles said yes-close off their people from access terday Soviet leaders made two to the realties of the outside errors fatal to the Kremlin dictatorship in the "Tito experiment" and in introducing ,mass education to the Russian people.

"It is not too much to predict that the Soviet Union can never be the same as it was in the days of Stalin," Mr. Dulles, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, said.

'In a "Lamont Lecture" at Yale University on the life of Presi-dent Woodrow Wilson, Mr. Dulles dent woodrow which, Mr. Dulles said, "We are now going through dramatic days in our relations with the Soviet Union and it seems that some inexorable laws are at last catching up with the Soviet system."

Raised Question in 1955

He said he had raised the question 18 months ago in view of Kremlin approval of "the Tito form of heresy." How could the Soviet Union "deny the European satellites the right to a similar heresy?"

"I only wish that this question had been a prophecy," Mr. Dulles said, "because it is proving to be true. Poland has already made moves in this direction. In Hungary the people were unwilling to accept a halfway station toward liberty and have electrified the world by their struggle for complete independence. In doing so, they have tended to disprove the theory so long held that revolt against tyranny equipped with modern weapons of war was foredoomed to failure.

"Whatever the final outcome in Hungary, those who have sacrificed themselves will not have failed. They have alerted the world once more to the meaning of Soviet despotism, and have struck a blow for freedom which will rank in history with the American and French revolu-

Mass Education Backfires Mr. Dulles said the Kremlin made a ratal error" in calcu-

lating that it could eafely introduce mass education into the Soviet Union and that those who were educated in science and technology would not come to think in political terms as well."

"Education has made it diffi-NEW HAVEN, Conn., Nov. 28 Soviet leaders to continue, to

Belmont Mason Mohr Parsons Rosen Tamm Nease Winterrowd Tele. Room Holloman . Gandy .

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 7/03/50 BY APL

Wash. Post and
Times Herald
Wash. News
Wash. Star 2-19
N. Y. Herald
Tribune
N. Y. Mirror
N. Y. Daily News
Daily Worker
The Worker
New Leader
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UTIG & L - Yellow 1 - Mr. Belmont 1 - Didison Section Legal Attache, London August 1. 1957. G2 833 38 - 32 RECORDED - 2 1 - Mr. Papich ALLEN W. DULLES ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED DIRECTOR HEREIN IS UNCA STEVED EXCEPT CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY WHERE SHOWN WTHERWISE. For your information, Mr. Dulles is scheduled to leave Washington, D. C., on August 1, 1957, for a trip to Europe where he will call at various Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) stations I He will spend some time vacationing, very likely, in Switzerland. If Dulles calls at offices of any Legal Attaches, he should be treated courteously but you should not get involved in the discussion of any official business without first consulting the Bureau. 1 - Paris 1 - Madrid CLASSIFIED BY SP a ALM LEHC I - Rome DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1 - Bonn 1 - Foreign Liaison Unit (detached) Classified by SOL by MW SJP:bjt/t Declassify A: QADR Cover memo Roach to Belmont. 7/30/57, same caption SJP:bjt 511 by .21 st 20 A Reviews no deletions per OGA 9/7/10 Tolson Nichols . Boardman' Belmont Mason Mohr . Parsons Tamm 6,0 AUG Nease Winterrowd Tele. Room Holloman Mail Room Gandy

#### Office Membrandum UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Mr. A. H. Belmont TO

DATE: July 30, 1957

Tolson

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Mohr Parsons

Rosen

Tamm

Nease . Winterrowd Tele. Room

Gandy.

FROM :

Mr. R. R. Roac

SUBJECT:

ALLEN W. DULLES

DIRECTOR

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

ALL THYORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCHASSIFIED EXCEPT

WHERE SHOWN ONHERWISE.

The Liaison Agent has been informed that Allen Dulles Holloman will depart from Washington, D. C., on Thursday, August 1, will depart from wasnington, D. C., constant be calling at 1957, for a trip to Europe, where he will be calling at 1957, for a trip to Europe, where he will be calling at 1957, for a trip to Europe, where he will be calling at 1957, for a trip to Europe, where he will be calling at 1957, for a trip to Europe, where he will be calling at 1957, for a trip to Europe, where he will be calling at 1957, for a trip to Europe, where he will be calling at 1957, for a trip to Europe, where he will be calling at 1957, for a trip to Europe, where he will be calling at 1957, for a trip to Europe, where he will be called the property of the pro various Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) stations. will also be vacationing, very likely, in Switzerland.

#### ACTION:

Enclosed herewith is a letter to our Legal Attaches in Europe. In the past, Dulles has paid courtesy calls on some of our Legal Attaches. It is not expected that he will bring up any official business but the Legal Attaches are being instructed not to get involved in such matters without first checking with the Bureau.

Enclosure Level 6-1-57

SJP: bjt bjt

1 - Mr. Belmont

1 - Foreign Liaison

1 - Liaison Section

1 - Mr. Papich

CLASSIFIED BY SP 2 DECLASSIFY ON: 6/21/99

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EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC ECLASSIFICATION ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HORITY DERIVED FROM: AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE EXEMPTION CODE 25X(uc/baw 60324) Office Memorandum UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT per oga letter dated 9/7/10 SEE REVERSE TO MR. A. H. BELMONT DATE: April 5, 1957 SIDE FOR CLASSIFICATION ACTION FROM : MR. R. R. FOR INSTRUCTIONS AS JOSEPH ALSOP SUBJECT: Mohr TO DISSEMINATION Parson SEE FILE 100 - 3544-77-208 Roser Tamm Nease Winter: On April 4, 1957, Agent Papich met with Allen Tele. f Dulles and James Angleton of the Central Intelligence Hollon Agency (CIA), at which time Dulles volunteered some comments concerning the instant case. Dulles had just finished reading a summary of information concerning Alsop compiled by the Bureau Dulles remarked, "This is really a tough one." He stated that as far as he was concerned, it would be most important to identiFy homosexuals in Government who might have been utilized by Alsor as sources, since such individuals would naturally be vulnerable to recruitment by the Soviets. Dulles expressed the opinion that (V) Alsop very likely would not divulge very much information along these lines. Shortly after, Agent Papich met with Angleton; Dulles was not present. Angleton advised that a cable had just the capie. Angleton The following was the pertinent information bl per Alsop manifested a casual attitude relative to the interview and tried to give the impression that he was no disturbed about his situation nevertneless, describe. Alsop as being under "heavy emotional strain." Alsop admitted that he had engaged in homosexual activity with several Government clerks in Washington, D. C. He emphasized that most of his homosexual activity had taken place in New York City. emphatically refused to identify any individuals. He claimed that he did not know of any top Government officials who were homosexuals. He told Welch that he expected that an investigation was being conducted in Washington, D. C., concerning his activities and as far as he was concerned, this would be "fruitless." He stated that while Guy Burgess, former British diplomat, was in Washington, D. C., he and Burgess had the same boyfriend. He refused to identify the boyfriend. Alsop state that while in Moscow, he did not see or seek Burgess. claimed that he has never engaged in any homesexual activity SJP: bal (4) 1 , 50,0 NOT RECORDED 36 APR 12 4957 1 - Liaison Section 20 APR 174857 2 a. THE PARTY IN 1 - Mr. Papich Borand

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

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Wemo Wr. Roach to Wr. Belmont SECRE Re: JOSEPH ALSOP

(5)

with any Soviet other than with the exception of the recent incident in Moscow. Alsop indicated that he would remain in Europe; that he was proceeding to Cairo, Egypt; that he planned to travel to satellite countries; and that he expected to return to Moscow for a visit.

Angleton advised Agent Papich that the foregoing information had not yet been furnished to Dulles and that for the time being, he was furnishing it strictly for the Bureau's information. He stated that complete details of the interrogation would be furnished to the Bureau

Angleton then volunteered some observations on a b1 per strictly confidential basis. He stated that at the presentb3 time in CIA the only individuals who were familiar with the recent Alsop development were: Allen Dulles General Cabell Frank Wisner. Colonel Sheffield Edwards,

and Angleton. Angleton stated that Dulles himself had been a good friend of the Alsops and that when Dulles first came to Washington a few years ago; he stayed at the Alsop home. In Angleton's opinion, this had been a stupid move on the part of Dulles. Angleton personally feels that Dulles is a man of integrity and that he has never left himsel; in a position where he could be compromised by Alsop. Angleton was particularly referring to possible leaks of information from Dulles. Angleton stated that a few weeks ago, Dulles and Alsop had a bitter argument as a result of some information which Alsop had printed in one of his columns. The information was directly related to a briefing which Allen Dulles had made before the National Security Council. Dulles called Alsop and charged him with "treasonable conduct."

With regard to Wisner, Angleton advised that this was a different situation. He stated that Wisner, for years, has been a close friend of Alsop's and Angleton is now greatly concerned because Wisner might be inclined to adopt a subjective rather than an objective attitude toward the case. Angleton stated he is doing everything possible to make certain that Wisner does not assume a dominating or directing position with regard to action taken by CIA in this matter

Angleton stated that another individual who presents a problem is Robert Amory, Deputy Director of Intelligence, CIA, Amory is one of the key men in CIA's preparation of intelligence estimates. According to Angleton, Amory has been a close friend of both Alsops




Memo Roach to Belmont Re: Joseph Alsop

(5)

(S)

Angleton made the observation that both CIA and FBI should not forget the fact that in the past, at least, Carmel Offie was friendly with Joseph Alsop. Offie has been reliably reported to be a homosexual. Angleton raised one question with Liaison Agent. He stated that in his opinion, by now, Thust have some knowledge of the Alsop incident in Moscow. Angleton inquired if the Rureau had any objection if he checked with on this matter. He plans to inquire as to exactly what the might have bl per OBSERVATION: b3 Although Angleton feels that Allen Dulles himself is not vulnerable as a result of his associations with Alsop, the Liaison Agent received the very strong impression on April 4, 1957, when he met with the Director of CIA, that Dulles was extremely worried. Dulles undoubtedly is going over in his own mind concerning all meetings he ever had with Alsop. Furthermore, he undoubtedly cannot forget the fact that many of his own employees have been closely associated with the subject. In this connection, we should bear in mind that several CIA officials have been very active in the Georgetown social set, which included Alsop. ACTION: If you approve, Liaison will advise Analeton that any decision he makes concerning contacting the is his own that contact with the on this matter will not interfere with Pureau operations; and that if he develops any information of interest to the Bureau, we would like to be advised



STANDARD FORM NO. 64

### Office Memorandum UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

: Mr. A. H. Belmont

DATE: September 18, 1957

Nease Winterrowd Tele. Room

Gandy.

Holloman -

FROM: Mr. R. R. Roach

SUBJECT: ALLEN DULLES, DIRECTOR

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

The Liaison Agent was informed on September 17, 1957, that Allen Dulles is departing for the West Coast on the afternoon of September 18, 1957. He is scheduled to make a speech at a dinner affair sponsored by the Advertising Council, Incorporated. It is believed that the speech will be made in Los Angeles.

On September 17, 1957, James Angleton of the Central Intelligence Agency confidentially advised that Dulles had been requested by his brother, the Secretary of State, to make the speech which reportedly will have ramifications in our foreign policy field.

ACTION:

None. For your information.

INFORMATION CONTAINED

- Mr. Nichols 1 - Mr. Belmont .

1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan

1 - Liaison Section 1 - Mr. Papich

SEP 20 1957

no deletions per OGA letter 9/7/10.

STATERE FORM NO. 64

## fice Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Mr. A. H. Belmont TO

DATE: September 25, 1957

Boardman Belmont Mason

Rosen

Tamm Nease

Winterrowd

Tele. Room Holloman

FROM: Mr. R. R. Roach ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: ALLEN W. DULLES 85 BY DOUDIAL

ADDRESS MADE BEFORE

ADVERTISING COUNCIL, INC.

SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

SEPTEMBER 19, 1957

Enclosed herewith is a copy of a speech entitled The Communists Also Have Their Problems," made by Allen Dulles before the Advertising Council, Inc., at San Francisco, California, on September 19, 1957. This document was furnished to the Liaison Agent on September 23, 1957, by Dulles.

This speech has already been publicized in newspapers. states that the ideological fervor "is seeping out of the international revolutionary communist movement, particularly in the Soviet Union." He states that Marxism was not designed for the atomic age and Russia is now confronted with numerous and complex industrial and technological problems which can't be resolved by applying Marxist and Leninist principles. Dulles claims that collective leadership in Russia has failed, as evidenced in the disposals of Molotov and Kaganovich. According to Dulles, the claim that the purpose of recent changes in the Soviet administration was to return to pure Leninist communism is "camouflage." Dulles asserts that communist and Marxist theories did not play decisive roles in the struggle in Russia and, to the contrary, "it:was a question of power politics."

Dulles stated that the Soviet leaders are divided on three issues: (1) The decentralization of industry. He points out that this decentralization will remove some of the power from the central government at Moscow to the provinces and, thus, create a problem. (2) The S agricultural problem. Dulles refers to this as the "Achilles heel" of the Soviet system. He states that Khrushchev's responsibility for the policy of investing heavily in the semi-arid and virgin lands is great 5 and may put Khrushchev on the spot. He points out that 45% of Soviet  $\sqrt[4]{8}$ . labor is on farms as compared with the figure of 10% in the United States. (3) Foreign policy and policy toward the European satellites Khrushchev continues to be vulnerable because of the policy followed with regard to Yugoslavia and for promoting a doctrine of "differing roads to Socialism." 02- 63388-JJ RECORDED-46

Dulles maintains that the Russian people still live in any dream world, considering everything outside of Russia. He is of the opinion that the Russians will continue to restrict their people from

Enclosure SJP:bjt (6) by 1 - Mr. Nichols

1 - Mr. Belmont 1 - Mr. W. C. Sulliva

1 - Liaison Section

1 - Mr. Papich

Memorandum Mr. Roach to Mr. Belmont RE: ALLEN W. DULLES ADDRESS MADE BEFORE ADVERTISING COUNCIL, INC. SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA SEPTEMBER 19, 1957

learning what goes on in the outside world. He states that there is student and intellectual unrest in Russia which may develop into a serious problem. He further points out that the Soviet leaders can't hold back the desire of their scientists and technicians to learn and expand their knowledge.

Dulles states that today communism is more valuable as an article of export than it is as a solution for the Soviet problems. He states that communism continues to have an appeal in undeveloped areas but in those countries where industrialization has expanded, communism is losing its appeal.

Dulles makes an interesting analogy in comparing communism as a revolutionary movement with the French Revolution. He describes the pattern as follows: Intellectuals assert themselves and adopt a "reform program." Revolutionary elements then take over from the intellectuals which leads to a reign of terror. Successive groups of leaders are destroyed with each change in the revolution. "Eventually human nature rebels and demands a more normal life. Then the practical political and military leaders depose the extremists." Dulles comments on the foregoing by stating that military dictatorship is one of the possible lines of evolution in the Soviet Union.

#### ACTION:

None. For your information.

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Land 12 day

"THE COMMUNISTS ALSO HAVE THEIR PROBLEMS"

ADDRESS BY ALLEN WELSH DULLES,
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
BEFORE THE ADVERTISING COUNCIL, INC.,
19 September 1957
ST. FRANCIS HOTEL,
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

It is a privilege to have this opportunity to recognize publicly the generosity of the Advertising Council in devoting so great a share of its time and resources in the general welfare. You have freely supported those great causes which promote domestically and internationally the ideals of our people. You have been in the forefront of campaigns to alert the people of this country to the dangers of alien and destructive movements such as international communism. As one in Government who has had the opportunity of judging of the effectiveness of this work, I wish to express gratitude.

It may seem a bit paradoxical that the Director of Central Intelligence should be addressing the Advertising Council. You represent the trend -- which seems quite irresistible -- that "it pays to advertise."

I am the head of the silent service and cannot advertise my wares. Sometimes, I admit, this is a bit irksome. Often we know a bit more about what is going on in the world than we are credited with, and we realize a little advertisement might improve our public relations. For major reasons of policy, however, public relations must be sacrificed to the security of our operations.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

. 12 - 83338 - 33 You and we, however, have much in common. We are both deeply concerned with the impact of ideas on human behaviour. In carrying out one of the Central Intelligence Agency's important tasks — that of estimating future developments in the foreign field — the ability to analyze public reactions is essential in our job. We, as you, have to judge whether ideas have a transitory value or will have an enduring effect upon the behaviours of people.

In particular, it is a fascinating study to follow the development of the ideas behind certain of the great revolutionary movements. Some such movements were promoted by religious fervor, some by brute military force, many by a combination of might and assertions of right. These movements have had their day -- long or short. Some have had broad geographic appeal -- some were limited to a particular area and the history of some has never really been deciphered. Our civilization, despite the dark ages, has been tough enough to survive the most vigorous and long-lived revolutionary assaults on mind and body.

Tonight I propose to give you the results of an analysis of the recent happenings within the Soviet Communist world and I shall be bold enough to draw certain conclusions which support my conviction that radical changes are taking place and more are in the making.

The initial ideological fervor, I believe, is seeping out of the international revolutionary communist movement, particularly in the Soviet Union. Marxism was not designed for the atomic age of the mid-twentieth century. Effective as Communism has been in establishing control of two powerful nations and imposing its will on a number of Satellite countries, it is beginning to encounter difficulties in coping with the complex industrial and technological problems of today. Further, while some of the industrial and military achievements of both the USSR and Communist China have stirred the pride of its citizens, Communism has failed to devise a political system capable of commanding the loyalties of governed peoples without resort to the cruel barbarities of mass terror. It has satisfied neither the ideals, the aspirations, nor the needs of the people subject to its domination.

Accordingly, the leaders of international communism are being forced to review their situation and to consider major changes—changes which strike at the very heart of the system. The theories of Marx and Lenin proved useful window—dressing behind which the Communists established their monopoly of political power—the so—called dictator—ship of the proletariat. These ideas are of little aid in guiding the Communist dictatorship in meeting the challenge of the world today.

What prophet is there left in Soviet Russia? Marx and
Lenin are given lip service, but their advice and counsel have
little applicability today. Stalin has been discredited though his embarrassing remains are still on view in the
Kremlin. Khrushchev is unlikely to blossom out as a
creator of new Communist doctrine though his impetuosity and
unpredictability remain a matter of grave concern in an international
situation as tense as that of today. Mao retains his role as a
prophet in China, but he, too, is having his troubles.

When Stalin disappeared from the scene a little less than five years ago, he left a clouded heritage. His later years of dictatorship had brought the Soviet Union close to war and disaster. Ventures in Greece, at Berlin, and finally in Korea had opened the eyes even of the credulous abroad. Domestically, harsh measures of forced industrialization and military buildup, successful as they were technologically, had left little place for meeting the needs of the people.

Moreover, the systematic cruelties of the secret police had created popular unrest, suspicion and despair. Khrushchev told us the story of how terror-ridden Soviet life had become in his now well-known secret speech at the 20th Party Congress over a year ago—a speech still unpublished in the Communist world. It was too strong medicine for popular consumption, although bits and pieces of it were allowed to leak out.

Stalin's successors had the difficult task of tempering a dictatorship but yet maintaining complete authority, of doing away with the Stalinist type of secret police repression and yet keeping the people under iron discipline, of maintaining a tight rein but still creating the impression, and giving some of the substance, of a new measure of freedom.

Beria found it hard to fit into this picture. He did not want to relinquish his personal control of the secret police through which he hoped to gain the top position. His plot was discovered and he was liquidated. Since then the military seems to have become the decisive element where force or the threat of force was required to support a political decision.

After the Beria crisis we were told that the dictatorship of the proletariat had become a collective leadership—more properly described as a collective dictatorship. True enough, the crisis of readjustment to the post-Stalin era brought together in uneasy harmony the surviving members of the governing body known as the Presidium of the Party. Many here at home and abroad wrongly estimated that this might be an enduring form of government. Actually bitter personal rivalries and basic differences of philosophies and outlook remain unreconciled.

The ultimate authority to make crucial decisions must rest firmly somewhere and that "somewhere" is unlikely for long to be

in a collective. Majority rule is appropriate for legislative and judicial bodies, but it does not function satisfactorily in the executive field, where decisiveness of action is essential.

For a time after Stalin's disappearance from the scene,
Malenkov tried to lead the collective team, seemingly down a course
which promised a better break for the people than they had ever had
before. In 1955 he was forced to confess his incapacity and Khrushchev took over, committing himself, like his predecessor, to the
collective rule formula.

Then, last June, the inevitable irreconcilable conflict of opinions emerged, the collective broke down and, with the approval of the military, in particular Zhukov, Khrushchev eliminated his rivals—Molotov and Kaganovich, who really felt that the old Stalinist and foreign policies were preferable, and Malenkov, who due to his relative youth, political experience, and apparent popularity, was a dangerous potential rival. At the moment, Khrushchev is busily engaged in implicating Malenkov in the crimes of Stalin's later days, classing him as "shadow and tool" of Beria. Since Beria was shot for treason, the threat to Malenkov is naked enough for all to see.

So the history of Soviet governmental changes repeats itself, although in a slightly different pattern from that of the two previous decades. Those recently purged have not yet been liquidated

like Beria or eliminated by mock trials such as those of the late 1930's. With a touch of almost sardonic humor, the miscreants have been assigned to the oblivion of Siberia or the darkness of Outer Mongolia.

It was the hand-picked Central Committee of the Communist
Party, with the backing of the Army, which played the decisive role
in last summer's changes in the high command. This suggests that
the Presidium on its own can no longer deal with recalcitrant
members, at least in a situation where the issues are closely drawn
and where those to be eliminated are not in a hopeless minority.

The claim that the purpose of these changes was to get back to the pure Leninist Communism of the past is camouflage. No differing theories of Communist and Marxist dogma played a decisive role in this struggle. It was a question of power politics in a situation where hard decisions had to be made in both the domestic and foreign fields. There were in fact very deep and fundamental divergences of views among the members of the Presidium and the collective failed to function because the differences were not susceptible of compromise.

Three main issues divided the Soviet leaders. The first concerned the decentralization of industry.

After years of extolling the virtues of a centrally planned economy, some of the Soviet leaders have recently begun to stress

the need of local initiative to improve efficiency at the plant level. By the use of local resources, it was hoped to ease the burden on transport facilities, minimize duplication of effort and stimulate managerial initiative. Acting on these theories, Khrushchev recently forced through a program to decentralize away from Moscow many elements of control of the great Soviet industrial machine, in the most sweeping reorganization of the economic management machinery since the first Five Year Plan was adopted in 1928.

Some 27 specialized economic ministries in Moscow were abolished and replaced by 105 regional economic councils.

Last June, several of Khrushchev's colleagues tried to reverse all this.

The reason for the reorganization is readily understandable if one tries to conceive of the bureaucratic mess which we would have if we attempted to manage from the Capital all the details of a growing industrial complex more dispersed geographically than that of the United States and approaching one-half of its size.

There should be eventual economic benefits from the decentralization, but Khrushchev's plan will creat as many problems as it solves.

A long period of transitional confusion is certain while new administrative command and coordination channels are worked out.

In the longer run, there is the danger for the Soviet Union that a

kind of economic provincialism will develop to threaten the dominance of the central government.

The reason for the bitter fight against this reorganization by many of Khrushchev's colleagues is clear. The decentralization will remove some of the power from the central government in Moscow and transfer it to the provinces. Here only two members of the Presidium are in a position to exercise real influence, Khrushchev, through his control of the party machinery throughout the Soviet Union, and the military, presently represented by Marshal Zhukov.

The second issue dividing the Soviet leaders in June last was the agricultural problem, often called the Achilles heel of the Soviet system. Khrushchev has been pressing for ever-increasing areas of State-controlled farm lands, on the pattern of the huge development he had started in the so-called "virgin lands" east of the Caspian, in order to make good the shortcomings of Communism's greatest flasco -- the collectivized farm system. This involves some 80 - 100 million acres; larger than the entire wheat acreage of the United States.

For many years Soviet emphasis on heavy industry and military strength drained manpower and capital investments away from the farms, making agriculture the stepchild of the Stalinist economy. In contrast with the rapid growth rate of other parts of the Soviet economy, for the past twenty years Soviet production

of agricultural commodities has failed to increase as fast as the population of the USSR.

After all, soil conditions, rainfall and temperature do not favor the Soviet Union despite its vast area. Less than 10% of the country is likely to produce reasonable agricultural yields in normal years. Moreover, the combination of bureaucratic mismanagement, and Communist neglect of the motivating force of personal incentives had resulted in an inefficiency of farm labor so great that it takes about one farm worker to feed and supply every four persons in the USSR, whereas the ratio in the United States is about one for every sixteen persons. Hence, 45% of Soviet labor is on the farms as compared with 10% of American workers.

Khrushchev's responsibility for the policy of investing heavily in the semi-arid, agriculturally marginal "virgin" lands is very great. So far he has been lucky, with one excellent crop and one fair one. This year (1957) promises to be only fair and there is no doubt that many Soviet leaders fear a major crop failure as the moisture is used up in the new lands. Even Mikoyan, who has stuck with Khrushchev so far and now is probably the number two man in the party, is said to have been dubious about the "virgin" lands program.

The final success or failure of the program is still to be determined and Khrushchev's personal reputation is deeply involved.

He has promised his people equality per capita with Americans in milk and butter by 1958 and in meat by 1961. This latter would involve an increase of 3 1/2 times in Soviet meat production which, to say the least, is an ambitious program, even taking into account the noted fertility of the rabbit, which is included in the Soviet calculations as well as their claimed ability to produce a larger number of twin lambs.

Finally, a third point at issue between Khrushchev and his opponents lay in the related fields of foreign policy and policy toward the European Satellites. Here Khrushchev was attacked by Molotov and his followers for having weakened the Soviet position by his policy of reconciliation with Yugoslavia and by his Austrian settlement. He was, in fact, vulnerable to the charge of having opened the flood gates to revolt by stimulating support for the doctrine of "differing roads to Socialism," a heresy that is now threatening the monolithic structure of the Soviet empire.

For a time during the Hungarian Revolution, the ranks in the Soviet leadership had closed and Khrushchev personally as well as his opponents must bear the responsibility for the ruthless intervention in November 1956. The scars of dissent remained, however, and in the indictment of Molotov by the Central Committee, his Yugoslav and Austrian policies are the subject of particular criticism. Hungary goes unmentioned.

Moscow's future policy toward the European Satellites remains unresolved. Though Molotov was vigorously attacked for his mistaken attitude, Khrushchev, since the Polish and Hungarian revolts, has feared the contagious influence of granting more freedom anywhere. Certainly none of the Soviet leaders cares to remember the precepts of Lenin, who had this to say in 1917:

"If Finland, if Poland, if the Ukraine break away
from Russia there is nothing bad about that....
No nation can be free if it oppresses other nations."

These were the major issues on which Khrushchev fought for, and by an eyelash won, the leadership of the Soviet Union.

There are many other burning problems facing the new group ruling the Soviet Union.

First of all, they have the problem of East-West contacts, which for propaganda purposes at least they strongly claim to favor. Can the leaders really permit the people of the USSR to have know-ledge of the facts of life? Do they dare open up to the press, to radio, to television?

Except for certain supervised and guided tours, the answer to this so far seems to be "no." We can guess how frightened they are from their panicky warnings to Soviet youth about being deceived by the words of the American boys and girls who went to Moscow

recently for the big Soviet Youth Festival.

Similarly, they do not dare publish such documents as the Khrushchev secret speech, the U.N. report on Hungary, nor the basic attack on Communist doctrine by the Yugoslav, Djilas, in his recently published book, "The New Class."

Instead of dealing with such criticisms openly, Soviet leaders try to sweep them under the rug and keep their own people in the dark.

There was recently published in Moscow a highly realistic novel, with the eloquent title Not By Bread Alone. It evoked great popular interest in the USSR because it showed some of the seamier side of political life and bureaucracy in the Soviet Union today. All the big guns of the Soviet regime began to fire at the author, Dudintsev, and Khrushchev himself recently lambasted the book as misguided and dangerous. It is significant that they have not yet banned it. Probably they were too late in realizing its subtle attack on the foundations of the Communist system.

By and large the bulk of the Russian people still live in a dream world about everything outside the USSR, and the most tragic part about this is the distorted facts and fancies the Soviet leaders give their own people about the allegedly hostile attitudes of Americans toward them. The exchange of a few controlled travelling delegations is not enough. The barriers to information and knowledge must be torn down.

The Soviet leaders also have to deal with the problems created by their own educational system and by the development of an industrial and technical elite. Under the lash of its pell-mell industrialization program, the USSR in the past decade has enormously speeded up the education of the Russian people, particularly in the scientific and technical field. As a result, the USSR is turning out hundreds of thousands of graduates of schools corresponding to our high schools and colleges.

It is true that in their educational system they emphasize scientific and technical fields much more than social sciences and the humanities. But knowledge is not an inert substance. It has a way of seeping across lines and into adjacent compartments of learning. The Soviet leaders, I firmly believe, cannot illuminate their scientific lecture halls and laboratories without also letting the light of truth into their history and economics classrooms. Students cannot be conditioned to turning off their analytical processes when the instructor changes a topic.

Student and intellectual unrest is a troublesome challenge
to a dictatorship. The Chinese Communists experimented briefly
with placating critics by liberalizing their thought-control system
-- emunciating the doctrine known as "let a hundred flowers bloom,
let a hundred schools of thought contend." In the face of the
far-reaching criticisms promptly voiced by Chinese intellectuals,

the Peiping regime quickly reversed itself and has only a few weeks ago resumed the practice of publicly executing students who dared to suggest that China's ills result in part from flaws in the Communist system itself.

The education which Soviet and Chinese Communist leaders give their people is a dangerous commodity for a dictatorship. Men and women who have their critical faculties sharpened are beginning to question why the Russian people cannot be freed from rigid Communist Party and police-state discipline, given a greater economic share of the fruit of their labors, and allowed to participate -- at least by an effective expression of consent -- in their own governing.

In the past the Soviets counted particularly upon their ability to appeal with success to the youth and the students. In 1905 Lemin wrote, "We are the party of the future but the future belongs to the young. We are the party of innovation, and it is to the innovators that youth always gladly gives its allegiance. We are the party of self-sacrificing struggle against the ancient rot, and the young are always readiest for sacrificial combat -- and we shall always be the party of the youth of the advanced class."

That proud boast could not be made today. The Hungarian students were ready for combat, but against the Soviets, not for them. The deep disillusionment of the Polish youth with the

Soviet-imposed version of Communism can be read in their brilliantly edited publications, and in spite of Soviet censorship there is evidence that they are read eagerly by those who can obtain them in the Russian universities.

The Soviet government can still organize massive propaganda circuses like the recent Moscow Youth Festival. They can train an ever increasing number of young scientists and technicians. They can bribe the ambitious with the rewards of power and special privilege in the swollen bureaucracy. But they are finding it increasingly difficult to enlist in their cause the self-sacrificing and idealistic young men that Lenin once so counted on and who are the real motive power of successful revolutionary movements.

The Soviet leaders also have the growing problem of the technical and managerial elite which has been created to run Soviet industry -- now being decentralized. It will not be easy to restrain this class of people from using its critical skills to question the cumbersome governmental and Communist Party bureaucracy and what it is doing -- or not doing -- to give the members of that elite a better life.

Probably it is out of respect for the growing perceptiveness of the people of Russia, and at least out of recognition of popular yearning for peace, that Soviet leaders have been forced to give lip service to disarmament, another grave problem before the Moscow

leaders. Now that the issue of conceding some form of inspection and control in the USSR is squarely presented, they are hesitating. This propsect goes against every tradition and instinct of the secretive and suspicious Communist dictators.

These are some of the practical issues which Khrushchev now faces. There is no easy solution. After all, dictatorships, whether of the Stalin or of the Hitler type, can for a time exact great sacrifices from their peoples and achieve great materialistic accomplishments. In fact, for a limited period, it may be easier for a dictatorship to make steel than bread and butter -- easier to build a mighty war machine than to satisfy the moral, spiritual and material needs of a great and diverse people. This is certainly the case with the Communist dictatorship in the USSR.

Today Communism is more valuable as an article of export than it is as a solution for the problems of a country like the Soviet Union, which is making great strides in fields of material progress, but which has still found no way of creating a government which can meet the needs and aspirations of its people.

Undoubtedly in many areas of the world, particularly those recently freed from Colonial rule, the image of Communism still has an appeal. It seems to combine the advantages of strict discipline at the top with the promise of quick industrialization.

These factors appeal to new nations struggling with the task of making a government work among peoples who have had little experience with it and who at the same time have the desire to become quickly an industrial force in their own right.

The politically unsophisticated peoples of the underdeveloped nations have yet to learn what the peoples of the Communist world are slowly coming to understand about Marxism and industrial growth. Djilas, the Yugoslav Communist heretic, put it well:

"Modern Communism began as an idea with the inception of modern industry. It is dying out or being eliminated in those countries where industrial development has achieved its basic purposes. It flourishes in those countries where this has not yet happened."

In fact, I would add to this that the force of ideological Communism seems weakest in those countries like the USSR, where it has been the longest in control. It has its strongest appeal to the minds of these peoples in the underdeveloped areas of the world where they have had no practical experience with it.

Viewed in broad perspective, Communism is only one of the many great revolutionary movements that have swept into world history. Such movements seemed to combine an ideology or a faith expressed as a program of action; and a discipline through a

political or military machine capable of organizing the energies of the people in order to carry out the ideas that have captured their imaginations and loyalties.

I realize that historical analogies are notoriously treacherous. But there may be food for thought in comparing the evolution of Soviet Communism with the classical periods of revolutionary movements. Possibly the closest parallel in history is with the French Revolution.

The pattern seems to be this: the intellectuals desert their political institutions and adopt what they call a "Reform Program." Then, revolutionary elements take over from the intellectuals and seize power, generally beginning with the moderates of the Danton type, and passing through the extremists like Robespierre, with a reign of inhuman zeal and terror. Successive groups of leaders are destroyed with each change in the tempo of the revolution. As Vergniaud said in the course of the French Revolution, "The Revolution, like Saturn, devours its own children." Eventually, human nature rebels and demands a more normal life. Then the practical political and military leaders depose the extremists.

Finally, in the case of the French Revolution, there was the temptation, to which they quickly yielded, to indulge in foreign military adventure, and -- eventually the access to power of the military man on horseback, Bonaparte. There is, naturally,

considerable speculation these days as to whether this last phase of the French Revolution will be repeated in the case of Soviet Communism. I have no crystal ball answer, but certainly military dictatorship is one of the possible lines of evolution in the Soviet Union.

From this analysis of developments in the Soviet Union, it is fair to conclude that I believe that the old Communist dialectic of Marx, Lenin and even Stalin does not answer the problems of the Soviet Union today — either those of its industrial growth or of its lasting control over the great peoples living within the Soviet Union.

It would flow from this that Khrushchev and whoever he may associate with himself in the leadership, assuming he keeps his control for a time, will have to determine how they are going to accomplish this dual task. Will they meet it by further relaxation, thereby increasing the moral and industrial potential of the Soviet Union itself, and the prospects of peace, but risking the loss of the Satellite countries? Will they attempt a reversion to something like Stalinism under another name as some of the tough, uncompromising language and actions from Moscow of recent days would suggest? Or will they be tempted to risk foreign venture with a view to uniting their people and their energies to meet alleged enemies they claim are encircling them?

These are the issues. I would not wish to suggest that what I have referred to as the decline of the Marxist Communism has left the Soviet Union materially weak in facing them. The Soviet may be ideologically less menacing, technologically its power is still increasing.

Throughout the entire revolution, once the Communist regime was firmly established in Russia, the emphasis was placed on heavy industry, and on building up the war machine. This has been a constant policy and has been one phase of Soviet life that has not been affected by changing leaders or interpretations of Communist ideology. After all, the men who are at the helm in the Soviet Union are not the original revolutionary heroes. Khrushchev and Mikoyan and their henchmen belong to the ever-present class of political careerists who see in a revolutionary movement the path to power and privilege. They did not make the revolution, like Lenin. It made them, and they want above all else to preserve their positions.

While Marxism at one time or another has invaded most segments of Soviet life, including the army with its political commissar and indoctrination agents, those who have planned the Soviet military buildup have been little hampered by it. In their concentration on the fields of nuclear energy, aircraft design and construction, and the development of guided missiles, they experienced little ideo-logical interference except during brief periods of Stalin's last hectic days.

Take, for example, the case of guided missiles. Here they never ceased work from the days of 1945 when they took over the German missile installation at Peenemuende with its rockets of a range between 150 to 200 miles. Now we know they have developed modern missiles of many times the power and efficiency of the German wartime models.

The Soviet Union which we face today presents a series of contradictions. Its leader has practically unrestrained power except for such control as the military may exercise, backed by a formidable war machine—a leader committed by his express policies to improve the lot of his people, and presumably committed also to relax the harsh controls of Stalin which he has described so vividly himself and which he purports to abhor.

At the same time, this leader, Khrushchev, faces the dilemma that any substantial relaxation at home or abroad, given the nature of the Communist dictatorship as it has evolved, may spell his own downfall. For he faces, and he knows it, a people who are questioning the basic tenets of Marxist Communism, and in particular a student body that is becoming more and more vocal in demanding the truth and may not be satisfied with half measures.

The Communist leaders are also facing a growing body of highly educated, technologically competent men and women in the

field of industrial management and production. It may prove impossible for them to stop the growing wave of intellectual unrest in the Soviet Union. Khrushchev cannot turn back education or stop technological development and keep the USSR a great power.

Yet Khrushchev seems to be in a hurry to solve a whole series of such problems as I have described and gain the personal success necessary to maintain his own position.

In addition to all this, he has deeply committed himself in certain foreign adventures, particularly in the Middle East -- partly, it may be assumed, to distract attention from problems at home and in the Satellites. All this rightfully makes us cautious in our judgments and does not suggest that there are any quick or easy ways out in our relations with the USSR.

But over the longer range, we can rest assured that revolutionary Communist tyranny cannot provide a final answer or a satisfactory answer to the needs of a civilized community. No power on earth can restore the myth that Communism is the wave of the future after 10 million Hungarians, after a decade of experience with it, and at the risk of their lives, gave it such a resounding vote of no confidence.

The people of Russia, if given the time to continue their evolution to freedom out of the narrow bounds of Communist dictatorship, will themselves help to find a peaceful answer.

# Office Memorandum · UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

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то :	MR. A. H. BELMONT	)	bruary 6, 1958
FROM :	MR. R. R. ROACH	HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIE	7 // -
subject:	ALLEN DULLES DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INT	TELLIGENCE AGENCY	Rosen Tamm Trotter Nease
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	which was "America's held at You subversive today. He been direct power, when on the best of more estate the sputnism declared the s	TO: MR. A. H. BELMONT  FROM: MR. R. R. ROACH  SUBJECT: ALLEN DULLES DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INT  Enclosed herewith are which was made by Dulles on Feb "America's Human Resources to M held at Yale University.  In his speech Dulles subversive and economic challen today. He emphasized that the been directed toward increasing power, whereas in this country w on the betterment of the lot of of more exchange of scientific  Dulles stated that th that the Soviet Union presently would involve the serious risk further stated that he did not take the position that the Sovi capability superior to our own.  Dulles advised that th gesources to meet the Soviet ch will be an easier task than to communism's programs of subvers declared that by ignoring warni the asputnik could become a kind ACTION:  ACTION:  None. For your infor SJP: jikely (6)  1 - Mr. Belmont 1 - Mr. Branigan 1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan 1 - Liaison Section 2 - Mr. Papich	TO: MR. A. H. BELMONT  FROM: MR. R. R. ROACH HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIE  SUBJECT: ALLEN DULLES  DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  Enclosed herewith are the contents of a si which was made by Dulles on February 3, 1958, at a c "America's Human Resources to Meet the World Scientific the Intersity.  In his speech Dulles outlined the nature of subversive and economic challenges of Russia as face today. He emphasized that the Soutet scientific res been directed toward increasing and strengthening So power, whereas in this country we have concentrated on the betterment of the lot of the individual. He of more exchange of scientific information with our  Dulles stated that there was no evidence i that the Soutet Union presently intends to follow a would involve the serious risk of nuclear war with t further stated that he did not know of any American take the position that the Soutet Union has an over- capability superior to our own.  Dulles advised that the "mobilization of h Resources to meet the Soutet challenge in the milit thill be an easier task than to mobilize to meet inte Communism's programs of subversion and economic pene declared that by ignoring warning signs and becoming the sputnik could become a kind of a Trojan horse.  ACTIONE.  None. For your information.  21 FEBI 25 1958  SJP:jlkoto  (6)

Conference on

America's Human Resources to Meet the World Scientific Challenge Yale University

February 3, 1958

AEN HAVEN

## THE SOVIET CHALLENGE

By Allen W. Dulles
Director of Central Intelligence

It is certainly timely that a group of experts such as is gathered here should consider America's human resources to meet the scientific challenge. My share of the task is to discuss the challenge presented by Soviet scientific and technological advances.

It is not easy to divide this problem into tidy compartments.

Science pervades the Soviet military threat, its industrial and economic progress. Much of the aid proffered to the newly developing countries in the free world includes technological assistance. Even on the subversive side of their operations they have shown great sophistication in the technical and scientific training of their agent personnel.

It is a challenge which calls for united and coordinated action. Hence right at the outset I wish to emphasize the value of measures to help pool the scientific assets of the United States with those of the free world wherever it will advance the common good and mutual defense. Steps in this direction have already been taken. More can and should be done.

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Many Process of the United States with those of the free world wherever it will advance the common good and mutual defense. Steps in this direction have already been taken. More can and should be done.

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I appreciate the security reasons often advanced for moving slowly and here is a field in which I can speak with some authority. The security factor deserves consideration but when properly balanced against the gain from freer scientific exchange, there will be plenty of leeway to go further than we have.

If legislative bars against certain phases of our cooperation with other countries in the nuclear field are removed, it will be a major step forward. Exchanging ideas on weapons development will certainly be of value in the field of intelligence since it would improve our ability to analyze and understand the nature of the Soviet nuclear threat.

Other informational exchanges between countries where each has the capacity to help the other will advance the common cause.

For us and our allies to keep scores of top scientists working separately and mutually uninformed on the same problems may be a waste of scarce resources that we can ill afford.

In your earlier meetings today I understand you have been considering the building up and marshaling of America's human assets, particularly in the scientific field, to meet the Soviet threat. In the somewhat circumscribed area of my own work, much of my time during the last seven years has been directed to a somewhat

similar end, namely how scientific assets and techniques can be most effectively used to increase our overall ability to interpret developments in the Soviet Union.

One result of this study has been to emphasize the need for current appraisals of our relative position to the Soviet in technical fields of critical importance to national security. The missile field is a good example.

Relative positions of course change from time to time as one side or the other places greater emphasis in a particular field of endeavor. This calls for constant study and re-study, but with a proper perspective of where we stand relative to the Soviet Union we can develop our foreign and defense policies with a better basis for sound decision.

During the past few months the world has had a spectacular demonstration of the great technical competence of the Soviet, notably in the field of earth satellites and ballistic missiles.

To those who have been closely following developments in the Soviet Union these came as no great surprise.

Contrary to what may be the generally accepted view, these happenings have not caused us to make any basic changes in our earlier estimates of the Soviet challenge. It was serious before. It appears to be slightly more so today.

Here and there time tables of when various Soviet new weapons might come into use have been moderately advanced, particularly in the ballistic missile field. Soviet Sputniks and recent ballistic missile tests have not altered the overall appraisals of Soviet capabilities and intentions reached a year or more ago.

We must really thank the Soviet for having dramatized their competence and mightily reduced, in this country at least, the ranks of those who could not bring themselves to believe in the high technological capability of the Russians.

Long complacently accustomed to being first, it has been a shock to the American public to find that that is not the case in a particular field and an important one. We were first in the development of long range aviation, in the dramatic break-through in the atomic field and in thermonuclear fusion, and then, as evidenced by the atomic submarine, in the application of atomic power in an important military area. On analysis one would find that the margin of our lead, here and there, had been tending to narrow.

Then in a dramatic way the Soviets had their "first" and there is a tendency to feel that there was some failure to keep the American people advised as to Soviet scientific progress which led to this result.

Also, many have instinctively assumed that in the fields of scientific achievement a free enterprise system would inevitably lead a state like the Soviet whose economy was controlled by a communist-type state dictatorship.

Achievements do not depend so much on the type of government, so long as the latter is technically competent and has a willing or subservient people at its beck and call. It depends on the goals and priorities set, the promptness and the correctness of the decisions reached, and the energy applied in terms of man hours with the proper tools and equipment.

Under normal conditions a liberal free enterprise society concentrates on the development of what the people want to improve their living standards. In a society controlled by dictatorial leaders, with the centralization and socialization of production, the leaders are able, for a time at least, to fix the goals and priorities. What the mass of the people want comes second. I have said "for a time." It may be difficult to carry on such a policy indefinitely. Some day the people may rebel against such programming.

The USSR has a national product of some 40% of our own.

If one includes on our side the segment of the free world allied with us and adds to the Soviet the questionable assets of the unhappy

European satellites, the margin in favor of the West is much greater.

Yet the Soviet today are producing in the military field, hardware and assets very nearly equivalent to our own. The fact that they are able to do this with less than half of our industrial

potential is due largely to three factors: (1) the different cost basis for military manpower as contrasted with that for us; (2) the larger percentage of gross national product devoted to military ends; (3) the concentration of scientific competence in military fields.

Under these circumstances is it surprising that from time to time we will have the shock of finding that the Soviet have outstripped us in some particular military field where for longer periods of time they have put in more concentrated effort than we, as for example, in the missile field.

Granting something like equality of brain power applied on each side, the answer comes close to being a mathematical one and there is no reason to seek any mysterious or sinister cause.

The fact is that since shortly after the close of the war in 1945, when they took over the German missile hardware and a large group of German scientists with their blueprints and plans in Peenemunde and elsewhere, they have spent in this field more man hours than we. They have done it under highly competent Soviet scientific and technological leadership with the necessary tools, equipment and priorities. While they profited greatly by German technological achievement up to 1948, during the last decade it has been largely a native Soviet achievement.

History is full of examples where the high standard of living countries -- placing emphasis upon those things which make the rounded, developed and cultured human being with leisure for a broadened life -- have failed to comprehend the extent and nature of external threats from the Spartas which have concentrated on military might. All you need do is read your history from the Greek and Roman days right down to England and France before World War II, or even our own history.

A free people such as ours seem to require at periodic intervals dramatic developments to alert us to our perils.

Some people seem to think that this shock treatment should be replaced by a continuous process of indoctrination which could and should be furnished by government officials. I am somewhat doubtful as to the efficacy of this.

Most Americans seem to be from Missouri. Seeing is believing.

By and large, the press does a good job in this field. Its sources of information are wide and varied. Jeremiads from government leaders are generally regarded as tinged with political or budgetary motives.

It was only by orbiting our own Explorer that an effective answer was made to the American people as to our own technical competence in the missile field. No amount of speech making would have done it.

Recently it has been hinted that if only the Central Intelligence Agency had been believed, everything would have been well. This is flattering but a great over-simplification. There never has been a time in history to my knowledge when intelligence has had as clear an opportunity to get its views over as it has had in this country in recent years. The National Security Act of 1947, creating the Central Intelligence Agency, has given Intelligence a more influential position in our government than Intelligence enjoys in any other government of the world. If in our government, intelligence estimates have not always had the impact that in the light of hindsight they may have deserved, responsibility must be shared by the intelligence producer. We have the chance to sell our wares.

No intelligence appraisal could have had the impact of a Sputnik.

Maybe it was necessary that over the last decade in our relations with the USSR, we had to have a series of political, economic and military Sputniks -- costly as some have been -- to keep us periodically alerted to our dangers, though once a particular crisis is over, we quickly forget the past.

First came the Soviet threat against Western Europe, Greece and Turkey after World War II. This led to the Marshall Plan and

and the Korean War in 1950. Each of these, plus the tragic loss of China and Czechoslovakia, has helped to alert us to the elements of political subversion and war by proxy in the communist menace. Hungary should have convinced us that the Soviet will not hesitate to use brute force in what they choose to call their area of influence. Now with the Sputnik and ballistic missiles, the free world knows better the nature of the competition we face in the field of science and military technology.

Knowledge of the nature of this particular Soviet scientific challenge has been brought home to the American people through the length and breadth of the land. It is the greatest advertising job ever done. The Soviet really wrote it in the sky.

For a time at least, it will not be hard to convince anybody that we really are up against a competitor with a highly developed scientific and technical competence. We can thank the Soviet that this particular selling job was done effectively in 1957 and not delayed until 1958 or later.

Under these circumstances we shall be better able than before to mobilize our assets, human and material.

What are the immediate issues, the challenges we face?

There is no evidence, as I see it, that the Soviet Union

presently intends to follow a policy which in their view would involve

the serious risk of nuclear war with the United States. They most

certainly have a healthy respect for our present military capabilities

and our great industrial potential. They recognize the present

limitation on their own. They recognize that nuclear war at this

time would result in devastating damage to them. They probably

question their present capability to deal a knockout blow and

consequently would expect that their own devastation under

retaliatory attack would be very great.

Comparative estimates of military strengths do not lie in my field of particular competence. This much I can say. I do not know of any American experts in the field whose views I respect, who take the position that today the Soviet Union has an overall military capability superior to our own.

What rightfully concerns us, however, is the dynamic growth in Soviet military and industrial power. Their further successes in the ballistic missile field and in the development of an arsenal of weapons with nuclear warheads would tend to change the nature of the threat to our security.

I am by no means suggesting that our concern is solely in the missile field or that we take seriously Khrushchev's remark about treating aircraft as museum pieces. This quip was probably motivated, in part, by the desire to downgrade our own Strategic Air Command during a period when the Soviet were in a position to flaunt their success with the guided missile. After all, we do not credit the Soviet with the industrial potential of developing and producing at the same time and with equal priority and on a massive scale all possible weapons in the modern military armory. They must make choices just as we.

We do have some evidence, however, that as much as a decade ago the Soviet turned to the guided missile as a challenging competitor to the bomber. What we badly needed back in 1945 was a Billy Mitchell for ballistic missiles.

Today we need wisely to use the time, which intelligence appraisals indicate we have, to build up our own capabilities and to see to it that any gap in time, during which they may have any superiority in the missile field, is reduced to negligible proportions and counter-balanced by the use of our substantial geographic advantages and general retaliatory power.

In most of our scientific breakthroughs we have had the disadvantage of being the front runner; the pioneer. In guided missiles

we can profit by the experience of others and we have just received a fine dividend of confidence in our own achievements.

We are alerted to the problem, to the technical competence of the opposition. We are still moving from a position of strength and forewarned should be forearmed.

The mobilization of human and other resources to meet the Soviet challenge in the military field will be an easier task than to mobilize to meet international communism's programs of subversion and economic penetration. Yet the latter today are their first lines of attack, with the military buildup remaining in reserve.

They have given us nothing quite as dramatic as the Sputnik to advertise what they are doing in the Middle East, Asia and Africa. Possibly they learned a lesson from the Marshall Plan and have no stomach for inciting us into a new competition on any grand scale in the uncommitted areas of the world.

But if we should ignore these warning signs and go missileminded to the exclusion of adequate defense against other dangers, the Sputnik can become a kind of Trojan horse. We might win the military race and yet lose great areas of the world that are vital to our own national security. The international communist apparatus with its communist parties and cells, its economic, technical, and military aid programs based on Moscow, Prague and Peiping, has a closely orchestrated, well disguised mechanism for the advancement of its cause. The economic side of it outwardly looks somewhat like our own -- until the objective is uncovered.

Communists work in and through the parliaments of many countries of the world. They try to use the democratic processes in order to defeat the basic aims of a free form of government. They had a part in writing many of the constitutions in the free world in the early post-war days and did so with the very objective of putting strong authority nowhere and helping to produce chaos everywhere.

The policy of keeping countries divided -- Germany, Korea,

Viet Nam and until recently Austria and Laos -- was an example of
their techniques. This development is beginning to boomerang as the
free peoples in the divided areas are furnishing studies in contrast
between what a people working in freedom can do as contrasted with
people under the domination of Moscow or Peiping.

Soviet progress in the scientific and technological field is used as a powerful argument in their appeal to the uncommitted areas.

Well before Sputnik the peoples in these areas were deeply impressed by the fact that the USSR in less than four decades had come from being a backward country into the position of the second greatest power in the world and a leader in the scientific field.

Certainly we should be more effective in bringing home to these people what has actually transpired in the areas that have been subject to Soviet colonialism or have been the unwilling objects of Soviet exploitation and domination.

Unfortunately, distance seems to lend enchantment and we can hardly expect the people of Java, to take only one instance, to understand fully the dangers which Soviet communism means for them.

Meanwhile in the Middle East, Africa and in South and Southeast Asia, the Soviet programs of arms and economic and scientific aid have helped to fan the flames of nationalism and anti-colonialism. The total of communist aid, economic, scientific and military, does not approach ours but they have cleverly concentrated on certain particular countries where they feel they can make the most impact.

Soviet educational programs are helping to build up a reservoir of technicians equipped in the lore of foreign countries. They also bring to Moscow University and other Soviet and satellite institutions large numbers of native students for training, particularly in the scientific

fields. If the Soviet scientific educational program continues at its present pace, they will have a growing reserve of trained scientists for export.

I trust that one of the results of this meeting may be to help us to find in the free world competent technicians willing to journey to the four corners of the earth to help build up the indigenous capabilities of the new countries. In any study of our own human resources to meet the scientific challenge it is well to remember that this cannot be done solely on the drawing boards of our own scientific institutions. It will also have to be done in the steel mills of India, on the dams of the great rivers of Asia and Africa, and in the industrial plants of the newly freed countries.

The contest for the minds and allegiance of millions of people is just beginning to be engaged. We cannot afford to neglect it.

I have tried to sketch the nature of the military, subversive and economic challenges of the USSR as we face them today. As one looks at the longer perspective, it is necessary to take into account the plans of Communist China to press forward on its own program of industrialization and militarization.

We have the capacity to meet these present challenges. They are definite in nature, measurable in amount and have back of them

far less in the way of assets, human and material, than we and our allies can muster if we will. But this is not just one confrontation. The challenge may be one of considerable duration.

The Soviet Union is still programming a rapid increase in its industrial production. It boasts that it will eventually close the gap between its own production and ours. If this program is even partially realized and also assuming some increase in the consumer's share of the total national production, the Soviet, if they are so minded, can year after year put ever increasing amounts into their military establishment and foreign economic programs.

To the extent that the Sino-Soviet peoples are willing, with Spartan determination, or with unquestioning obedience to arbitrary authority to follow such a policy, they can make the going harder and harder for us. Undoubtedly, no small segment of their future effort, as in their past, will go into science.

A distinguished Indian editor who visited successively the USSR and the United States, put this question repeatedly to the people with whom he talked, "What is the purpose of your system, of your society?" As well can be imagined, he received a multiplicity of answers from Americans, but in one form or another, they had to do with the improvement of the lot of the individual, man and

woman. In the Soviet Union, he reports, he received one universal response from people of low and high degree, "The purpose of our system is the advancement of science."

For many years I have felt that the greatest hope for the future in our relations with the Soviet Union lay in their advancement in education even though in the short run this has been largely harnessed to their military machine.

Education, particularly in science, was essential to permit the Soviet effectively to compete in the power struggle in which it had engaged itself. It has accomplished this initial purpose.

Great scientists are great thinkers and thought has no narrow military limitations. It would seem incredible if the horizons of Soviet scientists and educators do not become greatly widened over the years and their talents devoted more directly to meeting the needs of the Soviet people for a more satisfying form of life.

It would be pleasant indeed if an enforceable international agreement could be reached that no more than say 5 or 10 per cent of the gross national product of a country could be diverted from the needs of the people to the production of armaments. As this is hardly practicable we must place our hopes that the future education in the Soviet Union will produce so many people who will demand this

result that no government could act otherwise.

While we must be ready for those forms of sacrifice which are necessary to meet the challenge of the Soviet Union, we must also seize the opportunities offered to help their education build a new life for the Soviet people.

Education may then be the key to the solution of problems which otherwise would seem insoluble.

We have recently been celebrating the 150th anniversary of the birth of General Robert E. Lee. It is interesting to note a passage in the book by a German Major of the Royal Prussian Engineers who was in the United States as a military observer in the Civil War. He was commenting on the fact that Lee's philosophy in his role as commander was to get his forces to the right place at the right time, and then trust his division and brigade commanders to do the rest. As an instance of this he writes the following, "During the battle of Chancellorsville, May 3, 1863, at the height of the combat, I stood beside the General under pretty heavy fire and an interesting episode of the battle was taking place before us. In spite of the great excitement in which the progress of the battle kept the great leader, he spoke to me, to my great astonishment, about the future education of the people."

Robert E. Lee had the genius for getting at the basic truths.

February 27, 1958

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED AS HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE TO BY OPL DE IMW Central Intelligence Agency faller of beautiful Administration Euilding,

2430 E Street, Northwest Washington, D. C.

Room 123

Mr. Allen W. Dulles

Dear Allen:

Director

It is a pleasure to autograph to you one of the first printed copies of the book "Masters of Deceit." The book, which is being forwarded under separate cover, will be released to the public by Henry Holt & Company on March 10th.

I am hopeful that this account of American communism from its beginning to the present will assist the American people in the struggle against the deadly menace of atheistic communism by explaining what can be done to combat it.

With kind personal regards,

Sincerely,

GEM:amg

**REC-85** 

FEB 28 1958

elmont.

FROM

OFFICE OF DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF IN

TO

# OFFICIAL INDICATED BELOW BY CHECK MARK

Mr. Tolson . Mr. Boardman Mr. Belmont \_\_ Mr. Mohr \_ Mr. Nease Mr. Parsons . Mr. Rosen -Mr. Tamm -Mr. Trotter \_ Mr. Holloman Miss Gandy -See Me ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED Note and Return. Prepare Reply -For Your Recommendation -What are the facts? Remarks: 1.75 HAR 6 04 PM 58

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moment in world history. The next half century will be full of change and growth and rising aspiration. We can assume that China and India, which number about half the human race, will reach industrial maturity by the end of the century. And what about all those other scores of millions in Asia, the Middle East, Africa and Latin America?

Latin America?
This is one of the great watersheds of history. At the turn of the 21st Century it is certain that there will be in those areas great powerful nations, capable of applying to their resources all that modern science can afford. Our children and our grandchildren will share the planet with the citizens of these newer resulting.

Mhat idnd of world will that be? Will it be domi-nated by new and bitter conflicts, rooted in bitter memo-ries from a difficult colonial past, in memories of racial discrimination, in memories of paintal difficulty faced alone during the awkward transition to modernization? alone during the awkward fransition to modernization? Or will it be a world held together by bonds of common humanity, by memories of shared adventure during the period of transition, by a common respect for the dignity, and stature of the individual human being, by a common will to maintain a regime of international order on this tiny planet?

I am deeply convinced that the outcome depends on what the governments and people of the industriatized world do now—over the next decade.

The present generation in the West bears a heavy and timescapable responsibility-for the kind of world

The present generation in the West bears a heavy and sinescapable responsibility for the kind of world in which their children and grandchildren will live. This is the ultimate stake—the ultimate interest—in what we call; so inadequately, foreign aid.

The Washington foreign aid conference was a bipartisan affair. Here, former President Truman (center), one of the main speakers, is greeted by (I to r.) Sen. Wiley (R-Wis.), Dean Acheson, Senate Democration of the main speakers, is greeted by (I to r.) Sen. Wiley (R-Wis.), Dean Acheson, Senate Democration of the main speakers, is greeted by (I to r.) Sen. Wiley (R-Wis.), Dean Acheson, Senate Democration of the main speakers, is greeted by (I to r.) Sen. Wiley (R-Wis.), Dean Acheson, Senate Democration of the without bombs and we are convinced that our cause will be victorious."

The total amount in credits and grants extended the Sino-Soviet bloc for economic development and material to countries in the free world cutside the by the propriet of the sino-Soviet bloc for economic development and material to countries in the free world cutside the by the predicted to an american correspondent, "will live under socialism in the sino-Soviet bloc for economic development and material to countries in the free world cutside the by the predicted to an american correspondent, "will live under socialism in the sino-Soviet bloc for economic development and the sino-Soviet bloc for econo

The subject assigned me this morning is tile Soviet economic and trade offensive: I shall broaden the term "Soviet" to include what we often refer to as the Communist bloc, that is, the Soviet Union, the European satellites and Com-munist China. Each plays a role in the economic and trade offensive of international communism.

It is not always easy to get the facts regarding the Communist world. In the field of their trade and ald,

Communist world. In the field of their trade and ald, however, many of the basic facts are well known.

Too often people tend to ignore the statements of those whose credibility they may have reason to question. Many years ago, Hitler In, "Mein. Kampf!" wrote what he proposed to do. He did if. Little attention was paid to his book until after he had gone to war.

In the case of the Soviet Union there has been an extraordinary consistency over the years in basic policy declarations and the subsequent actions of the Communist leadership.

munist leadership.

munist leadership.

The statement issued by the Soviet Union and their allies and satellites in Moscow last November on the 40th anniversary of the Bolsheyik revolution might well have been written by Lenin, The declaration of the recent Atro-Asian Conference in Cairo was on all fours with the program of the Congress of the Peoples of the East which the Soviet held in Baku in 1920, Lenin limself predicted in 1923 that the outcome of the struggle would be determined by the population masses of Russia, India and China.

Tactics charge—the timetable is elfaved as circum.

Tactics change—the timetable is altered as circum-stances demand. The overall objectives and strategy

remain much the same.

The evidence as we now see it indicates that the USSR, in striving toward their objectives, do not propose to use their military power in a manner which would involve the grave risk of war. They probably still estimate that our power of retaliation could more than match their offense.

In any event they have now alerted us to the dangers which lie in their growing military capabilities; they have shaken our complacency, and shown us that we could not always expect to be first in all phases of military endeavor. Neither the U. S. nor any other country has any monopoly on brains.

Their Sputniks and missiles have also taught us that we cannot afford to be second in any important military field.

.This particular conference is considering whether we can afford to be second to the Soviet in supporting friends and allies and in our relations with friends and allies and in our relations with the uncommitted newly developing countries of the world.

In pressuring for a period of relaxation of tensions In pressuring for a period of relaxation of tensions and coexistence it seems clear that the Soviets desire this for two purposes: first, to build their military strength and to develop the highly complicated modern weapons—ballistic and nuclear—and second, to press forward in the area where they probably consider usmost vulnerable; the winning of the allegiance and, eventually, the control of the uncommitted nations of the world by trade and aid, and by subversion.

They probably estimate that if they can induce us to devote our resources almost exclusively to the military field, they can the more easily break our economic and cultural ties with other nations and win

This month is the 10th anniversary of the take-over of Czechoslovakia by communism. Not a shot was fired. It was not guided missiles but the so-called "guided democracy" which did the trick, Prague-last July, Khrushchev said, "We can fight

will be victorious."

Our own grandsons, he recently predicted to an American correspondent, "will live under socialism in Winerica; too."

And, last October, he explained that "wars are not necessary for the victory of socialism, capitalism, will inevitably vanish from the historical arena just as was the case of feudalism which made room for capitalism."

These are the theories they openly preach to the world and they propose to go out into the world with missionaries of trade and aid to spread this doctrine.

While the Communist leaders have suppressed and liquidated more peoples of allen races and views within their area of control than any dictator or conqueror of the past, they ally themselves abroad with nationalistic aspirations. While they deny freedom to their satellites in Eastern Europe, they attack those countries which, like Britain, have voluntarily given freedom to many more peoples than the entire population of Russia itself.

We would be negligent, however, to ignore the fact that their trade and ald programs, backed with subtle propaganda, have had a significant impact. In effect the [Soviets] will buy anything trade anything and dump anything if it advances communism or helps to destroy the influence of the West.

The strings are invisible, The Soviets can move While the Communist leaders have suppressed and

The strings are invisible. The Soviets can move The strings are invisible. The Soylets can move quickly. They have no budgetary limitations or legislative restrictions. They have vast stores of obsolescent military equipment which looks new and shiny to countries in the infancy of military development, it can be given away without affecting the Soylets own military position. They will take in barter payment agricultural products and raw materials which we,



Allen Dulles A lesson from Lenin.

because of our surpluses, find it impracticable to accept.

The total amount in credits and grants extended by, the Sino-Soylet bloe for economic development and military aid to countries in the free world cutside the bloc over the last three years amounts to the equivalent of about \$2,000,000,000.

Over 95 per cent of this aid has been concentrated on six countries—Afghanistan, Egypt, Syria, Indonesia and Yugoslavia. In these countries over the indonesia and Tugosiavia. In these countries over me past two and a half years Soviet programs in aggregate have been more than double those of the free world. Of course, many other countries have received attrac-tive offers and many are today in the throes of deciding whether to seek aid from East or West.

The Soviet programs have also included a large-scale movement of technical personnel from the Communist bloc to the free world countries where ald is extended. More than 2,000 bloc technicians are now active in films of the newly developing countries in whilch comparable U. S. personnel number less than 1,000. Also large numbers of technicians are going from these countries to Moscow, Frague and Pelping for their training.

We believe the Soviets can and will continue their programs in free world countries a scale at least as great as we now witness. Both intra-bloc and external programs combined will require less than 1 per cent of their gross national product. The net economic cost over a period of years will be even less than this because from this program they will receive some needed raw materials and consumer goods. The Soviet programs have also included a large

## Guns and No Butter

I mentioned the appeal of the Sovlet program to the newly developing countries of the world. Many are too far away from Moscow to understand the meaning of Hungary, to analyze the dangers which communism spells for their newly found freedom.

They see thiaf Russia, which economically and industrially was a backward country a couple of decades ago, has in some manner mysterious to them become in a relatively short space of time the second greatest industrial and millifary power of the world. They do not realize that much of this has been achieved by profiting from the industrial revolution of the West; that it has been developed at the expense of the standards of living of the peoples of Russia; that housing and road-building and consumer goods have been sacrificed to heavy industry and weapons of war.

They tend to feel that the American economic standards are too high, too distant, too hard for them to attain. They are not overly impressed by the fact that last year we made about 60 automobiles to the Soviets one; or that finer are wide dispartites between the Soviets and ourselves in the standard of living. They do hope that they can eventually aspire to something

do hope that they can eventually aspire to something like the economic and industrial advancement of the Soviet Union. When the missionaries of Soviet society appear with their offers, the temptation is great. If there are no clear-cut alternatives the reaction is often

To leave the field open to this type of penetration esents us with grave dangers. What use is it if presents us with grave dangers. What use is it if we and our allies concentrate solely on building barlers against some future military attack while the Soviet envoys of trade, aid and subversion get behind those barriers?

On this day, 10 years since the takeover of Czechoslovakia, it is appropriate that you should be consider-ing the countermeasures which will be most effective in meeting these threats to our national security. They most certainly can be met with the resources which his country can command.

NEW YORK POST, SUNDAY, MARCH 2, 1958

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# It Happened allower...

By PAUL SANN, Executive Editor

AMERICA '58—In a troubled moment when unem-ployment is around the 4½ million mark, what do you suppose turns up atop the list of best-selling songs? You guessed it: an item called "Get a Job."

CAN SPRING BE FAR BEHIND? The Yanks signed Mr. Mantle for \$70,000 (Post), \$72,000 Trib), or \$75,000 (Times, Telly & Journal),

what happened: wifey ruled he had been around New York long enough and lold him to get the hell home.



DIANA DORS: "I would much rather be unhappy in luxury than in poverty."

¥ \* OUCH—The government revealed that consumer prices had reached an all-time high during January.

IS THIS GOOD? Mike Todd discovered an equal-nay, an even better man—in Russia. A guy named Khrushchev, who's in charge of everything over there.

"He's the greatest showman of our times," Mr. Todd said. "I couldn't even carry his bag."

POLITICAL NOTE—Sen. Knowland said that if he doesn't run for President in '60 he'll back Dick Nixon.

take a dollar or two.

¶Kim Novak's new flop
has three fireplaces. The one
in the living room is purple.
The one in the bedroom is
suspended from the ceiling.
The third one . . . darn it,
the column didn't even say
where the heck it was.



HUSH HUSH STUFF—Mrs. Margaret Kelly of the Philadelphia Kellys said Grace and Rainier had a name for the new baby, due soon, but it's a state secret.

THE HAPPY PEOPLE—Americans spent something like \$150,000,000 on tranquilizing pills during 1957.



EVEN THE FILTER-TIPS MAKE ME SICK!

THE ROYAL FAMILY-The British Dental Assn. nade Philip an honorary dentist, whatever that is.

ONE MAN'S ORDEAL. Have a hot flash from

Dorothy Kilgallen:
"If you think the title of "If you mink the tate of the Vic Damone magazine story, How I Made a Mess of My Life, is pretty had, consider what it was called originally: T Was a


Please, Vic, say it isn't

THE WAR BETWEEN MEN & WOMEN—This came smoking off the Reuters wire on a quiet afternoon: "Bristol, England, Feb. 25—A judge today rejected the story of a nursing home matron who claimed she committed adultery with a surgeon for over three years without either of them using the other's first name."

It seemed a bit awkward to us, too.

ONE FOR THE BLUENOSES-In Bangkok, the local strippers were told to quit taking so much off.

BIRTHDAY—John Foster Dulles, 70.



The radio transmitter that went dead in our baby moon a couple of weeks ago started sending fresh sig-nals back downstairs one line day this week. Spooky, isn't it?

FOR THE MAN WHO HAS EVERYTHING-YOU can now buy an 18 carat gold lawn sprayer for \$12,500.

BOBBY SHANTZ (the dandy little relief pitcher; sweating out salary terms with the Yankees): "They may be rich but they ain't careless!"

FATHER & SON, This is borrowed from an Es-quire article by John Lloyd Wright, an architect:

Wright, an architect:
"My problem as a 'great
man's' son started early in
my life. For example, when
I was young my father was
so terribly husy establishing himself as The Architect of The Ages that he
often forgot his children's
names."



THE POOR SPORT-We flushed this one out of a

"HE POOR SPORT—We finshed this one out of a society column in a morning rag:

"A big hassle started in Palm Beach the other night when one married man came up to a second married man and said belligerently. Who was that lady I saw you with last night? They second man sneered: "Inat was no lady, that was your wife.' Friends literally had to pull them apart. Now they're talking law suits..."

In Our Set, the men don't take offense so easily.

THE COLUMNISTS-Lee Mortimer (Mirror), W.

Winchell's standin, ran this squib Tuesday:
"Mystery mama Eva Bartok and Kutt Jurgens, a new
London item. (Ho's her ex-

husband.")
But back further in
the same edition Sheilah
Graham had it another way:

Graham had it another way:

"Curt Jurgens and Claire
Bloom caught up with each
other in London, and here's
a quote—reportedly from
Miss Bloom: Maybe I will
marry him:"

The spelling, not the conflict of female interest, is
what worried us. Is it Kurt or Curt?



FOR THE WOMAN WHO HAS EVERYTHING—Schlaparelli slapped together a pair of glasses in a platinum frame garnished with diamonds. The price is \$10,000. Lenses extra, presumably.

#### SHOP TALK

This is a footnote to the lively municipal scandal that broke in Manhattan this week.

When Buildings Inspector Bernard Malone was arrested on perjury and contempt charges growing out of this newspaper's revelations about the rackets in the department, District Attorney Hogan issued this statement;

"I want to express my ap-preciation to The Post for giving us the information which led to the Grand Jury investigation and to this in-dictment and to thank them for their continuing cooper-ation." The Buildings Dept. Scandal

Going further, Mr. Hogan fold-a press conference that his men were able to dig out the mess because reporter Bill Haddad and his editors around here had held certain ticklish facts out of the paper to keep the track clear for the investigators.

Hogan: Post Stories Sparked Probe

the investigators.

So what happened?

The other gazettes in the town all carried the breaking story but not one of them found room lit only needed a line or two) to tell their readers that the D.A. had credited The Post with the break.

Let the fruit be told: Our little band of angels has sloughed off some of the competition's beats, too. But isn't it silly? Why don't we'all take a bow for a noble profession when a piece of enterprise pays off?

BRINGING UP BABY-Let's listen to James Ma-son's wife, Pamela:

"Our son Poopsie, 2, leads a baby's life but he is mad about cigarets. I is mad acout eighters. It thought, if you let them do what they want to do, they won't want to do it. We light the eighter. Poopsle holds it and blows out. He doesn't inhale . . ."



**New York Post** 

ELIZABETH TAYLOR: "Russia fascinated me. It's like a Grade B motion picture."

BRITAIN '58—This London husband took pieces of the TV set to work with him so that his bride wouldn't languish before the little screen all day.

The courts called it grounds for divorce.

AH, FAME! The new Japanese Who's Who omits? the name of Douglas MacArthur.

HOME, SWEET HOME—We were minding our own business, see? We wefe dawdling over the litting prose pain of Dylan Thomas' wid-

owed Caitlin and listening to some fine plano on WPAT. Suddenly, this woman burst into the chamber and spoke as follows:

"Have you always been true to "Penergy"

true to me, Bones?"
"Every day," we said, hoping she would-go away.
"I know that," the woman snapped. "What about the nights?"



How can a man fight against such heavy odds?





7. A

# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY WASHINGTON, D. C.

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

tes	67/1	James .	
11		Tolson _	30
2	Mr.	Boardnie Belmont	1/
AHDS	Mr.		XX
	Mr.	Parcons.	
		Tamm.	

Tele. Room

Mr. Helloman

Mr. Trater 25 FEB 1958 Mr. Clayton

The Honorable J. Edgar Hoover Director Federal Bureau of Investigation Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Edgar:

Your publisher has sent me an advance copy of your book, <u>Masters of Deceit</u>, which I have read with great interest.

I think that unquestionably Masters of Deceit will do a vast amount of good in our fight against Communism in the United States. Your exposure of communist history, tactics, hidden aims, and real purposes will act as a warning that no citizen can ignore if he feels the slightest temptation to align himself with the Communist Party or any of its fronts. It should give an equally strong incentive leading those Americans now caught in the communist net to extricate themselves from it.

**EX-136** REC- 56 62-83338 Congratulations on this excellent contribution to anti-communist literature. 16 MAR 19 1958

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ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED

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# ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED N IS UNULASSIFIED

These Days

Soviet Consistency

Allen Dulles, director, of Central Intelligence, occadirector, of sionally delivers an address, which generally goes by un-

noticed for some reason or other, but which contains essential truth that ought to make a profound impression on Americans. In one of the speeches, he



"In the case Sokolsky the subsequent actions of the nations and win them over." Communist leadership.

allies and satellites in Moscow last November on the vantages into disadvantages. The last November on the vantages into disadvantages. Sherik Revolution might well have been written by Lenin have been written by Lenin the economic field, they of Russia the social have no budgetary limitations of Russia seems tions or legislative restrictions or legislative restrictions or legislative restrictions of the Peoples of the East which the Soviet held in Baku in 1920. Lenin himself predicted in 1923 that the outcome of the struggle would be exhausted by the population masses of Russia, India of credit and grants to other on capitalism and will be followed by the population masses of Russia, India of credit and grants to other on capitalism and will be followed.

and China."

1 RECENTLY came across a two-volume collection of slavia. These are countries is the theory; in practice, it india, Indonesia and Yugo a two-volume collection of slavia. These are countries letters and other documents, entitled "Correspondence be the United States. They are tween the chairman of the tounied of Ministers of the United States. They are tween the Council of Ministers of the tions, "honest" uncommitted mac Council of Ministers of the that they will take from both the United States and the Presidents of that they will take from both sides. Offers are also being Britain during the Great Patries. It is now known that triotic War of 1941-1945." The Soviet Russia is pursuing its volumes were published in Moscow in 1957. Altogether 290 letters were exchanged between Roosevelt and Stalin's regret that Mr. a decade as military credits and hardware and outright Roosevelt died.

10 countries, 95 per cent going lowed by communism, This is the theory; in practice, it means that they do the best with our development that they can.

(Coovrient 1958, Kins. Features. Syndleate, Inc.)

(Coovrient 1958, Kins. Features. The countries is the theory; in practice, it means that they do the best with our development that they do they communism, This is the theory; in practice, it is the theory; in practice, it is the theory; in practice, i

By George E. Sokolsky

From this correspondence, cash. Toward the conversion one discovers how continuous of the indigenous economic the Russian policy is. Friend-ship or enmity are all one they are manifestations of the same policy and to me, at any rate, it is clear that Khrushchev, like Stalin before him and Lenin before Stalin, regards the economic war as of equal importance with the military and and the staling of the stalin Stalin, regards the economic Harry Hopkins were in war as of equal importance charge. That money is taken with the military war and out of the standard of living that success is more likely in the economic field. On this subject, Dulles says:

"They probably estimate that if they can induce us to devote our resources alof the Soviet Union there has most exclusively to the militheir people. been an extraordinary contary field, they can the more sistency over the years in easily break our economic basic policy declarations and and cultural ties with other

THEY HAVE several adskill we could turn their ad-

and social system to Russianstyle communism, \$900 million went to Poland, \$650 million to East Germany, \$450 million to Red China. In a word, Soviet Russia is throwing money around as though of the Russian people. It does not matter whether an economy is capitalistic or socialistic, governments can only receive the bulk of their revenue from the earnings of

WHILE IT is true that all this is a drain on Russia's economy, it is also true that Russia has managed to keep The statement issued by THEY HAVE several ad the standard of living of its the Soviet Union and their vantages over us but with people sufficiently down not allies and satellites in Mos. skill we could turn their ad the adrain on its raw mateon capitalism and will be followed by communism. This

odedmar Belmont Parson Rosen Tamm Trotter Clayton Tele.Room Holloman Gandy

Wa	sh. Post and
	Times Herald
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N.	Y. Mirror
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Th	e Worker`
	w Leader

APR 16 1958

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Mr. Tolson OFFICE OF DIRECTOR Mr. Boardman. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION Mr. Belmont UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE b3 per CIA 11:20AM Parsons April 29, 1958 Rosen in the office of Mr. Mr. Trotter. Allen Dulles, Director of the Mr. Jones Central Intelligence Agency, Mr. Clayton telephoned to extend an invitation Tele. Room to the Director to attend a dinner Mr. Holloman given by Mr. Dulles on May 12, Miss Holmes Miss Gandy . 1958, at 8:00PM in honor of General Paul R. Grossin, Director of the French External Intelligence Service. The dinner will be held at the Alibi Club, 1806 I Street, N. W. and will be black tie. asked to be called and advised whether b3 per CIA the Director could attend. She can be reached on Code 143, extension 601. It is noted that the Director is scheduled to meet General Grossin and his administrative assistant, Colonel Louis Ramier, on May 13th at 10:00AM. jwd ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

OFFICE OF DIRECTOR FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE Parsons April 30, 1958 Rosen b3 per CIA I called in the office of Mr. Trotter-Mr. Allen Dulles, Director of the Mr. Jones -Central Intelligence Agency, and Mr. Clayton expressed your appreciation for the Tele. Room kind invitation to attend a dinner Mr.~Holloman given by Mr. Dulles on May 12, at Miss Holmes. 8:00 p.m., in honor of General Paul R. Miss Gandy Grossin. was advised that you regretted very muc that a prior commitment would preclude your acceptance. bl per CIA stated Mr. Dulles would be advised of y declination. Telephone Room FCH:rm (3)16 MAY 2 1958

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DATE 7/03/85 BY DOLDIA / IMW

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont

DATE: May 23, 1958

FROM :

Mr. R. R. Roach

SUBJECT:

ALLEN DULLES DIRECTOR

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

On May 22, 1958, James Angleton, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), advised Agent Papich that according to all reports received, Dulles' performance before the Senate committee last week in connection with the anti-Nixon riots in South America went off very well. According to Angleton, Dulles was in the position to show that CIA had developed plenty of advance information indicating there would be troubles during Nixon's trip.

Later the Liaison Agent met Frank Wisner of CIA and Wisner commented that his "boss" had done a good job before the Senate committee. He commented "this is one time when we can produce the facts."

ACTION:

None. For your information.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED BY DOLLMAN

no deletions per OGA letter 9/7/10

SJP:bjt%

l - Mr. Nease

1 - Mr. Belmont

1 - Mr. Branigan

1 - Liaison Section

1 - Mr. Papich

Mar

EX-III

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66 JUN 2 1958

Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
Nease
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

STANDARD	FORM	NO	64
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Mr. A. H. Belmont Office Memorandum TO August 11, 1958 Tolson . Boardman FROM: Mr. R. R. Roac Belmont Mohr Nease Parsons Rosen . ALLEN DULLES, DIRECTOR SUBJECT: Tamm CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Tele. Room Holloman Gondy Dulles customarily takes a vacation in August. In past years he has traveled to Europe. The Liaison Agent has been informed that Dulles will not take any leave until the end of the month and he will then give consideration to making a trip, possibly to Europe. ACTION: None. For your information. SJP: bjtlyt 1 - Mr. Belmont 24 AUG 12 1958 1 - Liaison Section 1 - Mr. Papich 11 AMISON ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

52 AUG 15 1958

Mr. Tolson Mr. Boardma

Mr. Belmont.

Mr. Mohr Mr. Nease

Mr. Parso Mr. Roser

Mr. Tamm Mr. Troiter. Mr. Clayton

Tele. Room. Mr. Holloman Miss Gandy

# Master Spy Role

BY ANDREW TULLY,

Sefpps-Howard Newspapers,

WASHINGTON, June 4.—In this era of the understated prendise, it is not surprising to find that America's boss spy looks more like a Yale professor than a secret wholesaler in cloaks and daggers.

The name is Allen Welsh Dulles, a big, broad-shouldered man with tousled white hair, a high forehead and an ample

gray mustache.

His title is Director of Central Intelligence, and he sits tor strides—these days in a birch-paneled office in one of a cluster of nondescript buildings: occupied by the Central Intelligence Agency in a grimy warehouse district of Washington's Foggy Bottom.

Prime Red Target

Moscow undoubtedly would pay a fat fee for the head of this amiable 65-year-old onetime schoolteacher. After all, he did his first spying for the United States in World War I and since has been readily available when a delicate job needed doing.

But he tells visitors he has never even been shot at land I'm sure no one has ever tried to kidnap me." His booming, hall-fellow laugh makes Ithe thought ridiculous.

It is Allen Dulles job, through his top-secret agenty, to find out everything he cin arout the unannounced poli-cids of the world's nations and pass it on, evaluated, to the White House for use in shap-

en Dulles Underplays

ing our own foreign policy.
Thus for some months before the de Gaulle crisis in France. Allen Dulles was preparing President Eisenhower for the likelihood of a coup by the wartime resistance leader.

Mr. Dulles does not see Gen. de Gaulle as a would-be-Hitler "after all; he got out before." He disagrees with many experts about Gen. de Gaulle's character—"he is not a man drunk with power for power's sake." The second

Pooh Poohs Critics

Gesturing with a corncob pipe, Mr. Dulles poon pools critics who blame lack of intelligence for the insults suffered by Vice President Richard M. Nixon on his recent trip to South America. CIA had good information on antis Americanism south of the border, he told a recent visitor. der, he told a recent visitor, "but you can't predict when a mob will go berserk. We had to take some chances, you can't cancel a trip like that except for extraordinary resons, you can't let people blackmail you."

CLIPPING FROM THE

N.Y. N.Y. WORLD TELEGRAM & SUN

NIGHT EDITION

DATED 4 JUN 1958

11 PAGE

FORTARDED BY MY DIVISION

RE: ALLEN WELSH' DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

BUFILE -

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These days, as for several months past, Allen Dulles and his CIA have been gathering intelligence bearing on the long-projected meeting at the summit between President Eisenhower and the heads of state of the Soviet Union and our Western allies. CIO suggests no policy, nor does it recommend or disprove a summit meeting. It gathers what Mr. Dulles calls the "pros and cons of the situation.

CIA, in effect, says to the Thite House and State Department: If you hold a summit meeting, here are the probable consequences. White House and State then add it up for themselves...

#### Routine Is Routine.

For a master spy, Allen Dulles' daily routine is startdingly similar to that of any ythen working executive. He leaves his home in fashionably bohemian Georgetown at 8:15 a.m. after listening to a world news roundup on the radio-"we get the secret information, but your news comes in a lot faster." At the office, he first wades through a pile of decoded incoming cables. Thrice weekly he has a staff meeting, once a week he meets with the Intelligence Adviscry Committee, the Nafional Security Council and the

mental bottleneck-breaker.

Mr. Dulles tries to see as of the war. tion, but from the outside. This Strategic Services in Bern and a much younger Allen Dulles ered Germany, Czechoslovakia suffered during World War Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Hun-I when he was working with gary, Spain, Portugal, North with his elder brother, Secrehim to see an obscure Russian, counter-intelligence, agent to no sentiment.
then in a nearby Swiss city, named Hans Gisevius kept him "We get along fine,". Allen ing ideas. Mr. Dulles played Hitler's life, and he produced knows he can't persuade me tennis instead, and a few the first reports on the Nazis' out of something unless has wleks later Nikolai Lenin be experiments with rockets.

ope ations coordinating thard gan his trip by rail across Ger- Allen Dulles still finds intelthe latter an interdepart many an dinto Russia—which ligence work the most exciting was one of the turning points assignment possible, though it

then in a nearby Swiss city, named Hans Gisevius kept him "We get along fine," Allen cause he had some interest in touch with the plot against Dulles likes to say, "but he mis instead, and a few the first reports on the Nazis

is considerably streamlined; many people as he can, not In World War II, he set up from World War I days. For only from his own organiza operations for the Office of instance, "the beautiful female spy, unfortunately has been reis explained by an experience built a spy network that coy placed by the electronic gadget." As for his dealings. cloak and dagger in neutral Africa France, Italy and Austary of State John Foster Switzerland. Somebody asked tria. A contact with a Nazi Dulles, the spy master admits

the facts."



ALLEN DULLES.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

# Office Memorandum • United States Government

TO . Mr. A. H. Belmont	DATE: November 4,	7 958
A MANAGER AND	Ditt. 110 00 11000 , 13	Tolson
FROM : Mr. R. R. Roach		Belmont Mohr
		Nease/WW Parsons
SUBJECT: ALLEN DULLES		Totter
DIRECTOR CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE	TE AGENCY _ Z.M _	Clayton Tele. Room _
	College	Holloman Gandy
You may be int	erested in the following information	Marian Santvar
on a strictly confidenti	onal life. This data was obtained al basis by the Liaison Agent. As	
previously reported.		<del>-</del>
		1 6
1		b6 b70
Dulles' wife u	underwent a serious operation this	
the present time.	rtedly is in very poor health at	
Dulles' real p	problem is	
1	77 002011	
		,e
ACTION:	the same of the sa	s First
	2.2. Marca Apple	1 200
None. For you	er information. / \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \	
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1 - Mr. Belmont 1 - Liaison Section	Dro #67 83-5	13/ 4
1 - Mr. Papich	REC 10 62-83338-	93
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TO

Mr. A. H. Belmon

DATE: October 31, 1958

FROM :

Mr. R. R. Roach

SUBJECT:

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

1-E CUR

You may be interested in the following information developed by the Liaison Agent which touches upon CIA organization and personnel.

Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
Clayton
Tele. Room:
Holloman
Gand

Tolson \_\_ Boardman

Belmont

A few weeks ago, General Cabell received his fourth star as a general. The Liaison Agent has been reliably informed that Allen Dulles pushed this move very strongly in order to bring more prestige to "the intelligence community." Dulles allegedly told the President that it would add to the prestige of U.S. intelligence if CIA had a very high ranking military official. Dulles reportedly suggested that if Cabell were raised to a higher rank, intelligence interests would be best served.

Now that Cabell has acquired a fourth star, Dulles allegedly is ready to make his next move. He hopes to have a National Security Council (NSC) directive issued which will strengthen the responsibilities of the office of Director, CIA, bringing him closer to Cabinet rank. It is not known exactly how Dulles wants his responsibilities described but his motive is to bring more prestige and strength to the office which he now holds.

## ACTION:

None. For your information.

62-83

4.12.

SJP:bjt ...

1 - Mr. Belmont

1 - Mr. Kuhrtz

1 - Liaison Section

1 - Mr. Papich

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### Office Memorandum UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT no deletions per OGA 9/7/10

MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: November 5, 1958

FROM:

SUBJECT:

MR. R. R. ROACHA

ALLEN DULLES

DIRECTOR

CENTRAL INTELLUGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

Boardman Selmont Mohr \_ Nease Parsons

> Rosen Clayton Tele. Room

While discussing other official business with Agent Papich on November 5, 1958, Allen Dulles brought up the following matters:

Dulles made reference to the recent "Nation" article which attacked the Bureau. He stated that many years ago She made up his mind that he would not read the magazine because he did not approve of the political line and had little use for most of the contributors. He stated that she had heard about the article attaking the Bureau, but had seen no reason to read it until recently when one of his subordinates suggested that it might be worthwhile to do so. Dulles stated that he read the article and that he was shocked

at the extremes to which the writer had gone in striking at the Bureau. He referred to the material as "trash" and stated that he wanted the Liaison Agent to pass a message to the Director to the effect that if CIA's assistance was needed in running down any leads concerning any organization or

individual involved in a plan to attack the Bureau, he would be most willing to give full cooperation.

Dulles made brief reference to Eyrus Eaton. He stated that several years ago he had personal dealings with Eaton when he was practicing law. He described Eaton as having been "very sharp, but he is of the firm opinion that Eaton is now "batty.

Dulles stated that he had been invited by Gordon Gray to sit in on a Cabinet meeting scheduled for November 6, 1958, at which the Director was to speak. Dulles stated he was looking forward with great interest to hearing the Director.

Dulles made neference to pending action concerning the implementation of National Security Council Intelligence us Directive (NSCID) No. 5, which deals with U. S. espionage and counterintelligence activity abroad. Dulles stated that it was his understanding that the Bureau was opposed to some of the language in the proposed implementing procedures. He asked the Papich told Dulles that the Liaison Agent for his observations. 3 aute icerceio

- Mr. Belmont - Mr. M. W. Kuhrtz

Liaison Section

1 - Mr. Papich

TO NOV 7 1958 CONFIDENTIAL

Memo Roach to Belmont
RE: ALLEN BULLES
DIRECTOR
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY



proposed implementing procedures carry language which indicates that CIA would virtually control our Legal Attache operations It was pointed out that the language reflects that CIA possibly could examine or even inspect our Legal Attache system. Papich advised that the Bureau could never approve. any language which would give such an interpretation and if CIA did not have such intentions it would appear that a modification of the language proposed would be in order. The Liaison Agent emphasized that the Bureau would not support any directive which would grant any other agency control of our activities. Dulles was taken back by the comments stating that he never realized that such an interpretation could be given to the proposed language and he emphasized that he had no intention to establish control over any of our Legal Attaches. He expressed the opinion that a language could be introduced which would be satisfactory to the Bureau. also introduced the matter of coordination which allegedly is the main objective of the proposed implementing procedures. Dulles was told that the Bureau regularly is furnishing information to CIA abroad and at headquarters level concerning matters which relate to counterintelligence operations abroad. Liaison is closely following this matter and will keep you advised of developments.

### ACTION:

None. For your information.

osh.

Iwould like more details to the

K

mundy !

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CONFIGURIAL

: 1	STANDARD FORM NO. 64	
N J		UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
	TO : MR. TOLSON	DATE: January 27, 1959
,	FROM : G. A. NEASEY	Belmont Mohr Nease Parsons Parsons
	SUBJECT:	b6 W.C. Sentian -
	pamphlet, "How Mellon Got Rich," by Ha	the this morning the attached arvey o'Connor. This pamphlet ention to the marked portion of the
	first paragraph on page 13 wherein it is a former State Department official, joined Morgan concession." He thought that due not have seen it or that this statement management and Allen Dulles.	stated that, "Allen W. Dulles, another Loomis in the fight for the Mellon- e to the age of this pamphlet we may
	and the second s	n to the last paragraph on page 23 bncerning capitalism than has been
		ed to the Domestic Intelligence Division
	for its consideration in the event the atta to our attention.	,
	MINOR ATT ACTUAL	ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED WEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DE DIPLOMINATION DATE TION SO BY APPROPRIED
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	FORW JACON FORW.	10 62-83338-45
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by Harvey O'Connor

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INTERNATIONAL PAMPHLETS
799 Broadway New York

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### HOW MELLON GOT RICH

### By HARVEY O'CONNOR

#### The Mellon Fortune

Towering among the financial giants is the Mellon family with its billion-dollar hoard, probably the largest in America. The Pittsburgh titans of finance capital, are directly interested in corporations with assets of \$10,500,000,000.

Although he is usually described as king of aluminum, Andrew Mellon, former Secretary of the Treasury, raked in his billion from an amazing variety of industries. In this the Mellons differ from the Fords and their auto fortune, the duPonts and their chemical millions, the Rockefellers and their oil empire. For the Mellons draw tribute from real estate, banking, steel, railway equipment, oil, coal and its myriad by-products, aluminum, utilities. Workers in almost every industry you can name are being exploited to enhance the financial power of the Mellons.

Count off the major enterprises of Mellon and you will include most of the basic industries. His hundred Pittsburgh Coal Co. and Koppers Coal Co. mines stretch all the way from western Pennsylvania through feudal West Virginia into Kentucky. He probably draws more interest and dividends from the labor of steel workers than, any other person in America. His family has important interests in Pittsburgh Steel, Crucible Steel, and Bethlehem Steel and a sizeable block in U. S. Steel.

Coke links coal and steel. It is the pure fuel left when gases have been driven out of coal, and it is used to smelt iron ore. Through his Koppers Co., Mellon is the most important commercial coke producer in the United States and Canada. The by-products derived from coal constitute the base for explosives and all war gases. The Mellons hold key positions in the war industries through steel, coal, and by-products of coal gas and petroleum.

Bethlehem Steel cashes in handsomely by the sale of armor plate for battleships built in Bethlehem's own yards.

The Mellons sell the gas from their Koppers coke ovens to domestic consumers in scores of cities. They have become major owners of so-called public utility systems. Gigantic holding companies in which they have an interest include Eastern Gas & Fuel Associates in Boston, Plymouth and New Haven; United Light and Power, which sells gas and electricity in a thousand communities; U. S. Electric Power Corp., and others. They are big stockholders in the Philadelphia Co., the monopoly which controls all the gas, electricity and street car services in their home city, Pittsburgh. Their Brooklyn Union and Brooklyn Borough Gas companies "soak the poor" in Brooklyn. They make a minimum charge of \$1 a month, although most working class families actually never consume a dollar's worth of gas in any month.

Most famous of all Mellon's corporations is Aluminum Company of America, which, through its control of raw materials and patents, holds a 100 per cent monopoly on the manufacture of this extremely useful light-weight metal. Aluminum is one-third the weight of steel and just as strong when properly alloyed. Aluminum Co. of America, ever since its organization way back in the 80's, has enjoyed the express protection of the United States government through patents, tariffs and failure of government departments to prosecute it under the anti-trust law. Its tremendous profits have exceeded \$20,000,000 in one year. The sweatshop inquiry in Pennsylvania in 1933 found that Aluminum was firing men, earning \$4 and \$5 a day, from some departments, and hiring women to do their work at 18 cents an hour.

Biggest of all Mellon companies is Gulf Oil Corp. with gross assets of \$743,000,000, and exceeding those of the Ford Motor Co., whose owner has been considered the second richest man in the country. Gulf, like Aluminum, also profits from monopoly for it has quiet price-fixing agreements with Standard Oil and other big oil companies.

The full list of Mellon companies fills many pages. They are heavy stockholders in the Pullman sleeping car monopoly, Pittsburgh Plate Glass, American Tar Products, and National Lumber & Creosoting.

The Mellons are the perfect example of the fusion of industrial and finance capital. Their \$250,000,000 Union Trust Co. in Pittsburgh has the highest cash dividend rate in the banking world: 200 per cent. Their \$250,000,000 Mellon National Bank finances industries far and near. Another \$250,000,000 is represented in a chain of banks which covers western Pennsylvania. The Mellons maintain close relations with the Morgan and Rockefeller banking interests in Wall Street, and have considerable holdings in other corporations dominated by one or both of these groups.

# Judge Thomas Mellon

Andrew Mellon was born rich. His father laid the foundation of the family fortune in Pittsburgh as a corporation lawyer and money-lender. As soon as he was out of law school, Thomas Mellon began buying mechanics' liens, making loans on notes. Then he went into real estate. Through marriage he acquired control of East Liberty, most important of Pittsburgh suburbs, and made millions as the city grew, through mere ownership of land that other people had to have to build homes. He became the trusted confidential attorney of corporations and later he organized corporations of his own. After serving ten years as judge, he opened the T. Mellon & Sons bank in 1871. Here young Andrew learned the secrets of using money to make money.

Old Thomas Mellon was the perfect embodiment of the small competitive capitalist and money lender of the middle nineteenth century, before the age of imperialism. He was a studious old skinflint. More far-sighted than many, he foresaw the inevitable conflict between the classes. "The employees and their families in the larger manufacturing and mining establishments," he wrote in 1885, "are often designated each by his number and live in numbered tenements, and are all subjected to the same routine, and treated alike; too much like the soldiers of an army or inmates of a prison. The opportunity to work up and out and better their condition is rendered so remote as to appear to them hopeless."

But when the "hopeless" workers rebelled, Judge Mellon was for drastic action. "The vicious classes," he wrote, "seem to be greatly on the increase or at least show more boldness than ever before. It indicates a demoralized condition of public sentiment, which may require blood to purify." Two years later the Haymarket anarchists were hanged in Chicago.\*

Judge Mellon hated Karl Marx and studied Herbert Spencer to find arguments against Marx's statement that labor is the author of all wealth. He believed in religion, not so much for himself as to assure the stability of the capitalist system.

Aside from amassing more millions, Judge Mellon's chief satisfaction in life was to see his sons develop into "smart business men." Very smart they were. The older brothers kept on subdividing real estate and selling it at a handsome profit. Then their lumber firm sold building materials for houses to be built on the lots. Their street car companies carried people back and forth from Pittsburgh to East Liberty.

When Judge Mellon retired, it was Andrew who took charge of the money-making end of his fortune, that of T. Mellon & Sons bank, already the largest in Pittsburgh. He early formed a close alliance with Henry Clay Frick, the coke king, whom Judge Mellon had helped by loans to acquire control of Fayette County, source of much of the country's finest coking coal. From Frick, Andrew Mellon learned the technique of open shoppery. Frick engaged in bloody wars with his coke workers until in 1889-90 by starvation and bullets, he stamped out their union. Carnegie took him into his steel corporation as general manager, and in 1892 he smashed the steel workers' union at Homestead and established industrial tyranny in the steel industry that was unchallenged until 1919, when William Z. Foster led the great steel strike.†

Frick sat on the board of Union Trust, Mellon's new bank, along with representatives of the Pennsylvania Railroad and the big corporations of the Pittsburgh district. The two men made millions speculating in downtown real estate. In one deal Mellon made as much as \$200,000, although he added not a penny to the real worth of the property.

<sup>\*</sup>See The Frame-Up System, by Vern Smith. International Pamphlets, No. 8.

<sup>†</sup> For the story of Homestead, the 1919 strike and other struggles of steel workers, see *Labor and Steel*, by Horace B. Davis. International Publishers.

#### War-Mellon's Ally

War has been the Mellons' best ally. The peace-time stride of their fortune then quickens into the double march. The Mexican War started Pittsburgh off, and with it old Judge Mellon, chiefly through his transactions in real estate, laid the foundations for his fortune. The Civil War placed him in the millionaire class. The Spanish-American War, with its fat contracts for guns and ammunition, made his son Andrew a peer of Wall Street bankers and the lord of Pittsburgh, the seat of war industries.

The Mellons did not believe in fighting during the war. There was no money in that. Old Judge Mellon, instructing his sons during the Civil War, wrote: "It is only greenhorns who enlist. You can learn nothing useful in the army. . . . In time you will come to understand and believe that a man may be a patriot without risking his own life or sacrificing his health. There are plenty of other lives less valuable or others ready to serve for the love of serving."

The conquest of Cuba, Puerto Rico and the Philippines, the coming to age of imperialistic America, stuffed the Mellon banks to bursting with the profits wrung from the workers in Pittsburgh's glowing mills. Armed with the profits of war, promoters began forming whole industries into gigantic trusts. Mellon worked feverishly in Pittsburgh. He helped form two coal combines in 1900-01 from which emerged Pittsburgh Coal Co., at that time a monopoly in western Pennsylvania coal mining. Mellon's banks sold their watered stocks to the public and then obtained mortgages on every scrap of the coal combine's property in return for floating bond issues. Crucible Steel and a score of corporations were products of Mellon financing in this era. Nearly every big enterprise in Pittsburgh was financed by the Mellons in return for mortgages which covered all their property and gave them the right to foreclose in case they didn't pay.

About this time Andrew Carnegie fell out with his general manager, Frick, over the division of the tremendous wartime profits which flowed into Carnegie Steel Co.'s treasury—\$40,000,000 in the year 1900. Frick was fired. In revenge he and Mellon formed Union Steel Co. and threatened to build mills

rivalling Carnegie's. A company town was built around the new rod and wire mill at Donora, Pa. Eventually the new Union Steel Co., Mellon and Frick threatened, would add blast and open hearth furnaces to offer thorough-going competition to Carnegie's mills.

Carnegie capitulated before this threat and settled with Frick to the tune of \$31,000,000. The bluff had worked so well for Frick and Mellon that Carnegie himself used the same tactics in forcing J. P. Morgan to pay a fancy price for Carnegie's steel mills when the New York promoter organized U. S. Steel.

Mellon watched the success of these tricks as used by Frick and Carnegie, and decided to take a hand at the game himself. So he announced that his Union Steel Co. would build a rail mill that would put the U. S. Steel Corp.'s rail mill at Braddock, Pa., out of business. Further, he would construct a railroad from Pittsburgh to Lake Erie to haul his iron ore cheaply. He bought out the Sharon Steel Co., a big independent, and was in position in 1902 to compete with the steel trust in nearly every branch of steel making.

The U. S. Steel Corp., thoroughly frightened, bought Mellon's company for \$75,000,000. Mellon had put only a few million into Union Steel. An example of his tremendous profit from this deal was an ore mine for which he had paid \$150,000 and which he sold to U. S. Steel for \$4,000,000.

It was a handsome piece of poker-playing that brought perhaps \$20,000,000 into the Mellon pockets.

#### Industrial Capitalist

Up to the Spanish-American War, Andrew Mellon had been primarily a banker and real estate promoter. Then he began to blossom out as a first rate industrial capitalist. Back in 1888 the owner of patents for refining aluminum in electric furnaces sold a share in their Pittsburgh Reduction Co. to the Mellons in return for \$250,000 to set up a mill at New Kensington, Pa. This company controlled by the Mellons has grown into properties valued at \$300,000,000,000, known as Aluminum Co. of America and its Canadian affiliate, Aluminium, Ltd.

Monopoly is the essence of Aluminum's success. The government protected Mellon's monopoly rights through patents until 1909. From the first, subservient U. S. Senators saw to it that Mellon's company had a high tariff to keep out foreign aluminum. It has ranged from 2 to 7 cents a pound and is now 4 cents. The Mellon company has understandings with the European aluminum companies regarding production and prices. These agreements also provide that the Mellons are to be sole sellers of aluminum to the United States government, while the German, French and British companies are guaranteed no competition in selling aluminum, made into a multitude of war uses, to their respective governments.

Mellon's monopoly ran smack up into the opposition of powerful industrial interests—particularly automobile and airplane interests—who wanted to buy the lightweight metal cheap. They succeeded in 1912 in getting the U. S. Department of Justice to file suit against Aluminum Co. of America. The court ordered Aluminum Co. not to monopolize bauxite, the ore from which aluminum is refined, not to delay shipments, or ship defective material to companies which competed with Aluminum's subsidiaries in fabricating the raw metal into finished products.

How utterly useless the court order was, came to light in 1924 when the Federal Trade Commission found that Aluminum was not only continuing its price-fixing and its discrimination against competitors in fabricating aluminum, but had gained a 100% monopoly over the mining of bauxite and the refining of raw aluminum.

The full extent of this monopoly was brought out in court when George D. Haskell, a Springfield, Mass., manufacturer, sued for \$15,000,000 damages for conspiracy in restraint of trade. The jury awarded him an \$8,000,000 verdict, but the court of appeals, happily for Mellon, reversed the verdict. Haskell had formed an aluminum company with James B. Duke, the Carolina tobacco magnate who had cheap water power in Quebec. The Mellon company bought out Duke for \$15,000,000. Testimony also revealed that the Mellons had forced the Canadian government to get bauxite concessions in British Guiana for them, in return for furnishing aluminum during the war.

Aluminum was a gold mine during the war, for the Mellons charged the United States government 32 cents a pound for this indispensable war metal. After the war was over, the price dropped to 22 cents and even now the government has suits pending against Aluminum for wartime over-charges.

#### Oil and Imperialism

. When a penniless prospector struck the Lucas oil gusher in Texas in 1901, he unwittingly gave the Mellon family a big boost toward their \$743,000,000 oil corporation. This was the biggest gusher ever struck and the first one in the Southwest. Lucas and his backers, Pittsburgh men, had to turn to Mellon for cash to develop the new oil field. The result was Gulf Oil, a profitable and completely integrated independent oil company.

The Mellons had their hands in oil before. They speculated in the western Pennsylvania field and trimmed Standard Oil to the tune of \$2,000,000 when in 1895 they forced the Rockefeller company to buy their pipe line from Pittsburgh to Philadelphia. That involved changing the Pennsylvania law forbidding pipe line mergers, but the Mellons and the Rockefellers took care of that in the legislature, thus illustrating their control of the government machinery.

Gulf Oil Corp., in on the ground floor in the great Texas field, was too big for the Rockefellers to push under, especially when the Mellons stood behind it. So Standard Oil, Gulf and a few other big companies came to an agreement regarding prices and production and a virtual monopoly was set up. The little fellows, the owners of the wells, protested long and loud to the Federal Trade Commission and the courts against the price-fixing tactics of Standard and Gulf. But all to no avail. The big companies encouraged the little fellows to take all the chances in developing new wells. Standard, Gulf and others then stepped in and dictated the prices at which the small producer could sell. Profits naturally were fantastic. In one year Gulf made \$40,000,000.

"Oil is as necessary as blood in the battles of tomorrow," said Clemenceau, war premier of France. Mellon understood the patriotic importance of oil in the next slaughter; for that reason his Gulf Oil Corp. made use of the U. S. State Department to gain vast reserves of oil in Colombia, to uphold, with other United States interests, the gruesome dictatorship of Gomez in Venezuela, and to change Mexican oil legislation.

Independent oil producers of the southwestern United States fought bitterly against the flood of Mexican, Venezuelan and Colombian oil which poured into the United States market, ruining them. They claimed the imported oil was "foreign"; but to the Mellons and the Rockefellers, the countries along the Caribbean are just as American as Oklahoma or Texas. As a matter of fact, from the towers of Wall Street, Colombia and Venezuela are even more American, for there are bigger profits in petroleum wrung from the forced labor of semi-colonial countries than in the domestic product.

For that reason the little independents were never able to get a tariff on oil comparable to the tariff that kept foreign aluminum from competing with Mellon's Aluminum Co. of America. They failed to understand that tariffs, as well as other government measures, are framed by the big industrial capitalists to suit their private interests, regardless of the effect on petty competitors or exploited workers.

Soon after the workers and peasants of Mexico declared a social revolution in 1910, the Mellons, along with the Dohenys, Sinclairs and Rockefellers, found themselves in mortal combat with theories of social ownership which declared Mexico's natural resources belonged to the people. For the next decade the oil interests played cleverly among the politicians and generals of Mexico, subsidizing this one, overthrowing that one, hiring guerilla bands of their own. All the while, the U. S. State Department threatened invasion to protect oil rights and twice American troops marched into Mexico.

In the meantime, oil was discovered around Lake Maracaibo in Venezuela, and there the Mellons followed Standard and Deterding's Dutch-Shell, to exploit rich concessions. Venezuela was different. There dictator Gomez, rivalled only by the recently overthrown Machado of Cuba, held power, thanks to his army and his jails. He gladly signed concessions giving British and American companies the right to Venezuela's oil in return for

subsidies to maintain his own rule. The oil companies thereupon threatened a boycott of Mexican oil. The Mexican government made peace by 1928. A branch of the National City Bank was opened in Mexico City. Dwight Morrow, until then a partner in Morgan & Co., was sent as ambassador, and Lindbergh, soon to be his son-in-law, flew down to cement good will between Wall Street and the rising bourgeoisie of Mexico.

With Mexico safe for Mexican Gulf Oil and Venezuela pouring liquid gold into Mellon tankers, the Pittsburgh bankers now turned their attention to Colombia. Right next to the Venezuelan border was the Barco concession, owned by a firm composed of H. L. Doherty, the oil magnate, and J. P. Morgan & Co. The Mellons paid Doherty \$1,500,000 for his share of the concession, which the Colombian government had just announced it was about to cancel.

If this cancelled concession was worth \$1,500,000 to Mellon, why did Doherty let go of it? There were two reasons. Millions of dollars would be needed to lay pipe lines and develop wells before the first barrel of oil was pumped into a tanker. Standard Oil already being busy in the Carare district of Colombia, the Mellon company was the only one with enough free capital to undertake the development. Even more important, however, were the diplomatic angles involved. Tremendous pressure would be needed to get the cancelled concession validated. Gulf Oil, whose proprietor, Mellon, was Secretary of the Treasury in the Harding-Coolidge Administration, could see that the proper pressure was applied.

Colombia had distrusted the United States long before the seizure of Panama in 1903 by Theodore Roosevelt who wished by building a canal there to assure United States naval supremacy in American waters. The United States government tried to buy off Colombia's hatred with a \$25,000,000 payment in a deal which let Standard Oil into the Carare district. This deal involved a scandal in Colombia comparable to the Teapot Dome exposé in the United States and resulted in the resignation of the Colombian president. The Colombian Congress thereupon passed legislation which stated that petroleum resources were national property, and that the Mellons must show documentary proof to their title in the Barco concession.

The Mellon and Rockefeller firms retaliated. They hired Francis B. Loomis, former State Department official who had helped Roosevelt in the Panama grab in 1903, to present their case to the State Department and President Coolidge. Secretary of State Kellogg ordered the United States minister in Bogota to intercede for Mellon. Allen W. Dulles, another former State Department official, joined Loomis in the fight for the Mellon-Morgan concession.

When Colombia refused to knuckle down, Herbert Hoover's Department of Commerce declared a practical embargo on loans to the Caribbean country. That crippled Colombia and, in the resulting industrial paralysis, discontent increased. At this juncture the presidential election was held, and the Colombian minister to Washington, Olaya, a man thoroughly imbued with the Wall Street point of view, campaigned for the presidency. He was elected by 121,000, a thumping majority in a country where workers and peasants have no vote.

President Olaya immediately invited National City Co. (National City Bank affiliate) to send a representative to Colombia, and he himself visited Wall Street and Washington where he talked with the bankers and with Secretary Mellon. Mellon, of course, later denied that he had mentioned his concession when he talked with Olaya.

As a matter of fact, Olaya shortly after the interview got a \$20,000,000 credit from the National City Co. and returned to Bogota to force Mellon's concession through Congress. With him went a Princeton University professor and the oil law expert who helped Ambassador Morrow clean up the Mexican oil tangle. As soon as the Mellon oil law was passed by the Colombian Congress and signed by Olaya, the National City Co. released the last \$4,000,000 of the loan.

All this came out in testimony before a U. S. Senate committee investigating the flotation of foreign loans. Witnesses revealed that excited cables flew back and forth between the State Department and Bogota while Mellon's concession was hanging fire and that Secretary of State Stimson was concerned in helping with the deal.

The upshot of this piece of dollar diplomacy was that the

Mellons were confirmed in ownership of oil lands valued by a U. S. State Department official at from \$350,000,000 to \$2,000,000,000, and all for the trifling price of \$1,500,000 plus the pressure of the United States government.

International diplomacy was again called into use when the Mellons shouldered their way into Iraq oil. When Standard Oil learned that the British oil companies had staked out the rich Mosul field in Iraq as their own, thanks to a British mandate from the League of Nations, it indignantly protested to the State Department that the principle of the "open door" for all capitalists was being violated. It was arranged finally that Standard Oil was to have one-fourth interest in the Turkish Petroleum Co.

When Gulf Oil executives heard that, they boiled over with indignation. They demanded that the State Department pry the door open even wider so they could get in. Accordingly, the Near East Development Corp. was formed by the Standard Oil companies and Gulf, and the Mellons were given one-fifth interest.

#### Profits in Explosives

War brought another rich treasure to the Mellons. That was the Koppers Coke Co.

Dr. Heinrich Koppers was a German scientist who had come to America before the World War to introduce a type of coke oven which made use of the valuable gases which the old-fashioned bee-hive coke ovens wasted when converting coal into coke. When war broke out in 1914, Mellon saw that explosives meant millions, and these explosives were made out of those very gases that Dr. Koppers saved in his by-product coke ovens. So he bought out Dr. Koppers' patents and business giving him \$300,000 worth of shares in the new company and a salary of \$10,000 a year. Mellon proceeded to sign fat contracts with agents of the Allied nations.

When the United States entered the war in 1917, the "alien property" law was passed. The law declared that all German and Austrian property, including patents, in the United States, was to be confiscated.

Mellon's Koppers Coke Co. immediately informed the govern-

ment that one-fifth of its stock was owned by Dr. Koppers, a German citizen. Accordingly, the stock was confiscated and then offered for sale at auction in 1918. The Mellon company bought Dr. Koppers' share for a mere \$302,500. Profits for the first six months of 1918 alone easily exceeded what the Mellons paid for Dr. Koppers' one-fifth share in a \$15,000,000 company.

The Koppers company hastily erected by-product gas plants throughout the country during the war, to cash in on the high prices paid for ammunition. The government designated the Koppers units as "war order" plants whose products were essential to the manufacture of explosives. After the war was over, the Mellon company continued building these gas plants, and became a big factor in the so-called public utilities companies which sell gas to industrial and to domestic consumers. Koppers Gas & Coke Co. was organized and grew rapidly until in 1931 its assets were \$177,000,000. To control big gas properties in New England, the Mellons then organized Eastern Gas & Fuel Associates, a \$203,000,000 firm. In 1931 this company alone had profits of \$5,775,000.

Through their control of valuable St. Lawrence River power for use in their aluminum plant at Massena, New York, the Mellons acquired 21% ownership in the Morgan-Niagara Hudson Corp., a vast holding company which controlled light and power throughout New York State. They became powerful in the United Light & Railways Co., a \$498,000,000 concern; in United Light & Power Co., a \$575,000,000 concern; and in U. S. Electric Power Corp., whose assets are \$1,257,000,000.

#### Low Taxes for the Rich

Banker Mellon's rise to command of the U. S. Treasury was logical. What more reasonable than that one of the nation's greatest money masters should take charge of the nation's finances? A variety of reasons dictated the choice of Mellon as Secretary in 1921. First, the war had been terribly expensive, and the question came up as to who should pay for it. For the Republican Party there was only one answer. Those who had coined millions out of the war must not be called upon to pay for it. What better

assurance was there that taxes would be eased on the wealthy than to have the richest banker in the key tax position?

Second, the Republican Party had incurred a tremendous deficit in the 1920 campaign and somebody had to pay for that. Andrew Mellon made the biggest contribution, reported by the *New York Times* as \$1,500,000. He must be rewarded.

Mellon was glad enough to change from Pittsburgh to Washington. His corporations gathered dividends as the earth soaks up rain; the process was nearly automatic. Although he was on the top rung of the millionaire ladder, hardly anyone outside Pittsburgh had ever heard his name. He felt the need for public acclaim in keeping with his position. Further, no family ties bound him. His two children were away in private school and he had divorced his wife back in 1912.

That divorce showed Mellon's power. Mrs. Mellon came from a wealthy Irish brewer's family, liked gaiety, hated the smoke and grime and coldness of Pittsburgh and her husband's concentration on financial affairs. She obtained a legal separation, but Mellon refused to permit her to have their children part of the year. She defied him by moving back to the Mellon house in Pittsburgh. Thereupon he sued for divorce. The Pittsburgh newspapers refused to publish Mrs. Mellon's statements defending herself against his charges, and even the telegraph agencies helped to keep any news of the sensational divorce from getting out of the city.

Mrs. Mellon found a parallel between her position and that of thousands of foreign-born workers who toiled in Mellon mills. "It crept over me," she wrote, "that perhaps I, too, a foreigner like his Huns and Slavs, had been weighed coldly, dispassionately, on the scales of demand and supply and as a wife ranked merely as a commodity in the great plan of this master financier's lifework. The babies were there; even the male heir was there. Was the wife to be laid off like other hired help when the steel' mills shut down?"

Mellon wanted no publicity on his divorce. Accordingly Boss Penrose had a law passed quietly in the Pennsylvania legislature providing for secret divorce hearings. Then the banker discovered he wanted testimony taken in Europe. This too was arranged by Penrose. Nevertheless news leaked out and was published in certain eastern newspapers. Mrs. Mellon demanded a jury trial and the court granted it. Then Mellon was all for settling. Grounds for divorce were changed to simple desertion and the decree was granted in 1912.

The whole incident illustrated Mellon's influence on Pennsylvania politics in obtaining passage of special laws to suit his needs, in hushing publicity and controlling courthouse officials. Boss Penrose naturally was anxious to please the powerful Pittsburgher; Mellon was a heavy contributor to Republican Party funds. These gifts had run as high as \$150,000 at a throw. Penrose and other bosses of Pennsylvania, then as now, got their support from Mellon, General Atterbury of the Pennsylvania Railroad, Joseph Grundy of the Pennsylvania Manufacturers Assn., and similar big employing interests. No wonder all efforts to obtain minimum wage, child labor, and old age pension legislation invariably failed in the legislature!

In Pittsburgh, Mellon worked hand in glove with the Magee-Flinn Republican political machine and its successors, including the Coyne machine. Vice, poverty and corruption flourish, making the name of Pittsburgh pre-eminent in that regard among American cities. The big employers care not at all about that. Their workers live in miserable houses and shacks in the steel and coal towns surrounding the city, work long hours, or not at all, and get barely enough to hold body and soul together.

Senator Penrose and Senator Knox, faithful servants of the steel and coal interests and political messenger boys for the Frick-Mellon interests, both saw to it that their friend Andrew Mellon was made Secretary of the Treasury. Mellon's first job in Washington was to see that the excess profits tax on the fat earnings of the big corporations was done away with, and to reduce income taxes in the "higher brackets," that is, upon the very rich. Besides sparing the rich the burden of keeping up their government this also avoided leaving extra money in the Treasury for the veterans' bonus, for federal unemployment insurance or any other social legislation.

Money which might have gone into social insurance funds was dumped into the stock market, into further expansion of industrial plants and into foreign loans. Building more factories when those already built were not being used to capacity hastened the inevitable crash of 1929, and the foreign loans brought nearer the day of United States participation in the next imperialist war.

Under the Mellon regime the Bureau of Internal Revenue made tremendous refunds to great corporations and wealthy persons. These refunds were returns to them of taxes on war-time profits years after the war ended. Refunds to the capitalist class totalled close to \$3,000,000,000.\* U. S. Steel alone received \$96,384,000. Mellon served not merely himself but his class, and in serving his class served himself. He made refunds to his own corporations totalling about \$14,500,000. His own personal refund amounted to \$405,000.

Mellon himself, as the result of these favors to fellow-millionaires, and corporations, became the idol of the Big Business press. He was regarded as more powerful by far than President Coolidge, and as the Greatest Secretary of the Treasury since Alexander Hamilton! He was undoubtedly the power behind the throne in Washington from 1921 to 1929.

As befitted such a power in finance and government, Mellon had his daughter married to the son of a reactionary Maryland Senator in a million-dollar wedding that was the talk of society, and recalled those feudal rites in Pittsburgh where Mellon girls were married to the sons of steel magnates in made-to-order medieval castles. Hundreds of thousands of dollars were lavished on these affairs, even though thousands of Mellon miners might, at the time, be living on starvation rations while striking against Pittsburgh Coal Co. On the very day Sarah Cordelia Mellon was married, Mellon coal and iron police were evicting miners from their homes.

The Mellons did not believe much in charity and gave little. One exception was the \$3,000,000 given to build the East Liberty Presbyterian Church in Pittsburgh, known locally as the "Mellon fire escape." Millions were invested in the Mellon Institute, a research laboratory for manufacturers and for Mellon corporations. The Mellons and allied magnates controlled the board of the

<sup>\*</sup>See Wall Street, by Anna Rochester, p. 12. International Pamphlets, No. 30.

University of Pittsburgh, which became notorious for firing professors and radical students and suppressing freedom of thought on the campus.

The Mellons continue to invest heavily in the Republican Party. They gave and lent \$250,000 in the notorious 1926 Republican primary in Pennsylvania. Mellon defended his gifts on the ground that they were the same as gifts to the church. Each vote for the Mellon candidate for U. S. Senator in Pittsburgh cost \$4.14. The Mellons also controlled the Democratic Party in Pittsburgh, through alliance with its chiefs, a fact that became doubly important after the Democratic victory in 1932.

#### Mellon's Workers

Mellon is a staunch believer in long hours and low wages for his workers. The state sweatshop investigation in Pennsylvania in 1933, as we have noted, revealed that his aluminum factories paid 18 cents an hour to women. His aluminum plants worked the 11½-hour night shift even in 1933.

Strikes periodically convulsed his spy-ridden factories and mills. In 1913 his aluminum workers in New Kensington revolted, and wives of strikers used blacksnake whips to beat off strikebreakers. State police were rushed to the plant to break up meetings and picket lines. After six weeks, the workers were forced back under promise of arbitration.

In 1915, at Massena, New York, his aluminum workers struck, took possession of the aluminum plant and threw up a barricade in front of the main gate. Governor Whitman (Republican) of New York, sent in companies of militia which stormed the barricades and finally drove the workers out in a series of bloody encounters. Strikers' homes were raided and a strike leader later died of wounds inflicted by guardsmen. A hundred workers were jailed. The strike was soon settled with the company promising slight wage increases and correction of grievances over rents.

Again in 1916 the Aluminum workers in New Kensington struck, demanding the 8-hour day and recognition of A. F. of L. unions, but were defeated when the company shifted its war orders to other plants. The workers were forced back after three months.

In the Standard Steel Car Works at Butler, Pa., in 1919, state troopers beat back workers who joined the great steel strike. The troopers' horses were trained to kick in the doors of workers' homes and to enter, scattering terror among wives and children of the strikers.

In Pittsburgh Coal, however, the Mellon labor policy came to highest fruition. R. B. Mellon, once chairman of the company's board, practically admitted before a Senate committee that "you can't run coal mines without machine guns." Pittsburgh Coal, Charley Schwab's Bethlehem Mines Corp., and Rockefeller's Consolidation mines, took the lead in 1025 in breaking a contract with the United Mine Workers and smashing that union. Miners were evicted from the company towns in which they had been forced to live; coal and iron police, licensed by the state and paid by the coal and steel companies, terrorized strikers. Tear gas and machine guns helped the operators. When miners joined the National Miners Union in 1931 and conducted another great strike, Pittsburgh Coal Co. exceeded its previous efforts. Dozens of miners were shot, hundreds were gassed, others were sent to prison for long terms, their families evicted and starved. But a Pittsburgh Coal superintendent and a bunch of company guards at Arnold, Pa., who shot and killed John Philipovich, a strike sympathizer, were convicted of mere manslaughter and paroled. Two Pittsburgh Coal guards who tortured Mike Barkoski to death in their police barracks were given light sentences.

Company towns are an integral part of the Mellon apparatus of oppression. Andrew Mellon's partner, Henry Clay Frick, found the company store convenient in the hard times of the 1870's, for paying his miners and coke workers when he was short of cash. He gave them scrip redeemable at the company store, and found the practice so profitable that it was continued and adopted by other coal companies. Workers were forced to trade there, and high prices kept them in debt to the company. Popular outcry against these "pluck me" stores became so vehement that the Pennsylvania legislature abolished them. Thereupon the coal and steel companies organized dummy firms to operate them, and they flourish under this thin disguise to this day.

In the company town the company owns not only the stores, but

all the drab, monotonous shacks, the school, the church and everything else. The company is also the "law." It hires and pays the private police who patrol the streets and roads, help keep organizers out, spy on militant workers, and try to disrupt their organizations.

The East St. Louis race riots of 1917 were laid at the door of the Aluminum Co. and other employers by a Congressional investigating committee. Aluminum Ore Co., fighting its low-paid white workers then on strike, imported hundreds of Negroes from the lower Mississippi valley. So many were brought in that there were jobs for only part of them. Race hatreds were fanned. In the terrible riots that followed at least 25 Negroes, men and women, were burned to death, shot, drowned, hanged and their homes burned. The police and militia refused to interfere.

In 1933, the Aluminum Co. signed a code stipulating 30 cents an hour as the minimum wage in the industry. But even this hunger wage was too much to suit the Mellon company, and within a few weeks it was paying hundreds of its women workers at New Kensington, Pa., 25 cents an hour, in flat defiance of its own code. The workers at the New Kensington plant made their opposition felt by an overwhelming vote against the company union which was to be set up on the basis of the code.

Mellon's Pittsburgh Coal Co. signed a N.R.A. code and a working agreement with John L. Lewis of the United Mine Workers which took away from the miners, on strike at the time, the right to strike. Under this agreement between Pittsburgh Coal and Lewis, the checkoff was forced on the miners, to be paid into the district office instead of to local unions, the previous practice. In this way the local unions were robbed of their financial autonomy.

#### The Panic Helps Mellon

During the II years he held the office of Secretary of the Treasury, Andrew Mellon's private fortune and that of his family, leaped from the hundreds of millions to over a billion. The policies he sponsored—low taxation of the wealthy, easy money for speculators, unchallenged sway by the big corporations—padded his own fortune and those of his fellow-millionaires.

After the economic crash of 1929, his usefulness to the Republican Party declined. During the years of stock market prosperity he had been praised extravagantly as the author of good times; when stocks crashed, factories closed and millions roamed the streets looking for work, he was blamed. Veterans whose demand for a bonus he defeated; workers who knew his anti-labor policies had been responsible for low wages during "prosperity" and for lack of adequate relief and unemployment insurance during the crisis; and farmers who had been "deflated" since 1921 under his pro-corporation program, joined hands to denounce him. President Hoover thereupon sent Mellon as Ambassador to Great Britain. This, of course, meant no change in U. S. Treasury policy as millionaire Ogden Mills out-Melloned Mellon in his favors to his class.

Mellon used the crisis of 1929, as he had those of 1893 and 1907, and as his father had used the panic of 1873, to "clean up." His corporations, if necessary, paid interest and dividends out of vast surplus funds which had been piled up in good times. They bought up small companies in distress for a song. Mellon acquired numerous banks in western Pennsylvania when they became insolvent. He could have saved these banks and the workers money deposited in them. Instead he waited till they went on the rocks and then bought them up.

His Union Trust Co., keystone of his financial structure, continued to pay 200% annual dividends. An analysis of his family's income showed hardly any decline during years which saw at least 15,000,000 unemployed. In 1929 the Mellons received about \$35,000,000 in dividends alone. In 1930, their estimated income went up to \$38,000,000 and even in the panicky year 1931 the figure declined only to about \$33,000,000. (These figures are based on our estimate of Mellon share of control or ownership of particular companies.)

Despite this personal prosperity, however, his companies ruth-lessly slashed wages and working forces. Some of his aluminum workers, by 1933, were working for as little as 18 cents an hour. Thousands were laid off by Gulf Oil. No unemployment insurance protected them. In 1931 Mellon and his brother gave a grudging \$300,000 to Pittsburgh charity, less than 1% of their income for

the year. Later they were obliged to contribute \$750,000 more. But that was just a fraction of the sum that Andrew Mellon spent in that year for art treasures alone! From Union Trust in 1931 his family drew dividends of more than \$2,400,000, and other banks yielded him a million more.

President Roosevelt, seeking desperately to save the capitalist system from collapse, announced the "New Deal" in 1933, and instituted the National Recovery Act. Mellon continued to fight unionism, higher wages, and shorter hours with all the forces at his command.

#### Mellon-A Class Symbol

Mellon is the supreme expression of predatory, acquisitive capitalism. In this system of exploitation and individual acquisition, he did his best to search out, control, acquire and hold on to everything he saw that looked as if a profit could be made out of it. The more he, and all capitalists, acquired, the deeper in misery became the masses.

Mellon did not create this wealth, which he today controls. He sought only to gain control over wealth, that he might intercept the profits. And he used these profits to gain further control—the process being almost endless. But the source of this wealth and these profits remained as always—the exploitation of the resources of the country and the labor of the masses.

It is against this system of capitalism—mass exploitation for individual gain—that the workers fight. It is capitalism that produced Mellon, just as it produced the wretchedness of workers' lives, the horrors of our civilization and the army of half-starved unemployed.

Capitalism yesterday produced its great fortunes, today produces its Mellons and Rockefellers and Morgans, and tomorrow another set. Under capitalism all wealth becomes concentrated. It is for a new order of society, granting no place to exploiters, as in the Soviet Union, that we fight. The workers, creators of this wealth, will then have its use.

#### RECOMMENDED BOOKS

☆

THE LABOR AND INDUSTRY SERIES already includes six volumes. In these
books the chief American industries are for the first time treated
from the viewpoint of the workers. Prepared in collaboration with
The Labor Research Association.
LABOR AND STEEL, by Horace B. Davis\$1.00
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LABOR AND AUTOMOBILES, by Robert W. Dunn
LABOR AND SILK, by Grace Hutchins\$1.00



LABOR FACT BOOK, by Labor Research Association \$ .	85 I
THE MOLLY MAGUIRES, by Anthony Bimba \$1.	00 }
FORCED LABOR IN THE UNITED STATES, by Walter Wilson \$1.	00 }
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TEN DAYS THAT SHOOK THE WORLD, by John Reed \$1,	50
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STORM OVER THE RUHR, by Hans Marchwitza (a novel) \$ .	75
TALES OF MODERN CHINA, by Oskar Erdberg\$.	35
THE CANNERY BOAT, short stories from Japan	75
DAY WITH LENIN, by Maxim Gorky\$	25
VOICES OF REVOLT. The outstanding utterances of famous revolutiona	ry:
leaders, with introductions and notes. Volumes now ready	on
Robespierre, Marat, Lassalle, Karl Liebknecht, Bebel, Wilhe	mg
Liebknecht, Lenin, Debs, Ruthenberg. Each volume, bound	in
boards 5	o¢
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The publishers of these books will be glad to send a complete list of titles of interest to workers on request.

#### INTERNATIONAL PUBLISHERS

381 Fourth Avenue

New York

62-83338-45

Office	Memorandum	• UNITED	STATES GO	VERNMEN	IT
Jj		CONFIDENT	<del>iAL</del>		. –
то :	MR. A. H. BELMONT	3 194	DATE: Nou	ember 14,	1958
MFROM :	UR. R. R. ROACE	ALL INFORMATION HEREIN IS INC.	CONTAINED	Mo No	olson
SUBJECT:	WILLIAU TOMPKINS FORMER ASSISTANT A	WHERE SHOWN OTHE	SIFIED EXCEPT	Ro Ta Tr Cli	otter ayton
1958, adv Intellige	Reference is made ising that Tompkins wnce Agency (CIA) on t	as meeting wi	dum of Novemb th Allen Dull	er 13, w	C. Yukan
advised ti	On the evening of he Liaison Agent on a the following inform	strictly conj	fidential bas	is that he	had

discuss the appeal of Rudolf Abel which is now before the Supreme Tompkins indicated to Dulles that he had been called in by the Department to assume the responsibility of preparing the Government Tompkins advised Dulles that the argument before the Supreme Court. Department fully realizes that there is a good possibility that the Court will rule against the Government and the Department is already Tompkins stated that if there making preliminary plans for a new trial. is a new trial, Reino Hayhanen again will be a witness. Tompkins wanted to know if he could have legal access to Hayhanen for the Dulles took the position next few weeks in order to go over testimony. that at this time it was not necessary to make any kind of committal. concerning Hayhanen and he told Tompkins that they could discuss the the Court to rule on the matter at a future time. Tompkins expects Abel appeal sometime in February, 1959.

Angleton did not know if other matters may have been discussed with Tompkins, but he is of the opinion that Tompkins' interest in Hayhanen may be related to another motive, namely the writing of a book concerning the Abel case.

ACTION:

ACTION:

None. For your information.

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## fice Memorandum · UNITED STA S GOVERNMENT

MR. A. H. BELMONT TO

DATE:

April 13, 1959

FROM:

MR. R. R. ROAC

- Mr. Belmont

1 - Mr. Roach

- Mr. Papich

Rosen

Tolson Belmont

Mohr .

Nease Parsons

SUBJECT:

ALLEN W. DULLES

DIRECTOR. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

DeLoach McGulros W.C. Sillivan

You may be interested in the following comments which were volunteered to Agent Papich on 4-13-59 by James Angleton, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

As indicated in the press, the condition of John Foster Dulles is very serious. Angleton advised that there is considerable speculation within CIA concerning the possibility that President Eisenhower might appoint Allen Dulles as Secretary of State. Angleton made it very clear that as far as he knew, this was all restricted to speculation within his own Agency. However, he personally knows that Allen Dulles definitely. would like to receive such an appointment.

With regard to Allen Dulles' meeting with the President this past week end, Angleton stated that the interview dealt with the international situation and he was quite certain that it had no relationship to the appointment of the CIA Director to the position of Secretary of State.

#### ACTION:

For your information.

4-135

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED BY SOUDAILMW REC- 44

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ice Memorandum • United States Government Mr. A. H. Belmont INFORMATION CONTAINED Tolson HÉREIN, IŞ UNCLASSIFIED FROM : R. R. Roach McGuir Mohr . Parsons Rosen DULLES. DIRECTORTamm ALL THEORY CH CULTAINTO CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Georgies except BUTERU TERU Tele. Room Holloman Gandy Reference is made to the enclosed dopy of a Washington City news release dated May 12, 1959, which briefly describes a speech made by Allen Dulles before a group of businessmen at a meeting of the National Defense Executive Reserve. The article indicates that Dulles had been prepared to make some off-the-record remarks when he learned that reporters were present. After consultation with Defense officials, it was announced that Dulles would make off-the-record remarks in the presence of the reporters. His remarks apparently did not include anything that had not already been stated by other Government officials. On May 14, 1959, Assistant to Dulles confidentially furnished the following information to C. Agent Papich. per CIA ladvised that Dulles usually makes his speech from a prepared text. In the above-described instance he did not have such a text and talked from notes. impliedthat some confusion resulted when Dulles learned reporters were present but no damage was done because Dulles actually did not get involved in any sensitive material. Dulles has made speeches on alinfrequent basis ever since he became director of CIA in 1953. Very interestingly, in the past year he measurably has increased the number of speeches before various groups throughout the country. The reason for this is not specifically known but CIA officials have remarked to the Liaison Agent that in some instances Dulles has made the talks at the request of the State Department, and more specifically, from his brother, John Foster Dulles. Comment has also been made to the Liaison Agent that Dulles has expanded all his public Massified X SJP:sal (6) Declassia 1 - Mr. Belmont 1 - Mr. DeLoach 1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan 12 5 6 8 M 4 2 1/2 1 - Liaison Section 1 - Mr. Papich

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Memorandum Roach to Belmont RE: ALLEN W. DULLES, DIRECTOR CIA

addresses in order to build prestige for himself and his agency in anticipation of possible opposition which might be encountered by CIA from a new Administration in 1961. In this connection, you may be interested to know that Dulles allegedly has a very strong ambition to continue as Director of CIA until the new building is officially inaugurated. Dulles wants to be Director of the agency when that takes place. The building very likely will not be ready for occupancy until the middle of 1961.

#### ACTION:

None. For your information.

of marine

CALLEN DULLES,

ALLEN W. DULLES, DIRECTOR OF THE CIA SAID TODAY THE UNITED STATES

BELIEVES RUSSIA DOES NOT INTEND TO START A GENERAL WAR.

HE SAID U.S. OFFICIALS BELIEVE THE SOVIET UNION, RED CHINA AND
RUSSIA'S EUROPEAN SATELLITES WILL AVOID ANY SITUATION WHICH
COULD PRECIPITATE AN ALL OUT WAR.

DULLES SPOKE TO 750 BUSINESSMEN' AT A MEETING OF THE NATIONAL
BEFENSE EXECUTIVE RESERVE SPONSORED BY THE COMMERCE DEPARTMENT'S
BUSINESS AND DEFENSE SERVICES ADMINISTRATION.

THE RESERVE IS COMPOSED OF EXECUTIVES WHO WOULD WORK FOR THE
GOVERNMENT IN CASE OF WAR OR OTHER NATIONAL EMERGENCY.

DULLES ABRUPTLY SWITCHED TO AN OFF-THE-RECORD REMARKS IN THE
MIDDLE OF HIS SPEECH. HE DID SO AFTER ASKING OFFICIALS IF THE
CONFERENCE WAS OPEN TO REPORTERS.

A NEWSMAN TOLD DULLES THAT REPORTERS WERE PRESENT UNDER THE
IMPRESSION THAT HE WAS SPEAKING ON THE RECORD.

AFTER AN IMPROMPTU CONSULTATION WITH GONFERENCE OFFICIALS'
IT JAS ANNOUNCED THAT DULLES' ADDITIONAL REMARKS WOULD BE ON AN OFFTHE-RECORD BASIS.

IN THE REMAINING 25 MINUTES OF HIS SPEECH, DULLES SAID LITTLE IF
ANYTHING THAT HE OR OTHER GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS HAVE NOT PUBLICLY

STATED BEFORE.

5/12-+N544P

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 7/84/85 BY SOUDJAI IMW

Enclosure to Memorandum Roach to Belmont dated 5/15/59 captioned "ALLEN W. DULLES, DIRECTOR CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY"

62-53338-47

# ffice Memorandum . UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

то :	MR. A. H. BELMONT DATE: 7-27-59	b6 b7C
FROM :	CLASSFIED BY S R/2' ALM EHL DECLASSFIED ON: 25X	McGuire
subject:	ALLEN DULLES, DIRECTOR CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNGASSIFIED EXCEPT	Mohr
Sif the	WHERE SHOWN PRIERWISE.  On 7-25-59 Allen Dulles personally asked Agent Papich Bureau would be kind enough to transmit a message for him	

Governor Munoz Marin of Puerto Rico. Dulles advised that he had been 3\_ to invited to speak on 8-4-59 before the Governor's Conference. This is an annual conference held by Governors of all states, and will last for approximately 4 days beginning 8-3-59. Dulles stated he had not been Sable to confirm his attendance due to several pressing problems, and he is mes anxious to get a message to Governor Munoz. Dulles explained Sthat unfortunately his Agency has no means of fast and secure communication with Puerto Rico, and that he is very hesitant to use Scommercial facilities since he wants to avoid publicity. He commented that in view of the tense Caribbean political situation, advance publi-Vcity concerning his visit could be misinterpreted by the press. Dulles A stated he would be most greatful if the Bureau could pass the message on to Governor Munoz and at the same time ask the Governor to withhold any publicity concerning Dulles' trip.

Dulles volunteered that his speech would pertain to the international situation as it might relate to the civil defense problems of the Governors. He will speak in general terms and will not touch on any classified information. He also plans to have a personal meeting with Governor Munoz, the objective of which is to obtain the Governor's views and observations concerning the Caribbean political situation. Dulles considers Governor Munoz an astute politician whose comments could be of value. Dulles also indicated that he would endeavor to pay a courtesy call on our Agent in Charge, San Juan.

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) sent a teletype dated 7-25-59 to the Bureau regarding Dulles! visit to Puerto Rico, asking that a message be passed on to Governor Munoz. This teletype was prepared by one of Dulles' subordinates who had not been aware of the CIA Director's conversation with the Liaison Agent. On 7-27-59 the Liaison

Ageno was injulated by miss same numbers of the one offerable courte be
disregarded and the Bureau instead act on the basis of the conversation between Dulles and the Liaison Agent (51) (2) (2) (3338 - 48
between Dulles and the Liaison Agent (54) (1) (2-83338-1/6
SJP/nmn
(8) FOI/PA'# 340,403 JUL 29 1959
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1 - Mr. DeLoach CIVIL ACT. #
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1 = Mr. Papion

W. Xu.

Memorandum for Mr. Belmont
Re: ALLEN DULLES, DIRECTOR
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

#### ACTION:

Heretofore we have not received requests of this type from CIA, and we have always been most careful not to be doing leg work for that Agency. However, since this is a personal request from Allen Dulles, who has been most cooperative with the Bureau, it is believed that in view of the emergency circumstances described above, it would be advisable to transmit the message to Governor Kunoz via our San Juan office.

There is enclosed herewith a tadiogram to San Juan instructing the SAC to inform Governor Munoz that Dulles will be arriving San Juan 8-1-59 for speaking engagement scheduled for 8-4-59. Munoz will be informed that Dulles has asked that the Governor not issue any press release concerning Dulles' trip and speech.

SAC is being told that Dulles may pay courtesy call at his office. If so, SAC should extend usual courtesies and not get involved in discussions of a policy nature.

D

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1.

1-Orig
1-Yellow
1-Mr. Belmont
1-Mr. DeLoach
CODE 1-Mr. Baumgardner
1-Mr. Donahoe
1-Liaison
1-Papich UEGENT

RADIOGRAM 83338-49

TO SAC SAN JUAN

FROM DIRECTOR FBI

ALLEN DULLES, DIRECTOR, CIA. INFORM GOVERNOR LUNOZ TRAY DULLES

ARRIVING SAN JUAN AUGUST ONE FOR SPEAKING ENCAGEMENT SCHEDULED FOR

AUGUST FOUR, GOVERNOR'S CONFERENCE. ADVISE GOVERNOR DULLES ASKS THAT

NO PRESS RELEASE BE MADE CONCERNING HIS TRIP AND SPEECH.: FOR YOUR

INFORMATION, YOUR OFFICE HANDLING THIS BECAUSE CIA LACKS APPROPRIATE

COMMUNICATION FACILITIES. DULLES TO SPEAK CONCERNING INTERNATIONAL

SITUATION AS IT MIGHT RELATE TO CIVIL DEFENSE PROBLEMS OF GOVERNORS.

DULLES PLANS TO HAVE PERSONAL MEETING WITH MUNOZ TO DISCUSS CARIBBEAN

POLITICAL SITUATION. HE ALSO MAY PAY COURTESY CALL TO YOUR OFFICE.

EXTEND USUAL COURTESIES. DO NOT GET INVOLVED DISCUSSIONS POLICY

NATURE.

1 - Foretgn Liaison (detached)

SJP/nmmul

(9)

Belmont

ele. Room

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FNC

ENCLOSURE TO MEMO FROHBOSE TO BELMONT 7-27-59, REE "ALLEN DULLES, DIRECTOR, CIA."

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DeLoach
McGuire.
Mohr
Parsons
Tamm
(Trotter
W.C. Sullivan

**動 AUG 13 1959** 

MAIL BOOM TELETYPE UNIT

C.I.A. RELEASE Mr. Tolson
Mr. Belmont
Mr. DeLoach
Mr. McGuire
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Trotter
Mr. W.C.Sullivan
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

RR ESV

DE ESC 11

R 2516502

GR86

TO: DIRECTOR FBI

FM: DIRECTOR CIA

SECRET

OUT 79295

PER OGA REVIEW ON 5/24/0

FOL# 36/904

PER OGA REVIEW ON 5/24/0

PER OGA REVIEW ON 5/24/0

FOL# 366904
ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/3/19984 SP 3 ALM EHC

Palpagmit

PLEASE TRANSMIT THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO YOUR OFFICE IN PUERTO RICO:

1. MR. ALLEN DULLES ARRIVING SAN JUAN BY EAL 801 ON 1 AUG TO ÂTTEND GOVERNOR' CONFERENCE. WOULD LIKE TO MEET BURÊAU REPRESENTATIVES AND WOULD APPRECIATE THEIR TELLING GOVERNOR MUNOZ. WILL WELCOME OPPORTUNITY TO MEET WITH GOVERNOR AND DISCUSS PROBLEMS WITH HIME DESIRES NO PUBLICITY UNLESS RELEASED BY HIM.


2. NOTIFY MR. WILLARD GALBRAITH OF ABOVE

TOT: \25/1956 /

TOR: 25/1926Z

7-27-57 U

b6, b7C



C.I.A. Religion Mr. Tolson
Mr. Belmont
Mr. DeLoach
Mr. McGuire
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Trotter
Mr. W.C.Sullivan
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

RR ESV .

DE ESC 13

R 2920317

GR56

TO: DIRECTOR FBI

FM: DIRECTOR CIA

SECRET

OUT NUMBER 80537

REF: OUT NUMBER 79295

FUI# 34 6904

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED

PATE 6/21/99 BY SPA ALM EX

b6 Per FB

b6 Per FBI b7C

DECLASSIFIED BY 5P2 ALM EHL

ON 5/28/00

PER OGA REVIEW ON 5/24/00

per OGA review 9/7/10

1. PLEASE CHANGE ARRIVAL OF MR. ALLEN DULLES TO READ

"ARRIVING SAN JUAN BY EAL 2801 ON 1 AUG LEAVING NEW YORK AT

1215 HOURS; ARRIVE SAN JUAN AT 1650 HOURS."

EX 109 - REC- 23 - 62-8338-5/

2. NOTIFY MR. WILLARD GALBRAITH OF ABOVE

Ladiogram to San Juan

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12 AUG 24 1959

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# Office Memorandum • UNITED STARS GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE:

8/6/59

FROM

SAC, San Juan (66-565)

ATTN: Liaison Section

SUBJECT:

ALLEN DULLES DIRECTOR, CIA

Reburads 7/27/59 and 7/30/59 concerning the arrival of DULLES in Puerto Rico.

I personally met Mr. DULLES on his arrival in Puerto Rico on 8/1/59 at 4:50 p.m. I remained with him until such time as his plane departed for the Dorado Beach Hotel where he was staying. He departed for Washington, D.C. on Tuesday, 8/4/59. During the time he was here I saw him on several occasions and extended the usual courtesies to him. He expressed appreciation for the Bureau's interest on his behalf.

2 Bureau . 1 - San Juan

JFS:mls (3)

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DATE 9111 85 BY APLIBATION

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08/16/27/1954

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10Mr. Belmont 1-Mr. DeLoach 7-30-59 copy 1-Mr. Baumgardner 1-Mr. Donahoe 1=Liaison 1=Papich URGENT ADIOGRAM ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCHASSIFIED EXCEPT TO SAC SAN JUAN WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE. FROM DIRECTOR FBI ALLEN DULLES, DIRECTOR, CIA. REBURAD JULY TWENTY-SEVEN. ADVISE GOVERNOR MUNOZ DULLES DEPARTING NEW YORK AUGUST ONE FIFTEEN P.M., EAL TWO EIGHT NAUGHT ONE, ARRIVING SAN JUAN FOUR FIFTY P.M. NOTE CHANGE FLIGHT NUMBER. ALSO ADVISE WILLARD GALBRAITH, CIA. DECLASSIFIED BY SP2 AC PER OGA REVIEW ON 1 - Foreign Liaison (detached) per OGA 9/7/10 Classified by SJP/nmn Declassify 6A: OADR Dulles scheduled to make speech at Governors! Conference, San Juan, 8-4-59. CIA does not have radio communication with San Juan and Dulles asked on 7-25-59 if we would send message to Governor Nummez through our office. San Juan was instructed to do so by radiogram dated 7-27-59. On 7-29-59 CIA advised that flight number of plane has been changed and instant radiogram therefore being sent to San Juan. #366994 ASSIFIEN BY JP 3 FOI/PA# DECLASSIFYON: 25 APPEAL # NR: 30 CIVIL ACT. # 6 3112 Tolson APPROVED BY 403 Belmont 65° MA ee 11 JUL 3 () 1959 DeLoach. , FEDERAL DUREAU OF INVESTIGATION McGuire TYPED BY Mohr \_ U. S. . CPARTMENT OF JUSTICE Parsons . COMA MICATIONS SECTION Rosen \_ Tamm . Trotter W.C. Sullivan Tele. Room Holloman \_ MAIL ROOM TELETYPE UNIT Gandy .

W. C. Fullware

CIA Chief Speaks

Allen W. Dulles, CIA chief, speaking:
The evidence is overwhelming that the Soviets intend to
use nuclear blackmail as a major weapon to promote their objectives — namely to spread communism throughout the world.

They showed this intent at the time of the Suez crisis when they threatened England and France with ballistic attacks. They used these tactics again, chiefly against Turkey, at the time of the Middle East crisis about a year ago.

They will use the same threat against this country. If due either to any weakening of our defenses — and all forms of protection against nuclear attack are important elements of our defense — or due to any failure to maintain our retalistion striking power, we render ourselves susceptible to such nuclear blackmail, the security of this country and of the Free Would would be gravely compromised.

I have no reason to believe that we will fail to meet this

challenge.

El Mundo San Juan, P.R. 8/6/59.... Page 36, Col. 1-2

ALLEN DULLES DIRECTOR, CIA SJ 66-565

149 AUG 21 1959

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WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

Mr. Tolson. Mr. Belmont Mr. DeLoach Mr. M. Guire. Mr. Mohr .. Mr. Par ns . Mr. P.sen. Mr. Tehan Mr. Mr. W. Sullivan Tele. Room.

Mr. Holleman.

Miss Gandy.

August 5, 1959

b6 Per FBI

b7C

The Honorable J. Edgar Hoover Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation Department of Justice Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Edgar:

I have just returned from a brief visit to San Juan, Puerto Rico, in connection with a talk I made to the Governors' Conference, which assembled there.

During my visit your representative there, Mr. Joseph F. Santoiana, was most helpful to me on several occasions, and I want to express to you, and through you, to him, my appreciation of these courtesies.

For \$366904

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thfully yours,

20 SEP 1 1959

62 SEP 3 1959 101

### Office Memorandum . UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

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	то :	MR. A. H. BELMONT	r i	DATE: 11-2-59	
200	FROM : SUBJECT:	ALLEN DULLES DIRECTOR, CENTRAL I	b b	06 07C W 3-	Tolson — Bernont DeLooth McGuire Mohr Parsons Rosen Tamm Trotter W.C. Sull Tele. Roc
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Mrk Beling Mr. DeLog Mr. McGuh Mr. Moha Mr. Parsons Mr. Rosen. Mr. Tamm. Mr. Trotte Mr. Wassuffi Tele. Room. Mr. Holloman Miss Gandy.

## HARVEY:

## merican Spies Ineffective

something of a charmer. One public affairs visiting or that would expose our hand

rather a cloak-and-dagger in each other's hair. Harold Stassen, well meaning If you want to know on but ineffectual.

Agency is twice as big as our lution, for example, there is

of your tax dollars with little man to determine which side or no supervision.

formation available even to But the testimony of for the members of Congress who eign service officers, retired,

inclined to extravagance in of his organization's activities spite of the most careful seem to have been blunder-watchdog scrutiny by Con ing affairs and most, if not gress and the public. Imagine all of them, seem to have rethe phenomenal waste that sulted to the disadvantage of may be "cloaked" behind the the United States. Sometimes "secret" label where no con in failure of disastrous progressional eye is allowed to portions.

Harry Howe Ransom's recent book, "Central Intelligence and National Security," presents a frightening picture of this self-policing organiza-

Socially, Allen Dulles is Perceptive students of Since nobody wants a row something of a charmer. One public affairs visiting or that would expose our hand gets the impression that he working overseas often get would like to be remembered the impression that C.I.A. perhaps the only answer is by history but probably will agents, and the intelligence for Congress to designate and operatives of other government agencies, are operating proved Americans as Dougles flung network of American in unco-ordinated fashion in spies (Central Intelligence every dark alley, behind every bush and apparently often the spies.

which side your money is be-The Central Intelligence ing spent in the Cuban revoentire State Department! no way for you to find out.
It spends tremendous sums No way for your congress American spies and their lim-There is little accurate in litless funds may be aiding.

must vote gigantic appropriations the Senate foreign re-tions for this purpose. Illations committee, leaves the Government "bureaus" are distinct impression that most

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THE HOUSTON CHRONICLE 9/4/59 Houston, Texas HOUSTON DIVISION

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REGISTERED

Date:

September 29, 1959

To:

Director, FBI

(N) ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

Legat, Ottawa (80-10) From:

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT

WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

Subject:

RELATIONS WITH THE CENTRAL

INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)
(Porposed Visit of Allen Dulles to Canada 10/2 - 9/59)

As the Bureau is porbably well aware, Allen Dulles, Director of CIA, is scheduled to arrive in Ottawa, Ontario, Canada, on Friday, 10-2-59, and following a dinner with various Canadian officials on Friday night, will leave on Saturday morning accompanied by U. S. Ambassador Wigglesworth and a party of approximately thirteen, and will fly to

Greenland, the various Distant Early Warning Line (DEW Line) posts and will also fly over the North Pole. The party is scheduled to return to Ottawa on or about 10-9-59.

This office anticipates no contact with Mr. Dulles during his visit.

2 - Bureau

1 - Ottawa MLI inc

(3)

Declassify or

GROGA REVIEW

176 OCT 8 1959

EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM: AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1) DATE 06-14-2010

per OGA review 9/7/10

57 OCT 13 1959



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OGa document declassified per OGA 5/24/00

per OGA 9/7/10



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY WASHINGTON, D. C.

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

**DEC 1959** 

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Mr. Bel

Mr. Del

Mr. McGuir Mr. Mohr.

Mr. Parsons

Mr. Rosen. Mr. Tamm.

Mr. Trotte Mr. W.C.Sillivan

Tele. Room Mr. Holloman Miss Gandy

VIA LIAISON

Honorable J. Edgar Hoover Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation United States Department of Justice Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Edgar:

Thank you very much for your thoughtfulness in sending me the memorandum on "Soviet Russia's and Red China's Reaction to Nikita Khrushchev's Peaceful Coexistence."

I have looked it over with interest and have forwarded it to some of my specialists here on a need-to-know basis for a further study.

... With kindest regards.

366904

EX 109

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ENLIRE DOCUMENT IS Declassified PER OGA REVIEW ON 5/24/00

**REC-73** EL-13 Sincerely, 62-83338 555

11 DEC 7 1959

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Director

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DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM: FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE DATE 05-13-2010

Office Memorandum UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT Mr. A. H. Belmont DATE: November 4, 1959 McGuire Mohr . Parsons Rosen ALLEN W. BULLES SUBJECT: Tamm b6 DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY b7C REMARKS BEFORE NATIONAL STRATEGY SEMINAR NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE, JULY 24, 1959 (CENTRAL RESEARCH MATTER) In connection with Mr. Tolson's request this day for the full remarks of Allen Dulles before the National War College in which Dulles allegedly made statements deprecating the menace of communism, there is enclosed the full text of Dulles' speech. It will be recalled that, by memorandum August 14, 1959, Sullivan to Belmont, captioned "National Strategy Semirar, National War College, July, 1959," W. C. Sullivan, who lectured at the Seminar, reported comments regarding Dulles' speech made by one of the professors handling the Seminar. had said that Dulles left the Seminar with the over-all impression that there was no crisis at the present time; that the problem generally was under adequate Government control; that tac patient attitude on the part of Americans toward the Russians and other foreign communists should be adopted; and that some changes for the better could be expected to take place in the communist world. The following are excerpts from Dulles' speech on that occasion: b6 "In dealing with analyses of the Soviet threat I find that there is b7C often a tendency to go to extremes. There are experts in this field who tend to magnify all aspects of Soviet power and become prophets of gloom..." (page 1) MATTER SERVICE THE TOTAL MLL INFOKMATION CONTAINED Enclosure HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED. 1 - Mr. BelmoBATE 764185 aut plant l - Mr. Sullivan 1 - Mr. Papich Z DEC 10 1959 1 - Mr. Gray 1 - Section tickler AWG:ba m (7) OENTRI MER

Memorandum to Mr. Belmont Re: ALLEN W. DULLES

"... The threat of mutual nuclear destruction is a nightmare that cannot be dismissed, but even though International Communism expects to gain the world, it does not wish to acquire a world in ashes...." (page 3)

"Despite occasional missile rattling, as at the time of Suez, during the Middle Eastern crisis last year, and more recently in talks with Mr. Harriman and others, we do not estimate that it is the Kremlin's present intention to advance Communism by deliberately provoking war..." (page 5)

"The basic strategy of International Communism, with its primary emphasis on measures short of war, has remained remarkably unchanged over the years. So too have its objectives..." (page 6)

"... To a considerable degree the Kremlin's international objectives are not well understood or necessarily shared even by the Soviet people themselves with whom our tourists and exchange missions come in contact, and with whom as individuals the American people have so much in common..." (page 7)

"Today the Communists, with their progress blocked in Western Europe and to a great extent in the Far East, are concentrating a major effort in the newly emergent states of Asia and of Africa...." (page 10)

"... there is no reason to adopt an attitude of pessimism as we face this particular challenge of International Communism.

"We are far better prepared than is generally believed, to deal with the Communist political and subversive threat.

Memorandum to Mr. Belmont Re: ALLEN W. DULLES

"In the last ten years, after going through far too long a period of naive complacency, this country has been awakened to the danger. We have also learned to understand Communist operating techniques. We know about the orders given in Moscow to leaders of other communist parties. This is not too difficult. The security of these parties as they operate in the Free World varies from medium to poor. We have ways of covering their activities and we get the basic information we need to gauge their strength and tactics. Like too many of the rest of us, they talk too freely for their own good.

"Furthermore, the efficiency of the Communist organization in the less developed areas of the world is itself not well developed. In the post-war days they had in many European countries, as in France and Italy, for example, sophisticated old-line Communists of the Thorez-Togliatti school. Through death and old age this type of leadership is wearing out in Europe, and it will be a long while, if ever, before such leadership could be developed for Asia, Africa, or Latin America.

"In area after area Moscow and Peiping, and their covert spokesmen in their far-flung apparatus, have overreached themselves..." (pages 11 and 12)

"Many of the states in Europe, Asia, Africa, and even in parts of this Hemisphere, which have tended towards neutralism, have markedly changed in their attitude about communism over the last few years. Their former complacent approach to the danger is being replaced by a far greater degree of sophistication. Here some of the initial appeal of communism is wearing off. The uninitiated are becoming initiated...." (page 13)

"Finally, there are signs of change within the Soviet Union itself which over the years might bring about some relaxation of the aggressive expansionist policy of the International Communist movement.

Memorandum to Mr. Belmont Re: ALLEN W. DULLES

"The rigid police state of the days of Stalin has been relaxed...." (page 14)

"While the Soviet government is still a closely regulated autocracy, it is not today quite as free as under Stalin to disregard wholly the desires of the people among which the yearning for peace is foremost. As long as the Soviet people are only permitted to hear, to read and to learn what the Soviet government dictates, progress will be slow. But as long as there is some progress there is hope of gradual evolution. Increasing contact between the American and Russian peoples should contribute to this end..." (page 14)

Apparently aware that he might have left the Seminar members somewhat complacent about the threat of communism, Dulles, in the conclusion of his remarks, stated:

"I would not leave the impression, in concluding, that this listing of favorable trends should in any sense cause us to relax our sense of urgency in taking measures to counter Soviet political, economic and subversive penetration in the Free World.

"Quite the contrary, the moment a tide shows signs of slacking, then is the opportunity to drop holding operations and press the advantage. Since I appreciate there are many "Doubting Thomas' on this score, I can assure you that we are better prepared and better coordinated to deal with this challenge, and are dealing with it more effectively, than many of you realize...." (pages 14 and 15)

## RECOMMENDATION:

For your information.

V.

ON MW -4-

REMARKS TO THE NATIONAL STRATEGY SFMINAR
THE NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE
By ALLEN W. DULLES
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
July 24, 1959 (8:00 p.m., EDST)

I appreciate the opportunity to make the concluding remarks to the National Strategy Seminar for Reserve Officers. From the reports I have had of your meetings, and my intelligence on this is good, I realize that you have broadly covered the various elements of Soviet strategy and tactics, the nature of the Communist threat, the relative military strength of East and West, and the face of war in the nuclear age.

In dealing with analyses of the Soviet threat I find that there is often a tendency to go to extremes. There are experts in this field who tend to magnify all aspects of Soviet power and become prophets of gloom. Others tend to discount Soviet accomplishments and unduly magnify their internal difficulties. This could add up to an unhealthy complacency.

The first class of experts is the larger, though recently we have seen the other extreme in some magazine articles which have attempted to discredit, on what appears to me to be the flimsiest evidence, recognized Soviet accomplishments, particularly in the field of outer space.

Certainly it is more dangerous to underrate than to overrate, though the latter can well be expensive in terms of our budget.

 In these estimates of where we stand in relation to the Soviet, one of the crucial areas where some tend to underrate the Soviets is in the assessments of the relative economic output of the two great power blocs.

True, the gross national product of the United States alone is over twice that of the USSR. If we add to U.S. production that of other countries of the Free World, while adding to Soviet production that of Communist China and the Soviet Satellites, the ratio is still more favorable to us.

But as against this we must recognize that the rate of growth of the Communist Bloc is substantially greater than that of the Free World, and will probably remain so for some time.

Even more important is the extent to which Soviet present production and investment are keyed directly and indirectly to their military power. In fact, Soviet military outlays are now about equal to ours in terms of what they would cost us. Similarly, their annual investment in industry - vital to military power as well as economic growth - is now equal to that of the U.S. To achieve all this from their lower economic base, they have to devote about twice the proportion of their gross national product to military purposes as we do.

Of course, to achieve such goals within their much smaller economy, they are forced to curtail consumers: goods. But by emphasizing guns instead of butter, they have greatly reduced the significance in the terms of the power struggle of the still great gap between their over-all economic strength and ours.

Naturally, Khrushchev would like to have his people believe that the USSR has already achieved a state of military parity, if not superiority. While it is not the role of intelligence to attempt detailed net estimates of our relative military position vis-a-vis the Bloc, we have good evidence on which to reject any such conclusion.

Furthermore, the theory that either of the great nuclear powers could destroy the other, without the attacker himself being devastated, is not, I believe, subscribed to on either side of the Iron Curtain. The threat of mutual nuclear destruction is a night-mare that cannot be dismissed, but even though International Communism expects to gain the world, it does not wish to acquire a world in ashes.

From Soviet statements as well as from other evidence available to us, it seems clear that the USSR is placing more and more reliance on the development of ballistic missiles as its chief instrument of strategic nuclear attack. But the Soviets are not immune to the many difficulties inherent in developing new and untried hardware into reliable weapons systems.

Meanwhile Khrushchev and his military aides have done their best to deprecate the manned bomber, both to their own people and abroad. In fact he has called them "museum pieces." This may be, in part, to quiet the fears of their people and to bolster their assertions of superiority in one key military field.

Last May, Khrushchev told a delegation of West German Social Democratic editors that, though the NATO countries really possessed a large air force, it was, he said, technically outdated and it could be shot down by ordinary anti-aircraft artillery, and even by ordinary fighters.

"Why then," said Khrushchev, "do the Western military leaders base themselves on bomber aviation and talk a lot about it? Because their rocket technology is still weak" . . . "Therefore it appears that talk about a large number of bombers is being indulged in for purposes of deceit."

From Khrushchev's viewpoint this is undoubtedly good propaganda if he can make it stick, since the USSR today is in a position of inferiority vis-a-vis the U.S. with regard to manned bombers. The tremendous effort which we see the Soviets putting into advanced radar, ground-to-air missiles, and other defenses against aircraft would seem to belie the deprecatory statements of Khrushchev about them.

Obviously both our military defenses and our ability to retaliate by missile and aircraft should together be kept adequate to meet the threat. Here is where the superior industrial capacity of the Free World and of the U.S. in particular can and must play its role.

In the past when a technical, scientific, or industrial problem, such as that we face today in the missile field, has been put up to the ingenuity of our scientists and production experts, we have not long remained in second place. It is certainly incumbent upon us to see to it that we do not fail in this instance.

If we do keep up our military defenses, the most immediate threat to us for the years immediately ahead is not likely to be physical destruction by all-out nuclear war. The danger is rather the slow attrition of the power position of the Free World by a combination of political warfare, and economic penetration and subversion.

Despite occasional missile rattling, as at the time of Suez, during the Middle Eastern crisis last year, and more recently in talks with Mr. Harriman and others, we do not estimate that it is the Kremlin's present intention to advance Communism by deliberately provoking war.

We cannot entirely discount the risk, however, that the Soviets might miscalculate Western strength or the firmness of our intentions, and adopt positions from which it would be hard for them to find an acceptable line of retreat. The Soviets have miscalculated before, as in the 1948 Berlin blockade and in Korea. We can hope that Khrushchev, after having castigated Stalin for adventurism in the famous speech of February 1956 will not fall prey to the same temptation at Berlin or elsewhere. Aggression by proxy against the newly emerging and less developed countries may be a tempting but it obviously is a dangerous course.

The basic strategy of International Communism, with its primary emphasis on measures short of war, has remained remarkably unchanged over the years. So too have its objectives.

These were never more bluntly stated than in Khrushchev's ebullient speeches in Poland these last days.

Obviously referring to the phrase attributed to him, "We will bury you," he explained that when he said that Communism would be the graveyard of Capitalism, he did not mean that Communists would take shovels and start digging; "History," he said, "would take care of capitalists." They too, he suggested, would become museum pieces, and added that "If there were a God and he could act, he would take a good broom and sweep you out."

Certainly Khrushchev pictures himself as devoted to the task of helping in this burying and sweeping.

The "we will bury you" theme has been the fanatical tenet and credo of communism, sophisticatedly preached by Lenin, brazenly carried out by Stalin, and more subtly practiced by Khrushchev.

If Soviet policy were restricted to building a better Russia for the Russians, we could not object. To the Kremlin leaders, however, the USSR is merely the base from which Communism is to be expanded to cover the world.

As we are entering a period of greatly increased personal intercourse between the two power blocs, with exhibitions, tourism, cultural exchanges, and the like, it is important not to lose sight of the fundamental nature of this conflict.

This is too often overlooked by the casual visitor to the Soviet Union. To a considerable degree the Kremlin's international objectives are not well understood or necessarily shared even by the Soviet people themselves with whom our tourists and exchange missions come in contact, and with whom as individuals the American people have so much in common.

We should remember that the Soviet Union is a dictatorship, run by the high command of the Communist Party, that the Party itself numbers only about eight million -- about five percent of the adult population of the Soviet Union and only about 13 percent of the number of actual voters in our own last Presidential election.

Furthermore, these eight million party members have no real freedom even in choosing their local party leaders much less the leaders in the Presidium. It is these latter who determine the policies on which the fate of the Soviet people depend, including the policy of the secretly subsidized export of Communism on a world-wide basis.

This policy is an insidious interference in the internal affairs of free countries. If the Communist program were advanced in the international field by open and peaceful means as a form of competition between two great conflicting views of how society and the lives of people should be organized, we could well accept this challenge. Let us compete, let the peoples choose and decide which system is the better. Khrushchev claims he is inviting us to such a competition.

But this is a mirage.

Where behind the Iron Curtain have the peoples themselves had a free opportunity to choose? Certainly not in Czechoslovakia in 1948, or in Hungary in 1956, or in East Germany today. And where in the Free World would Khrushchev give this choice, if our liberties had once been taken away. And if Khrushchev wants an open competition why does he shield the Soviet people from a full exchange of ideas, of information, and of persons? Why the almost pathological concern to hide things from us and from his own people also.

The answer is that Communism, despite its brazen ideological pronouncements, cannot tolerate free competition. Nowhere has a nation fallen under Communist domination and then been allowed to test its choice by resort to free elections.

Instead, peoples are faced with the fait accompli of being taken over before they realize what has happened. In Hungary this was helped on in the immediate postwar days by what I understand has been vividly described to you as the Rakosi "salami" technique -- biting off, bit by bit, elements of freedom until the whole structure was eroded.

In Czechoslovakia the popular front technique succeeded in putting a minority party into power. This illustrates the grave danger of a situation in any state where the Communist party and its allies succeed in gaining even a substantial minority position. Once in power, the voting ends and popular say has no peaceful way of recovering control. In the case of Czechoslovakia the danger point was reached when the Communists gained less than 40 percent of the electorate, with the non-Communist parties, as is so often the case, hopelessly divided.

Today the Communists, with their progress blocked in
Western Europe and to a great extent in the Far East, are concentrating a major effort in the newly emergent states of Asia and of Africa. Here they exploit political weaknesses as well as dynamic nationalism and the surge of rising expectations which are not easy to satisfy.

Their weapons include economic penetration, the development of hard-core Communist parties -- underground or aboveground -- propaganda both open and black, and in the areas around
the periphery of the Communist bloc itself, they maintain the
overhanging threat of their military power.

Yet there is no reason to adopt an attitude of pessimism as we face this particular challenge of International Communism.

We are far better prepared than is generally believed, to deal with the Communist political and subversive threat.

In the last ten years, after going through far too long a period of naive complacency, this country has been awakened to the danger. We have also learned to understand Communist operating techniques. We know about the orders given in Moscow to leaders of other communist parties. This is not too difficult. The security of these parties as they operate in the Free World varies from medium to poor. We have ways of covering their activities and we get the basic information we need to gauge their strength and tactics. Like too many of the rest of us, they talk too freely for their own good.

Furthermore, the efficiency of the Communist organization in the less developed areas of the world is itself not well developed. In the post-war days they had in many European countries, as in France and Italy, for example, sophisticated old-line Communists of the Thorez-Togliatti school. Through death and old age this type of leadership is wearing out in Europe, and it will be a long while, if ever, before such leadership could be developed for Asia, Africa, or Latin America.

In area after area Moscow and Peiping, and their covert spokesmen in their far-flung apparatus, have overreached themselves. Their true hand has been shown in Hungary, Tibet, Egypt, and in many other countries that could be mentioned. It may be that in their over-eagerness to promote a Communist-dominated Iraq, the Communists have overplayed their hand with the new Iraqi leaders and damaged their position in the Arab world.

Here is an interesting sidelight on Tibet. The agreement of May 23, 1951, between the Peiping government and the local government of Tibet provided that the Chinese Communist army units entering Tibet should not "arbitrarily take a single needle or thread from the people." Eight years later they took the lives of many Tibetans, the liberty of all.

The Communists are fond of saying that the forces of history are on their side. One of the great forces at work today is that of nationalism, particularly in the newly emerging countries of the world. However, not the Communists, with their goal of domination, but the West, with its ingrained respect for self-determination, is coming more and more to be recognized as the ally of the new Afro-Asian nationalism. As anti-colonial feeling subsides in the new states, it is being replaced by growing realization that Sino-Soviet expansionism is a far greater threat to their cherished independence.

Soviet economic aid is beginning to run into the same type of problems we face in our own aid programs, including too many Soviet experts and technicians and here and there shoddy goods. Also the political petticoats of the programs have shown up badly in several instances, notably in Yugoslavia where aid was promptly terminated and half-built projects left to the weather, when Yugoslav policy no longer pleased the Soviet.

Here as in certain other instances the so-called "aid without strings" has been shown up as "strings without aid."

It is significant that little or no publicity is allowed to reach the Russian people themselves about the Kremlin's loans and aid to foreign countries. This leads one to believe that this use of their assets would not go down well with people who are themselves denied so many of the good things of life.

When things don't go as the Soviets want, they tend to lose their temper in public, as most recently in the cancellation of Khrushchev's Scandinavian trip and in the Chinese Communists' retort to India over Tibet.

Many of the states in Europe, Asia, Africa, and even in parts of this Hemisphere, which have tended towards neutralism, have markedly changed in their attitude about communism over the last few years. Their former complacent approach to the danger is being replaced by a far greater degree of sophistication. Here some of the initial appeal of communism is wearing off. The uninitiated are becoming initiated.

Finally, there are signs of change within the Soviet Union itself which over the years might bring about some relaxation of the aggressive expansionist policy of the International Communist movement.

The rigid police state of the days of Stalin has been relaxed. Education is being pressed and while special emphasis is being placed on education in scientific, technical, and engineering fields, which would add to their industrial and military strength, there is nevertheless, a general broadening of the educational base in the Soviet Union.

While the Soviet government is still a closely regulated autocracy, it is not today quite as free as under Stalin to disregard wholly the desires of the people among which the yearning for peace is foremost. As long as the Soviet people are only permitted to hear, to read and to learn what the Soviet government dictates, progress will be slow. But as long as there is some progress there is hope of gradual evolution. Increasing contact between the American and Russian peoples should contribute to this end.

I would not leave the impression, in concluding, that this listing of favorable trends should in any sense cause us to relax our sense of urgency in taking measures to counter Soviet political, economic and subversive penetration in the Free World.

Quite the contrary, the moment a tide shows signs of slacking, then is the opportunity to drop holding operations and press the advantage. Since I appreciate there are many "Doubting Thomas'" on this score, I can assure you that we are better prepared and better coordinated to deal with this challenge, and are dealing with it more effectively, than many of you realize.

But too much talking about plans and practices would only alert the challenger to our counter measures. Hence silence in face of criticism is better than any bragging about past accomplishment, or programs for the future.

One of the key purposes of this reserve officer seminar has been to alert a highly selected group to the nature and implications of the challenge which we face from International Communism. I would like to give my fullest endorsement both to the objective of the seminar and to the manner in which it has been carried out. But the job does not end here tonight. Each of you in turn can help to give the thinking citizens of your communities the benefit of your own impressions. In a free society like ours an informed public opinion is indispensable to give the backing to those men and to those measures that are needed to meet Khrushchev's challenge to us.

Mr. Tolson . Mr. Mohr -Mr. Parsons Mr. Belmont February 10, 1960 Mr. Fallahan Mr. DeLoach Mr. Malone . Mr. McGuire Mr. Rösen Mr. Tamm FULTON LEWIS, JR. Mr. Trotter/ COLUMN REGARDING Mr. W. C. Suff CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA) Tele Room 2-10-60 Mr. Ingram . Miss Gandy . The Director might be interested in taking a look at Fulton Lewis's attached column for 2-10-60. He really takes off on Allen Dulles, Director of CIA. Lewis hits CIA secrecy very hard. It is a very good column. RESPECTFULLY, C. D. DE LOACH

Enclosure

MR. MOHR:

CDD: sak (3)

1 - Mr. Jones

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(CAUTION: ADVANCE LEWIS COLUMN FOR RELEASE WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 10,

Â.M. AND P.M. PAPERS. MUST NOT BE PUBLISHED BEFORE THAT DATE.)

## WASHINGTON REPORT

BY FULTON LEWIS, JR.

COPYRIGHT, 1960, KING FEATURES SYNDICATE, INC.

WASHINGTON, FEB. 9-Allen Dulles, Central Intelligence Agency director, is spending much of his time on Capitol Hill these days testifying in secret and open sessions about Russian affairs.

In recent months the C.I.A. chief has briefed Congress on the Soviet economy, the progress of the Red missile program, and overall Russian military capabilities.

As the guardian of America's "intelligence" secrets, Dulles speaks with an authority that few dare to challenge. His organization is shrouded in secrecy, invulnerable to Congressional scrutiny. Yet despite those barriers to knowledge, one thing is evident: The Central Intelligence Agency is by no means omnipotent, its half-billion dollar a year budget guarantees no truth. The C.I.A., for example, was totally unaware of the approaching Hungarian Revolution, of the all-important events in Lebanon and Iraq two years ago.

Congressional leaders are stymied when they try to delve into C.T.A. activities; little information, therefore, can come from them. The most voluminous source material is probably Harry Rowe Ransom, who wrote the semi-official, friendly story of the C.I.A., "Central Intelligence and National Security," in 1958.

Ransom quickly dispels the romantic notion that C.I.A.'s sources are furtive agents dashing over borders and through curtains of iron and bamboo with top-secret information. The major sources of C.I.A.'s "intelligence," instead, are "the college graduate or Ph.D. sitting at their desk creating a mosaic from multi-colored data gathered from around the globe, most likely from non-secret sources."

(MORE)

BY FULTON LEWIS, JR.

XX sources."

These "agents" spend their working hours wading through public information--radio broadcasts, military journals, newspapers and periodicals--that the Communists have made available to us. Dulles himself admits that "getting good information from behind the Iron Curtain is the toughest job intelligence has ever faced. American pipelines to the Kremlin are scarce, if they exist at all."

Ransom, rationalizing for Dulles, says: "It would obviously be a waste of effort and money--and possibly of human life--to attempt to procure information from behind the Iron Curtain which might be available otherwise from a translation of Pravda, or from monitoring a Russian radio broadcast."

There seems to be little realization that the Communists can easily plant false information to mislead the intelligence people themselves.

This is but one reason for the severe criticism that followed Dulles's recent testimony on Soviet economic growth, His official viewpoint was that the Russian economy is growing at a much greater rate than ours, and that the Reds are rapidly approaching the U.S. in economic output. His source: the official Red figures released to the West, not clandestine agents roaming behind the Iron Curtain.

Knowledgeable students of the Soviet economy, such as G. Warren Nutter and Colin Clark, later reviewed those statistics and found them to be grossly exaggerated. They declared the real industrial output gain to be a fourth of what the Kremlin claimed. Nutter put the Soviet economy at a state of development comparable to the U.S. economy in 1914.

All this makes Dulles's analysis of Red military power seem less authoritative than some would have us believe. It lends credence to the contention of Rep. George McMahon, chairman of a House Subcommittee on Military Appropriations, that the intelligence people are "unable to give Congress any estimate as to what Russia has in the way of weapons...intelligence representatives answer questions as long as we ask them, but they still don't have the facts with respect to the power of our opponent."

Tomorrow we shall examine a case history of U.S. intelligence, the air force "crisis" of 1956. Its lesson for today is great.

PERSONAL

62-83338-58

Mr. Harvey G. Foster Federal Bureau of Investigation New York, New York

Dear Foster:

I have received your letter of May 2, 1960, and appreciate your thoughtfulness in bringing to my attention the remarks made by Allen W. Dulles. I hope you will continue to keep me informed of matters of this nature in your Division.

## Sincerely,

MAILED 27 MAY 10 1960 COMM-FBI

J. Edgar Hoover ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

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- 1 Sam Papich Enclosure
- 1 Personnel File ôf SA Sam Papich Enclosure

NOTE: SA Papich mentioned in SAC Foster's letter EOD 3-10.

is assigned to Domestic Intelligence in GS-15.

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Tamm
Trotter
W.C. Sullivan
Tele. Room

AFH:elw/mhd



File No.

### UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

New York, N. Y. May 2, 1960

Mr. J. Edgar Hoover Director Federal Bureau of Investigation Washington, D. C.

b6 b7C

Mr. Tolson Mr. Mohr. Mr. Parsons

Mr. Callahan

Mr. Malone

Mr. Tamm\_ Mr. Trotter. Mr. W.C.Sullivan Tele. Room.

Mr. Ingram. Miss Gandy.

Mr. McGuire. Mr. Rosen

Dear Mr. Hoover:

I attended the Communion Breakfast of the New York City Police Department St. George Association at the Waldorf yesterday. The Association's Golden Rule Award was presented to Allen W. Dulles of There are two things I thought you would be interested in knowing - first:

During his speech, Mr. Dulles paid tribute to you and to the organization led by you, for your most effective combatting of Communism in this country.

Secondly, during a conversation with Mr. Dulles, he commented about Special Agent Sam Papich as being an outstanding liaison officer. He advised 3 that he has found him to be a "tough", hard man whose word is his bond, and who is respected and trusted by himself, Mr. Dulles, and his staff.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

Sincerely

G. FOSTER Spécial Agent in Charge.

HGF: MT

7 MAY 12 1960

UNITED STATES GOVE

# lemorandum

TO

MR. BELMONT

DATE: 6-3-60

FROM

R. O. L'ALLIER"

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT:

ALLEN W. DULLES

DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

You may be interested in the following observations which were volunteered to Agent Papich on 6-2-60 by Dulles.

Dulles referred to his recent appearance before congressional committees relative to the U-2 incident. He commented that he actually had not been treated roughly, but was asked many sensitive questions which were difficult to answer because he did not wish to reveal vital intelligence information. He stated that Senator Gore of Tennessee, was by far the most capable interrogator. He described Gore as one who asked very intelligent and penetrating questions.

Dulles is of the belief that the Democratic critics of the Administration will not be picking on him any more. In his opinion the Democrats feel that there is nothing to be gained politically by hitting the CIA Director. He is certain that the Democrats will, continue using the U-2 incident and the Summit failure during the election campaign. He stated that it was "tragic" that the President would continue being a target of the Democrats in connection with the U-2 matter.

Dulles was not specific, but did leave the impression with the Liaison Agent that he might be concerned over allegations that he let the President down when he appeared before the congressional He emphatically stated that although the President had made the final decision (apparently concerning the last U-2 flight) he told the Congressmen that he personally would have made the same decision.

Dulles commented that from a propaganda standpoint Khrushchev is continually gaining advantages being made available as a result of this being an election year. He referred to the letter which Democratic

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REC- 14

1 - Mr. Parsons 1 - Mr. Belmont

1 - Liaison

1 - Mr. Papich

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Parsons Belmont

Callahan

Memorandum for Mr. Belmont

RE: ALLEN W. DULLES

DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

leaders Adlai Stevenson, Lyndon B. Johnson, Sam Rayburn, and William Fulbright had sent to Khrushchev asking him to prevent the collapse of the Summit Conference. This letter was sent shortly prior to the time when the Conference was to convene. Dulles explained that Khrushchev has now answered this letter, which will be publicized throughout the world. It has given him an excellent opportunity to expound his views in typical Soviet fashion. In Dulles' opinion, the Democrats made a mistake when they sent the letter. He commented that there was much to be done by the U.S. to combat Khrushchev's propaganda, but unfortunately, "Nobody knows how to play." By this he implied that there was not the leadership, organization and unity to effectively combat Khrushchev's tactics.

Dulles is making available a copy of the statement which he made before the Senate committee. He stated that if the Bureau was interested in reviewing the complete text of his testimony, which apparently would include questions and answers, he would permit the Liaison Agent to review the material.

### ACTION:

For your information.

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UNITED STATES GOVE MENT

# Memorandum

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Mr. Belmont

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FROM : R. O. L'Allier WM

SUBJECT: ALLEN W. DULLES

DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENC

As you know, Dulles has been in Europe for the past three weeks and for your information he is scheduled to return July 5, 1960. The Liaison Agent also has been informed that Dulles will again leave the country either in August or in the fall of this year. He is scheduled to make a trip to Africa where he will make stops in practically every country.

The Agent was told that Dulles prefers to be outside of the United States during most of the election campaign. Central Intelligence Agency officials take the position that by being outside of the country Dulles can maintain a nonpartisan position in the political picture.

#### ACTION:

None, for information.

SP: bas Ms

1 - Mr. Parsons

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то : Мг.	<b>v</b>	DATE: July 7,	1960 Tamm Trotter W.C. Sulforan
FROM : R. (	O. L'Allier	2,	Ingram Gandy
subject: ALLE	EN W. DULLES ECTOR, CENTRAL INTEL	LIGENCE AGENCY	Pallily
in the "Amer July 3, 1960 account of I information to us. Gini annual budge many tas 16,0 these figure is made to I	eference is made to rican Weekly" section, authored by K. S. Dulles" activities in has been previously iger indicates that et amounts to \$350,000 people. Very in es are close to bein bulles' employment i	n of the Washington Giniger. The article of the intelligence of printed before and Central Intelligence 00,000 and the Agent terestingly, it is g fairly accurate.	Post, Sunday, cle is a favorable field. All of the is well known e Agency's (CIA) cy employs as believed that Brief reference
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Re: ALLEN W. DULLES
DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

While was connected with CIA one of his
responsibilities allegedly was the preparation of the history of
the Agency. He also had occasion to handle matters of a public
relations nature. In view of this background, it would appear
logical that would be readily used by CIA for publicizing
the Agency.

ACTION:

For your information.

b6 b7C

Memorandum L'Allier to Belmont

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"We tell the Russians too much"

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THERE'S NOTHING SECRET about the location of the most secretive agency of the U. S. Government.

By K. S. GINIGER

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The Washington Post and 4
Times Herald
The Washington Daily News
The Evening Star
New York Herald Tribune
New York Journal-American
New York Mirror
New York Daily News
New York Post
The New York Times
The Worker
The New Leader
The Wall Street Journal
Date

JUL 3 1960

62-83335-61

In the basement of the big steel and concrete building ... a light over a door changed from red to green ... The Chief sat behind a desk on which an enormous green marble paperweight held down a single sheet of paper. A ... glass of milk, a bottle of grey pills ... stood by the black telephone. (The red one was for scrambling.) His black morning coat, black tie and black monocle hiding the left eye gave him the appearance of an undertaker, just as the basement had the effect of a vault, a mausoleum."

That's how writers of spy stories like to describe the headquarters from which the world's spymasters operate. The example quoted here is famed novelist Graham Greene's portrait of Britain's intelligence chief in his London headquarters.

I know, from my own experience, that it is nothing like that. And neither is the headquarters of his opposite number in the United States, Allen Welsh Dulles, Director of Central Intelligence and head of the Central Intelligence Agency, most secretive of America's government agencies.

If you had visited Allen Dulles in the midst of the recent furor over the downing of the U-2 photographic intelligence plane, presumably piloted by a C.I.A. civilian agent, your taxi would have taken you to the administration building of C.I.A.

Set in a cluster of marble and red brick government buildings of a type common to Washington, this structure is clearly identified by signs leading to it. The door is guarded by security police and no one not an employe of C. I. A. goes through it without a C. I. A. escort.

The corridors carry the usual security posters warning against loose talk. Through the open doors of various offices, banks of locked safes and file cabinets can be seen; opened ones carry large signs saying "Open" as a reminder that their secrets must, be locked in again before the user leaves the room:

the room:

Mr. Dulles' own office is no basement hideaway but a smallt room on an upper floor. His deak and

tables are covered with papers, bound reports and books of all kinds. But Dulles himself is not often behind the desk, especially when he is receiving a visitor. He prefers to stride back and forth across the room, an ever-present pipe in hand.

On his wall there is an architect's rendering of the new multimillion-dollar C. I. A: headquarters building now being erected across the Potomac in Virginia.

From this room, Allen Dulles advises the President and various government agencies on what is going on all over the world. Russia is not America's only intelligence target; it is important sometimes that we know what our friends as well as our foes, are planning.

are planning.

To accomplish this, Dulles spends an amount believed to be as high as \$350,000,000 a year and employs possibly as many as 16,000 people at home and abroad. What the real figures are is a closely guarded secret known only to a few members of Congress and to top officials of the Agency itself.

Who is this man who, as critics have charged, has the power to take steps that may, as in the U-2 incident, lead us precipitately into an atomic war? And where did he obtain the experience that has led our government to trust him with huge expenditures of money and manpower "without," as the law creating his job specifically states, "regard to the provisions of law and regulations relating to the expenditure of government funds."?

Now 67, Allen Dulles entered into the arena of foreign affairs at the age of eight, when he wrote a pamphlet on the Boer War, then in progress. This was proudly published by his family who saw signs that the youngster would follow the path already marked by older members of the family.

His father was a Presbyterian minister and his mother was the daughter of Benjamin Harrison's Secretary of State. One uncle had been ambassador to England in Rutherford Hayes' administration while another was to become Woodrow Wilson's Secretary of State.

In a family such as this, it could be expected that Allen, his brother, John Foster, and his sister, Eleanor Lansing, might be attracted by the lure of serving their country abroad, as all of them eventually did.

Allen Dulles entered this country's foreign service in 1916, after having received his bachelor's and master's degrees from Princeton and teaching in India for a year. World War I and the years following saw him holding posts in Vienna, Bern, at the Paris Peace Conference, in Berlin and in Constantinople.

He returned to Washington in 1922 to head the Division of Near Eastern Affairs in the State Denartment for four years, during which he also

attended the Geneva Disarmament Conferences of 1925 and 1926. At night and over the weekends, he studied law, receiving his degree from George Washington University in 1926.

By then he was a family man, having married Clover Todd, daughter of a Columbia University professor, in 1920, and facing the problems of raising a family that now numbers two daughters and a son.

The State Department offered him a promotion but, unfortunately, no raise went with it. He resigned to join his brother, John, in the important Wall Street law firm of Sullivan & Cromwell, using the incident to create a storm of protest about State Department salaries.

Over the next 16 years he practiced law in New York and served as legal advisor for various government missions abroad. When World War II broke out and General William J. ("Wild Bill") Donovan was asked by President Franklin D. Roosevelt to form a secret espionage agency, Allen Dulles, because of his knowledge of strategic European areas was a logical choice for chief of the new O.S.S. in Switzerland.

In the fall of 1942 he set up headquarters in Bern, the wartime spy center of Europe, and soon established contact with a German intelligence operative, to this day identified only as "George." George hated his Nazi masters and was willing to do everything he could to destroy them.

The result was a constant flow of German war secrets, including more than 2,000 documents from "George" to Dulles to the various Allied head-quarters concerned. Among these were the documents which gave away the secret of the famous Operation Cicero," involving the valet to the British ambassador at Ankara as the key figure in a Nazi spy ring.

The greatest of Dulles' World War II "cloak and dagger" exploits was his work as the liaison between the Allies and German officers who were plotting to assassinate Hitler. Although their plot failed and Hitler was only injured, the contacts developed in this work led to the famous "Operation Sunrise," the surrender of the German troops in North Italy in 1945. For this Dulles was decorated not only by our own government but by the Italians, French and Belgians.

After the war, Allen Dulles returned to Sullivan & Cromwell. The O.S.S. became merely a collection of files marked "Top Secret" in a Washington basement. However, important officials were convinced that the U.S. needed a full-time, permanent intelligence organization to coordinate all foreign intelligence activities.

A Central Intelligence Group was set up by President Truman in 1946. In 1947, the new

National Security Act superseded this with the Central Intelligence Agency. But not until the outbreak of the Korean War, did the C.I.A. begin to assume its present proportions.

In 1947, President Truman appointed Allen Dulles to a panel created to survey American intelligence needs and procedures. Like so many such reports, this one gathered dust until it came into the hands of General Walter Bedell Smith, newly appointed Director of Central Intelligence, in 1950. Smith read it carefully and telephoned Dulles. "We'll do what you recommend," Smith is said to have told him, "only you'll have to come down to Washington and show us how."

Dulles agreed to take a short leave from Sullivan & Cromwell, so that he might serve as a consultant to C.I.A. Smith persuaded him to resign his highly profitable law partnership to become the \$20,500-a-year deputy director of the Agency. He again immersed himself in the job of controlling and directing our intelligence activities in the critical years of the Korean war.

A personal tragedy overshadowed this period for Dulles: his only son, Allen, a Marine in Korea, was severely wounded in the fighting there, and is still going through a series of operations in the hope he can recover his health.

When the war in Korea ended and Bedell Smith retired, Dulles was the obvious choice for Director of Central Intelligence, a position to which he was named in 1953. A raise of only \$500 went along with the promotion but, by then, his private fortune, gained in his law practice, made it unnecestary for him to repeat his protest of 1926.

Today he is healthy vigorous and active He plays tennis regularly although he has had to abandon singles in favor of doubles. He gets in an oceational game of golf and, when he can't get outloors, enjoys bridge.

His favorite relaxation probably is swimming. He enjoys travel and mixes business with pleasure by spending as much time as he can away from his office seeing for himself what C.I.A. people are up to all over the world. He makes a particular point of taking such trips during election campaigns to minimize the possibilities of the Agency being involved in politics.

Busy now defending the Agency against the charges growing out of the U-2 incident, he resists the idea that C.I.A. should be more closely supervised. He does not believe that operations of this kind can be run by committees and he tells friends that he does not feel he could continue in his post if the present closely guarded barriers of secrecy surrounding the agency were removed.

"We tell the Russians too much," he has said, and Washington observers believe that the decision to acknowledge U.S. responsibility for the U-2 flights over Russia was one with which he did not agree.

Although he is opposed to greater Congressional supervision of Agency activities, he points out that the individual members of Congress who serve on the sub-committee that approves the C.I.A. budget knew of the U-2 program from the beginning. No secret this important or involving this many people—in the C.I.A., in Congress, in the various other agencies and aircraft companies concerned with the U-2—has ever been kept for so long a time.

The world now knows this secret, but Allen Dulles has lots of others. Most of them none of us will ever know. Those we do find out usually will be the secrets of plans and operations which have gone wrong. We can only hope that few of them do



ALLEN DULLES (right) reminisces about the 1944 plot to kill Hitler wit Dr. Hans Gisevius, one of the conspirators whom Dulles helped to escape



51 gug 5 1960

WFO 62-0

	It is noted ALLEN W. DULLES, Director of CIA, resides at 2723 Q Street, N.W.;	he
	was advised that the matter of his	b7C
	would not be within the jurisdiction of the FBI. He was further advised that his allegation concerning	
	would not be within the jurisdiction of the FBI. WFO indices were negative regarding the captioned individual. This is being furnished for informand no further action contemplated.  One copy being designated to BA for info inasmuch as the BA territory.	
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Walls A

# Memorandum

ro : Mr. Belmont ()

DATE: 7-29-60

FROM : Mr. L'Allier

1 - Mr. Parsons

Parsons Belmont

Callahan DeLoach Malone \_\_ McGuire \_

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Ingram

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1 - Mr. Belmont

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED Papich

DIRECTOR, CIA HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

You may be interest of in the following information which 3 - was furnished to Agent Papich on July 29, 1960, by Dulles.

Dulles referred to his intelligence briefing of Senator Lyndon Johnson and commented that the Senator has an unusually good grasp of sensitive situations throughout the world. Johnson told Dulles that he personally wanted the August session of Congress to be as brief as possible. Johnson stated that in his opinion there were 4 bills which should be acted on and then they can recess. According to Dulles, 2 of the bills mentioned dealt with health, education and welfare and with foreign aid. Johnson stated that he was leaving for Massachusetts to confer with Kennedy and that en route he would visit with Harry Truman. Johnson hopes that Kennedy will share his views with regard to the bills which require action. Dulles received the definite impression that Johnson was most anxious to finish his congressional business and to settle down to campaigning.

Richard. Dulles was most complimentary concerning Vice President Nixon's convention speech. He referred to it as a "real thumper." He then commented that he very likely would cancel his planned trip to Europe and Africa next month. He stated that there was no question in his mind that communism and Soviet Russia would be key issues in the campaign and he did not think it would be wise to be away from the country.

Dulles stated that he stayed overnight at the Johnson ranch home and another guest was Congressman James Wright of Texas. It is Dulles' understanding that if Johnson is elected Vice President, Wright will be promoted as Johnson's successor to the Senate.

ACTION:

For your information.

18-10-100 Xoneto

EX 104

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sjp;mtb/

SENT DIRECTOR

- Orig. & 1 - Ye11ow Legal Attache, Rome September 8, 1960 - Mr. Parsons Mr. Belmont Director, FBI - Liaison - Mr. Papich ALLEN DULLES DIRECTOR CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY The Bureau has been informed that Dulles will be in Rome, Italy, during the latter part of September. 1960. The purpose of this visit is unknown Dulles possibly may pay a courtesy call at your b3 office. In accordance with previous instructions issued to you, do not get involved in any discussions of a policy nature. AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM: FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION EXEMPTION CODE 25K(1) 1 - Foreign Liaison Unit (detached) ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEP WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE: SJP:bas classified per OGA 9/7/10 See memorandum L'Allier to Belmont dated September 7, 1960, captioned, "Allen Dulles," SJP:bas. 6 22 99 Classified by 1000 bya mo BE BY A ALM EHL Declassify of OADR FOI#366904 [] CLASS FIGO PER OGA 1960 SEP 9 62-83338-66 Mohr . REC- 34 Parsons Belmont Callahan DeLoach EX 109 19 SEP 12 1954 Malone McGuire Trotter W.C. Sullivan

### Memorandum UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

The Director

8-29-60 DATE:

FROM J. P. Mohr

SUBJECT: The Congressional Record ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

Original filed in: 6 6. 1731-


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Pages 16765- Senator Keating, (B) New York, submitted an address by the Honorable Allen W. Dulles, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, to the Veterans of Foreign Wars, Detroit, Michigan, August 27, 1969. Mr. Keating stated "it has long been my profound conviction that the awesome reality of the Communist design for world conquest has been grasped only partially by the citizens of our Nation. - - - The theme of his outstandingly fine and timely speech was precisely the 'know thine enemy' admenition which constitutes the basic and indispensable first line of delense for human freedom."

184 SEP 6 1960

In the original of a memorandum captioned and dated as above, the Congressional was reviewed and pertinent items were Record for 8-27 60 marked for the Director's attention. This form has been prepared in order that nortions of deal of the original memorandum may be clipped, mounted, and piaced in appropriate Bureau case or subject matter files.

A	UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT  Memorandum  TO: Mr. Belmont  FROM: R. O. L'Allier  SUBJECT: ALLEN DULLES	DATE: September 7,  ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN : SUNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.	Trotter W.C. Sullivan Tele. Room Ingram Gandy
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AUTHO FBI A EXEMP	advising him concerning  TED FROM AUTOMATIC ASSIFICATION  PRITY DERIVED FROM: AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE PATION CODE 25X(1) 06-14-2010  1 - Mr. Parsons 1 - Mr. Belmont 1 - Liaison 1 - Mr. Papich	with is a letter to our Legal Ar Dulles' visit to Italy.  Classified by ADA Declassify on OADR	bil per CIA billion by ballion by ballion by ballion by ballion by b
FOI/PA APPEAL CIVIL E.O. # DATE	CLAS  DEGL  ACT. # 10856   6/2	SIFIED BY SPA ALM/EH43 SEP 13-19 ASSIFY ON: 25X  2/19 2/20 CLASSIFIED BY SPA ALM/EH43 SEP 13-19 CLASSIFY ON: 25X  Classified per OGA 9/7/10  SIFIED BY SPA ALM/EH43 SEP 13-19 Classified per OGA 9/7/10	60



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Memorandum L'Allier to Belmont Re: /ALLEN DULLES ](X)(U)

the Soviets of stirring up trouble. Menshikov was highly critical of United States use of NATO countries in stirring up troubles and had no regard for our program to control nuclear tests.

Gore received the definite impression that Menshikov was a "lonely man" and that he enjoyed conversing with an American. Gore noted that there were no other Russians at the residence other than Kornienko, who served as an escort for Gore.

Senator Church lunched with Menshikov at the Soviet / Embassy on August 25, 1960. The Senator asked the Ambassador if it were true that there was considerable anti-Jewish activity in the Ukraine. Menshikov immediately stated that there was no such atmosphere in Russia and anything to the contrary was sheer propaganda. The Ambassador then initiated a discussion of developments in Africa and made several derogatory remarks concerning the "colonial powers," Church retaliated by referring to the expansion of the "Russian empire." Menshikov very hotly denied any Soviet desires to acquire additional territory.

The Ambassador raised questions concerning the coming elections and Church followed a line very similar to that of Senator Gore. Church felt the Democrats would win but very strongly pointed out that both parties would follow the same line with regard to Russia.

Menshikov denied that the Soviets were trying to move into Cuba but commented that there was nothing wrong in doing so, particularly when the United States has encircled Russia with bases in foreign countries. He stated: "We have surpassed you in military power and you can't catch up."

Menshikov briefly referred to the U-2 flight and stated: "One or more U-2 flights will mean war between us."

A discussion developed on the subject of treaties and negatiations with Russia. Church emphasized to Menshikov that Soviet officials quite often forget how our system of Government operates. He pointed out that no United States President, whether

SEX

Memorandum L'Allier to Belmont Re: /ALLEN DULLES (4)

he is a Democrat or Republican, can establish a treaty with a foreign country without a two-thirds Senate ratification. He cited the example of President Wilson, who failed to obtain the Senate's support: in his objective to make the United States a member of the League of Nations. Menshikov then "exploded." He ridiculed the Senate, stating that: "Many members ought to be in cages and be taken off to medical laboratories for examination." He immediately cooled off and stated to Church that he meant "no personal offense." (\$)

A lengthy discussion was held concerning the banning of nuclear tests. Church held to the position that nothing will ever be accomplished unless the Soviets accept an inspection system.

Dulles made the observation that in his opinion Menshikov undoubtedly is doing everything possible to collect information which might assist the Soviets in predicting election results in November. According to Dulles, it is very possible that Menshikov's future in the diplomatic service will depend on the accuracy of his reports to Moscow. Dulles feels that Menshikov may be contacting other Congressmen. In this connection, Dulles heard that the Ambassador may have tried to contact Senator Joseph Clark of Pennsylvania, but he was not certain if this took place.

Dulles stated that he contacted the Liaison Agent because he had informed both of the Senators that in his opinion it was necessary that the Bureau be advised of the above-described meetings with the Soviet Ambassador.

ACTION:

For your information.

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COPY TO MR. TOLSON

Mr. Parsons Mr. Belmont . Liaison Mr. Papich-21-60 DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM: URGENT ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS OCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE. TO LECAL ATTACHES LONDON ROME FROM DIRECTOR PRI DULLES, INFORMATION CONCERNING. DULLES DEPARTING OCTOBER THO TWO FOR TRIP TO ENGLAND, FRANCE, ITALY AND GREECE. CONTACTING FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY OFFICIALS. CONTACTS LEGAL ATTACHES, EXTEND USUAL COURTESIES. INVERTED IN POLICY DISCUSSIONS. Classified by . - Foreign Liaison Unit Declassify

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
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APPROVED BY

TYPED BY

DATE 06-14-2010

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10 Tolson UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT lemorandum McGuire Rosen : Mr. Belmont DATE: **October 24, 1960** Tamm Trotter W.C. Sullivan Tele. Room Ingram : R. O. L'Allier ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED Gandy HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT 0 WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE. bl per CIA SUBJECT: ALLEN DULLES DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA) b3 Liaison has previously advised that Dulles was leaving for Europe October 22, 1960, [and would be in sontact with various foreign intelligence and security officials As you know, CIA did receive a detailed report from us/ which was disseminated to interested key agencies. \_\_\_\_\_pointer put that the State Department disseminated to the British Foreign Office a paraphrased report based upon the information disseminated by the Bureau. This was done with Bureau approval. Pursuant to instructions, the Liaison Agent advised on October 21, 1960, that the Bureau has given MI-5 a copy of the detailed report concerning the Soviet-Chinese Communist differences. that this was given to MI-5 on a highly Tt was impressed upor restricted basis and with the understanding that the British impose very strong controls in handling the information. (S) ACTION: Declassify. For your information. SJP:bas per OGA review 9/7/10 1 - Mr. Parsons 13 OCT 25 1960 1 - Mr. Belmont 1 - Liaison 1 - Mr. Papic 630CT311960 EXEMPTION CODE 25X(uc/baw 60324) DATE 09-10-2010



Memorandum from Mr. L'Allier to Mr. RE: ALLEN DULLES,
DIRECTOR,
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

b1 per CIA

	b3	
	ACTION:	/(5
	If you approve will be informed that CIA the information which came from our information which was disseminated to CIA by the Bureau. The Liaison Agent will make it very clear that the information should be used on a strictly need-to-know basis and it should not be utilized in any intelligence operation without first checking with the Bureau.	n
	Attached also for approval is a cable to Legal Atta Bates, London, instructing him to advise that we	(S)
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#### CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY WASHINGTON, D. C.

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

VIA LIAISON

RECEIVED FROM FEB 1 11901 SJP C.A

1 6 FEB 1961 Tele. Room. Mr. Ingram. Miss Gandy.

Mr. DeLoad Mr. Evans.

Mr. Malone. Mr. Rosen.

Mr. Pavel.

Honorable J. Edgar Hoover, Director Federal Bureau of Investigation United States Department of Justice Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. Hoover:

Thank you for your letter of 10 February concerning the forthcoming visit of Premier Khrushchev to the United States.

I very much appreciate your thoughtfulness in bringing: this information to my attention and I have forwarded it to some of my people here on a need-to-know basis.

With kindest personal regards,

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED TS Declassific Per OGA Review

Of 5/4/00 per OGA letter 9/7/10

52 MAR 3

Sincerely,

b6 Per FBI b7C

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UNITED STATES GOVER MENT

## Memorandum

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TO

The Director

DATE: 2-7-61

FROM

N. P. Callahan

SUBJECT:

The Congressional Record

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Pages A741-A742. Congressman Evins, (D) Tennessee, extended his remarks to include an article entitled "Kennedy Leadership Gives Nation New Direction" which appeared in the inaugural issue of the Democratic Digest. Mr. Evins advised that the article records highlights of the 73-day transition period between election day and inauguration day. The article points out "The tone was set with announcement of the first decision on appointments, assuring the retention of Allen W. Dulles as Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and J. Edgar Hoover as Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. This decision, the Washington Evening Star commented, constituted gratifying recognition of both the nonpolitical nature of their jobs and the value of their services to the Nation."

162-83338-NOT RECORDED 176 MAR 14 1961

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DIA MW DATE 7/04/85 BY OPE DIA MW

In the original of a memorandum captioned and dated as above, the Congressional Record for 2-6-6/ was reviewed and pertinent items were marked for the Director's attention. This form has been prepared in order that portions of a copy of the original memorandum may be clipped, mounted, and placed in appropriate Bureau case or subject matter files.

57 MAR 1 1 1501 36

Original filed in: 66-1731 617

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10	· , 🖭	Mr. Tolson.
UNITED STATES GO COMMENT		Mr. Pagens
Memorandum	The second second	Mr Birrent
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TO : Mr. Moloner	- 1 1-	Mr. D. Sanh
AP 51 /	DATE: 2/24/61	And I
Altn: Mr. Edwards		Mr. To i
FROM :		Mr. 11 to 2 Mr. W.C. C. Iliven
		Tele. Room
SUBJECT: ALLEN DULLES, DIRECTOR	b6	Miss Gandy
TENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIALLUNCHEON - QUANTICO, VA. 3/3/61	b7C	165
		of Charles
Lt. General E. W. Snedeker, Comm Schools, Quantico, Va., today advised th	<u>nandant Marine (</u> nat Mr. Allen Di	lorps
Director, C.I.A. will address the combin	ned Junior and S	Senior-
Schools of Marine Officers on the morning and that he would like for the writer to	ig of March 3,	1961
being given for Mr. Dulles at Waller Hal	ll at 12:20 PM	that
date, which I accepted.		
For your information Mr. Dulles	has visited the	Academu 3
in previous years during the Secretaries	s' of Defense Co	onferences
and if you have no objection I will invite the Academy following lunch.	ite him to agair	ı visit
		/ PW
ACTION:		
Informative, if you have no obje	ections, I will	
informally invite Mr. Dulles to visit the lunch at Waller Hall, March 3, 1961.		•
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SAC, Miami

March 16, 1961

Director, FBI

ALIEN DULLES DIRECTOR CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

On 3/10/61 an official of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) advised he was becoming somewhat concerned about propaganda attacks of Castro government against that Agency. CIA representative pointed out that Cuban propaganda organs were characterizing Director Dulles of CIA as individual responsible for the worsening in Cuban - U. S. relations and as individual responsible for planning invasion of Cuba. He noted that Cuban fanatics might attempt to physically attack Mr. Dulles either at his home or while he was traveling to various cities for conferences.

CIA official said that he would appreciate receiving any information which might come to Bureau's atention relative to plans of pro-Castro elements to attack Mr. Dulles. Offices receiving this letter should be most alert for any such information and should promptly advise Bureau under this caption, if such data should be received.

2 - New York
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2 - Washington Field HEREIN
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Malone Rosen Tavel Trotter W.C. Sullivan Tele. Room


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MAIL ROOM TELETYPE UNIT TO SO MAR 21 1061

April 26, 1961

62-83338-80 ALL INFURMATION CONTAINED New York, New YorkHEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED Dear April 21, 1961. Your interest and courtesy in furnishing this information to me, as well as your kind offer to be of assistance, are indeed appreciated. Should the occasion arise, we will not hesitate to call upon you. Sincerely yours, MAILED ST APR 2 6 1961 J. Edgar Hoover COMM-FBI NOTE ON YELLOW: No communist literature is being in view of his concern over the Cuban situation. Due to the nature of his comments and his references to the press, it is felt Bu the above answer to his communication is sufficient. olson grsons ohr\_ elmont NOTE CONTINUED PAGE TWO: allahan onrad" eLoach vans' alone rotter ele. Room

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of doubtful back	ground.	62-90451	√ .
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	TO : Mr. Sullivan	DATE: Ju1	y 5, 1961	Rosen — Sullivan Tavel —	
	FROM : R. O. L'Allier		1	Trotter _ Tele. Ro Ingram _	om
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	Allen Dulles is in the process	advised on Jul	y 3, 1961, t	hat	<b>-</b>
	communism. The book may not be is also organizing material for	published for	several mon	ths. He	b2
	which is unknown at this time.	5×1)(c) (u)	n, one subje	000	
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UNITED STATES GOVER NT CUNFIDENTIAL OF CONTINUE	
Memorandum    Callahan   Contrad   C	
TO: Mr. W. C. Sullivan  DATE: July 13, 1961  Rosen Sullivan Trotter Trele. Room	
FROM: Mr. R. O. L'Allier Gandy	
SUBJECT: ALLEN DULLES  SUBJECT: ALLEN DULLES  HESEIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT. WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE: 23-	2
information to Agent Papich on July 13, 1961, on a strictly confidential basis:	2
On the night of July 12, 1961, informant held a lengthy conference with who has been a member	
of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board.  The informant stated that based upon his conversation b6  with there is no doubt in his mind that Dulles b7C  is finished as Director of CIA and that he could be replaced in the very near future.	
The informant then stated that he personally add not know if there was any connection/Dulles was called	
Tafternoon. (4-1) (4) (W) For# 3444	
For information.  DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1	
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58 JUL 251961 COPYNITION MR TO LEON CONFIDENTIAL	1

September 27, 1961

PERSONAL

Honorable Allen W. Dulles Director Central Intelligence Agency Administration Building, Room 123 2430 E Street, Northwest Washington, D. C.

Dear Allen: Dulles

670CT 2-1961

On the occasion of your retirement as Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, I want to express my warm thanks for the cooperation and assistance you have given this Bureau over the years.

Certainly, you may take deep pride in the accomplishments of the CIA during your tenure of service, and I am sure public-spirited citizens throughout the country are most appreciative of the contributions you have made toward the welfare and security of our Nation. Your work in this most difficult assignment has been characterized by ability and honor, and your friends in the FBI join me in extending our very best wishes for every possible success in your future endeavors.

every possible success in your future endeavors.
SPECIAL MESSENGER
BY COURIER SVC. With kind regards,
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NOTE: Prior correspondence with Mr. Dulles has been on a first name basis.  25 50 11 13 11 11 11 12 13 13 18 - 85 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
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UNITED STATES GOVER		Callahan
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W	711	Malone
ro : Mr. Sullivan	DATE: July 21, 1961/	Sullivan
1)	5	Trotter
FROM: R. O. L'Allier		Ingram Gandy (
C.		410 King
SUBJECT: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE	,	6 PA
You may be inter	ested in the following comments	which
Kirkpatrick and	Papich on July 20, 1961, by LymCIA.	b3 per CI
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ind whatsoever that many	ed that there was no doubt in he changes would be taking place i	in CIA.
He commented that there wo	ould be reorganization and very	likely
changes in top personnel.	BLLEN	, a
	it on the night of July 20, 1961	Dulles D
was a dinner quest at his	home. fully expects Dulle on t see the President removing	~ ~ ~ ~
until the Berlin crisis is	resolved one way or another. [	has i
the definite impression th	nat so far Dulles has been a key	figure
far as he knows. the CIA I	have been held relative to Berl Director would continue particing	pation in
further conferences.	-	3
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#### UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

### $Memora \acute{n} dum$

11/10

MR. BELMONT

DATE:

11/24/61

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Ingram .

Polson \_\_ Belmont **k** 

DeLoach 1
Evans \_\_\_\_

Mohr \_\_\_\_ Callahan Conrad \_

FROM

W. C. Sullivan

cc Mr. Belmont Mr. Sullivan

Mr. Bartlett

Lett Gandy.

SUBJECT:

NATIONAL SECURITY MEDAL to be presented to CIA Director Allen Dulles by the President, 11/28/61

The Director has accepted an invitation to attend the presentation by the President of the National Security Medal, to Mr. Allen Dulles, Director of CIA. This presentation is to be held at 11 a.m., Tuesday, 11/28, at the new CIA Building in Langley, Virginia.

Today I received an invitation, through the office of the Naval Aide to the President, at the White House, to attend this presentation as a member of the US Intelligence Board.

In view of the fact that the Director is attending this ceremony and representing the Bureau, I see no actual need for my being present. However, if the Director thinks I should accept the invitation, naturally I would have no objection.

#### RECOMMENDATION:

That I be advised of the Bureau's wishes in this matter.

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OPTIONAL EDAM NO. 10 \*UNITED STATES GOVE morandum Malone MR. SULLIVAN DATE: 9-28-61 Sullivan Tavel . Trotter ALL INFORMATION CONTAINE The Recommend of the Recommend o R. O. L'ALLIER HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SUBJECT: At the U.S. Intelligence Board (USIB) meeting today, Allen Dulles opened the meeting by commenting upon the appointment of Mr. John McCone as his successor as Director of Central Intelligence 3-/ Agency (CIA). Dulles reported that in August of this year, he advised the President that he had completed 10 years of service as Deputy or Director of CIA and felt it was time for a change. He requested that the President select his successor if possible before the first of the new year. About two weeks ago, the President indicated to Dulles that he had decided on Mr. McCone and as a result, had offered the position to him. Approximately one week ago, McCone had notified the President of his acceptance and came to Washington for conferences. Dulles pointed out that the results of his and McCone's conversations with the President at Newport, Rhode Island on 9-27-61, were very accurately reported in the 9-28-61 edition of "The New York Times of "The New Yo York Times." (Clipping attached). As a matter of interest, Dulles advised the USIB that McCone had inquired of the President and Dulles if they were committed to any immediate changes in the administrative organization of CIA. McCone obtained the assurances of both Dulles and the 80 13 President that no such commitments for changes in the administrative setup of CIA had been made and that any such changes will not be made until after McCone has had sufficient time to participate in any recommended changes ... It was announced that McCone had indicated he would like two weeks on the West Coast to handle his personal business affairs, which would include a short holiday. He expects to come to Washington which would include a short holiday. He expects to come to Washington thereafter and spend four to six weeks working with Dulles before taking over the administration of CIA. During this time, it is quite possible that both he and Dulles might make an inspection tour of CIA installations in Europe. was quite apparent that Dulles desired the Board to know Enclosure NOT RECORDED 1-Belmont; 1 Sullivan; 1-Evans 149 OCJ 8071981 1961 WOC: jad(7) : MCT .. 3 1961, 1-Papith;/1-Liaison; 1-Cregar HARRING STORY STORY स्राज्यकारमञ्जूषात्रमञ्जूषात्रमञ्जूषात्रमञ्जूषात्रम् अर्थाः

Memo L'Allier to Sullivan Re: CIA

that he was not retiring as the result of ill health or "senility."
He also made the point that contrary to the newspaper articles, he would not serve in the future as a consultant to the President, but rather as a consultant to McCone as the Director of CIA.

ACTION:

For information.

with Den 18

# PRESIDENT NAMES M'CONE TO C. I. A.

Visits Naval War College to Announce Change—Dulles and Successor on Hand

Transcript of remarks made at ceremony, Page 20.

By TOM WICKER Special to The New York Times.

NEWPORT, R. I., Sept. 27—President Kennedy announced today his nomination of John A. McCone to succeed Allen W. Dulles as director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

The President made the announcement at an appearance before the Naval War College here. Mr. McCono, Mr. Dulles and Vice Admiral Bernard Austin, president of the war college, were with him on the stage of the War College Auditorium.

The President paid tribute to both Mr. McCone and Mr. Dulles, and he took pains to emphasize that Mr. Dulles was not leaving the C. I. A. under dufress.

"I know of no man who is a more courageous, selfless public servant than Mr. Allen Dulles," the President said. He expressed "profound regret" at Mr. Dulles' retirement after ten years as a leader in the intelligence agency.

of Mr. McCone, a Republican business man who served in both the Truman and Eisenhower Administrations, Mr. Kennedy said:

"He has had broad experience. Coming once again to Washington represents a real sacrifice for him. I know that all of us who are concerned with our present responsibili-

Continued on Page 20, Column 3

## KENNEDY NAMES M'CONE TO C. I. A.

Continued From Page 1, Col. 4

ties are extremely happy to have his counsel, extremely happy to have him associated with us."

The transition will be made in November, the President said. He said Mr. McCone would come to Washington in about two weeks to work with Mr.

Mr. McCone and Mr. Dulles, calling each other "John" and "Allen," responded briefly.

Dulles Hall's Successor

Mr. Dulles said he was "deeply touched" by the President's tribute.

"In these troubled times," he continued, "the importance of intelligence is emphasized as essential to policy. I know of no better time to turn from this job to others than after having served for ten years and then to have found what I feel is the ideal choice for a man to carry on this important work."

Mr. McCone, taking note of the President's remark about sacrifice, said that in his mind an "opportunity to serve my country in this capacity is a

very definite privilege."

He said to Mr. Dulles that in was "not unmindful of the fact that it will be extremely difficult to fill your shoes because of your long experience in this particular field."

#### Many Officers Present

The ceremony took place in an auditorium filled with the high-ranking officers who are attending the war college. Most were in civilian clothes.

That Mr. Kennedy chose such a forum, and that he had both Mr. Dulles and Mr. McCone on hand, underscored the importance that is attached to the directorship of the C.I.A.

It had been understood for some months that Mr. Dulles would resign in November, following an understanding that he had reached with Mr. Kennedy when the latter asked him to continue in office shortly after the election last year.

After the abortive attempt to topple the Castro regime in Cuba, widely regarded as a C.I.A. project, there were repeated reports, always refuted by the White House, that Mr. Dulles was on the way out.

Mr. Kennedy noted that Mr. Dulles was retiring of his own volition, after having served the year that he had promised last November.

Fly in . I. A. Plane

Mr. Dulles and Mr. McCone flew this morning from Washington to Quonset Point Naval air station, near here, in a C. I. A. plane. They went at the hyperbolic form of the hyperbolic form of the hyperbolic form, where Mr. and Mrs. Kennedy are on holiday.

The three men conferred for about a half-hour on the patio. The White House press secretary, Pierre Salinger, said it was at this time that his, isomeous had made his final decision to nominate Mr. McCone.

After the patio conference, the President and his two visitors crossed Newport Harbor, a twenty-minute cruise, in the Honey Fitz, the Presidential yacht. This brought them to the

naval base and the War College, a gray stone building standing on a hill above the harbor. Immediately after the ceremony. Mr. Dulles and Mr. Mc-

mony, Mr. Dulles and Mr. Mc-Cone took off in a helicopter for Quonset Point and the return flight to their homes.

flight to their homes.

Mr. Kennedy recrossed the harbor in the Honey Fitz, picked up Mrs. Kennedy and their two children, Caroline and John, Jr., at the Hammersmith Farm landing, and departed on a cruise.

Mr. Kennedy's sleep was interrupted twice last night, Mr. Salinger said, because of the adjournment of Congress. He was awakened at 2:30 A. M. by Representative Carl Albert of Oklahoma, the assistant Democratic leader of the House, who said that body was ready to quit.

that body was ready to quit.
At 6:12 A. M., Senator Mike Mansfield of Montana, the Democratic majority leader, called to say that the Senate had finished its business. Such calls are a customary part of the Congressional ritual however they may interrupt a President's slumber.

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ENCLOSURE

PINCTORU:

## Retirement Of CIA Chief Announced 2

Associated Press The White House said yes-terday that Allen W Dulles intends to retire as director of the Central Intelligence Agency by the end of this year:

Press Secretary Pierre Salinger declined comment on reports that Fowler Hamilton, Wall Street lawyer and veteran of Government service, is in line to succeed Dulles.

. Administration sources have said off the record in the past that Dulles, when President Kennedy asked him last year to continue on the job expressed the hope to retire in about a year. They added that the year ran from last Novemder, after Mr. Kennedy's elec tion.

Dulles, brother of the late Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, was appointed direcfor of CIA during the Administration of former President Eisenhower.

Salinger, in saying Dulles wanted to retire by the end of the year, said there had been no change in the status, meaning that this had been Dulles' intention all along.

His remarks were in response to questions about the report that Hamilton would succeed Dulles, carried in an article to be published in the Aug. 7 issue of Newsweek magazine. The article says Hamilton, 50, is to succeed Dulles as head of the controversial hush-hush agency in October, after several months of working with Dulles.

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UNITED STATES GOVI

# emorandum

Belmont Mohr \_ Callahan Conrad DeLoach Evans Malone Rosen

Tolson

FROM

MR. TOLSON

A. H. BEI

DATE: Nov. 27, 1961

Sullivan
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Trotter
Tele. Room
Ingram
Gandy

SUBJECT:

A	(phonetic) in the office of
at	the White House called my office at approximately 5:35 p.m.

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said that was extending an invitation to me

to attend the presentation by the President to Allen Dulles tomorrow morning at 11:00 a.m. in the new CIA building in Langley, Virginia.

It was requested that my appreciation be expressed to Captain Shepard for his thoughtfulness and the invitation was declined on the basis of prior commitments.

ACTION: For information.

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#### UNITED STATES GOVER

### lemorandum

MR. A. H. BELMON

DATE: November 24, 1961

FROM

W. C. SULLIVAN V

Tolson Belmont Mohr

allahan Conrad

DeLoach Evans Malone Rosen

Sullivan Tavel Trotter Tele. Room Ingram

Gandy

SUBJECT:

ALLEN W. DULLES

PRESENTATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY MEDAL TO CIA DIRECTOR, ALLEN DULLES

The Director has accepted an invitation issued by the White House to attend the presentation of the National Security Medal to CIA Director, Allen Dulles, on Tuesday, November 28, 1961, at the new CIA Headquarters Building, Langley, Virginia. presentation will be made by the President.

Liaison has determined that in addition to the Director. other honored guests will include the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Attorney General, members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Mrs. Dulles, and members of the U.S. Intelligence Board. The President will arrive by helicopter, and the guests have been requested to be seated in the lobby inside the main entrance of the building by 10:40 a.m.

The distance from the Justice Building to the new CIA building is ten miles and will require approximately twenty-five minutes driving time. The most direct route will be via Memorial Bridge and the George Washington Parkway directly to the new CIA building. Liaison Agent will meet the Director at the CIA building upon his arrival and will escort him to his seat. Following the ceremony, will escort the Director to his carALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

ACTION:

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For information. BATE 7/05/85 RY SOUDIAL MW

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1-Mr. Ingram 1-Mr. Belmont

1-Mr. Mohr

1-Director's Têlephone Room

1-Mr. Sullivan

1-Liaison


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Nil

Atten Dulles Retires,

The retirement of Allen W Dulles as director of the Central Intelligence Agency is inevitably related in the public mind to some of the misfortunes that have befallen the CIA—for example, the shooting down of the U-2 plane over Soviet Russia and the Cuban fiasco. In a long public career there are certain to be many vicissitudes, however, and these should not be allowed to obscure long-range achievements. On the basis of his four and a half decades of public service Mr. Dulles is entitled to a generous salute from the American people. President Kennedy recognized this yesterday when he flew to the CIA headquarters to present the much decorated Mr. Dulles with the National Security Medal.

Like his brother, the late Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, Allen Dulles grew up with a keen interest in foreign affairs. It seems to have been related to the fact that their maternal grandfather, John W. Foster, had been Benjamin Harrison's Secretary of State and an uncle, Robert Lansing, had been Secretary of State under Woodrow Wilson. Allen Dulles joined the foreign service in 1916, and had a wide experience in many lands before he resigned to practice law with his brother. While he was in private practice he served as adviser or counsel to several international gatherings, and after the United States entered World War II his knowledge of European finances and strategic areas led to his association with the Office of Strategic Services.

As OSS director in Switzerland, Mr. Dulles learned of the German generals' plot to assassinate Hitler six months before the bomb went off without achieving its intended purpose. He was also credited with maintaining an agent in the Nazi Foreign Office and with engineering a revolt in Italy that gave the Allies a notable advantage. It was natural that, after the war, he should be summoned to Washington to head a three-man team to study the United States intelligence system. He was also a member of the Committee on the Marshall Plan to Aid European Recovery. President Truman brought him back to Washington as deputy director of the CIA, which he had helped to establish, and in 1953 President Eisenhower made him director.

Through his numerous assignments Mr. Dulles has demonstrated a large capacity for objective judgment. It has been said of him that, while Foster was master of the deadpan, he is master of the smile. Whether or not this is accurate, he has willingly undertaken some extremely difficult tasks and has brought to them dedicated effort and balanced judgment, qualities still needed in the CIA as it now strives for more efficient organization and better checks against error.

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Honorable Allen W. Dulles 2723 Q Street, Northwest Washington, D. C.

Dear Allen: Dulles

ALL INFURINATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

I was privileged to hear you last Thursday evening during your appearance on television. Your presentation was excellent, and I want to thank you for your kind comments concerning the FBI and me. Your cogent observations are certainly indicative of the high quality of service which you have rendered so many years for your country.

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NOTE: Address per current telephone directory. He is on the mailing list for reference only; he is addressed as "Dear Allen," See Jones to DeLoach memo dated 4-27-62 captioned "'The Hot and Cold Wars of Allen Dulles' CBS Documentary, 4-26-62, Channel 9." FCS:par

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	JLLES DIRECTOR OF CENT ION APPEARANCE,		GENCE	Œ/		/
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GITICSTAL FORM NO. 10 UNITED STATES GOVERN lemorandum. Evans Malone ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED TO Mr. DeLoach avel Trotter Tele. Room HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED Holmes FROM b7C DATE 7/05/85 SUBJECT: "THEXHOT AND COLD WARS OF ALLEN DULLES" The above-captioned program, the Crime Research Section.

RIEF SUMMARY OF CONTENTS:

The program consisted of a dialogue between Allen Dulles and CBS correspondent, Erice Sevareid. The program was planned so that Sevareid would ask questions and allow Dulles to answer in great detail. The point of the program was to allow Dulles to reminisce and set forth his opinions on various topics.

Virtually, the entire program was devoted to Dulles' opinions on vional events. Dulles indicated that the CIA, which he was Director, had loo successes. He talked about his wartime experiences with the viere, he indicated he was able to secure confidential information in 1944 to assassinate Hitler.

The in a room where Hitler was being the bomb exploded, Hitler the German out of the capture of the control of the capture of the control of the capture o CBS DOCUMENTARY WashiDR Dulles mentioned a brief talk he had with Mr. Khrushchev when the latter visited the United States. He laughingly stated that Khrushchev mentioned, in this connection, that he was reading CIA reports. Other topics covered during the interview concerned the U-2 incident. He indicated that these flights provided valuable information and that he did not share the criticism against pilot Francis Powers. Dulles stated that on the whole Powers handled himself properly.; In this connection, Dulles stated that the CIA had informed Congressional leaders concerning secret operations including the U-2 flight. He made mention of a speech by Congressman Clarence Cannon on the House floor in which, Cannon mentioned that this information was available to selected Congressional leaders. 1 - Mr. Papich - Room 84 MAY 1 1962

Jones to DeLoach Memo RE: Allen Dulles, Channel 9

Mention was made of Cuba, but here Dulles obviously did not desire to answer the questions in detail. He indicated that the CIA did not inform the Cuban underground concerning the invasion date. It was a complete surprise as to the place of landing.

After the abortive invasion, the President set up a committee to look into the episode. Dulles stated that he would not deny that this committee felt that the CIA had exceeded its authority in this situation.

Sevareid brought up the recent controversy between Mr. Nixon and Mr. Kennedy over the briefing given during the 1960 Presidential Campaign, in which Nixon claimed Kennedy had acted unfairly. Dulles said he did not want to go into these charges and that there had been aphonest misunderstanding.

Dulles indicated that, in his opinion, there was no conflict between CIA policy and our foreign policy. At the present time, CIA is being "credited" with many things, such as manipulating the ouster of King Farouk of Egypt and replacing him with Nassar, which is not true.

Sevareid asked Dulles his opinion what would happen if we followed a "soft line" concerning communism. Dulles replied that disaster would follow and that it was necessary to face the communist peril wherever it appeared and not be guilty of appeasement as in the case of Hitler. He mentioned the communists technique of "overload" which he defined as the communists starting many "small things" around the world in order to divert our attention. He indicated that the Soviet in the Congo had been wernated but that the situation in South Viet Nam was most serious. The Soviets like to believe that communism is the wave of the future and though the United States is not going communist in the next decade or so, it would be encircled by the communists. He indicated that the communists were thinking in terms of economic pressures against this country. He also commented about how the communistsoften gain leadership of the "disaffected" elements to stir up agitation.

Dulles stated that, in his opinion, the splits in the communist world were undoubtedly one of Khrushchev's great preoccupations. It's really something to see a small Nation like Albania throwing out Soviet diplomats. The strain between Russia and China is very serious and Dulles felt that it was probably Chinese pressure which had forced Russian technicians from China.

Dulles stated that a new generation was rising in Russia and it was his opinion that some of these younger Russians, when they learn more about what is going on in the rest of the world, will push for more freedom. Obviously, the younger generation is confused with the denouncing of Stalin. These younger Russians see the falsity of Russian history. At this point, he commented that one of CIA's important accomplishments was the securing of the text of Khrushchev's

Jones to DeLoach Memo RE: Allen Dulles, Channel 9

speech before the 20th Party Congress denouncing Stalin. This speech was not publicly released at that time inside Russia.

#### MENTION OF THE FBI:

The FBI was mentioned very briefly toward the end of the program. Sevareid commented that communism in the United States was not under Dulles' jurisdiction, but under the FBI. Dulles stated that due to the work of the FBI and what J. Edgar Hoover has done, communism is much less of an internal menace here than in other countries. The discussion then shifted to what people in the United States can do to fight communism. Dulles mentioned certain "aberrations," by which he meant the right-wing extremists. People want to do something to fight communism, but they do not know what action to take. As a result, many innocent people are led astray. In this connection, Dulles emphasized that people should learn more about the communists, that our free system is more effective than the communist system. Moreover citizens should support the Government's action against communism such as in Berlin. At the yery end Sevareid, echoing Dulles' opinions, asked whether a good recipe on how to fight communism in the United States would be (1) be informed (2) believe in your country (3) don't let them scare you. nate to Dulle

OBSERVATIONS:

Dulles actually gave very little new information in his interview. Most of this data has previously been published. The first part of the program was somewhat "slow" in that Dulles was hesitant to speak directly and appeared very passive. The tempo of the program picked up considerably in the last half hour. It might be noted that Sevareid's questions closely followed material set forth in the recent book by Andrew Tully entitled "CIA--The Inside Story."

#### RECOMMENDATION:

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ALLEN W. DULLES

MAIN POST OFFICE, BOX 1513

WASHINGTON 13, D. C.

14 May 1962

b6 b7C Mr. Trotter\_\_\_\_ Tele. Room\_\_\_ Miss Holmes\_\_ Miss Gandy\_\_\_

Mr. Tolson Mr. Belmont Mr. Mohr Mr. Callahan Mr. Conrad

Mr. DeLoach Mr. Evans....

Mr. Malone

Mr. Rosen Mr. Sulky Mr. Tavol

The Honorable J. Edgar Hoover Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation United States Department of Justice Washington, D. C.

Dear Edgar

I have just returned from a brief European trip and find your kind letter of April 28, 1962, about my television appearance. I keenly appreciate your kind comments.

I would add that what I had to say about you and your organization was, as you know, the expression of a very deep feeling of appreciation I as an American have for what you have accomplished.

Sincerely yours,

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# Hitler, Khrushchev, Cuba, and the U-2 2

# 'America's Master Spy'

Recalls His Wins and Losses

Allen Welch Dulles has been called "America's Master Spy." For more than eight years, from 1953 until his retirement late last year, he headed The United States

Central Intelligence Agency. During World War II he was an intelligence officer in Europe. His agency's occasional failures often made him the center of controversy. Few people are more qualified to dis-

cuss the nature and methods of the Communist menace. With this in mind, CBS News correspondent Eric Sevareld chatted for an hour with Mr. Dulles last Thursday evening on the television program, CBS Reports. Their talk ranged from Cuba to the Congo, from Nikita Khrushchev to Adolf Hitler. Here are the highlights:

Mr. Sevareid: Mr. Dulles, when Khrushchev was here, did you get a chance to talk with him at all?

Mr. Dulles: Yes: I didn't have a long talk with him; but I had a very—quite an amusing encounter with him. It took place at the dinner that President Eisenhower gave for Khrushchev, and the President introduced him, and said: "This is Mr. Dulles. You may know Mr. Dulles." He turned to his reporters, kind of a twinkle in his eye, because he's got a keen—you must admit, he's got a good sense of humor; and he said: "Oh, yes, I know you. I read your reports."

Mr. Sevareid: Really?

Mr. Dulles: Yes. And I said: "I hope you get them legally." And, "Oh," he said, "you know, you know how we get them. We all pay the same agents and we all get the same reports." And, "Well," I said, "That's kind of sharing the wealth, isn't it?" And then we had a laugh and that ended it.

The Briefcase Bomb .

Mr. Sevareid: Did he mean your public or your private reports?

Mr. Dulles: Ah, he never told me. I think he had in mind that he read agent reports.

Mr. Sevareid: Do you think it's possible that he has?

Mr. Dulles: Every once in a while somebody gets caught, but that game goes both ways.

Mr. Sevareid: Mr. Dulles, would it be accurate to say that because of your work in World War II, in Switzerland, Washington kept informed on plots against Hitler's life?

Mr. Dulles: They knew about the last plot. I did have the details of the last and most serious plot that almost succeeded on July 20, 1944. Hitler was having a briefing at the time. He was up on the East Front in East Prussia, and he was having his regular morning briefing, and Stauffenberg, who had the bomb, was in the room. He was—had a special message for Hitler, so he was admitted. He put the bomb down in this briefcase against a leg of a table. It was a—you know, one of those long tables that are in barracks with legs at various intervals. He put it down on the leg nearest to where Hitler was: Here was a long map, 20 feet or

Jeds M. Williams

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New York Journal-American
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Eric Sevareid

more long, with maps of the East Front, the West Front, and so forth, and so on. And Hitler was being briefed there, and just before the bomb went off, Hitler went off here to see how the front was, let's say, in Pinsk, and that took him 10 feet away from the bomb. The bomb went off and he was blown out of the building, but he wasn't seriously wounded. It was a shack—it was just a barracks there.

Mr. Sevareid: It must have been a great disappointment to you and every one else?

Mr. Dulles: Well, it was. I was waiting to see whether they'd get hold of the radio that day, and they never got hold of the radio. You know, that's one of the modern revolutions — one of the great things to note is, have they got control of the radio, and again and again as I've sat back, either when revolutions were upcoming, the indication to you as to whether one side or the other is winning, is who has got control of the air?

Mr. Sevareid: You apparently knew very early in '45, Mr. Dulles, that the Japanese were in very bad shape. How did you know that?

Mr. Dulles: Eric, at that time, I had access to information that was reaching the German Foreign Office . . . messages from the German Ambassador in Tokyo, the German Air Attache and the German Army Attache. Those cables showed, very clearly, the plight of the Japanese Air Force and the plight of the Japanese

Navy. By the end of '44 and early '45, their position, both air and sea, was becoming almost untenable, far more than the public realized. Word came through to me from certain Japanese sources with whom I was in contact, that the Japanese would like to find a way of negotiating for a surrender.

They made quite interesting proposals, and as a result of these proposals I was asked to go up to Potsdam in the time of the Potsdam Conference, when President Truman met there with Stalin, you remember, and Churchill. I took to (Secretary of War Henry) Stimson, at that time, the proposals that had come through this channel with regard to an early Japanese surrender.

#### Were A-Bombs Necessary?

Mr. Sevareid: Do you think that the dropping of those first atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki might have been unnecessary in terms of bringing about the Japanese surrender?

Mr. Dulles: Well, that's an awful hard question to answer. I have the deepest respect for the men who made that decision. I do feel that there was a failure to interpret available intelligence as to the extent of the Japanese collapse, and their inability really effectively to carry on the war.

Mr. Sevareid: Is there anything you'd like to say, Mr. Dulles, about the pilot of the U-2, Francis Powers?

Mr. Dulles: I never shared some of the public and maybe of the press criticism of Powers. While it was difficult to tell until after we—the agency—had talked with him and had made (our) report how well he had done, I think on the whole he handled himself properly. You must remember that he was an aviator. He was a great navigator. He had a very difficult assignment merely on the aviation-navigation side and to expect of him—to make of him a great undercover agent was impossible—one of these two professions took all a man's time—all a man's concentration and thought and I'm not sure that point has been brought out fully enough.

#### No Suicide Commitment

Mr. Sevareid: Mr. Dulles, some people said that the pilot, Mr. Powers, should have taken his own life. Is there any way you can have a man sign a contract to commit suicide?

Mr. Dulles: No-no-you couldn't-first place, it would be ineffective, of course. In the second place, I think it would be immoral and we just didn't do it. We said, "Here, you have this. If you get into a situation where you think that death is beter than what awaits you, use it."

Mr. Sevareid: Mr. Dulles, about the foulup on all the explanations of the U-2 affair when it first happened. The Government went through a lot of agony. We looked very silly. Now, is it necessary that we go through all that? Do we have to explain?

Mr. Dulles: I doubt whether, in the two

.

I mean this: Do we have a kind of a government here that would let, say, me, as then Director of Central Intelligence, send an airplane, even 70,000 feet high, over Russia? Is that a responsible kind of government? Or mount an expedition, or have something to do with an expedition for the training of Cubans that were going to Cuba? It seems to me that that kind of thing can only be done with the approval of the highest authority, and the American people or the world began to think that we had a government here where that kind of thing could be done without approval by the highest authority.

There might be a feeling of uneasiness, that there are some people here who could do things that might lead to serious international complications without knowledge at the highest level. So could the President have declined knowledge of these situations, or said, "I won't say anything about them?"

Mr. Sevareid: Mr. Dulles, there's been much criticism that we took much too long to recognize the danger of Castro and tried to do something about it.

#### Timing Vital in Cuba Attack

it. Certainly we got disturbed about Castro at a fairly early date, but what were you going to do about it? Castro was in there, with the great support of the majority of the people, and if we had planned any expedition at an earlier date, that might not have been of any more success than the one that we did after rather mature preparations.

Mr. Sevareid: Mr. Dulles, if you can, would you tell me, in regard to the Cuban affair of last spring, where you think the central basic mistake was?

Mr. Dulles: I'd rather limit my remarks to pointing out that there were certain factors which bore upon the timing of any operation if it was carried outnamely, that we knew that Cuban pilots were being trained in Czechoslovakia, that MIGs were in crates in large numbers in Cuba and that if these trained pilots got back and these MIGs became operative, the possibility of any invasion by a Cuban force, or even by an American force, would be greatly—the dangers and the problems would be greatly increased.

Mr. Sevareid: But what about the philosophical and the legal argument that the Cuban invasion was both immoral and illegal?

Mr. Dulles: Well, I think I'd respond to that by asking you a question. Here you had a group of fine young men — these Cubans—formed the brigade that went into Cuba, who asked nothing other than the opportunity to try to restore a free government in their country, who were ready to risk their lives and have done so, whether they should have been told that they would get no sympathy, no support,



Allen W. Dulles

no aid from The United States. That's the question.

Mr. Sevareid: Is it true that we did not inform the Cuban underground in Cuba of the date—the place and the timing of that landing?

Mr. Dulles: Eric, we didn't inform them. As I recall, we informed very few people when we started the invasion of France in June of '44. You can't do that. We did not inform the Cuban underground of the time and place of the invasion. To do so would have been informing Castro and it would have been catastrophe for the invading force.

Mr. Sevareid: We did achieve some element of surprise, did we?

Mr. Dulles: Complete surprise was achieved as regards the place of landing.

Mr. Sevareid: But not timing, because that was published.

Mr. Dulles: No they did not know the exact timing. They had been crying invasion for weeks and months before, and as you note, they're even now crying that invasions are being planned.

Mr. Sevareid: Mr. Dulles, some Europeans—Jean Monnet, for example—say that Americans are much too obsessed about Russian communism. Do you think this is true?

Mr. Dulles: I think that is true in a

sense, and not true in another sense. I think that the one grave peril that we face is the Communist peril. That is the only peril to our freedoms, to our institutions, to everything that we hold dear. Now, I think that it is true that the Communists practice on us and on other countries towards which they're directing their attack, they try on us what I would call the overload theory. They will start a lot of petty annoyances in various parts of the world, without knowing whether they are going to seriously push them ahead, in order to divert our attention, maybe, from the major points of their attack.

Mr. Sevareid: Could you give any concrete examples of what has turned out to be minor or major?

#### South Vietnam Threat Serious

Mr. Dulles: Well, I think we overrated the Soviet danger, let's say, in the Congo! They went in there with great fanfare. They supported Gizenga. They established a Lumumba Institute in Moscow, and it looked as though they were going to make a serious attempt to take over in the Belgian Congo. Well, it didn't work out that way at all. Now, maybe they intended to do it, but they didn't find the situation ripe, and they beat a pretty hasty retreat;

Mr. Sevareid: Would you call Vietnam a serious threat or just a tactical operation?

Mr. Dulles: No. I think that's a serious threat: I consider South Vietnam of a major importance, and not just one of the overload theory type of operations.

Mr. Sevareid: Don't (the Russians) already have perhaps for much on their plate? They can't control Albania, or Yugoslavia, or China—all Communist systems and states. May it not be that a pluralistic communism around the world would be anti-Moscow?

#### Freedom Alive in Russia

Mr. Dulles: That's quite true, but difficulties at home have rarely stopped countries in foreign adventure, sometimes has pushed them on. I believe that the splits, the fissures, the differences between various Communist countries is to-day one of the greatest preoccupations that Khrushchev has

After all, he said what he calls the socialist world, if the world becomes all socialist, they'll all live—lie down in peace, and live together. Well, that isn't what's happened, and when you see little Albania, practically throwing out the Russian representation there, both civil and military, that is really something. Why they went, hard to tell; obviously, at that time they felt that they would have to use force to stay, and they didn't want another Hungary on their hands at that moment.

A new generation is coming on in Russia, and I have a feeling that some of the younger generation of Russians, as they learn more about what goes on in the rest of the world, are going to bring great pressure to get more freedom. They'll want to hear your radio and see your television. They'll want to learn what goes on in the rest of the world. They'll begin to see the basic falsity of the whole history of Russia.

They've having a terrible time now in getting out their histories. What do you say about Stalin? Twenty-five years of rule. Twenty-five years the great hero. Stalingrad. Stalin in the tomb. In 1956, came out the great speech of Khrush-chev's—denigrating Stalin, but they never dared let that speech circulate in Russia. They leaked little parts of it and they had to go back to the attack now—that was at the Twentieth Party Congress—but the Twenty-second Party Congress, these had to go back to the attack, because they hadn't gotten over to the people.

Mr. Sevareid: Wasn't it your agency that got hold of that speech originally?

Mr. Dulles: I'm willing to accept that charge. Khrushchev charged me with it charge.

at one time. You'll find it in one of his statements back two or three years ago.

Mr. Sevareid: Well, you have to rank that rather high among the accomplish-

Mr. Dulles: I think it was one of the really important accomplishments.

ments.

Mr. Sevareid: Mr. Dulles, I know the problem of communism inside The United States is not—has not been under your jurisdiction, but the FBI, but what are your feelings about it? Is it a serious matter?

#### Red Menace Exaggerated

Mr. Dulles: Well, I think that's due to the vigilance of the FBI and what J. Edgar Hoover has done, it's probably much less of an internal menace here with us than it is with many other countries. I think that the frustration of the American citizen and of the citizens of other countries who are told, "Here's this great menace. You must do something to meet this menace." And yet the ordinary man, the man in the street, the man and woman, he doesn't know how he can contribute.

He agrees as to the judgment that there is a menace, that our society is menaced by communism, but what's he to do; and that has resulted in certain aberrations that I don't need to define, because you and those who are listening and hearing and seeing will probably know what I have in mind, and I think a great many innocent people without realizing the harm they are doing, they get led astray by this.

Well, now, there's certain things one can do. In the first place, we ought to learn what we can about it. We can do it by understanding that our great strength is showing that our system, our free system, is more efficient and more effective than the Communist system, and we all, on these issues, we will rally together in support of the actions our Government has taken strongly to defend our positions where they may be threatened by communism, whether it's Berlin, or Laos, or Vietnam, or wherever it may be.

Mr. Sevareid: Mr. Dulles, would this be a fair summation of your recipe for the average American? Be informed. Believe in your country, and as the late Elmer Davis put it, "Don't let them scare you."

Mr. Dulles: I'd like to leave it at that.

	OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10	Tolson Belmont
	UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT	Mohr
	Memorandum	Conrad
f	10800	Malone
\	TO : MR. W. C. SULLIVAN DATE: May 31, 1962	b6 Sullivan
J		b7C Tele. Room
	FROM:	Gandy
	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	
	SUBJECT: ALLEN DULLES FORMER DIRECTOR	
	CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)	= (1)
	For your information Dulles was rushed to the	e hospital
	on May 25, 1962, after he had been taken suddenly ill	and was
	suffering severe abdominal pains. A kidney stone, whis source of this illness, was removed on May 28, 1962, as	ch was the nd Dulles
	is expected to return to his home today, May 31, 1962.	end end
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	1 - Mr. Belmont 1 - Mr. Sullivan	The same of the sa
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DATE: November 2, 1962

•	Conrad DeLoach
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	Trotter
	Tele. Room
	Holmes
	Gandy

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FROM:

SUBJECT: ALLEN DULLES

INFORMATION CONCERNING

Special Agent Papich saw Dulles for a few minutes on November 1, 1962. You may be interested in the following:

b6 b7C

Dulles stated that he is spending most of his time on his book which probably will not be finished for several weeks. This book will essentially concentrate on Soviet efforts to subvert and dominate the world. He hopes to describe Soviet techniques and methods giving concrete examples on a world-wide basis. One of his problems is to make certain that he does not use any classified information and he therefore is continually checking with Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) for clearance. He has one secretary, a former CIA employee. He is also assisted by a CIA intelligence officer who is ynow on leave without pay.

Dulles advised that he is also practicing some law in New York City and is a member of several boards and committees. He is very active as a trustee of Princeton University.

Dulles spoke very favorably concerning the Director's recent book and the Director's speech before the American Legion.

He expressed his concern over the Cuban situation by commenting that he did not like to see the fate of the U.S. in the hands of United Nations officials.

Although Dulles did not volunteer any hint, there has been a definite split between him and McCone. Dulles discontinued the use of CIA space which he had been utilizing for research on his book. He also dropped a CIA secretary. All of this allegedly took place has a result of pressures coming from McCone.

#### ACTION:

For information

- 1 Mr. Belmont
- 1 Mr. Sullivan
- I Liaison

I - Mr. Papich

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# Dulles Belittles Cuba's Importance จ As Base for Soviet Spying on U.S.

Allen W. Dulles, former director of the Central Intelligence Agency, said yesterday
Russia does not need Cuba as
a spy base but will find it
useful mainly for infiltration
peting for business in Europe
Into other Latin American
Countries.

Allen W. Dulles, former diing, Col. Sidney S. Rubenstein, a detriment to our economy,
in said, American he said, as aircraft and weap
ons developed here are now
in production in Europe for
NATO countries.

A former NATO security adviser, who is now a consultant

ways of getting their agents Department, Rubenstein said

ways of getting their agents into this country without using Cuba, Dulles told a reporter after speaking to a meeting of the American Society for Industrial Security at the Statler Hilton Hotel.

In his talk, he said "We firm holding a defense conmust not carry secrecy to a point where a potential enemy might misjudge our strength."

The great deterrent today is pany, he said.

Such, security shackles are realization of our strength."

However, he said, "I believe we give away too many se-crets unnecessarily" by publishing details of defense proj ects "before they are too wide-ly known." The foreign intelligence agent's job is thereby greatly facilitated, he said, Another speaker at the mos

The Soviets have plenty of on security for the Defense viser who is now a consultant

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The Washington Daily News \_ The Evening Star \_ New York Herald Tribune \_\_

New York Journal-American \_\_\_

New York Mirror \_\_\_ New York Daily News\_

New York Post -

The New York Times \_ The Worker\_

The New Leader\_

The Wall Street Journal \_\_\_ The National Observer \_

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The Washington Post and Times Herald

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	MR. ROSEN MR. SULLIVAN MR. TAVEL MR. TROTTER MR. JONES
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October 16, 1962

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EX-102

Honorable Allen W. Dulles 2723 Q Street, Northwest Washington 7, D. C.

Dear Allen:

Dulles

I have received your letter of

the 10th and appreciate the interest you indicated

in my speech at the National Convention of The

American Legion. In response to your request,

I am enclosing a copy of it.

MAILEO IL

OCT 1 G 1962

COMPLET

Sincerely,

Edgar

Enclosure An American's Challenge

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DATE 11/17/86 BY SOZMAC/OC

NOTE: A reference card maintained in the Crime Research Section indicates Mr. Dulles is addressed on a first-name basis.

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Belmont

Mohr \_\_\_\_ Casper \_ Callahan Conrad \_ DeLoach

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ALLEN W. DULLES 2723 Q STREET, N. W. WASHINGTON 7. D. C. ADAMS 2-0104

October 10, 1962

The Honorable J. Edgar Hoover Federal Bureau of Investigation Washington, D. C.

Dear Edgar:

I read with interest the newspaper account of your speech on October 9 to the American Legion.

In case it is available, I would like to have the full text of your speech as it sounded most interesting and very pertinent to our problems today.

Faithfully yours,

Allen W. Dulles

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REC. 16

EX.103

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## Memorandum

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Mr. W. C. Suffiyan

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March 14, 1963

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FROM

D. J. Brennan, Jr

JULY 1/2

SUBJECT:

"THE CRAFT OF INTELLIGENCE"

BY ALLEN WODULLES

Reference is made to memorandum dated March 1, 1963, from Mr. Smith to Mr. Sullivan. We reviewed Dulles' article under the above caption which is to appear in the Encyclopedia Britannica. Liaison was instructed to discreetly inform Dulles concerning certain inaccuracies and to tactfully suggest the inclusion of a sentence regarding the Bureau's internal security jurisdiction.

Agent Papich met with Dulles on March 13, 1963. Dulles readily agreed to include a sentence reading along the lines, "The FBI has jurisdiction over security matters involving espionage, sabotage, and subversive activities within the United States."

He expressed his appreciation for the inaccuracies which we had detected and stated that he would make the necessary corrections.

One of the observations which we made pertains to a statement in Dulles' article indicating that had volunteered his services to the Bureau. Dulles was told that this was not the true situation and that cooperation was actually achieved after several days of interviewing. Dulles agreed to make the necessary corrections.

Dulles stated that he had returned from a West Coast trip much later than he expected and he might run into a problem in making the necessary corrections for the article in the Encyclopedia Britannica. He stated that if printing hadn't started, the corrections could be made. With regard to the forthcoming article in Harpers magazine and the book which is being published under the same title, Dulles advised that corrections easily could be made.

#### ACTION:

For information.

SJP:mab (7) mal

1 - Mr. Belmont

1 - Mr. Sullivan

1 - Mr. R. W. Smith

1 - Mr. A. W. Gray

1 - Liaison

1 - Mr. Papich (1963)

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DATE 11/17/86 BY sprmaclos

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

## *lemorandum*

DATE: February 25, 1963

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FROM

D. J. Brennan

SUBJECT:

"THE CRAFT OF INTELLIGENCE" Book

BY ALLEN W. DULLES

Enclosed herewith is a document containing the first-page proofs of "The Craft of Intelligence" written by Allen Dulles for the 1963 issue of Encyclopedia Britannica. This document was furnished to Agent Papich on February 22, 1963, by Dulles for the Bureau's use. He invited any suggestions or observations which we desire to make. The enclosed writing is only a reproduction of first-page proofs and according to Dulles there will be some changes and corrections before the final printing. In March, 1963, Harpers magazine will feature a synopsized version of the enclosure. In April or May of this year a book under the same title will appear and will be more detailed.

There is also enclosed a copy of a February 17, 1963, Encyclopedia Britannica news release on the Dulles article.

#### ACTION:

If approved, the enclosure will be reviewed by the Central Research Section upon the completion of which recommendations will be made regarding any comments which we may desire to pass on to Dulles.

Allen W.

Enclosures

SJP:mab made

1 Nr. Belmont

1 - Mr. Sullivan 1 - Mr. DeLoach

1 - Mr. Branigan

1 - Mr. R. W. Smith

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	liberties are	not threatened h	y our intellige	nce organiza	ation but	rather by the	
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Memo Smith to Sullivan
Re: "THE CRAFT OF INTELLIGENCE"

#### DETAILS:

Reference is made to memo 2/25/63, Brennan to Sullivan, same caption, concerning page proofs of captioned article (attached) which is to be published in 1963 issue of Encyclopaedia Britannica. Dulles made copy of page proofs available to Liaison Agent and referenced memo approved our review of them in order to submit recommendations regarding comments we may desire to pass on to Dulles.

The Dulles article has been reviewed by the Espionage and Central Research Sections of the Domestic Intelligence Division. It is a comprehensive view of intelligence-gathering and counterintelligence techniques which includes background relating to mythology, Biblical times, medieval history, American history, and modern times, as well as specific references to cases involving the Axis powers and the communists. Dulles states that there are sound reasons for not divulging any intelligence secrets and he lays the ground rules for his discussion by declaring: "However, the discipline and techniques--what we call the tradecraft of intelligence--are widely known in the profession, whatever the nationality of the service may be. A discussion of this reveals no secrets."

#### References to FBI

Dulles refers to the FBI several times (pgs. 16, 34, 35, and 37). None of these references is unfavorable. Since he refers to the FBI's jurisdiction over internal security as distinguished from that of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), it is believed that it would be appropriate to suggest that, on page 16 where he mentions this difference for the first time, he could spell out the distinction clearly by inserting one sentence regarding the Bureau's security jurisdiction. In this connection, Dulles writes (page 16, right column, line 3); "The spheres of operation of the Central Intelligence Agency on the one hand and of the Federal Bureau of Investigation on the other are quite distinct." It is believed that this statement should be followed by this sentence: "The FBI has jurisdiction over security matters involving espionage, sabotage, and subversive activities within the United States."

It is noted that the article contains no mention of the Bureau's Special Intelligence Service (SIS) during World War II. However, in view of Dulles' statement (p. 16, left column, last complete paragraph) that an intelligence service in a free society should never become involved in domestic security matters and

Memo Smith to Sullivan
Re: "THE CRAFT OF INTELLIGENCE"

that in totalitarian systems the intelligence function is often combined with internal security operations, it is not believed to be desirable to suggest that he include a reference to SIS.

#### Specific Inaccuracies

The Espionage Section has noted that the article contains the following inaccuracies:

Page 25, left column, paragraph under title "Soviet Espionage in the West"

Comment that investigations of personnel with credentials from Allied countries were not always conducted as thoroughly as in the case of U.S. citizens (refers to Klaus Fuchs and Bruno Pontecorvo) is incorrect and could reflect on Bureau. The fact is that no background checks were made on such people as the United States accepted the assurances of the country of citizenship that its people were cleared.

Page 26, right column, last incomplete paragraph, and
Page 28, right column, first incomplete paragraph

correct first name is b6 b7C

Page 28, left column, first complete paragraph, and
Page 39, right column, last incomplete paragraph

The Soviet State Security Service (K.G.B.) did not exist at the time indicated. The K.G.B. came into being in 1954. b6

Page 37, right column, third paragraph

Comment regarding microfilms being found in apartment of American couple eventually led to apprehension of is incorrect. Microfilms were found in house, not apartment, and source of information regarding was a later defector.

Page 37, left column, third complete paragraph

Case involving Boris Morros does not illustrate point he is trying to make.

Another example should be used. Morros did not check in early with FBI. We broke him after days of interviewing.

Memo Smith to Sullivan
Re: "THE CRAFT OF INTELLIGENCE"

Dage 20 left column fingt incomplete

b6 b7C

Page 36, left column, first incomplete	comment is made diat, becaus	e or muor -
paragraph	mation furnished by	Soviet
	espionage attempts to procure	atom-bomb
	secrets were stopped. This is	vastly over-
	stateddefection of	lid not stop
	Soviet atom-bomb espionage.	It resulted
	in conviction of one spy in Brit	ain,

Page 39, left column, second complete paragraph

was Czech Military Attache from August 1955 until his defection in July 1959.

#### Importance of Intelligence

The article declares that the Soviet Union has raised the art of espionage to an unprecedented height, while developing the collateral techniques of subversion, deception, and penetration, and that no other country has ever before attempted espionage on such a scale. A wide variety of intelligence and counterintelligence techniques are mentioned, including, photography, electronic devices, cryptography, physical surveillance, and double agents.

Dulles highlights the problems that a free society has in protecting itself against a communist adversary which has built up a formidable wall of security and secrecy, and he notes that more and more we must rely on intelligence operations to help provide strategic warning. He concludes the article with a defense of CIA against its critics who allege that there are not enough controls on the Agency and he argues against the establishment of a "watchdog" committee. Dulles states flatly, "It is not by our intelligence organization that our liberties will be threatened, but rather by our failure to understand the nature of the dangers facing us throughout the world today."



CAL.

V.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10 5010-10A MAY 1962 EDINON GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27 UNITED STATES GO  $\it 1emorandum$ Mr. DeLoach

DATE: 7-1-63

FROM

SUBJECT:

MR. ALLEN W. DULLES FORMER DIRECTOR OF CIA

GUEST ON ABC TELEVISION PROGRAM.

"ISSUES AND ANSWERS"

b6

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Beimont Mohr Casper

Callahan Conrad Del.oach Evans Gale

Rosen Sullivar Tavel Trotter Tele. Room

Holmes

Mr. Dulles' appearance on the above program was monitored at 2:30 p.m. on 6-30-63. He was interviewed by two newsmen and presented with a series of questions dealing with intelligence matters. The high lights of the program were noted as follows:

QUESTION: How good is Russian intelligence compared with ours?

ANSWER: Our intelligence is superior to Russian's in some respects and is getting better but the Russians probably have a better massive coverage and penetration. The Russians operate their intelligence apparatus on a world-wide basis against almost all countries.

QUESTION: How many Russian spies are in this country?

Dulles stated he did not have this information and that the interviewers ANSWER: should realize that internal security of the United States is within the jurisdiction of Mr. Hoover and the FBI. He noted that the CIA was concerned only with foreign intelligence and that information it obtained relating to United States' internal security was passed on to the FBI. He noted as an example the Rudolf Abel case, stating that the facts concerning this matter were first picked up by CIA through a foreign contact and furnished to the FBI, which subsequently arrested Abel.

QUESTION: Do you regard members of the CP, USA as potential spies?

ANSWER: Dulles stated that he did not, as a general rule, consider communists in this country as potential spies as they are not trained and the communists wish to keep their Party divorced from any activity of this nature. He noted, however, there have been exceptions/to this general rule. Enclosure

1 - Mr. DeLoach

1 - Mr. Sullivan

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10/22/83

RA

Mr. D. J. Brennau, Jr.

ALLEN DULLES FORMER CIA DIRECTOR

Delles furnished the following to Agent Papiels on 10/20/63.

He mivised that he is scheduled to appear as a speaker at the New York Horald Tribune Yorkm in the near future. His talk will be predicated on his book, "The Craft of Intelligence." Dulles has learned that another speaker scheduled for this forum at the same time is Jesuica Lacy Mitford, the author of the recently publicized book "American Way of Death," which is an attack on the morticizes in the country. Dulles stated that he was concerned because it is his understanding that Mitford has a communist background. He has given some consideration to canceling his appearance but he new feels such an act as his part will give the communists ammunition for prepagands. As of 10/20/63, Dulles planned to appear at the 156 forum.

ACTION:

This matter is being referred to the attention of Mr. Delouch for possible consideration of alerting the appropriate official or officials of the New York Merald Tribune concerning the background of Jesnica Mitford.

1 - Mr. Belmont

1 - Mr. Deinech

1 - Mr. Bullivan

1 - Mr. Bland

- 77-27703

- Lisison

1 - Mr. Papick

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CORIGINAL FILES IN

M. A. Jones to DeLoach Re: MR. ALLEN W. DULLES

QUESTION: Will the Profumo case have any repercussions in this country, and is it, in Dulles' opinion, a vice case or espionage case?

ANSWER: Dulles stated he considered this to be a vice case rather than an espionage matter and that while most of the information he has concerning it has been received through press reports, he does not believe it will stir up any repercussions in this country. In referring to the sexual angle in this case, he was asked whether United States Intelligence ever uses sex as a weapon in obtaining data. He declined to discuss this matter but indicated that U. S. Intelligence makes very little use of this type of thing.

QUESTION: In view of the series of recent security cases turned up in Britain, has British security deteriorated to the point where we should be wary of furnishing them information?

ANSWER: He believes that the security services of Britain are competent and the fact that several recent spy cases have turned up indicates that the British are alert.

QUESTION: How useful is the polygraph in clearing persons for security positions?

ANSWER: Dulles stated that the polygraph is useful for indicating weaknesses. He said that CIA has used the polygraph effectively, particularly in connection with inquiry about homosexuality, but that not everyone in CIA has been required to take polygraph examinations. He said that during his tenure as Director of CIA, new employees were generally asked to take these examinations, but it was not always a requirement.

QUESTION: Was the CIA responsible for the Cuban Bay of Pigs fiasco?

ANSWER: Dulles stated that President Kennedy had assumed responsibility for this incident and had asked that others connected with Government not comment concerning the matter; therefore, he had never made any statement concerning it. Dulles state that Russian subversion in Latin America is a great danger at present because the Russians are able to use Cuba as a base from which to launch their operations.

#### OBSERVATIONS:

The effectiveness of Mr. Dulles on the program was somewhat dimmed by the fact that he had to point out on several occasions that he did not know the current situation in the CIA but could only fall back on what knowledge he had when he was Director. He had little of real importance to say during the program and the discussion was only moderately informative.

There is attached a clipping from the 7-1-63, issue of "The Washington


Post" concerning this interview.

#### RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

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Agency, dipped into his mem-certain types of information." He ranged from the use of sex on to declare: as a lure, to lie-detectors as a safeguard.

In a wide-ranging interview on "Issues and Answers" (WMAL-TV, ABC), he said:

· "As long as there is sex, it is going to be used" in intelligence work.

· "No one is ever convicted, or cleared, just on a polygraph test, a lie-detector test. It is one of the important elements, as to where there may be weaknesses."

that Khrushchev wouldn't British intelligence excluded want to entrust too many nu- from security checks. The latclear warheads to his friend, ter is usually called in, he Castro: I don't think he would said, only "on the crash landtrust him that far."

The sex angle was introduced by questions on Brit-States intelligence "ever uses ain's current Profumo case. sex as a bait to get informa-

Herald Tribune News Service case primarily a vice matter, don't discuss those matters Allen Dulles, former direction but added that "apparently an very much." tor of the Central Intelligence attempt was made to get

"I must say the question they (the Russians), apparent- Dulles answered, "We recogly gave the young lady to ask, nize the existence of sex, and as to when the Germans were the attraction of sex, though," going to get the atomic bomb, he added. was not a very penetrating intelligence question to ask.

Dulles said the Profumo case was no indication of laxness by British intelligence. in his opinion. Most British however, in giving one clues departments, he explained, including the Foreign Office and Defense Ministry, select · "I am inclined to think their own personnel, ings."

Asked whether United Dulles said he considered the tion," Dulles replied that "I

In any event, his questioner ory bag yesterday to discuss In a sarcastic reference to pressed, the U. S. dosen't "use various aspects of espionage. Soviet intelligence, he went it as widely as the Soviets pressed, the U.S. dosen't "use do?"

"No, we certainly do not,"

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The Washington Post and
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New York Post
The New York Times
The Worker
The New Leader
The Wall Street Journal
The National Observer

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(Mount Clipping in Space Below)



Mr. Tolson. Mr. Belmont\_ Mr. Mohr .... Mr. Casper\_ fr. Callahan ..... Mr. Corrad ..... \*\*\* \*\* \* Mr. Fvans Mr. G. 1. Mr. Tavel Mr. Traiter Tele, Room., Miss Holmes .. Miss Gandy\_

ARTICLE

# Red Take-Overs Explained

By the Associated Press

Durham, N.H. The former director of the United States Central Intelligence Agency says the same Soviet apparatus which took over Czechoslo-vakia and Caba "is working on a dozen or more countries today."

Allen W Dulles delivering a convocation lecture Tuesday at the University of New Hampshire, listed four elements of the Soviet

apparatus, as follows:
1. "The Communist Party system. Nikita Khrushchev boasts the Communists have 90' parties around the world, and over 70 are in the free world.

2. "The World Federation of Trade Unions, capable of stopping production in

some countries.
3. "Front organizations, such as peace congresses, the Youth Congress, and Women's Congress.

4. "The Soviet Secret Service."

Making what a university official said was his first public speech since leaving the intelligence agency, Mr. Dulles said:

"This is the apparatus which took over Czechoslovakia 15 years ago and then Cuba right under our noses in the last few years, and it is working on a dozen or more countries touay."

He did not list those countries.

Mr. Dulles also said, "There is a rift, a pretty serious ideological rift between Soviet Russia and [Communist] China, but generally when it comes to dealing with the free world, particularly the United States, they get together.

"We will have an interesting show of that pretty soon in Laos. We'll see there whether the Soviet Union and China are able to work together or not."

On Cuba, Mr. Dulles said:

"I have thought a great deal about Cuba, and there is still a good deal that isn't known about the situation, but I can't quite see what one could have done at any particular time which would have been surely effective even if one had had all the knowledge about, Castro's Communist leanings many years ago."

He also said, "Our intelligence must make. certain covert moves to defeat the activities. going on in the country which is threatened with infiltration.

"If the threatened country's government; already is so infiltrated it won't cooperate, then you have a very difficult situation, and it is terribly important to move before that situation comes about."

(Indicate page, name of newspaper, city and state.)

BOSTON GLOBE Boston, Mass.

BOSTON HERALD Boston, Mass.


BOSTON TRAVELER Boston, Massa

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Boston, Mass.

RECORD AMERICAN Boston, Mass.

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5-8-63 Date: New England Edition: Author:

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Red Take-Overs Explained

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0-20 (Rev. 10-15-62) V. 100 900 Belmont Casper Callahan . My. Conrad ALL INFJRINATION CUNTAMPED Del back Evans HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED Gale DATE 11/17/86 BY springelled Syflivan 1 Tavel \_\_\_ Trotter \_ Tele. Room ALLEN W. DULLES b7C Holmes Gandy -3/ UPI-21 WASHINGTON FILEN W. DULLES, FORMER DIRECTOR OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, PREDICTED TODAY THAT THE CASTRO REGIME IN CUBA EVENTUALLY WILL BE OVERTHROWN. "IT'S ONLY A QUESTION OF HOW IT WILL HAPPEN AND HOW SOON," SAID DULLES. "I'M AN OPTIMIST." IN AN ARTICLE PUBLISHED IN FEBRUARY, DULLES HAD SAID THAT NO PEOPLE UNDER COMMUNIST RULE COULD CARRY OUT A SUCCESSFUL REVOLUTION. SUCH ATTEMPTS HAVE BEEN PROVED "INEFFECTIVE AND DISASTROUS," HE SAID. DULLES DID NOT SAY WHY HE THOUGHT PREMIER FIDEL CASTRO WOULD BE OUSTED. HE WAS INTERVIEWED ON A TELEVISION PROGRAM ("GEORGETOWN UNI-VERSITY FORUM--WITG-TV) ABOUT HIS ARTICLE, "THE CRAFT OF INTELLIGENCE," APPEARING IN THE APRIL ISSUE OF HARPER'S MAGAZINE. DULLES. WHO RETIRED IN 1962 AS CHIEF OF THE CIA, ALSO SAID HE DID NOT BELIEVE THE UNITED STATES HAD "GONE TOO FAR" IN DEFENSE SECRETARY ROBERT S. MCNAMARA'S TELEVISED BRIEFING IN FEBRUARY ON INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES OF SOVIET STRENGTH IN CUBA. "IT DIDN'T WORRY ME VERY PARTICULARLY." DULLES SAID. "WE WERE TELLING THE RUSSIANS WHAT THEY ALREADY KNEW" ABOUT U.S. INTELLIGENCE-GATHERING METHODS. HE WAS INTERVIEWED ON A TELEVISION PROGRAM ("GEORGE TOWN UNI-PRESIDENT KENNEDY HAD EXPRESSED CONCERN AT A NEWS CONFERENCE,
AFTER MCNAMARA'S BRIEFING, THAT THE ADMINISTRATION HAD DISCLOSED TOO
MUCH ABOUT ITS INTELLIGENCE WORK.

DULLES SAID HE BELIEVED THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MIGHT
HAVE MISJUDGED SOVIET PREMIER NIKITA S. KHRUSHCHEV'S INTENTIONS IN
CUBA BEFORE THE DISCOVERY OF SOVIET OFFENSIVE WEAPONS THERE.

BUT HE COMMENDED JOHN A. MCCONF. THE DRESENT CLA DIRECTOR AS BUT HE COMMENDED JOHN A. MCCONE, THE PRESENT CIA DIRECTOR, AS HAVING DONE A "VERY GOOD JOB" DURING THE CUBAN CRISIS.

IN THE HARPER'S ARTICLE, DULLES HAD SAID THAT IN OCTOBER, 1962, "CERTAINLY HERE HE (KHRUSHCHEV) MISESTIMATED-JUST AS SOME ON OUR SIDE HAD MISESTIMATED THAT KHRUSHCHEV WOULD NOT ATTEMPT TO PLACE OFFENSIVE WEAPONS IN CUBA, RIGHT UNDER OUR NOSE."

DULLES SAID THE "MOST DIFFICULT THING TO GET AROUND" IN INTELLI-GENCE WORK IS THE PREJUDICES OF INDIVIDUALS. A GOOD EXAMPLE WAS PEARL HARBOR, HE SAID. U.S. OFFICIALS INSISTED THE JAPANESE WOULD BE FOOLISH TO ATTACK, HE SAID, ALTHOUGH THEY WERE FACED WITH PLENTY OF INTELLIGENCE DATA WHICH SUGGESTED THAT AN ATTACK WAS **b**6 COMING. b7C 162-83338- A. 3/24--AM600PES NOT RECORDED 184 MAR 28 1963 51 MAR 28 9 F

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1 - Mr. Belmont 1 - Mr. W.C. Sullivan

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1 - Mr. Wannall

1 - Mr. Garner

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25 SEP 27 1963

1 - Miss Butler - 62-83338

Memorandum for Mr. Sullivan

Re: BOOK REVIEW: THE CRAFT OF INTELLIGENCE

BY ALLEN DULLES

62-46855

The author describes the enormous, painstaking, and time-consuming task involved in planning, coordinating, and collecting intelligence, in conducting counterintelligence operations, and in processing intelligence information, the end product of which is so vital in the formation of national estimates and national policy.

Dulles explains the necessity for and the ride of intelligence in the "cold war" of today's world by saying that "we are not really 'at peace' with them (the communists), and we have not been since Communism declared its own war on our system of government and life."

Dulles is not one to entertain fear that an intelligence or security service may endanger our freedoms, as some critics claim. He is confident that our free, open society and its constitutional safeguards will never permit a Secret police to take rout in our Nation. "It is not our intelligence organization which threatens our liberties," he concludes. "The danger is rather that we will not be adequately informed of the perils which face us.

The book highlights the need for and the problems confronting the intelligence community in meeting and countering the mounting Soviet-bloc intelligence offensive directed against this country.

#### References to FBI:

A number of references are made in the book to the FBI (pages 42, 104, 115, 122, 128, 130, 157, 199, 206, 210, 233, 244, and 252), most of them dealing with espionage cases—German, Soviet, and satellite—in which the FBI played a leading or prominent part. All of these references are favorable and accurate.

Dulles states that the FBI and the CIA do not work against each other or in competition, but work very closely in the field of counterintelligence. "Relations between the two agencies," he says, are on a "wholly satisfactory basis. Each agency passes to the other all information that belongs to its special province. There is no failure of coordination." Dulles also mentions that the FBI has performed effective work in penetrating and neutralizing the Communist Party in the United States.


Memorandum for Mr. Sullivan
Re: BOOK REVIEW: THE CRAFT OF INTELLIGENCE
BY ALLEN DULLES
62-46855

#### RECOMMENDATION:

1. For information.

poent separately

2. That the enclosed book be returned to Crime Records Division for inclusion in the Bureau Library.



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October 14, 1963 83338

Honorable Allen W. Dulles 2723 Q Street, Northwest Washington 7, D. C.

Dear Allen:

I have seen the article by Mr. William McCullam from the October 9th issue of the "New York Journal American."

All too frequently security agencies receive unwarranted criticism, and by the general nature of their work are unable to answer their critics. I was, therefore, all the more interested in reading your remarks, for they should furnish the public with a clearer insight into the many problems encountered.

Needless to say, all of us in the FBI appreciate your kind comments about our organization.

> Sincerely. 4

NOTE: See Mr. D. J. Brennan to Mr. W. C. Sullivan memorandum dated 10/10/63 and captioned: "Central Intelligence Agency (GIA) Director corresponds with Dulles on a first-name basis.

RMW:ng (3)

Belmont Mohr . Conrad DeLoach Sullivan

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PERSONAL

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DATE 11/17/86 BY SPIME

# Memorandum

: Mr. D. J. Brennan, Jr.

TO Mr. W. C. Sulliv

SUBJECT: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

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Reference is made to the enclosed article which appeared in the 10/9/63 issue of the New York Journal American. This article captioned "CIA 'The Goat' for U. S. Blunders in Viet Nam," is based on an interview of Allen Dulles and relates to the criticism of CIA in Viet Nam. You may be interested in the following observations which were volunteered to Agent Papich by Dulles on 10/10/63.

Dulles stated that the referenced interview actually was only a part of a general discussion which he held with William McCullam concerning Dulles' book "The Craft of Intelligence." As the interview progressed, McCullam brought up the matter of CIA's alleged blundering in Viet Nam. Dulles stated that he then "took off" and made the statements attributed to him in the article. As indicated, Dulles took a very strong position that CIA was being made "The Goat" in the entire situation. He maintained very strongly that CIA has never initiated any operations without White House approval and that furthermore CIA "does not make policy." Dulles advised the Agent that he personally has been greatly perturbed because nobody has been coming to the defense of the intelligence officers who have been dedicating their time and lives to most complicated international problems. In his opinion, the "troops" in the intelligence business were not getting a fair treatment and he decided to show the other side of the story.

Dulles advised that in retrospect it might have been wiser for him to have consulted with the White House before he made the statements. He did not know that the activities of CIA in Viet Nam were going to be raised at the President's press conference held on the evening of 10/9/63. Dulles, nevertheless, expressed his pleasure that the President came to the defense of CIA.

Dulles also confided that he and McCone have been following different approaches with regard to dealings with the U. S. press.

# Enclosure 1 - Mr. Belmont 1 - Mr. Sullivan 1/- Mr. Wannall 1 - Liaison 1 - Mr./Papich SJP:chs (6) chs (6) chs

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COPY FILED IN 62- 80753

OCT 22 1963

Mr. Brennan to Mr. Sullivan Memo

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

So far, McCone has followed the line of avoiding interviews with newspapermen. Dulles feels that in our form of society, it is absolutely necessary for an agency like CIA to periodically grant interviews to responsible writers. It is his feeling that this becomes necessary if the Agency is to protect its interests, bearing in mind that an intelligence agency in our country is continually being exposed to criticism and scrutiny.

It will be noted that the enclosed article includes statements concerning the U. S. Intelligence Board. Dulles identifies the members of this Board which includes the FBI. The article also includes the statements:

"Incidentally -- all reports to the contrary -- The CIA works very closely with the FBI in domestic security affairs. I have the highest regard for J. Edgar Hoover. Our relations have been excellent. He has a very fine highly competent group of men."

Dulles explained to the Liaison Agent that the article does not indicate the background for these particular statements. He advised that during the course of the interview, McCullam raised a question concerning the status of relations between the Bureau and CIA. Dulles responded as indicated although he pointed out that the language set forth was not absolutely accurate. advised that he actually used the terminology "intelligence and security matters." For information. to Bulls

World Exercise

ACTION:

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# CIA The Goat for U.S.



EX-CIA CHIEF ALLEN W. DULLES

Journal-American Photo by Vio De Lucia

# By WILLIAM McCULLAM Copyright, 1963 by N. Y. Journal-American

Allen W. Dulles, former director of the Central Intelligence Agency, charged today that the nation's multi-billion-dollar spy apparatus is being made "the goat" for American blundering in South Viet Nam.

"Occasionally the CIA has to be the goat," he said. "It looks like it has to be the goat again.

"Still—it may be better for the CIA to be tarred in the Vietnamese mess that the President of the United States or the Scoretary of State."

Mr. Dulles made his statements in a personal interview at his suite in the Mayfair House, Park ave. and 65th st.

Speaking rapidly and bluntly, he also made the following major points in defending the controversial agency he headed from 1953 until his retirement just two years ago at the age of 68:

• Any disputes between the CIA, the State Department and military leaders involved in the war against Communist guerillas in South Viet Nam have

# Junders in Viet Nam

# EXCLUSIVE

been due to the lack of a clear-cut operational policy in Washington,

- .• What is needed in Saigon and Washington both is "more cooperation and less backbiting between officials of the U. S. agencies concerned."
- It is "nonsense" to refer to the CIA as a new third force in the government which spends billions in furtherance of its own secret policies and is accountable to no one, as alleged by its foes.
- No operations of a political nature ever have been mounted by the CIA without White House approval and there never has been a case where the agency has failed to go along with Whit. House policy to the best of its ability.
- n Mr. Dulles, his blue eyes occasionally hinting at a controlled indignation, stabbed his points home with the stem of his pipe.
- He referred frequently to his new book, "The

Craft of Intelligence," published this week by Harper & Row, in which the brother of the late Secretary of State John Foster Dulles sums up his unique career as an international lawyer, diplomat and, for over eight years, as the nation's espionage chief.

"I will not discuss the situation in South Viet Nam in any detail because I know no more than I read in the papers," he said.

"But I hate to see the CIA accused as a troublemaker and the morale of its members weakened by such charges as have been reported against Mr. Richardson in Saigon."

(John H. Richardson, CIA chief in South Viet Nam, was recalled to Washington for White House consultations several days ago. News reports declared he twice refused earlier to obey instrutions from Ambassador Hnry Cabot Lodge.)


"I doubt that Mr. Richardson refused to carry out orders from Mr. Lodge," Mr. Dulles declared firmly. "I

Turn to CIA, Page 17

Newspaper article by William McCullam New York Journal American Dated: Wednesday, October 9, 1963 ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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ENCLOSURE



ALLEN W. DULLES WITH HIS NEW BOOK "The CIA Does Not Make Policy... But Follows It to the Letter" Journal-American Photo by VicDeLucia

# **Dulles Calls CIA** 'Goat' in Viet Nam

Continued from First Page

doubt that very much. What I do belive is that the Ambassador has the right to request any new personnel he may want.

"The situation in Viet Nam is very difficult. There is a civil war going on. The government there is unstable and unpredictable. But it is wrong to accuse the CIA or its officials of trying to make policy.

"The CIA does not make policy. It is made by the President, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense. Once they make a policy, it is the policy for everybody and there never has been a case where the CIA has failed to go along to the best of its ability. FBI, among others.

there never has been a clear cut policy for day to day operations in a rapidly changing situation."

#### AN OLD STORY

Asked about reports that U.S. officials and agencies in Viet Nam were divided on whether

its members have all worked under the law.

"The prime function of the CIA is to gather facts, intelligence, on which policy naturally is largely based. But it is nonsense to say the CIA makes the policy or acts on its own convictions.

#### POLICY DECISION

"Policy is determined by the President after the CIA reports of its findings are studied by the U. S. Intelligence Board and the Board submits its own estimates to him. The CIA is on the Board, but so is the State Department, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Air Force Intelligence, the Office of Naval Intelligence and the

"In Viet Nam, the trouble is Mandentally-all reports to the contrary—the CIA works very closely with the FB in domestic security affairs. I have the highest regard for J. Edgar Hoover. Our relations have been excellent. He has a very fine highly competent group

KNEW OF U-2

and serving in various philanthropic and business boards of directors, he is an avid reader of Ian Fleming spy stories.

"Intelligence work is thrilling and fascinating" he said, "bu; not usually as adventuresome as my friend Fleming describes it. So I read his books with a great deal of pleasure."

November 12, 1963

Honorable Allen W. Dulles 2723 Q Street, Northwest Washington 7, D. C.

Dear Allend

Assistant Director C. D. DeLoach advised me of his conversation with you today while en route to Washington. It was most thoughtful of you to mention our fine relationships while making appearances on radio and television in the City of Philadelphia.

One of the finer aspects of work between agencies in handling the grave intelligence responsibility for our Nation is the possibility of sincere and enduring friendships. We certainly treasure our relationship with you and deeply appreciate the continuing interest that you have shown in our activities.

Sincerely.

1 - Mr Belmont (Sent with memo)

1 - Mr. Sullivan (Sent with meme)

1 - Mr. Jones (Sent with memo)

- Mr. Morrell (Sent with meme)

NOTE: See DeLoach to Mohr memo dated 11-12-63 captioned d'Allen Dulles, Former Director of CIA, Suggested Letter from Director, "CDD:saj.

Mohr Callahan CDD: saj Conrad

Belmont

Sullivan

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# Memorandum

TO

Mr. Mohr

DATE: November 12, 1963

DeLoach Evans Gale Rosen Sullivan

> b6 b7C

FROM

C. D. DeLoach

Favel \_b6 frotter \_b6 Tele. Rocb 7 Holmes Goody

SUBJECT:

ALLEN DULLES

FORMER DIRECTOR OF CIA

SUGGESTED LETTER FROM DIRECTOR

While in Philadelphia on 11-12-63, I ran into Allen Dulles and had a rather lengthy discussion with him. He was in Philadelphia to publicize his new book on the CIA. While there he had three radio and two television shows. He told me that in all of his appearances he mentioned very favorably his association with the Director and the FBI.

As a matter of fact, the Philadelphia Inquirer this morning, 11-12-63, reported Dulles as stating, "The CIA is the overseas intelligence arm of the FBI." In mentioning this quote, Dulles told me that he did not know how McCone, the present Director, would take this, however, he felt it to be correct. He then went on to make some very commendatory remarks concerning the Director. He also mentioned, with praise, his association with Mr. Papich of our Liaison Section.

#### ACTION:

The Director may desire to send the attached letter to Mr. Dulles.

Enclosure

1 - Mr. Belmont

1 - Mr. Sullivan

1 - Mr. Jones

1 - Mr. Morrell


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Memorandum to Mr. W. C. Sullivan

RE: ALLEN DULLES

FORMER DIRECTOR OF CIA

RECEIPT OF ANONYMOUS LETTER FROM ALLEGED FBI INFORMANT

b6 b7C

(3) That Mr. Angleton be furnished pertinent background b7D information regarding as follows (4) (4) was never a Special Agent of the FBI. As an informant, he joined the Communist Party in 1942 and furnished information on a voluntary confidential basis from 1942 to 1955 (4)

He was arrested in April, 1940 for adultery. This charge was changed to fornication to which he pled guilty and was fined \$25. He was also arrested in May, 1941, for possessing lewd pictures and literature. This charge was adjourned without date and he was sentenced to one year's probation on 6/17/41(2)

Since his discontinuance as a Bureau informant, he has indicated a reluctance to testify as a Government witness. Information furnished regarding is not to be construed as a clearance, nonclearance or recommendation of the FBI

all items above headled

b6 b7C

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(m)

SUNTIDENTIAL

rights workers conduct themselves in a manner which would not be objectionable to the residents of Mississippi.

Mr. Dulles was questioned whether there was any communist activity in the civil rights unrest in the South, and he stated that he did not look into this matter as he felt this was in the FBI's field and was in good hands.

Mr. Dulles refused to answer queries on the specific findings of the President's Commission, however, noted that he felt it had made a thorough investigation and a report was being prepared as to accuracy of the three shots fired at the President,

1 - Mr. DeLoach W AU

1 - Mr. Rosen

1 - Mr. Sullivan RLR:blh

SENT DIRECTOR<sup>™</sup> 8-3-64

(continued next page)

ESEARCH

M. A. Jones to DeLoach Memo Re: ALLEN W. DULLES

Mr. Dulles noted that from Oswald's vantage point, the President was moving "down the line of vision" and not "across the line of vision" so that it was relatively easy to keep him in his sights.

Mr. Dulles was asked whether the Commission had found there was any dereliction on the part of the FBI. He answered that he had better leave that answer up to the report, and he noted that the report was full and completely fair in every way.

Mr. Dulles did not answer questions as to the recommendations the Commission would make regarding the President's wanting to meet and mix with people. He stated this was included in the report, but he did note that he felt the American people want to see the President protected rather than seeing him assassinated. He felt the job now was to get the people themselves to want the President to be protected, but he did not elaborate on how this could be accomplished. He stated that the Secret Service only has to protect the President against the lunatic fringe. In this regard, the administration should avoid too much announcement in advance of plans concerning the President's appearance at any particular place. He then elaborated on a number of past assassinations and attempts wherein the assassinators obtained their information from advance announcements and all they had to do was show up at that time and place and make the attempt.

No Sicrial

#### RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

# Memorandum

Mr. W. C. Sullivan Well

DATE: 6/29/64

D. J. Brennan, Jr. CAP To

SUBJECT: ALLEN W. DULLES

The purpose of this memorandum is to record information volunteered to SA Papich by Dulles on 6/28/64, relative to Dulles's recent trip to Mississippi.

Dulles advised that he personally was surprised that the President had selected him for the mission. Before leaving for Mississippi, he had a clear-cut understanding with the President that he would not become involved in any way whatsoever with investigation being conducted to determine the whereabouts of the three missing students. The President had emphasized to Dulles that he was to look into the over-all law enforcement picture and try to come up with recommendations which would not involve the use of U. S. Marshals or troops. Dulles described his meetings with the Governor of Mississippi, other subordinates, state officials, and several business and civic leaders. He was treated very cordially. The Governor invited him tologo stay at the Mansion, but Dulles politely declined. He explained that he was concerned that before he left, it might become necessary to confer\_with-Negroes and obviously such discussions would never be condoned in the Governor's Mansion. He stayed at a local hotel and held most of his confer ences in the U. S. Attorney's Office. He also had some talks with church leaders in the offices of a Catholic cathedral. Before he left Mississippi. he was a guest at a dinner given by the Governor which included several state government officials and civic leaders. Everybody in this group was N firmly opposed to the project which has led to Northern students coming into 62-83338-Mississippi.

The Governor and others referred to the pending Civil Rights legislation and asked Dulles if he would appeal to the President to delay the enforcement of the laws once they are enacted for an indefinite period. Dulles took the position that it would be impossible for the President to do so, explaining that once the legislation was law, it had to be enforced.

Dulles described his discussions with the Director prior, to his departure for Mississippi and the discussion which he had with the Director while in the President's Office on 6/26/64. He referred to the

1 - Mr. Belmont

1 - Mr. Rosen

1 - Mr. Papich

8 JUL 2 1964

1 - Mr. DeLoach 1 - Mr. Sullivan 33 37 25 37 25 SJP:mll. SJP:mll (8)

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Tavel Trotter Tele. Room Holmes .

Memo Brennan to Sullivan Re: Allen W. Dulles

recommendations which already have been publicized and commented that the Director possibly was irritated with him for recommending the "Beefing up" of Bureau personnel in Mississippi. The Agent's only comment was that if the Director was displeased with any statement made by Dulles, he, Dulles would certainly hear from the Director. Dulles then explained that he had no other recourse because the President had made it very clear that he wanted to avoid the use of Marshals and Federal troops. In Dulles's opinion he could only see the Bureau as serving as a deterrent force representing the Federal government. He recognized that the situation in Mississippi is so explosive that it will be impossible for all law enforcement agencies. including the FBI, to eliminate the current threat to Northern student visitors.

Dulles advised that on 6/27/64 he conferred with leaders of the National Council of Churches. At this meeting, he emphatically told all present that although the church leaders claimed that they were training people in what appeared to be a noble mission, they should clearly understand that they were participating in a project which could lead to the deaths of any or all of these students going into Mississippi. Dulles stated that he made it clear that he wanted his views to go on record wit. the church leaders because he was acting on the instructions of the President, The church leaders advised Dulles that they recognized the gravity of the situation and that they would meet concerning this matter in New York City on the morning of 6/29/64.

Dulles volunteered some personal observations concerning the situation in Mississippi. He personally believes that the three students have been disposed of and he is inclined to discount the story that all of In his opinion, many of the people involved in the this may be a hoax. student training project are naive and completely incapable of appreciating or understanding the dangers in Mississippi. He thinks that most of the students are not mature enough to appreciate the realities involved. also recognizes that some of these students are "Jerks" and are involved solely for adventure. He commented that worst of all so many of the integration leaders earnestly want incidents and will continue to provoke situations. Dulles is firmly convinced that such people want to force the President's hand so that he will have no alternative other than sending troops into Mississippi.

Dulles commented that he hoped he will not have to return to Mississippi and he personally believes it would be unwise for him to make another trip in that area in the immediate future. He was very complimentary concerning the reputation enjoyed by the Bureau in the South and he IN WICK commented very favorably concerning the courtesies extended to him by the Resident Agent in Meridian, Mississippi.

ACTION:

For information.

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1/	Tele. Room . D/C
V	Holmes
	Gandy

UPI -37

(DULLES) NEW YORK--FORMER CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA) CHIEF DULLES URGED THE ADMINISTRATION LAST NIGHT TO RELY LESS ON INTELLI-GENCE OPERATIONS AND MORE ON GOVERNMENT ACTION IN FIGHTING COMMUNIST

SUBVERSION.

DULLES SAID THE GREATEST DANGER TO THE FREE WORLD NO LONGER LIES IN THE MILITARY SPHERE BUT IN A WAR OF THE MINDS. HE CALLED FOR TH HE CALLED FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF EFFECTIVE POLICIES AND MACHINERY IN THIS KEY BATTLE.

THE FORMER CIA BOSS SPOKE TO 1,000 GUESTS OF THE FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION AT A LUNCH SPONSORED BY THE PRIVATE, NON-PROFIT, NON-PARTIZATION ORGANIZATION DEVOTED TO CITIZEN EDUCATION IN WORLD AFF AIRS.

SAID THE UNITED STATES IS SO SUPERIOR TO RUSSIA IN MILITARY DULLES CAPABILITIES THAT SOVIET PREMIER NIKITA S. KHRUSHCHEV FEARS AN ALL-CUT WAR.

INSTEAD, HE SAID, THE SOVIET LEADER HAS DECIDED ON A PLAN OF INSIDIOUS CONQUEST THROUGH THE COMMUNIST PARTY'S WORLD-WIDE MACHINERY THE SOVIET LEADER HAS DECIDED ON A PLAN OF TO SUBVERT GOVERNMENTS.

HE SAID CUBA WAS A PRIME EXAMPLE AND ADDED: "IF WE TOLERATE A SUBVERTED, COMMUNIST CUBA AT OUR DOORSTEP--THAT HAS GIVEN (KHRU-

SHCHEV) A KEY TO TRY IT OUT ON A WORLDWIDE BASIS." "IN THE PAST, TOO MUCH HAS BEEN ASKED OF THE CIA," DULLES SAID. SAID ITS SIZE AND THE NEED FOR SECRECY HAMPERED ITS OPERATIONS. QUESTIONED FURTHER ABOUT CUBA, DULLES NOTED THAT AS A PRIVATE CITIZENS HE WOULD NOT ADVISE A SPECIFIC PLAN BUT COULD ONLY "ACT

AS A PHYSICIAN DIAGNOSING A DISEASE, BUT NOT PROPOSING THE CURE."
ONE THING WAS OBVIOUSLY NEEDED, HOWEVER, HE ADDED: "ACTION."
"THERE ARE AT LEAST A DOZEN COUNTIES WHERE THE (COMMUNIST) PARTY
IS A PRESENT DANGER," DULLES SAID.

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WASHINGTON CAPITAL NEWS SERVICE

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# **DULLES-**

### TEACH RED

**FACTS EARLY** 

Special to the Feruit Tribune ATLANTIC CITY, N.J.

Teach the hard facts early about the Communist program to undermine our liberties, said Allen W. Dulles, former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. He pointed out that Lee Harvey Oswald "began to read Marxist literature in his early teens"-on his own.

But be careful what you teach or you'll be branded a Communist, said a National Education Association official. After all, a woman member of the Indiana State Board of Education came out against teaching about Robin Hood and His Merry Men because communistic they views." "held

#### PLAYTOYS, TOO

The NEA official is Miss Virginia Kinnaird, who is Associate Executive Secretary of the NEA Commission on Professional Rights and Responsibilities. Both she and Mr. Dulles spoke yesterday at fine contamnial convention of

School Administrators, which has attracted 23,000 equcators and guests.

Right wing groups such as the John Birch Society, Miss Kinnaird said, have demanded the schools remove everything from play-toys to J. D. Salinger from their tried to hound out of the system as communists those teachers who try to see that all sides of an issue are presented.

Since 1958. Miss Kinnaird said, "textbooks have come under fire in at least a third of our state legislatures. Numerous book battles have ensued in local communities. Publishers of textbooks, in order to sell their product, have too frequently succumbed to the pressures. In one instance a publishing house deleted an entire chapter on the United Nations from an eighth grade textbook."

#### POSSIBLE HARM

Mr. Dulles said that he realized that "the task of those who favor teaching the facts about communism have been thwarted because such teaching has too often been misrepresented as bein 'theg teaching of communism."

In urging the early teaching of communism, Mr. Dulles said: "I recognize the harm that extremists at both the right and the left havt done to the efforts of those who advocate more education about communit methods and techniques in our schools and colleges. I have no use forthe extremes of McCarthyism and Birchism, although I recognize that many wellmeaning, but misguided people have been deluded by their appeal."

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DATE 11/17/86 BY Spinacle

The Washington Post and \_

Times Herald

The Washington Daily News \_

The Evening Star \_\_

New York Herald Tribune \_

New York Journal-American \_\_\_

New York Mirror \_\_\_

New York Daily News \_\_\_\_

New York Post \_

The New York Times \_\_\_\_

The Worker

The New Leader \_\_

The Wall Street Journal

The National Observer

People's World \_\_\_\_

128 MAR 3

FEB 18 1964

#### BY LIAISON

Honorable Allen W. Dulles Washington Hospital Center 110 Irving Street, Northwest Washington, D. C.

Dear Allen:

I cannot tell you how sorry I was to learn of your confinement to the hospital, and I sincerely hope this note finds you feeling much better.

Please follow your doctor's instructions closely and take this opportunity to relax and get a good rest. Our thoughts are with you for a rapid and complete recovery.

If there is anything I can do, please do not hesitate to call.

With every good wish,

Sincerely.

stulles mid necessary president fer lune being (les mon balls)

#### 1 - Liaison Section

NOTE: Mr. Dulles entered the hospital yesterday (11-11-64) and his condition was diagnosed as a slight stroke. There is no serious damage, and he will remain in the hospital for several days. (Per

Liaison Section)

CJJ:asf (4)

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DeLoach Casper\_ Callahan Evans Gale Rosen Sullivan Tavel . Trotter Tele. Room

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# Memorandum

ON TO

Mr. W. C. Sullivary

DATE: November 18, 1964

Gale \_\_\_\_\_ Rosen \_\_\_\_ Sulfivan \_\_\_\_ Vavel \_\_\_\_

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FROM


D. J. Brennan, Jr.

SUBJECT:

ALLEN DULLES

Dulles contacted Special Agent Papich on the evening of November 17, 1964, and stated that he wished to express his sincere gratitude for the very kind note sent to him by the Director. He remarked that the message was most touching and that the letter was the first communication which he had received after entering the hospital. Dulles stated that he had returned to his home on the morning of November 17, 1964, that he was feeling much better but would continue undergoing some more tests. The vision in one eye has been partially impaired but Dulles has been told by his physician that this may be a temporary condition.

#### ACTION:



ALLEN W. DULLES
2723 Q STREET, N. W.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20007
ADAMS 2-0104

Mr. Casper Mr. Callahan Mr. Conrad Mr. Evans Mr. Gale Mr. Rosen Mr. Shriya Mr. Trotter

Mr. Belmont Mr. Mahr.... Mr. JeLond

19 November 1964 Tele. Room

Tele. Room.\_\_ Miss Holmes\_ Miss Gandy\_

Honorable John Edgar Hoover
Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

Dear Edgar:

I was deeply touched by your message of 12 November 1964, which I received the other day at the hospital. Your message was the first one I received after my attack, which briefly hospitalized me, and I send my heartfelt thanks.

to be at work again. I shall follow your wise advice and pay more attention in the future to doctor's orders.

With high admiration and respect, I remain

Faithfully yours,

Allen W. Dulles

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# Memorandum

TO

Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE:

10/3/66

Tavel . Trotter . Tele. Room

Rosen Sullivan

Callahan Contad Fell Gale

SUBJECT: ALLEN DULLES

FROM : D. J. Brennan, Jr,

FORMER DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

The Liaison Agent has been reliably informed that Dulles' health has not improved and he definitely is "slowing up." Dulles suffered a slight stroke about two years ago and he never completely recovered. His vision was somewhat impaired and he has frequent lapses of memory.

His present state of health undoubtedly has been very much aggravated by the publications and articles which have been critical of the Warren Commission Report. Dulles feels that the criticism is most unjustified and he has been appealing to the other members of the Commission to counter this criticism. He has been unsuccessful in his efforts.

#### ACTION:

For information.

SJP:rab

1 - Mr. DeLoach

1 - Mr. Sullivan

1 - Mr. Branigan


1 - Liaison

1 - Mr. Papich

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#### BY LIAISON

- Mr. DeLoach - Mr. Sullivan - Liaison

- Mr. Papich

- Mr. Morrell

Honorable Allen W. Dulles 2723 Q Street, Northwest Washington, D. C.

Dear Allen: DULLES

I have just learned of your hospitalization. Knowing you, I know that you will be up and around before long, but I do suggest that you take full advantage of the opportunity to have a complete rest.

My associates and I hope you have a speedy recovery and extend all our best wishes to you.

Sincerely yours,

ALL IMPORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 11/17/86 BY Sprmacklo

NOTE:

See memorandum D. J. Brennan, Jr., to W. C. Sullivan, dated 6/29/67, captioned, "Allen Dulles, 2 prepared by SJP:rab/csh. 10 JUL 5 1967 EX 101

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Mr. Tolson. Mr. Delouch Mr. M.br Mr AMek & ALLEN W. DULLES Mr. Casper 2729 Q STREET, N. W. Mr. Caliahan WASHINGTON, D. C. 20007 Mr. Conrad .... Mr. Felt ADAMS 2-0104 Mr. Gala Mr. Des Mr. OW Mr. Te Mr. Trotter July 10, 1967 Tele. Room. Miss Holmes Miss Gandy. parte foots Hon. J. Edgar Hoover Director Federal Bureau of Investigation Department of Justice Washington, D. C. Dear Edgar: I was deeply touched by your thoughtfulness in writing when you heard that I was in the hospital. I have been here for a little over a week now, and I hope to be out again before another week is by. They do not expect any return of the difficulty which hospitalized me. Your kind words of good wishes were a real encouragement to me, and I send you all my best regards for the days which are ahead of us. Respectfully yours, ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED REC- 24 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED BYSPIMACLED

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### UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ON THE WILLIAM

## Memorandum

то

Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: January 24, 1968

Collahan Conrad Fell Gale Rosen Sullivan Tavel Trotter Tele. Room Holmes

FROM

D. J. Brennan, Jr.

*~* 

SUBJECT:

ALLEN DULLES

"THE SECRET SURRENDER"

SEE REVIRSE SIDE M CLASSIA CATION ACTION

I more pose

Gandy

You may be interested in the following information which was volunteered to the Liaison Agent on January 23, 1968, by Bureau Informant 100:

Dig

Plans are in progress to make a movie based on the book "The Secret Surrender," written by Allen Dulles and b6 published in 1966. The book dealt with Dulles's experiences as an intelligence officer in World War II when he played a key role in events and negotiations which led to the Nazi surrender in Italy. Louis De Rochemont reportedly will handle production of the movie. Alec Guinness, well-known British actor, is currently being considered for playing the role of Dulles. Much of the filming will take place in Switzerland, where Dulles had been stationed during World War II.

#### ACTION:

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#### UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

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
: Mr. W. C. Sullivan

FROM

: D. J. Brennan, Jr

SUBJECT: ALLEN DULLES, FORMER DIRECTOR.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY



b7C

Liaison Agent Papich advised by telephone that Allen Dulles died at 10 p.m. on January 29, 1969. PARA C

#### ACTION:

For information.

1 - C. D. DeLoach 1 - W. C. Sullivan

1 - Liaison

GAD:clb (4)

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

1 - Mr. N. P. Callahan 1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan

May 10, 1068

SAC, Now York

Director, FBI (62-46855)

PURCHASE OF BOOKS ECOM REVIEWS 1 - Mr. B. M. Suttler 1 - Mr. R. W. Smith

1 - Mr. R. S. Garner

TIMP

You are authorized to obtain discreetly one copy each of the following books for the use of the Bureau. They should be forwarded to the Eureau attention Research-Satellite Section, Domestic Intelligence Division.

- 1. "The Real CIA" by Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Sr. New York, The Macmillan Company, \$6.95
  - 2. "Great True Spy Stories" edited by Allen Dulles. New York, Harper & Row, \$6.95

I - Mr. M. F. Row, 6221, IB

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NOTE:

Books requested for reference purposes by Assistant Director W. C. Sullivan. After perusal, books will be placed in Bureau Library where not now available.

62-83333 NOT RECORDED 19 MAY 10 1968

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# Memorandum

TO

Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: January 30, 1969

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FROM : D. J. Brennan, Jr. 50

SUBJECT: ALLEN W. DULLES,

FORMER DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Reference is made to my previous memorandum of this date concerning the death of Mr. Dulles.

The Liaison Agent has been advised that a funeral service will be held at 11 a.m., Saturday, February 1, 1969, at the Georgetown Presbyterian Church, 3115 P Street, Northwest, Washington, D. C. Private burial will follow in Baltimore, Maryland.

#### ACTION:

For information.

1 - C. D. DeLoach

1 - T. E. Bishop (Malmfeldt)

1 - W. C. Sullivan

1 - Liaison

1 - S. J. Papich

SJP:clb (6)

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DO-6 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ALLEN DULLES My dear Mr. Hoover, The things you say of my husband are good to hear. I know he had a very high regard for you. TELE. ROOM -Very sincerely yours, MISS GANDY -Clover Dulles (Mrs. Allen Dulles) COPY:nm For # 366904

The Hon. J. Edgar Heorier Federal Bureon of Investigation Department of fustice houstington. D.C. Fo1 #366904 2 DIRECTOR ALL INFORWATION CONTAINED opined by Kerem is unclassified DESCHASING ST SPA ALMERU 2 FEB 24 68. \$ al. 4 57 - 10 -

### 2723 Q Street

The Things you say of my husband one good to hear. I know he had a very high regard for you.

Usry sincerely yours,

Chas Dullis

Fadinary 19,1969

Jan

ANNEWS 62-83338-119

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DATE 11/17/21 BY SPIMACED

10 MAR 10 1969

UC. ... 16:00

SAC, NEW YORK (100-87235)

PURCHASE OF BOOKS BOOK REVIEWS

ReBulet 2/4/70.

Enclosed for the Bureau are 2 copies of "Craft of Intelligence" by ALLEN DULLES.

(3)- Bureau (Encls. 2)
(1-Attn: Research Section - Domestic Intelligence Division)

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# Memorandum

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Mr. W.R. Wannall

UNITED STATES (

DATE: 4/17/74

FROM

H.A. Boynton, Jr

SUBJECT: CLOVER TODD BULLES Deceased
(MRS. ALLEN W. DULLES) OC

INFORMATION CONCERNING

OC.

Bout to

Assoc. Dir.

Dep. AD Admir

Dep. AD Admir

Asst. Dir.:

Admin. \_\_\_\_

Comp. Syst. \_\_

Files & Com. \_\_ Gen. Inv. \_\_\_\_

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Legal Coun, \_\_\_\_ Telephone Rm. \_\_\_

Director Sec'y \_\_\_

This recommends that an appropriate floral arrangement from the Director be forwarded in memory of Mrs. Dulles who passed away 4/15/74.

Allen W. Dulles (deceased 1/29/69) was the well-known and respected former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) from 2/26/53 to 11/29/61. He was also the brother of the late Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. During his career at CIA Mr. Dulles was highly regarded by his associates in CIA and other U. S. agencies. The Bureau enjoyed a very warm relationship with Mr. Dulles during and after his tenure at CIA. In view of this, it is believed appropriate that a floral arrangement be sent from the Director in memory of Mrs. Dulles.

CIA has advised that Mrs. Dulles' funeral is tentatively arranged for the afternoon of 4/20/74 at the Georgetown Presbyterian Church, 3115 P Street, Northwest; however, this is subject to change and the funeral director has not yet been announced. CIA has advised that when this information and other pertinent details are available, it would be promptly furnished to Liaison.

#### RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that an appropriate floral arrangement from Clarence M. Kelley and associates be forwarded in memory of Mrs. Dulles.

LFS:tdp (5)

1 - Mr. R.R. Franck

1 - Mr. W.R. Wannall

1 - Mr. Boynton

13 -

REC-62 62-83338-SEE ADDENDUM PAGE TWO

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DATE 11/17/86 BYSpammelde

58 APR 29 1974

2723 Q Street ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/25/99 BY SP2 ALM/FA)

Dear Mr. Kellerg, white flowers which you and your associates sent on the occasion of my mother's Much appreciated. It world have meant a lest to my father to know that the Bureau had been so thoughtful.

Sincereles

**b6** 

b7C

april 23 rd

FOI# 366904 hallen is inclassing 50 25/99 SP 2 ALMEH C 12 DIRECTOR The Honorable 6 Carence M. Kelley 12 APR 26 84 Federal Bureau Oxlinestigation Carneghania avenue and 9th Street, N.W. Washington W. G.

ADDENDUM:

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

HAB:tdb

CIA advised 4/17/74 that Mrs. Dulles' body was cremated this morning and that family interment will be in Baltimore on Saturday. After the service Saturday at the Georgetown Presbyterian Church, there will be a reception at the house, 2723 Q Street, Northwest, and flowers will be welcomed at the house or the church. It is expected that Director William Colby and a number of people from CIA will be in attendance.

+ at 2:00 PM

Channel Karoleng.

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OFFICE OF DIRECTOR
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

2723 Q Street (Washington, D.C.) April 23rd (1974)

Dear Mr. Kelley,

The pink and while flowers which you and your Associates sent on the occasion of my Mother's death were beautiful and much appreciated. It would have meant a lot to my father to know that the Bureau had been so thoughtful.

MR. JENKINS

MR. MILLER

MR. ADAMS

MR. CAMPBELL

MR. CLEVELAND

MR. FRANCK

MR. GEBHARDT

MR. JACOBSON

MR. JAMIESON

MR. MARSHALL

MR. THOMPSON

MR. WALSH

MR. WANNALL

MR. WHITE

MR. MINTZ

MR. COLEMAN

MR. REED

TELE. ROOM

MRS. METCALF

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## Dulles Defended Lying to Shield FBI and CIA

Book Quotes Late Spy Director as Saying Practice Was Justified to Protect Agents

WASHINGTON M-The late CIA Director Allen W. Dulles told the Warren Commission that the FBI and CIA directors might lie to anyone but the President to conceal identities of their undercover agents, according to re-cently declassified documents.

The documents are quoted in our book pub-- lished Friday about the investigation of President John F. Kennedy's assassination entitled "White-wash IV" by Harold Weis-berg, a Frederick, Md., writer and investigator.

· He lost a suit against the government seeking release of the Dulles documents. Hewever, the National Archives later declassified the and mation and sent him copies.

As a member of the Warren Commission, Dulles, who died in 1969, took part in a discussion on Jan. 27, 1964, about whether Directors J. Edgar Hoover of the FBI and John A. McCone of the CIA would answer truthfully if questioned about whether Lee Harvey Oswald had ever worked for either of their agencies.

The declassified documents included a verbatim transcript of that executive session of the commission.

"I think under any circumstances, I think Mr. Hoover would say certainly he didn't have anything to do with this fellow, said Dulles, when no longer CIA director.

AN 1 5 1975

mba book quotes Dulles as saying: "I would tell the President of the United States anything, yes, I am under his control . . . I wouldn't necessarily tell anybody else, unless the President authorized me to do it."

At one point in the disthe late Sen. Richard B. Russell (D-Ga.), saying to Dulles: "If Oswald never had assassinated the President, or at least been charged with assassinating the President and had been in the employ of the? FBI and somebody had gone to the FBI, they would have denied he was an agent."

Dulles responded: "Oh,

Russell then said: "They would be the first to deny it. Your agents would have done exactly the same thing."

Dulles said: "Exactly."

Hoover told the commission when he was questioned on May 14, 1964: "I can most emphatically say that at no time was he (Osward) ever an employe of the bureau in any capacity, either as an agent or as! a special employe, or as an informant."

McCone was asked by the committee's general counsel, J. Lee Rankin, whether Oswald "had any connection with the CIA, informer, or indirectly as an employe, or any other capacity?"

McCone replied: "I have ALL INVIVIC determined to my satisficconnection . . . "

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tion that he had no such HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 11/17/86 BY SP7MACKE

# Policy on C.I.A. and F.B.I. Lies Described by Allen Dulles in '64

WASHINGTON, Nov. 22 (AP)

—The late Director of Sentral Intelligence, Allen Woulles, told the Warren Commission that the F.B.I. and C.I.A. directors might lie to anyone but the President to conceal identities of their undercover agents, according to recently declassified documents.

The documents are quoted in a book being published today about the investigation of President John F. Kennedy's assassination. The book, entitled "Whitewash IV," is by Harold Weisberg, a Frederick, Md., writer and investigator.

Mr. Weisberg lost a suit against the Government seeking release of the documents. However, the National Archives declassified the information and sent him copies.

Mr. Dulles, a member of the Warren Commission, who died in 1969, took part in a discussion Jan. 27, 1964, about whether J. Edgar Hoover, director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and John A. McCone, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, would truthfully answer questions on whether Lee Harvey Oswald had ever worked for either of their agen-

The documents declassified included a verbatim transcript of that executive session of the commission.

"I think under any circumstances, I think Mr. Hoover would say certainly he didn't have anything to do with this fellow," said Mr. Dulles, who was no longer C.I.A. director at the time.

The book also quotes Mr. Dulles as caying: I would tell the President of the United

States anything, yes, I am under his control. I wouldn't necessarily tell anybody else, unless the President authorized me to do it."

At one point in the discussion the book quotes the late Senator Riciard B. Russell as saying to Mr. Dulles: "If Oswald never had assassinated the President and had been in the employ of the F.B.I. and somebody had gone to the F.B.I., they would have denied he was an agent."

Mr. Dulles responded: "Oh,

Mr. Russell, Democrat of Georgia, then said: "They would be the first to deny it. Your agents would have done exactly the same thing."

Mr. Dulles said: "Exactly."

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"I can most emphatically say that at no time was he [Oswald] ever an employe of the bureau in any capacity, either as an agent or as a special employe, or as an informant."

Mr. McCone was asked by the committee's general counsel, J. Lee Rankin, whether Mr. Oswald "Had any connection with the C.I.A., informer, or indirectly as an employe, or any other capacity?"

Mr. McCone replied: "I be determined to my satisfithat he had no such tion."

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Was	hington Star-News
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The	Los Angeles Times

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EDITORS' NOTE:

THE FOLLOWING IS A PHOTO REPRODUCTION OF THE
FIRST PAGE PROOFS OF "THE CRAFT OF INTELLIGENCE"
BY ALLEN W. DULLES. THIS HAS BEEN RUSHED
THROUGH FOR EARLY USE BY THE PRESS. IT IS
UNCORRECTED. A FEW MINOR REVISIONS REQUESTED
BY MR. DULLES HAVE NOT YET BEEN MADE ON THESE
PAGES:

THE PRESS IS PERMITTED TO QUOTE UP TO A MAXIMUM OF 500 WORDS FROM THE TEXT.

Enclosure to D.J. Brennan to W. C. Sullivan memorandum, 2/25/63, captioned "THE CRAFT OF INTELLIGENCE" BY ALLEN W. DULLES.

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## INTELLIGENCE

By ALLEN W. DULLES

#### I. INTELLIGENCE COMES OF AGE

In our time the United States is being challenged by a hostile group of nations that profess a philosophy of life and of government inimical to our own. This in itself is not a new development; we have faced such challenges before. What has changed is that now, for the first time, we face an adversary possessing the military power to mount a devastating attack directly upon the United States, and in the era of nuclear missiles this can be accomplished in a matter of minutes or hours with a minimum of prior alert.

To be sure, we possess the same power against our adversary. But in our free society our defenses and deterrents are prepared in a largely open fashion, while our antagonists have built up a formidable wall of secrecy and security. In order to bridge this gap and help to provide for strategic warning, we have to rely more and more upon our intelligence operations.

Another change is that we have had to assume the responsibility of leadership for the countries of the Free world. Accompanying this responsibility is a burden of unprecedented dimensions placed upon both our policies and our measures for military preparedness. As a result, our intelligence services have had to equip themselves for an expanding range of problems unlike those they have ever faced before.

This report concerns itself with how our intelligence services have been developing and what they must be equipped to do in this age of peril.

In the past, in wartime, our military commanders have had military intelligence services available to them. Nevertheless, during World War I we still found ourselves inadequately prepared for our intelligence responsibilities, despite the high degree of competence and devotion of a small group of able army and navy intelligence officers. It was only in World War II and particularly after the Pearl Harbor attack that we began to develop, side by side with our military intelligence organizations, an agency for secret intelligence collection and operations. The origin of this agency was a summons by President Franklin D. Roosevelt to William J. Donovan in 1941 to come down to Washington and work on this problem. The result was an organization known as the Office of Strategic Services (OSS).

Colonel (later Major General) Donovan is generally regarded as the father of modern U.S. intelligence. He was eminently qualified for the job. A distinguished lawyer, a veteran of World War. I with the distinction of having won the Medal of Honor, he had divided his busy life in peacetime between the law, govern-

ment service and politics. He knew the world, having traveled widely. He understood people. He had a flair for the unusual and for the dangerous, tempered with judgment. In short, he had the qualities to be desired in an intelligence officer.

The Japanese sneak attack on Pearl Harbor and our entry into the war naturally stimulated the rapid growth of the OSS and its intelligence operations. It was just after Pearl Harbor that I was recruited by General Donovan, who had been a close friend of mine for many years. I served with him until the end of the war in 1945.

For a short time after V-J Day, it looked as though the U.S. would gradually withdraw its troops from Europe and the Far East. This would probably have included the disbanding of intelligence operations. In fact, it seemed likely at the end of 1945 that we would do what we did after World War I—fold our tents and go back to business-as-usual. But this time, in contrast to 1919 when we repudiated the League of Nations, we became a charter member of the United Nations and gave it our support in hopes that it would grow up to be the keeper of world peace.

#### Communists Overplayed Hand

If the Communists had not overreached themselves, our government might well have been disposed to leave the responsibility for keeping the peace more and more to the United Nations. In fact, at Yalta Stalin asked President Roosevelt how long we expected to keep our troops in Europe. The President answered, not more than two years. In view of the events that took place in rapid succession during the postwar years, it is clear that in the period between 1945 and 1950 Premier Stalin and Mao Tsetung decided that they would not wait for us to retire gracefully from Europe and Asia; they would kick us out.

Moscow installed Communist regimes in Poland, Rumania and Bulgaria before the ink was dry on the agreements signed at Yalta and Potsdam. The Kremlin threatened Iran in 1946 and followed this in rapid succession by imposing a Communist regime on Hungary, activating the civil war in Greece, staging the take-over of Czechoslovakia and instituting the Berlin blockade. Later, in 1950, Mao joined Stalin to mastermind the attack on South Korea. Meanwhile Mao had been consolidating his position on the mainland of China. These blows in different parts of the world aroused our leaders to the need for a world-wide intelligence system. We were, without fully realizing it, witnessing the first stages of a master plan to shatter the societies of Europe



United Press International
Col. William J. Donovan visiting a
military school in Sofia, Bulgaria,
in Feb. 1941 in his capacity as personal representative of Pres. Franklin D. Roosevelt. At right, Gen.
Nihoff, head of the school

and Asia and isolate the United States, and eventually to take over the entire world.

In his address to Congress on March 12, 1947, President Truman declared that the security of the country was threatened by Communist actions and stated that it would be our policy

to help free peoples to maintain their free institutions and their national integrity against aggressive movements seeking to impose on them totalitarian regimes.


He added that we could not allow changes in the status quo brought about by "coercion or by such subterfuges as political infiltration," in violation of the United Nations charter.

It was by then obvious that the United Nations, shackled by the Soviet veto, could not play the role of policeman. It was also clear that we had a long period of crisis ahead of us. Under these conditions, a series of measures were taken by the government to transform our words into action. One of the earliest was the reorganization of our national defense structure, which provided for the unification of the military services under a secretary of defense and the creation of the National Security Council.

At that time President Truman, basing his action upon a blue-print that General Donovan had submitted, recommended that a central intelligence agency be created as a permanent agency of government. A Republican Congress agreed and, with complete bipartisan approval, the CIA was established in the National Security Act of 1947. It was an openly acknowledged arm of the executive branch of government although, of course, it had many duties of a secret nature. President Truman saw to it that the new agency was equipped to support our government's effort to meet Communist tactics of "coercion, subterfuge, and political infiltration." Much of the know-how and some of the personnel of the OSS were taken over by the Central Intelligence Agency. Fortunately many ranking officers of the OSS had remained in various interim intelligence units which had functioned under the aegis of the State and War departments in the period 1945–47.

I have spent more than ten years with the Central Intelligence Agency, eight as its director. During World War II I served Allen Dulles, retiring after eight years as director of the CIA received the National Security medal from Pres. John F. Kennedy, who went to Langley, Va., Nov. 28, 1961, to open the new CIA headquarters building





A meeting of the U.S. intelligence board, a group of military and civilian advisers to the CIA, with Allen Dulles at the head of the table

with the OSS, and even earlier, during my years in the diplomatic service (1916-26), I was often engaged in the gathering of intelligence. Since returning to private life in 1961, I have felt strongly that someone—even though he be a deeply-concerned advocate—should tell what properly can be told about intelligence as a vital element in the structure of government. Probably intelligence is the least understood and the most misrepresented of the professions. Many books and articles, thrillers that are more fictional than factual, have been written over recent years about "spy" work. From them the general reader must have drawn some strange conclusions as to the real purposes and activities of our intelligence service.

When, on November 28, 1961, President Kennedy came out to inaugurate the new CIA headquarters building and to say goodby to me as director, he expressed one reason why this misunderstanding exists: "Your successes are unheralded, your failures are trumpeted." For obviously one cannot tell of operations that go along well. Those that go badly generally speak for themselves. The President then added a word of encouragement to the several thousand men and women of CIA:

... but I am sure you realize how important is your work, how essential it is—and in the long sweep of history how significant your efforts will be judged. So I do want to express my appreciation to you now, and I am confident that in the future you will continue to merit the appreciation of our country, as you have in the past.

It is hardly reasonable to expect proper understanding and support for our intelligence work in this country if only the insiders, a few people within the executive and legislative branches, know anything whatever about the CIA, and all others continue to draw their knowledge from the so-called inside stories by writers who have never been on the inside.

There are, of course, sound reasons for not divulging any intelligence secrets. It is well to remember that what is told to the public also gets to the enemy. However, the discipline and techniques—what we call the tradecraft of intelligence—are

widely known in the profession, whatever the nationality of the service may be. A discussion of this reveals no secrets. What must not be disclosed, and will not be disclosed here, is where and how and when the precise means of the tradecraft are being or will be employed in particular operations.

The CIA is not an underground organization. One need only read the law to get a general idea of what it is set up to do. One of my own guiding principles when I was Director of Central Intelligence was always to keep secret, by every human means, only those activities which should be secret, and not to make a mystery out of what is a matter of common knowledge or is obvious to friend and foe alike.

#### Futile Secrecy

Shortly after I became director I was presented with a good illustration of the futility of certain kinds of secrecy. Dr. Milton Eisenhower, brother of the President, had an appointment to see me on some matter of mutual interest relating to the field of education. The President volunteered to drop him off at my office. They started out, I gather, without forewarning to the Secret Service and were unable to find the CIA headquarters until a telephone call had been put through for precise directions. This led me to investigate the reasons for a secrecy surrounding my location that was quite futile—the agency was, after all, listed, in the telephone book with its proper number and address, and. many cab drivers in Washington knew its location. But the gate outside our headquarters bore only the sign "Government Printing Office," which in fact had a shop on the premises. I learned that the sightseeing buses going around Washington were making it a practice to stop outside our front gate. The guide would harangue the sightseers to the effect that behind the barbed wire before them was the most secret, the most concealed place in Washington—the headquarters of the U.S. spy organization, the Central Intelligence Agency.

As soon as I had a proper sign placed outside our headquarters, the glamour and mystery disappeared. We were no longer either sinister or mysterious to visitors to the capital—we became just another government office.

When we try to make a mystery out of everything relating to intelligence, we tend to scatter those efforts and energies which should properly be directed toward maintaining the secrecy and security of operations where it is essential to success. Each situation has to be considered according to the facts, keeping in mind the principle of withholding from a potential enemy all useful information about secret intelligence operations or personnel engaged in them. The injunction that George Washington wrote to Colonel Elias Dayton on July 26, 1777, is still applicable to many intelligence operations today:

The necessity of procuring good Intelligence is apparent and need not be further urged. All that remains for me to add, is, that you keep the whole matter as secret as possible. For upon Secrecy, Success depends in most Enterprizes of the kind, and for want of it, they are generally defeated, however well planned and promising of a favourable issue.

On the whole, Americans are inclined to talk too much about matters which should be classified. I feel that we hand out too many of our secrets, particularly in the field of military "hardware" and weaponry, and that we often fail to make the vital distinction between the type of things that should be secret and those which, by their very nature, are not and cannot be kept secret. Also, there are times when our press is overzealous in seeking "scoops" with regard to future diplomatic, political and military moves. We have learned the importance of secrecy in time of war, although even then there have been serious indiscretions at times. But it is well to recognize that in the "Cold War" our adversary takes every advantage of what we divulge openly or make publicly available.

To be sure, in our form of government, given the attitude of the public and the press, it is impossible to erect a wall around the whole business, nor do I suggest that this be done. Neither Congress nor the executive branch intended this when the law of 1947 was passed. Furthermore, certain information must be given out if public confidence in the intelligence mission is to be strengthened and if the profession of the intelligence officer is to be properly appreciated.

Most important of all, it is necessary that both those on the inside—the workers in intelligence—and the public should come to share in the conviction that intelligence operations can help mightily to protect the nation.

#### II. THE ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE

Does the United States need a central intelligence service? This question has often been asked me. The inquirer then goes on to point out that the Departments of State and Defense have their own intelligence resources. Officers of the U.S. Foreign Service and various military attachés do collect information and these two departments have their intelligence experts who analyze incoming data. All these people are highly competent and do a good job. Are not their accomplishments sufficient to our needs?

The answer given to this question in our time by both the executive and legislative branches of government has been in the negative; Congress passed the legislation establishing the Central Intelligence Agency and the President signed the bill. No effort has been made to repeal this legislation, for the character of the Communist threat has made it necessary, even crucial, to our survival. The Soviet Union, Communist China and the entire Communist bloc surround all their activities, both of a military nature and of the sort we term subversive, with a wall of secrecy and security. The intelligence collection work of the State

and Defense departments, although of great value, is not enough.

Then, in addition to getting the information, there is also the question of how it should be processed and analyzed. I feel that there are important reasons for placing the responsibility for the preparation and co-ordination of our intelligence analyses upon a centralized agency of government that has no responsibility for policy. Quite naturally policy makers tend to become wedded to the policy for which they are responsible, and State and Defense employees are no exception to this very human tendency. They are likely to view with a jaundiced eye intelligence reports that might include elements casting doubt upon the wisdom of existing policy decisions. The most serious occupational hazard we have in the intelligence field, the one that causes more mistakes than any foreign deception or intrigue, is prejudice. I grant that we are all creatures of prejudice, but by entrusting intelligence co-ordination to our central intelligence service, which is excluded from policy making, we can avoid, to the greatest possible extent, the bending of facts obtained through intelligence to suit a particular point of view.

At the time of the Pearl Harbor attack many high officials here and abroad were convinced that the Japanese, if they initiated hostilities in the Pacific, would strike southward against the "soft underbelly" of the British, French and Dutch colonial areas. The likelihood that they would make the initial attack directly upon their most dangerous antagonist, the United States, was discounted. The Pearl Harbor attack was a classic instance in which intelligence evaluation was not handled objectively. It undoubtedly influenced later decisions concerning the organization of our intelligence service.

#### Broad Range of Problems

Furthermore, both the State and Defense departments these days have a vast range of absorbing problems to deal with—in forming policy, planning for a wide variety of contingencies, and implementing their policies in action. To burden them also with the major responsibility for gathering and evaluating intelligence would tend to subordinate that function to their other roles and reduce the importance of the task an intelligence service must perform.

That task is to provide the makers of our foreign policy—primarily the President, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense, but including others in government strictly on a "need-to-know" basis—with information on what is going on and what are the likely future developments in the world about us. Any information from any source that bears on the security of the United States lies within the scope of the intelligence service. Of course, particular emphasis is placed on information about the countries whose policies are hostile to us, namely the Communist bloc. We must know as much as possible about their power and their plans, about the types of military "hardware" they are developing, particularly the missiles, nuclear bombs, aircraft and the other elements of their offensive strength which they could bring to bear upon us and our allies.

If anyone has any doubt about the importance of obtaining objective intelligence, I would suggest that he merely study the mistakes political leaders have made in the past because they were badly advised or because they misjudged the facts and therefore the attitudes of other countries. When Kaiser Wilhelm II ordered the invasion of France by way of Belgium in 1914, he had been persuaded by his military leaders that the violation of Belgian neutrality was essential to military success. But he relied too heavily on the judgment of these same military men, who were reasonably sure, on military grounds, that Éngland would not enter the war on behalf of the Belgians. The Kaiser had received ample warning from the political side and his decision represented a gross failure to appraise the available

intelligence objectively.

The days leading up to World War II were filled with similar examples. Disregarding Churchill's warnings and various intelligence sources, the British failed to comprehend both the intentions and the growing military capabilities of Nazi Germany. They especially underestimated Germany's striking power through the air. Hitler likewise made a series of miscalculations. After France had fallen and most of the Continent was in German hands, he discounted the strength and determination of Britain to hold out much longer and opened a second front against Russia in June 1941. Also, when he was advised of the plan for a U.S.-British landing in North Africa in 1942, he reportedly refused to pay attention to the available intelligence. I have been told that he remarked casually, "They don't have the ships to do it." In our own case, the warnings the United States received prior to Pearl Harbor may not have been clear enough to permit the President and his military advisers to pinpoint the attack on Hawaii and the Philippines; but, had they been adequately analyzed, they would have alerted us to the imminent danger of sudden attack somewhere in the Pacific. As for Japan, successful as was the Pearl Harbor attack, its government proved later to have made the greatest miscalculation of all when it underestimated United States military potential.

Today's intelligence service finds itself in the situation of having to maintain a constant watch in every part of the world, no matter what may at the moment be occupying the main attention of diplomats and military men. Our vital interests are subject to attack in almost every quarter of the globe at any time.

#### Unpredictable Involvements

Two decades ago no one would have been able or willing to predict that in the 1960s our armed forces would be stationed in Korca and be deeply engaged in South Vietnam (how many of us even knew such places existed?), or that Cuba would have become a hostile Communist state closely allied with Moscow, or that the Congo would have assumed grave importance in our foreign policy. Yet these are all facts of life today. The coming years will undoubtedly provide equally strange developments.

Today it is impossible to predict where the next danger spot may develop. It is the duty of intelligence to forewarn of such dangers, so that the government can take action. No longer can the search, for information be limited to a few countries. The whole world is the arena of our conflict. In this age of nuclear missiles even the Arctic and the Antarctic have become areas of strategic significance. Distance has lost much of its old significance, while time, in strategic terms, is counted in hours or even minutes. The oceans, which even in World War II protected this country and allowed it ample time to prepare for eventual participation, are still where they have always been. But now they can be crossed by missiles in a matter of minutes and by bombers in a few hours. Today the United States is in the front line of attack, for it is the main target of its adversaries. No longer does an attack require a long period of mobilization with its telltale evidence. Missiles stand ready on their launchers, and bombers are on the alert.

Therefore, an intelligence service today has an additional responsibility, for it cannot wait for evidences of the likelihood of hostile acts against us until after the decision to strike has been made by another power. Our government must be both forewarned and forearmed. The situation becomes all the more complicated when, as in the case of Korea and Vietnam, a provocative attack is directed not against the U.S. but against some distant overseas area which, if lost to the Free world, would imperil our own security. Obvicusly, then, the very nature of the intelligence service has changed radically in the past two decades.

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The extraordinary security precautions taken by the U.S.S.R. and Communist China are excellent testimony to this change. Great areas of both countries are officially sealed off from foreign eyes. The information that these countries release about their military establishment is carefully controlled and patently misleading, and yet accurate knowledge is needed for our defense and for defense of the Free world. The Soviet Union has so far refused to permit the inspection and control that are essential for nuclear and conventional arms limitations. The Communist nations brazenly assert that this secrecy is a great military asset and an element of basic policy. As in Cuba, they arm in secret in order to be able to attack in secret, as they did in Korca. In 1955 the U.S.S.R. refused the "open skies" proposal of President Eisenhower, which we were prepared to have applied to our country on the same terms as to their own. It is the task of the U.S. intelligence service to right the uneven balance of essential knowledge about military capabilities and their preparation; to do so it has no other choice than to break through the Communists' shield of secrecy.

#### United States as Leader

The United States has been forced by the course of events, particularly by the aggressive tactics of the Soviet Union, to assume a role of leadership in the Free world. Not only do we have formal allies, but there are many other friendly nations who share our view of the Communist threat. Our partners in the Free world are making a real contribution to the West's total strength, and this includes contributions in matters of intelligence that help keep the Free world forewarned. However, some of our friends lack the resources to develop an effective intelligence organization, and they look to the United States to play a major role in this field and to advise them if we uncover hostile plans against them. It is in our interest to do so. One of the most gratifying features of my work has been the co-operation established between the U.S. intelligence service and its counterparts throughout the world who make common cause with us in uncovering aggressive moves of the Communists.

There is another side of the coin in intelligence work, known most commonly as counterintelligence, devoted to warding off the vigorous onslaught of espionage emanating largely from Communist nations and aimed at penetrating our most important secrets in the fields of national defense and foreign policy.

#### Red System Formidable.

In the Soviet Union, we are faced with an antagonist that has raised the art of espionage to an unprecedented height, while developing the collateral techniques of subversion, deception and penetration into a formidable political instrument of attack. No other country has ever before attempted espionage on such a scale. These operations have gone on in times of the so-called thaw with the same vigour as in times of acute crisis. We have the task of ferreting out and "neutralizing" hostile agents and hostile activities that present a common danger to us and to our allies and friends, and we also must keep our allies and friends alerted.

The fact that so many Soviet spy cases have been uncovered recently in several NATO countries is not due to mere chance. It is well that the world should know what the Soviets know already, namely, that the free countries of the world have been developing increasingly sophisticated counterintelligence organizations and have become more and more effective over the years in uncovering Soviet espionage. Naturally, in all of our formal alliances we have a direct interest in the internal security arrangements of countries that may share some of our military secrets. If a NATO document is filched from one of our NATO allies; it is just as harmful to us as if it had been stolen from our own files. Herein

lies one of the pressing reasons for co-operation in counterintelligence work.

No matter how much accurate intelligence it collects or how efficient is its counterintelligence capability, an intelligence service is not fulfilling its purpose unless it can serve a third and extremely important function. This consists of analyzing the intelligence and reaching judgments or estimates on the basis of all information, both overt and secret, available on any subject of importance to the national security. In the United States this process is generally referred to as the production of national estimates, in which all the various U.S. intelligence groups participate under the leadership of the Director of Central Intelligence.

There is one aspect of intelligence work that may seem rather mechanical, but nevertheless presents some very real and practical problems. This is the matter of getting intelligence to its "consumers" in a manner that will ensure prompt and thorough consideration of its implications for policy. At the present time the responsibilities for this procedure have been clearly fixed. I believe this is one of the major improvements realized through the CIA.

#### The President Always Reachable

Arrangements have been made so that the President and other senior officers of government, as required, can be instantly reached by the Director of Central Intelligence or by their own intelligence officers. Experience over the years has proved that this system really works. I don't recall a single instance, during my service as director of the CIA, when I failed to reach the President in a matter of minutes with any item of intelligence I felt was of immediate importance. Today, it is a rare occasion indeed when an important policy decision pertaining to foreign affairs is made without an intelligence estimate first having been submitted covering the essential considerations involved.

These are the things an intelligence service in a free society should do, but there are others it should not do that are equally important to understand. First, as has already been implied, an intelligence service should have a clear understanding of its relation to policy decisions. It should not consider itself a policy-making organization, despite the fact that an intelligence estimate and the conclusions in it may, and often do, have considerable influence on what policy is finally adopted. This proper function of intelligence has given rise to the mistaken charge that intelligence is meddling in policy. If the intelligence officer proposes policy or colours his conclusions in order to influence policy decisions he is acting improperly. Everything in the present mechanism of intelligence reporting and the preparation of estimates guards against this happening.

#### Domestic Security Eschewed

There is another rule which an intelligence service in a free society should follow scrupulously: it should never become involved in domestic security matters. In totalitarian systems the intelligence function is often combined with internal security operations, which include the liquidation of so-called "enemies of the state" at home or abroad. Such was the case with Himmler's Gestapo, the secret police in Japan under the militarists, and the Russian security services under the tsars as well as during the Communist regime. This warped use of the intelligence apparatus and the wide notoriety it has obtained has tended to confuse many people about the true functions of an intelligence service in a free society. Moreover, there have been many instances—most conspicuously in Latin America—in which dictators have converted authentic intelligence services into private gestapos for maintaining their rule.

In this country, under the law, CIA has no police powers what-

soever. It is, however, responsible for the security investigation of its own employees and for the physical security of its own installations. The spheres of operation of the Central Intelligence Agency on the one hand and of the Federal Bureau of Investigation on the other are quite distinct. Naturally, there must always be close co-operation between the two organizations, particularly in the matter of sharing information pertaining to Communist espionage, for such information is acquired both at home and abroad.

Once having clearly in mind the chief functions of intelligence services in the free world, one is able to look at the details—the day-to-day operations of the service—in the proper perspective. But first one should have at least a brief view of the role intelligence has played in history.

## III. INTELLIGENCE IN ITS HISTORICAL SETTING

The history of intelligence activities is probably as old as the rivalries between sovereign nations or communities. So long as there is a need to protect vital interests and to promote the power and welfare of a state or ruler, there is also a need for intelligence. Thus the first instances of its use may be drawn from the earliest recorded events.

Indeed it even has its place in mythology. The god Apollo became enamoured of Cassandra, daughter of Priam of Troy, and bestowed on her the ability to see into the future. With this gift, her intelligence activities were worth more than those of any number of conventional spies, and she turned in accurate "estimates" of the consequences of abducting Helen to Troy and of accepting the "Greek gift" of the Trojan horse. But Apollo, after he had been rebuffed by Cassandra, added the proviso that her prophecies should not be believed. Hence her intelligence forecasts were disregarded. The result was the fall of Troy. While not all intelligence officers have suffered the same fate as Cassandra, it is a commonplace of history that intelligence is all too often disregarded or not even solicited.

#### Moses Sent Forth Spies

The Bible contains accounts of several intelligence operations, one of the earliest of which appears in chapter 13 of Numbers. While Moses was in the wilderness with the Children of Israel, he was directed by the Lord to send a ruler of each of the twelve tribes "to spy out the land of Canaan," which had been designated as their home. Moses gave them instructions to "see the land, what it is; and the people that dwelleth therein, whether they be strong or weak, few or many." And "so they went up, and searched the land." They spent 40 days on their mission and returned bearing grapes and pomegranates and figs as well as the report, "surely it floweth with milk and honey, and this is the fruit of it." But 10 of the 12 members of the mission (Joshua and Caleb dissenting) submitted that the military outlook was bleak, that the Canaanites were "men of a great stature" and "the cities . . . walled and very great." This report so discouraged the Israelites that they "murmured against Moses and against Aaron." The Lord then decreed that because of the little faith that the people had shown in him, they "should wander in the wilderness forty years."

This particular intelligence mission had been doomed from the start, and was obviously simply a means to test the faith of the Israelites. Instead of a few technicians, an unwieldy number of political leaders had been dispatched to do the job. Here was an obvious case of allowing policy makers to impose their prejudices upon the intelligence picture. But after the 40 years had expired a more successful operation took place when Joshua sent out two men to "spy secretly," and they were received in Jericho in the

house of Rahab the harlot (Josh. 2). This is, I believe, the first instance on record of what is now called in the intelligence trade a "safe house." Rahab concealed the spies and got them safely out of the city with their intelligence. The Israelites conquered Jericho "and utterly destroyed it and its people except that Rahab and her family were saved." Thus was established the tradition that those who help the intelligence process should be rewarded.

Throughout ancient history, from Cyrus the Great to Alexander the Great to the Roman Caesars, the effective use of intelligence and espionage was a hallmark of the exploits of a successful military leader. Mithradates VI, the king of Pontus, fought the power of Rome to a standstill in Asia Minor, in part because he had become an outstanding intelligence officer in his own right. He mastered 22 languages and dialects and knew the local tribes and their customs far better than did the Roman conquerors.

During the Middle Ages, due as much to the fragmented political situation as to the difficulties of transportation, supply and mobilization, it was impossible to attain strategic surprise in military campaigns. It took weeks, even months, to assemble an army, and even when the force had been collected, it could move only a few miles a day. Sea-borné expeditions could move somewhat more unobtrusively, but the massing of ships was difficult to conceal. For example, in 1066 King Harold of England had all the essential intelligence long before William the Conqueror landed at Hastings. He had been in Normandy himself and had seen the Norman army in action. He knew that William was planning an attack; he estimated the planned embarkation date and landing place with great accuracy; and, judging by the size of the force he concentrated, he made a very good guess about the number of William's troops. His defeat was not due to strategic intelligence deficiencies. He lost, rather, because his troops were battle-weary, sick and exhausted after a long forced march.

#### Medieval Europe in the Dark

A more organized kind of strategic intelligence collection was needed when western Europeans came into conflict with people outside their own area. They were not very well informed about the Byzantine Empire and the Eastern Slavs; they knew even less of the Muslim world, and they were almost completely ignorant of anything that went on in Central and East Asia. Emperor Frederick II (1212–1250) tried to keep up contacts with Muslim rulers (and was denounced as a heretic for his pains) and Louis IX of France (1226–1270) sent emissaries to the Mongols. Marco Polo's famous book about China contained material that would have been useful for strategic intelligence, but no one looked at it in that light. Throughout most of the Middle Ages Italian merchants did obtain considerable information about the East; unfortunately, they seldom had a chance to pass it on to the people who determined Europe's policies in that direction.

The most serious political mistakes of western Europe in the Middle Ages were made in relation to the East, due in large part to inadequate intelligence collection. European rulers consistently weakened Byzantium, instead of supporting it as a bulwark against invasion. They failed to recognize both the dangers and the opportunities created by the Mongol drive to the west. They underestimated the Turkish threat during the period when the Ottomans were consolidating their power. Given their prejudices, they might have made the same mistakes even if they had had better intelligence support, but without it they had almost no chance of making correct decisions.

In the fifteenth century the Italians made an important contribution to intelligence collection by establishing permanent embassies abroad. The envoys of Venice were especially adept at obtaining strategic intelligence. Many of their reports were of a very high quality, full of accurate observations and shrewd judg-

ments. Not only did permanent embassies provide for this kind of observation, but they also provided bases from which to establish regular networks of espionage. By the sixteenth century, most European governments were following the example of the Italian city-states.

Because map making was an almost unknown art in earlier times, an important item of intelligence was information on local geography. Knowledge of a river ford might allow an army to escape encirclement; discovery of a mountain path could show the way past a strong enemy position. Local inhabitants could usually be induced to give this kind of information, and Louis IX gave a large reward to a Bedouin who showed him where to cross a branch of the Nile, thereby enabling him to stage a surprise attack upon a Muslim army. Louis' son turned a strong defensive position in the Pyrenees by buying information about a little-used route through the mountains. Better known is the incident in the Crécy campaign when Edward III was nearly hemmed in by a large French army. A shepherd showed him a ford across the Somme, and Edward not only escaped pursuit but also obtained such a strong defensive position that he was able to break the French army when it finally attacked.

When European politics became more sophisticated with the rise of nationalism, the first specialists began to appear on the scene—ministers and secretaries of cabinet who devoted much time to organizing the collection of secret information. In England there were Sir Francis Walsingham and Lord Burghley for Queen Elizabeth I, John Thurloe for Cromwell. In France there was a long series of police "lieutenants," running from the days of Louis XIII and Richelieu to Napoleon. The Minister of Police for the latter, the notorious Joseph Fouché, directed political espionage to uncover the plottings of Jacobins, royalists and émigrés both at home and abroad.

Sir Francis Walsingham, who combined diplomacy with espionage in the service of Queen Elizabeth  ${\bf I}$ 

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
One of the great intelligence services of the nineteenth century in Europe was that maintained not by a government, but by a private firm, the banking house of Rothschild. In promoting their employers' financial interests from headquarters in Frankfurt-am-Main, London, Paris, Vienna and Naples, the Rothschild agents were often able to gain vital intelligence before governments did. In 1815, while Europe awaited news of the Battle of Waterloo, Nathan Rothschild in London already knew that the British had been victorious. In order to make a financial killing, he then depressed the market by selling British government securities; those who watched his every move in the market did likewise, concluding that Waterloo had been lost by the British and their allies. At the proper moment he bought back in at the low, and when the news was finally generally known, the value of government securities naturally soared.

#### Disraeli's Suez Coup

Sixty years later Lionel Rothschild, a descendant of Nathan, on one historic evening had Disraeli as his dinner guest. During the meal a secret message came to Lionel that a controlling interest in the Suez Canal Company, owned by the Khedive of Egypt, was for sale. The Prime Minister was intrigued with the idea, but the equivalent of about \$44,000,000 was required to make the purchase. In the absence of Parliament, he could not get it quickly. So Lionel bought the shares for the British government, enabling Disraeli to pull off one of the great coups of his career. It was rumoured that some of the Rothschild "scoops" were obtained by use of carrier pigeons. There was probably little basis for the rumour, although it is true that one of the Rothschilds, immobilized in Paris when the city was surrounded by Germans in the Franco-German War of 1870, used balloons and

Maj. Allan Pinkerton (left), who organized an espionage system for the U.S. during the Civil War, photographed with Pres. Abraham Lincoln and Maj. Gen. J. A. McClernand at the headquarters of the Army of the Potomac in Oct. 1862

United Press International



possibly also carrier pigeons to communicate with the outside world. The world heard of the armistice ending the war through this means, rather than through conventional news channels.

Prussian espionage in the nineteenth century is perhaps the first that can be credited with a mass organization. Previously espionage had made use largely of a few highly-placed individuals. In preparing for the campaigns against both Austria in 1866 and France in 1870, Prussian intelligence, directed by Wilhelm Stieber, enlisted the services of hundreds of low-level informants in the countries Prussia intended to attack.

In United States history, only in wartime has there been much evidence of government intelligence activity, at least until recent times. George Washington fortunately possessed a keen understanding of the value and methods of secret intelligence and of the need for keeping such activities utterly secret-so secret, in fact, that we may never have the full history of his intelligence operations. The most famous incident of American spying (and unsuccessful spying at that) in the Revolution is of course the story of Nathan Hale, but there is some evidence that the unfortunate outcome of this episode is exactly what drew Washington's attention to the need for more professional and dependable secret intelligence operations. Washington's financial accountings show that he spent around \$17,000, a lot of money in those days, on secret intelligence and that one of his main targets, where he kept a complex network of agents and couriers, was the New York area. Many supposed Tories with access to British headquarters there were really secret agents of General Washington. Of the many battles in which intelligence played an important role in the Revolution, the Battle of Saratoga, the turning point of the war, was by far the most outstanding.

#### Civil War Activity

During the Civil War, of course, both sides were intensely engaged in intelligence activities, particularly espionage. A civil war always presents difficult problems for the counterintelligence officer. Each side has little difficulty in finding spies and agents whose speech, appearance, and mode of living are identical with those of the enemy. Almost the only way to uncover a spy under these circumstances is to apprehend him in flagrante.

Nevertheless, just prior to and during the opening phase of the Civil War our federal government had a dearth of organized intelligence facilities. Then certain intelligence and security work was farmed out to the private Pinkerton's National Detective Agency, originally hired only to guard the person of President Lincoln and to run down plots against him and his Cabinet. In the early days of the war, Pinkerton men were also watching nearby Virginia for signs of sabotage, uprisings, and military action that would have isolated and paralyzed the city of Washington. In later years Mr. Pinkerton's agency was to become a famous detective organization in this country, specializing in protection of industrial properties. At that time, however, his men were pinch-hitting in jobs which today are part of the duties of three quite distinct government organizations: the Secret Service (guarding the President), the FBI (dealing with domestic counterespionage), and the CIA (collecting foreign intelligence).

When the United States entered World War I, initially it had to rely largely on the French and British for tactical and strategic intelligence. But we learned rapidly—due largely to a group of officers to whom I wish to pay tribute. There was, first of all, Colonel Ralph H. Van Deman, who is considered by many to be the moving force in establishing a U.S. military intelligence. His work is described in what I consider the best account by an American author of intelligence services through the ages, The Story of Secret Service, by Richard Wilmer Rowan. I worked personally with Colonel Van Deman in World War I when I was in Bern, and I can attest to the effective work that he and his

successors, General Dennis E. Nolan and General Marlborough Churchill, performed in establishing the basis for our military intelligence today.

The British and French, the Germans, and later the Italians, entered World War II with highly developed secret intelligence organizations in addition to military intelligence services. During the war years when I was with the OSS, I had the privilege of working with the British service and developed close personal and professional relationships which remained intact after the war. In Switzerland I made contact with a group of French officers who were helping to build the intelligence service of De Gaulle and the Free French. Near the end of the war, cooperation was established with a branch of the Italian Secret Service that declared allegiance to King Victor Emmanuel when non-Fascist Italy joined the Allied cause. Through much of the war, I was also working secretly with the anti-Nazi group in the German Abwehr, the professional intelligence service of the German army. This group was involved in secret plots against Hitler. The head of the Abwehr, the extraordinary Admiral Canaris, was executed by Hitler after records were discovered proving that Canaris had co-operated with those who made the unsuccessful attempt on Hitler's life on July 20, 1944.

#### Legacy of World War II Work

This wartime co-operation with the intelligence services of the Free world has contributed, I believe, towards creating a certain unity of purpose among them today. NATO, SEATO, and other security communities are examples of present-day cooperation, needed to help the Free world counter the espionage activities and Cold War tactics of the intelligence and security services of the Soviet Union.

Essential to any discussion of the history of intelligence is a consideration of the Soviet service, which is one of the most tightly structured organizations of its kind in the world. It has just celebrated its 45th anniversary with what, for the Soviets, was a good deal of fanfare, considering their usual reticence on this subject. On December 20, 1962, an article appeared in Pravda written by the present Chief of Soviet State Security (K.G.B.), M. Semichastniy, which opened with the words, "Forty-five years ago today, at the initiative of Vladimir Ilitch Lenin . . ." and went on to describe the founding of the first Soviet security body, the Cheka, in 1917, and to summarize the ups and downs of 45 years of Soviet police history. While the purpose of the article was no doubt to improve the public image of this justly feared and hated institution, its importance to the foreign observer lay in the tacit admission that despite changes of name and of leadership, the Soviets really view this organization as having a definite and unbroken continuity since the day of its founding.

#### Dual Totalitarian Services

Most totalitarian countries have, in the course of time, developed not just one but two intelligence services with quite distinct functions, even though the work of these services may occasionally overlap. One of these organizations is a military intelligence service run by the general staff and responsible for collecting military and technical information abroad. In the U.S.S.R. this military organization is called the G.R.U. (Intelligence Directorate). G.R.U. officers working out of the Soviet Embassy in Ottawa operated the atomic spy networks in Canada during World War II. The other service, which more typically represents an exclusive development of a totalitarian state, is the "security" service. Generally such a service has its origin in a secret police force devoted to internal affairs such as the repression of dissidents and the protection of the regime. Gradually this organization expands outward, thrusting into neighbouring areas

for "protective" reasons, and finally spreads out over the globe as a full-fledged foreign intelligence service and much more.

Since this security service is primarily the creation of the clique or party in power, it will always be more trusted by political leaders than is the military intelligence service, and it will usually seek to dominate and control the military service, if not to absorb it. In Nazi Germany the "Reich Security Office," under Himmler, during 1944 completely took over its military counterpart, the Abwehr. In 1947, the security and military services in Soviet Russia were combined—with the former dominant—but the merger lasted only a year. In 1958, however, Khrushchev placed one of his most trusted security chiefs, General Ivan Serov, in charge of the G.R.U., apparently in order to keep an eye on it.

But whether or not the security service of a totalitarian state succeeds in gaining control of the military service, it inevitably becomes the more powerful organization. Furthermore, its functions, both internal and external, far exceed those of the intelligence services of free societies. Today, the Soviet State Security Service (K.G.B.) is the eyes and ears of the Soviet state abroad as well as at home. It is a multipurpose, clandestine arm of power that can in the last analysis carry out almost any act that the Soviet leadership assigns to it. It is more than a secret police organization, more than an intelligence and counterintelligence organization. It is an instrument for subversion, manipulation and violence, for secret intervention in the affairs of other countries. It is an aggressive arm of Soviet ambitions in the Cold War. If the Soviets send astronauts to the moon, I expect that a K.G.B. officer will accompany them.

#### Tsarist Secret Police

Secret police were not invented by the Soviets, and even the foreign operations of the K.G.B. have precedents in Russian history. The purpose of the tsars' Okhrana was to "protect" the Imperial family and its regime. In this capacity it kept watch on the Russian populace by means of armies of informants, and once even distinguished itself by tailing the venerable Leo Tolstoi around Russia. Tolstoi had long since become a world-renowned literary figure, but to the Okhrana he was only a retired army lieutenant and a "suspect."

In the late nineteenth century there were so many Russian revolutionaries, radical students and *émigrés* outside Russia that the Okhrana could not hope to keep Imperial Russia secure merely by suppressing the voices of revolution at home. It had to cope with dangerous voices from abroad. It sent agents to join, penetrate and provoke the organizations of Russian students and revolutionaries in western Europe, to incite, demoralize, steal documents, and discover the channels by which illegal literature was being smuggled into Russia. When Lenin was in Prague in 1912, he unknowingly harboured an Okhrana agent in his household. The primary reason for secret police operations abroad is to neutralize the political opposition of its own nationals in exile; although the Okhrana generally limited itself to this mission, Soviet state security has not.

No sooner had the Bolsheviks seized power in Russia than they established their own secret police. The Cheka was set up under Feliks Dzerzhiński in December 1917 as a security force with executive powers. The name stood for "Extraordinary Commissions against Counter-Revolution and Sabotage." The Cheka was a militant, terroristic police force that ruthlessly liquidated civilians on the basis of denunciations and suspicion of bourgeois origins. It followed the Red armies in their conflicts with the White Russian forces, and operated as a kind of counterespionage organization in areas where sovietization had not yet been accomplished. In 1921 it established a foreign arm, because by that time White Russian soldiers and civilian opponents of the

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Bolsheviks who could manage to do so had fled to western Europe and the Middle and Far East and were seeking to strike back against the Bolsheviks from abroad.

Almost at once this foreign arm of Soviet security had a much bigger job than ever confronted the tsar's Okhrana. It had not only to penetrate and neutralize the Russian exile organizations that were conspiring against the Soviets, but also to discover and guard against the hostile acts of those Western powers anxious to see the downfall of the Bolsheviks. It thus became a political intelligence service with a militant mission. In order to achieve its aims, it engaged in violence and brutality, in kidnapping and murder, both at home and abroad. This activity was directed not only against the "enemies of the state" but against fellow Bolsheviks who were considered untrustworthy or burdensome. In Paris in 1926 the Soviet security murdered General Petliura, the exiled leader of the Ukrainian nationalists. In 1930, again in Paris, it kidnapped General Kutepov, the leader of the White Russian war veterans; in 1937, the same fate befell his successor, General Miller. For over a decade Leon Trotski, who had gone into exile in 1929, was the prime assassination target of Stalin. On August 21, 1940, the old revolutionist died in Mexico City after being slashed with an Alpine climber's ice ax by an agent of Soviet security.

Lest anyone think that these violent acts against exiles who opposed or broke with the Bolsheviks in the early days were merely manifestations of the rough-and-tumble era of early Soviet history or of Stalin's personal vengefulness, it should be pointed out that in the subsequent era of so-called "socialist legality," which was proclaimed by Khrushchev in 1956, a later generation of exiled leaders was wiped out. The only difference between the earlier and later crops of political murders lay in the subtlety and efficacy of the murder weapons. The mysterious deaths in Munich, in 1957 and 1959, of Lev Rebet and Stephen Bandera, leaders of the Ukrainian émigrés, were managed with a cyanide spray that killed almost instantaneously. This method was so effective that, in Rebet's case, it was long thought that he had died of a heart attack. The truth became known only when the K.G.B. agent Bogdan Stashinskiy gave himself up to the German police in 1961 and acknowledged that

he had perpetrated both the killings.

In 1922, the Cheka became the G.P.U. (State Political Administration), which in 1934 became part of the N.K.V.D. (People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs). This was a consolidation which finally brought together under one ministry all police, security and intelligence bodies-secret, overt, domestic and foreign. As the foreign arm of Soviet security was expanding into a world-wide espionage and political action organization, the domestic arm grew into a monster. It is said that under Stalin one out of every five Soviet citizens was reporting to it. In addition, it exercised control over the entire border militia, had an internal militia of its own, ran all the prisons and labour camps, and had become the watchdog over the government and over the Communist party itself. Its most frightening power as an internal secret police lay in its authority to arrest, condemn and liquidate at the behest of the dictator, his henchmen or even on its own cognizance, without any recourse to legal judgment or control by any other organ of government.

During the war years and afterward the colossus of the N.K.V.D. was split up, reconsolidated, split up again, reconsolidated again, and finally split up once more into two separate organizations. The M.G.B., now K.G.B., was made responsible for external espionage and high-level internal security; the other retained all policing functions not directly concerned with state security at the higher levels and was called the M.V.D. (Ministry of Internal Affairs).

Obviously, any clandestine arm that can so permeate and control public life—even in the upper echelons of power—must be kept under the absolute control of the dictator. Thus, it must occasionally be purged and weakened to keep it from swallowing up everything, the dictator included. The history of Soviet state security, under its various names, exhibits many cycles of growing strength and subsequent purge, of consolidation and of splintering, of rashes of political murders carried out by it and similar rashes against it. After the demise of any leader who had exploited it to keep himself in power, the service had to be cut back to size. Stalin used the O.G.P.U. to enforce collectivization and liquidate the kulaks during the early thirties, and the N.K.V.D. during the mid-thirties to wipe out all the people he



Wide World
Body of Joseph Stalin lying in state
in Moscow in March 1953. Stalin, now
repudiated by the Soylet government,
was honoured by a line of mourners
that stretched for ten miles, 16
abreast

did not trust or like in the party, the army and the government. Then in 1937 he purged the instrument of liquidation itself. Its chiefs and leading officers knew too much about his crimes, and their power was second only to his. By 1953, after the death of Stalin, the Security service was again strong enough to become a dominant force in the struggle for power, and the so-called "collective leadership" felt they would not be safe until they had liquidated its leader, Lavrenti Beria, and cleaned out his henchmen.

In Khrushchev's now-famous address to the 20th congress of the Communist party in 1956, in which he exposed the crimes of Stalin, the main emphasis was on those crimes Stalin had committed through the N.K.V.D. This speech not only served to open Khrushchev's attack on Stalinism and the Stalinists still in the regime, but was also intended to justify new purges of existing state security organs, which he had to bring under his control in order to strengthen his own position as dictator. Anxious to give both the Soviet public and the outside world the impression that the new era of "socialist legality" was dawning, Khrushchev subsequently took various steps to wipe out the image of the security service as a repressive executive body. Once again, a change of name was in order. Khrushchev announced on September 3, 1962, that the Ministry of Internal Affairs (M.V.D.) was now to be called the Ministry of Public Law and Order. Just what this new ministry would do he did not clarify, although he did promise that no more trials would be held in which Soviet citizens were condemned in secret.

#### New Soviet Controls

But internal control systems still exist, even though in new forms. For example, under the terms of a decree published on November 28, 1962, an elaborate control system has been established which, to quote the *New York Times* (November 29, 1962), "would make every worker in every job a watchman over the implementation of party and government directives." In commenting on the decree *Pravda* made reference to earlier poor controls over "faking, pilfering, bribing and bureaucracy" and asserted that the new system would be a "sharp weapon" against them, as well as against "red tape and misuse of authority" and "squanderers of the national wealth." The new watchdog agency is called the Committee of Party and State Control.

With so many informers operating against such broad categories of crimes and misdemeanors, it should be possible to put almost anyong in jail at any time. And indeed the press has been full of reports recently that courts in the Soviet Union have been handing down death or long prison sentences for many offenses that in the United States would be only minor crimes or misdemeanours. It should also be noted that Aleksandr N. Shelepin, who was designated by the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. to be the head of this new control agency, once served as head of the Soviet State Security Service (K.G.B.), having succeeded General Ivan Serov in 1958.

But all these shake-ups, purges and organizational changes seem to have had remarkably little effect on the aims, methods and capabilities of that part of the Soviet security service which interests us most—its foreign arm. Throughout its 45 years it has accumulated an enormous fund of knowledge and experience: techniques that have been amply tested as to their suitability in furthering its aims in various parts of the world, and files of intelligence information kept intact through all the political power struggles. It has in its ranks intelligence officers (those who survived the purges) of 20 to 30 years' experience. It has on its rosters disciplined, experienced agents and informants spread throughout the world, many of whom have been active since the 1930s. And it has a tradition that goes all the way back to tsarist days.

In their attempts to evade detection and capture by the Okhrana, the Russian revolutionaries of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries developed the conspiratorial techniques that later stood the Soviets in such good stead. The complicated and devious tricks of concealing and passing messages, of falsifying documents, of using harmless intermediaries between suspect parties so as not to expose one to the other or allow both to be seen together—these were all survival techniques developed after bitter encounters with and many losses at the hands of the tsar's police. When the Soviets later founded their own secret police, these were the tricks they taught their agents to enable them to evade the police of other countries. Even the very words used by the Bolsheviks in their illegal days before 1917 as a kind of private slang became, with time, the terms in official use within the Soviet intelligence service.

A brief look at the end product of this tradition, the Soviet intelligence officer, should provide a fitting close to a history of intelligence work. To many he represents the culmination of centuries of the development of the breed. To my mind he represents the species *Homo Sovieticus* in its unalloyed and most successful form—this strikes me as much the most important thing about him, more important than his characteristics as a practitioner of the intelligence craft. It is as if he were the human end product of the Soviet system, the Soviet mentality refined to the *n*th degree.

He is blindly and unquestioningly dedicated to the cause, at least at the outset. He has been fully indoctrinated in the political and philosophical beliefs of communism and in the basic "morality" which proceeds from those beliefs. This morality holds that the ends alone count, and that any means that achieve them are justified. Since the ingrained Soviet approach to the problems of life and politics is entirely conspiratorial, it is no surprise that this approach finds its ultimate fulfillment in intelligence work.

#### Soviet Operative Ranks High

The Soviet intelligence officer throughout his career is subject to a rigid discipline. As one man put it, he "has graduated from an iron school." On the one hand, he belongs to an elite; he has privilege and power of a very special kind. He may ostensibly be an embassy chauffeur, but in truth his rank may be higher than that of the ambassador and he may possess more of the kind of power that really counts. At the same time, neither rank nor seniority nor past achievement will protect him if he makes a mistake. When a Soviet intelligence officer is detected or his agents are caught through an oversight on his part, he can expect demotion or dismissal, even prison.

It is no surprise, then, that the Soviet intelligence officer himself acquires a harsh, merciless attitude. There is no better example of this than the story told about one of Stalin's intelligence chiefs, General V. S. Abakumov. During the war, Abakumov's sister was picked up somewhere in Russia on a minor blackmarketing charge, or "speculation." In view of her close connection to a man as powerful as Abakumov, the police officials making the arrest sent a message to him asking how he would like the case handled. They fully expected that he would request the charges be dropped. Instead, he is reliably reported to have written on the memorandum that had been sent him: "Why do you ask me? Don't you know your duty? Speculation during wartime is treason. Shoot her."

Abakumov met the fate of many Soviet intelligence officers after the death of Stalin and the liquidation of Beria. By that time he was in charge of the internal section of Soviet security and controlled the files on members of the government and of the party. Abakumov was secretly executed and his entire section was decimated under the Malenkov regime. They knew too much.

Despite certain relaxations in the public life of Khrushchev's Russia today, the "terror" still holds sway within Soviet intelligence itself; this arm of Soviet power cannot relax, cannot be allowed any weakness.

The Soviet citizen usually does not apply for a job in the intelligence service. He is spotted and chosen. Bright young men in various positions, be it in foreign affairs, economics or the sciences, are proposed for intelligence work by their superiors in the party. To pass muster they must themselves be either party members, candidates for party membership, or members of the Komsomols, the Communist youth organization for the older age groups. They must come from what appears to be an impeccable political background, which means that there can be no "bourgeois taint" to them or any record of deviation or dissent among their immediate family or forebears.

An ambitious young man who is able to make his career in one of the branches of intelligence service is fortunate by Soviet standards. His selection for this duty raises him to the ranks of the "New Class," the nobility of the new Russia. His prestige equals and often surpasses that of the military officer. He receives material rewards much above those given the similar ranks of government bureaucracy in other departments. He has opportunities for travel open to few Soviet citizens. Further, a career of this kind can lead to high political office and important rank in the Communist party.

But the Soviet security service suffers from the same fundamental weakness as does Soviet bureaucracy and Communist society generally—indifference to the individual and his feelings. This indifference results in frequent lack of recognition for personal service, improper assignments, frustrated ambition and unfair punishment—all of which breed in a Soviet, as in any man, loss of initiative, passivity, disgruntlement, and even disillusionment. Furthermore, service in the Soviet bureaucracy does not foster independent thought and the qualities of leadership. The average Soviet official, in the intelligence service as elsewhere, balks at assuming responsibility or risking his career. There is an ingrained tendency to perform tasks "by the book," to conform, to pass the bureaucratic buck if things go wrong.

Most important, every time the Soviets send an intelligence officer abroad they risk his exposure to the very systems he is dedicated to destroy. If for any reason he has become disillusioned or dissatisfied, his contact with the Western world often works as the catalyst that starts the process of disaffection. A steadily growing number of Soviet intelligence officers has been coming over to our side, proving that Soviet intelligence is by no means as monolithic and invulnerable as it wishes the world to believe.

#### IV. INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION

The collection of foreign intelligence is accomplished in a variety of ways, not all of them mysterious or even difficult to understand. This is particularly true of overt intelligence which is information derived from newspapers, books, learned and technical publications, official reports of government proceedings, radio and television. Even a novel or a play may contain useful information about the state of a nation.

The two main sources of overt intelligence in the Soviet Union are, of course, the newspapers *Izvestia* and *Pravda*, which translate into "News" and "Truth." The former is an organ of the government and the latter of the party. There are also "little" *Izvestias* and *Pravdas* throughout Russia. A wit once suggested that in *Izvestia* there is no news and in *Pravda* there is no truth. This is a fairly accurate statement, but it is, nevertheless, of real interest to know what they publish and what they ignore, and what turn they give to embarrassing developments that they are

obliged to publish.

It is, for example, illuminating to compare the published text of Khrushchev's extemporaneous remarks in Soviet media with what he actually said. His now-famous remark to Western diplomats at a Polish Embassy reception in Moscow on November 18, 1956, "We will bury you," was not quoted thusly in the Soviet press reports, even though it was overheard by many. The state press apparently has the right to censor Premier Khrushchev, presumably with his approval. Later, of course, the remark caught up with Khrushchev and he gave a lengthy and somewhat mollifying interpretation of it. How and why a story is twisted is thus at least as interesting as the actual content. Often there is one version for domestic consumption, another for the other Communist bloc countries and still other versions for different foreign countries. There are times when the "fairy stories" that Communist regimes tell their own people are indicative of new vulnerabilities and new fears.

The collection of overt foreign information by the United States is largely the business of the State Department, with other government departments co-operating in accordance with their own needs. The CIA has an interest in the "product" and shares in collection, selection and translation. Obviously, to collect such intelligence on a world-wide basis is a colossal job, but the work is well organized and the burden equitably shared. The monitoring of foreign radio broadcasts that might be of interest to us is one of the biggest parts of the job. In the Iron Curtain countries alone, millions of words are spewed out over the air every day; most of the broadcasts originate in Moscow and Peking, some directed to domestic audiences and others beamed abroad.

#### Trained Analysts Needed

All overt information is grist for the intelligence mill. It is there for the getting, but large numbers of trained personnel are required to sort and cull it in order to find the grain of wheat in the mountains of chaff. For example, in the fall of 1961 we were forewarned by a few hours of the Soviet intention to resume atomic testing, by means of a vague news item transmitted by Radio Moscow for publication in a provincial Soviet journal. A young lady at a remote listening post spotted this item, analyzed it correctly, and relayed it to Washington immediately. Vigilance and perceptiveness succeeded in singling out one significant piece of intelligence from the mountains of deadly verbiage that have to be listened to daily.

In countries that are free, where the press is free and the publication of political and scientific information is not hampered by the government, the collection of overt intelligence is of particular value and is of direct use in the preparation of our intelligence estimates. Since we are that kind of a country ourselves, we are subject to this kind of collection. The Soviets pick up some of their most valuable information about us from our publications, particularly from our technical and scientific journals. published transcripts of congressional hearings and the like. A recent defector from the Polish diplomatic mission in Washington has told us that his embassy is assigned the task of collecting this literature for Moscow's use. There is no problem in acquiring it. The Soviets simply want to spare themselves the effort in order to be able to devote their time to more demanding tasks; also, they feel that a Polish collection agent is likely to have less trouble than a Russian in picking up the required material.

Information is also collected in the ordinary course of conducting official relations with a foreign power. This is not overt in the sense that it is available to anyone who reads the papers or listens to the radio. Indeed, the success of diplomatic negotiations calls for a certain measure of secrecy. But information

derived from diplomatic meetings is made available to the intelligence service for the preparation of estimates. Such information may contain facts, slants and hints that are significant, especially when coupled with intelligence from other sources. If the Foreign Minister of X hesitates to accept a United States offer on Monday, it may be that he is seeing the Soviets on Tuesday. Later, from an entirely different quarter, we may get a glimpse into the Soviet offer. Together these two items will probably have much more meaning than either would have had alone.

The effort of overt collection is broad and massive. It tries to miss nothing that is readily available and might be of use. Yet there may be some subjects on which the government urgently needs information that are not covered by such material. Or, this material may lack sufficient detail, may be inconclusive, or may not be completely trustworthy. Naturally, this is more often the case in a closed society. We cannot depend on the Soviets making public, either intentionally or inadvertently, what our government wants to know; only what they wish us to believe. When they do give out official information, it cannot always be trusted. Published statistics may credit a five-year plan with great success; economic intelligence from inside informants shows that the plan failed in certain respects and that the ruble statistics given were not a true index of values. Photographs may be doctored, or even faked, as was the famous Soviet publicity picture of the junk heap designated as the downed U-2. The rocket in the Red Army Day parade, witnessed and photographed by Western newsmen and military attachés, may be a dud, an assemblage of odd rocket parts that do not really constitute a working missile. As easy as it is to collect overt intelligence, it is equally easy to plant deception within it. For all these reasons clandestine intelligence collection (espionage) must remain an essential and basic activity of intelligence.

Clandestine intelligence collection is chiefly a matter of circumventing obstacles in order to reach an objective. Our side chooses the objective. The opponent has set up the obstacles. Usually he knows which objectives are most important to us, and he surrounds these with appropriately difficult obstacles. For example, when the Soviets started testing their missiles, they chose launching sites in their most remote and inapproachable waste-

lands. The more closed and rigid the control a government has over its people, the more obstacles there are. In our time this means that U.S. intelligence must delve for the intentions and capabilities of a nation pledged to secrecy and organized for deception, whose key installations may be buried a thousand miles off the beaten track.

In this particular situation our government determines what the objectives are and what information it needs, without regard to the obstacles. It also establishes priorities among these objectives according to their relative urgency. ICBMs will take priority over steel production. Whether or not the Soviet Union would go to war over Laos will take priority over the political shading of a new regime in the Middle East. Only after priority has been established is the question of obstacles examined. If the information can be obtained by overt collection or in the ordinary course of diplomatic work, the intelligence service will not be asked to devote to the task its limited assets for clandestine collection. But if it is decided that secret intelligence must do the job, then it is usually because serious obstacles are known to surround the target.

#### Free and Denied Areas

In the eyes of Western intelligence, the world is divided into two kinds of places—"free areas" and "denied areas." Its major targets lie in the denied areas, that is, behind the Iron and Bamboo curtains, and are comprised of the military, technical and industrial installations—the capabilities—that constitute the backbone of Chino-Soviet power. Also among the major targets are the plans of the people who guide the Soviet Union and Communist China—their intentions concerning warfare and their "peaceful" political intentions. All information about such targets is called "positive intelligence."

The Berlin Wall not only shut off the two halves of a politically divided city from each other and severely limited the number of East Germans escaping to the West. It also was supposed to plug one of the last big gaps in the Iron Curtain, the barrier of barbed wire, land mines, observation towers, mobile patrols and "sanitized" border areas that zigzags southward from the Baltic. The erection of the Berlin Wall is intended to be the final



United Press International
Official Soviet photograph of what was
represented as the wreckage of the
U-2 plane piloted by Francis Gary
Powers, shot down over Soviet territory in May 1960. It was a pile of
junk assembled for public viewing,
rather than the actual plane

#### THE CRAFT OF INTELLIGENCE

step in sealing off eastern Europe, a process that took 16 years to accomplish. Yet it is still possible to get under or over, around or even through the barrier of the Iron Curtain. It is just the first of a series of obstacles. Behind that first wall are segregated and restricted areas and, behind these, the walls of institutional and personal secrecy. This combination protects everything the Soviet state believes could reveal either its strengths or weaknesses to the inquisitive West.

Clandestine collection uses people: "agents," "sources," "informants." It may also use machines, for there are machines today that can do things human beings cannot do and can "see" things they cannot see. Since the opponent would try to stop this effort if he could locate and reach it, it is carried out in secret; thus we speak of it as clandestine collection. The traditional word for it is espionage.

The essence of espionage is access. Someone, or some device, has to get close enough to a thing, a place or a person to observe or discover the desired facts without arousing the attention of those who protect them. The information must then be delivered to the people who want it. It must move quickly or it may get "stale." And it must not get lost or be intercepted en route.


At its simplest, espionage is nothing more than a kind of well-concealed reconnaissance. This suffices when a brief look at the target is all that is needed. The agent makes his way to an objective, observes it, then comes back and reports what he saw. The target is usually fairly large and easily discernible—such things as troop dispositions, fortifications or airfields. Perhaps the agent also can make his way into a closed installation and have a look around, or even make off with documents. In any case, the length of his stay is limited. Continuous reportage is impossible to maintain because the agent's presence in the area is secret and illegal.

#### Technical Know-How Required

Behind the Iron Curtain today, this method of spying is hardly adequate. Not because the obstacles are so formidable that they cannot be breached, but because the kind of man who is equipped by his training to breach them is not likely to have the technical knowledge that will enable him to make a useful report on the complex targets that exist nowadays. If you don't know anything about nuclear reactors there is little you can discover about one, even when you are standing right next to it. And even for the rare person who might be competent in both fields, just getting close to such a target is hardly enough to fulfill today's intelligence requirements. What is needed is a thorough examination of the actual workings of the reactor. For this reason it is unrealistic to think that U.S. or other Western tourists in the Soviet Union can be of much use in intelligence collection. But for propaganda reasons, the Soviets continue to arrest tourists now and then in order to give the world the impression that U.S. espionage is a vast effort exploiting even the innocent traveler.

Of far more long-term value than reconnaissance is "penetration" by an agent, meaning that he somehow is able to get inside the target and stay there. One of the ways of going about this is for the agent to insinuate himself into the offices or the elite circles of another power by means of subterfuge. He is then in a position to elicit the desired information from persons who come to trust him and who are entirely unaware of his true role. In popular parlance, this operation is called a "plant."

The plant is a tried and true method of espionage. In our own history we have the example, in Revolutionary War days, of the adroit British spy, Dr. Edward Bancroft, who was born in the Colonies and who successfully wormed his way into the employ and confidence of Benjamin Franklin. In 1776 Franklin was negotiating in Paris for French aid for the Colonies. Professing



Culver Pictures, Inc.

Benjamin Franklin dictating to Edward Bancroft, the trusted secretary-assistant who was an espionage agent for Britain during the Revolution

loyalty to the American cause, Bancroft worked as Franklin's secretary and assistant for little pay. His real mission was to report to George III's government on Franklin's progress with the French. He passed his messages to the British Embassy in Paris by depositing them in a bottle hidden in the hollow root of a tree in the Tuileries Gardens. Whenever he had more information than could be fitted into the bottle, or when he needed new directives from the British, he simply paid a visit to London—with Franklin's blessing—for he persuaded Franklin that he could pick up valuable information for the Americans in London. The British obligingly supplied him with what we today call "chicken feed," misleading information prepared for the opponents' consumption.

To deflect possible suspicion of their agent, the British once even arrested Bancroft as he was leaving England, an action intended to impress Franklin with his bona fides and with the dangers to which his devotion to the American cause exposed him. Everything depended, of course, on the acting ability of Dr. Bancroft, which was so effective that when Franklin was later presented with evidence of Bancroft's duplicity he refused to believe it. Even as wise and able a diplomat as Franklin could be fooled by a spy whose credentials rested on his own claims.

A penetration of this kind is predicated upon a show of outer loyalties, which are often not put to the test. Nor are they easily tested, especially when opponents share a common language and background. Today, when the lines that separate one nation from another are so sharply drawn with respect to basic outlook and frame of reference, the dissembling of loyalties is more difficult to maintain over a long period of time and under close scrutiny. It can be managed, though. One of the most notorious Soviet espionage operations before and during World War II was the Sorge network in the Far East. The agents of Richard Sorge, a German Communist, provided the Soviets with top-level information on Japan's military planning. Although the network was primarily directed against Japanese targets, Sorge himself made it his business to cultivate his fellow countrymen

at the German Embassy in Tokyo. Eventually he succeeded in having himself appointed press attachézhere. This not only gave him excellent cover—and diplomatic immunity—but also provided him with additional information about the Nazis' conduct of the war and their relations with Japan.

To achieve this, Sorge had to play the part of the good Nazī, which he apparently did convincingly. The Gestapo chief in the embassy, as well as the ambassador and the service attachés, were all his friends. Had the Gestapo in Berlin ever investigated Sorge's past, as it eventually did after Sorge was apprehended by the Japanese in 1942, it would have discovered that Sorge had been a Communist agent and agitator in Germany during the early 1920s.

#### Soviet Espionage in the West

Shortly thereafter, we were being subjected to similar treatment at the hands of Soviet espionage. Names such as Bruno Pontecorvo and Klaus Fuchs come to mind as agents who were unmasked after the war. In some such cases records of previous Communist affiliations lay in the files of Western security and intelligence services, even while the agents held responsible positions in the West, but they were not found until, it was too late. Because physicists like Fuchs and Pontecorvo moved from job to job among the allied countries—one year in Great Britain, another in Canada and another in the United States—and because the scientific laboratories of the Allies were working under great pressures, investigations of personnel with credentials from Allied countries were not always conducted as thoroughly as in the case of U.S. citizens. And when available

Richard Sorge, German newspaperman who used his position as press attaché in Tokyo to organize a spy ring for Soviet Russia

Wide World





Camera Press-Pix from Publix

Italian atomic scientist Bruno Pontecorvo, who left his top-secret post at Britain's Harwell Research establishment in 1950 and flew to the U.S.S.R. This photograph was taken at one of his rare public appearances in Moscow

records were consulted, the data found in them—particularly if of Nazi origin—seem often to have been discounted at a time when Russia was our ally and Hitler our enemy, and when the war effort required the technical services of gifted scientists.

The consequences of these omissions and oversights during the turbulent war years are regrettable, and the lesson will not easily be forgotten. We cannot afford any more Fuchses or Pontecorvos. Today, investigation of persons seeking employment in sensitive areas of the U.S. government and related technical installations is justifiably thorough and painstaking.

An agent who performs as a plant in our time must have more going for him than acting ability; he can succeed only if there is no record of his ever having been something other than what he represents himself to be. The only way to disguise a man today so that he will be acceptable in hostile circles for any length of time is to make him over entirely. This involves years of training and a thorough concealing and burying of the past under layers of fictitious personal history which have to be "backstopped." An agent made over in this fashion is referred to as an "illegal."

If you were really born in Finland, but are supposed to have been born in Munich, Germany, then you must have documents showing your connection to that city. You have to be able to act like someone who was born and lived there. Arrangements have to be made in Munich in order to confirm your origin there in case you are ever investigated. In most Western countries the lax procedures involved in issuing duplicates of most vital statistics—birth certificates, records of marriage, death, etc.—make it relatively easy for hostile intelligence services to procure valid documents for "papering" their agents. The Soviets have frequently taken advantage of this fact, and it would certainly be



Klaus Fuchs (left), scientist member of the ring that fed atomic secrets to Soviet Rússia, arriving at an East German airport after his release from a British prison

in our interest to tighten up this laxity.

The Soviet "illegal" may be a Soviet national or a native of almost any country in the world. His actual origin is of no great importance, since it is completely buried under a new nationality and a new identity. A national chosen for such work will be sent to live abroad for as many years as it takes him to perfect his knowledge of the language and way of life of the other country. He may even acquire citizenship in the adopted country. But during this whole period he has absolutely no intelligence mission. He does nothing that would arouse suspicion. When he has become sufficiently acclimatized, he returns to the Soviet Union where he is trained and documented for his intelligence mission. tested for his loyalties and eventually dispatched to the target country, which may be the same one he has learned to live in, or a different one. It matters little, for the main thing is that he is unrecognizable as a Soviet or eastern European. He is a German or a Scandinavian or a South American. His papers show it, and so do his speech and his manners.

#### The Case of Gordon Lonsdale

Gordon Lonsdale, the "Canadian" who was caught in London in early 1961 as the leading figure in an extensive Soviet spy ring, was a Russian whose Canadian identity had been carefully built up over many years. Here the Soviets used their "illegal" not to work in Canada, where he would have been much more exposed to accidental encounters with people from his "home town," but in England, where, as a Canadian, he would be quite acceptable and would be unlikely to become the subject of much curiosity about the details of his background.

Because they have almost perfect camouflage and are consequently immensely difficult to locate, "illegals" constitute the gravest security hazards to countries against which they are

working. There is every evidence that the Soviets have been turning out such "illegals" at an accelerated rate since the end of World War II. Generally, they are used in a supervisory capacity, for directing espionage networks, rather than for penetration jobs that increase the danger of discovery. Lonsdale was such a man, and so was Rudolf Abel, who masqueraded in Brooklyn as a photographer and who, after his conviction as a spy, was exchanged for the downed U-2 pilot, Francis Gary Powers, in 1962.

An alternative procedure to attempting to place one's own agent within a highly sensitive foreign target is to find somebody who is already there and recruit him. This technique must be adapted to suit each case. The main thing is to find an insider who is willing to co-operate and who also is "cleared" and qualified in his position. Often, however, such a person is not quite at the right spot to have access to the information you need. Or you might have to settle for someone just beginning a career that will eventually lead to his employment in the area of the target. Some maneuvering and manipulation is needed to get your man, who is more or less an amateur in espionage, in the place where he can acquire the information without arousing suspicion.

Most of the notorious instances of Soviet penetration of important targets in Western countries were made possible by the recruitment of someone already employed inside the target. David Greenglass, although only a draftsman at Los Alamos during World War II, had access to secret details of the internal construction of the atomic bomb. Judith Coplon, while employed in a section of the Department of Justice responsible for the registration of foreign agents in the United States, regularly copied FBI reports crossing her desk concerning investigations of espionage in the United States. Joseph Scarbeck was only an administrative officer in our embassy in Warsaw, but after he had been trapped by a female Polish agent and blackmailed, he managed to procure for the Polish intelligence service (operating under Soviet direction) some of our ambassador's secret reports





David Greenglass, former U.S. army technician who was convicted as a member of the Rosenberg atomic spy ring, in custody of a U.S. deputy marshal after his arraignment in June 1950

to the State Department on the political situation in eastern Europe. In Britain, Frederick Houghton and John Vassall, although of low rank and engaged chiefly in administrative work, were able to procure classified technical information from the Admiralty. Alfred Frenzel, a West German parliamentarian, had access to NATO documents distributed to a West German parliamentary defense committee on which he served. Heinz Felfe, in the West German intelligence service, whose case is still pending in the German courts, had plenty of opportunity to pass valuable information to the Soviets during the years he was progressing up the ladder as a promising young intelligence expert.

#### In "Interesting" Jobs

All of these people, at the time they were recruited, were already employed in some job that made them interesting to the Communists because of their positions of natural access. In some cases, they later moved up into jobs that increased their value to the Soviets, and these transfers may in some instances have been achieved under secret guidance from the Soviets. Houghton and Vassall were both recruited while stationed at British embassies behind the Iron Curtain. When each returned home and was assigned to a position in the Admiralty, his access to important documents and other information naturally was broadened. Similarly, had Scarbeck not been caught as a result of careful counterintelligence efforts while still at his post in Warsaw, he probably would have been of ever-increasing use to the Soviets as he was reassigned to one United States diplomatic post after another over the years.

In this kind of espionage operation, then, the first step is the most crucial. Everything depends upon the ability to "spot" the

right person—the one who is vulnerable—inside the target, to reach him without being apprehended, to persuade him to cooperate, to continue to communicate with him secretly after he has been won over. This is where one can really begin to talk about the techniques of espionage. There are techniques for "spotting" agents, for recruiting agents, for directing agents, for testing agents, and for communicating with agents. If the operation is very sensitive, the Soviets will use one of their "illegals" to handle the case. The illegal, unless apprehended with the agent or betrayed by him, can disappear into the woodwork if something goes wrong. There will be no trail leading to a Soviet diplomatic installation to embarrass or discredit it. There are times, however, when Soviet intelligence personnel stationed in an embassy or some other official installation will handle recruited agents or certain aspects of their operations. Sometimes the "cover" of the embassy or trade mission lends advantages not available to the illegal, and if the so-called "legal resident" is caught in the act, all that happens is his enforced departure and the subsequent arrival of a replacement to fill his shoes.

If, for example, the Soviets are anxious to find an agent in a Western country who will provide intelligence on a certain sensitive industry, they will use the built-in spotting mechanism provided by their embassies or trade missions. With the object of looking over candidates without their knowing it or the local authorities knowing it, the Soviet trade mission will advertise that it is interested in purchasing certain nonstrategic items manufactured by the particular industry or one closely allied to it. Manufacturers will be attracted and will visit the Soviet mission to talk over possible business. But it is just a ruse to entice into the field of vision of Soviet intelligence, people with the desired access. The visitors will be requested to fill out forms calling for personal and business data, references, financial statements, and the like. All this material is reviewed by the intelligence officer stationed at the mission, who may also participate in the personal interviews and get a direct look at the human material under consideration. If any candidates seem promising because of their innocence, their political or perhaps apolitical attitudes, their need for money or susceptibility to blackmail, the Soviets can cultivate them further by pretending that the business deal is slowly brewing. The hand of espionage has not yet been shown. Ostensibly, nothing has yet been done against the law.

#### Party Used in Finding Agents

The Communist party apparatus and Communist front organizations can also be used to spot potential agents for espionage. The evidence given in the Canadian trials shortly after World War II by the defected code clerk from the Soviet Embassy in Ottawa, Igor Gouzenko, acquainted the public for the first time with the elaborate techniques employed by the Communist party under various guises. "Reading groups" and "study groups" for persons quite innocently interested in Russia were formed within Canadian defense industries, entirely for the purpose of spotting and cultivating people who could eventually be exploited for the information they possessed. The target in this case was the atomic bomb.

However, the Communist party outside the Soviet Union has been used only intermittently by the Soviet government for actual espionage. Every time some element of the Communist party is caught in acts of espionage, this discredits the party as an "idealistic" and indigenous political organization and exposes it for what it really is—the instrument of a hostile foreign power, the stooge of Moscow. Whenever such exposures have taken place, as happened frequently in Europe in the 1920s, it has been observed that, for a time, there is a sharp decline in the intelligence work performed by local Communist parties. The value

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of using personnel not fully trained in intelligence work is questionable, since these amateur collaborators can expose not only themselves but also the operations of the intelligence service proper.

Chiefly in countries where the party is tolerated but where resident agents are difficult to procure, the Soviet intelligence services have had recourse to the party. This was the case in the United States during World War II. One of the reasons for the eventual collapse of Soviet networks that reached deeply into our government at that time was the fact that the personnel was not ideally suited for espionage. Many of these people had only strong ideological leanings toward communism to recommend them for such work and in time were repelled by the discipline of espionage. Some, like Whittaker Chambers and Elizabeth Bentley, to whom the work became unpalatable, finally balked and went and told their stories to the FBI. This problem came to a head for the Soviets just after the end of World War II as a result of the Gouzenko revelations. At that time the K.G.B. issued a secret order to its officers abroad not to involve members of Communist parties further in intelligence work.

In foreign and hostile countries, then, the Soviets must proceed with some caution in recruiting resident agents. They have not always done so, of course. Some of their attempts, particularly through their UN personnel, have been so crude and barefaced as to give the impression that the UN is being used by them for the schooling of their spies.

#### Entrapping Victims

But within the Soviet Union itself, or in a bloc country, where the Soviets can set the stage, provide the facilities—a safe house, hotel or nightclub—and furnish the cast of men or women agents provocateurs, more vigorous tactics are customarily used to recruit or entrap prospective agents. The Soviets often work on the principle that in order to get a man to do what you want, you try to catch him in something he would not like to have exposed

to the public, to his wife; to his employers or to his government. If the potential victim has done nothing on his own to compromise himself, then he or she must be enticed into a compromising situation set up by K.G.B. operatives. Two of the most recent cases involving this technique are those of Joseph Scarbeck in Poland and John Vassall in the Soviet Union.

The sordid story of Vassall, the British Admiralty employee who spied for the Soviets for six years both in the Soviet Union and in London, is a typical one. In my own experience, I have run across a score of cases where the scenarios are almost identical with this one. The K.G.B. operatives assigned to the task, after studying Vassall's case history from all angles and analyzing his weaknesses, set up the plan to frame him, exploiting the fact that he was a homosexual. The usual procedure here is to invite the victim to what appears to be a social affair; there the particular temptation to which the victim is likely to succumb is proffered him and his behaviour is recorded on tape or on film. He is then confronted with the evidence and told that unless he works for the Soviets the evidence will be brought to the attention of his employers. Vassall succumbed to this.

If the target individual is strong-willed enough to tell the whole story to his superior officer immediately, then the Soviet attempts at recruitment can be thwarted with relatively little danger to the individual concerned—even if he is residing in the Soviet Union. Sometimes his superior officer will want to play the man back against the Soviet apparatus in order to ferret out all the individuals and the tactics involved. But if the man approached does not seem qualified to play such a role, especially if the approach was made behind the Iron Curtain, he is merely told to break off from his tormentors and tell them he has disclosed everything.

There is, of course, the other side of the coin. Western intelligence is able to procure agents too, but does not use the same methods. It is no secret that the piercing of the Iron and Bamboo curtains is made easier for the West because of the volunteers



Gamera Press—Pix from Publix
Hungarian freedom fighters crossing
snow-covered fields to refuge in Austria after Soviet Russia's suppression
of the uprising

who come our way. We don't always have to go to the target. Often it comes to us through people who are well acquainted with it. While this is not a one-way street, the West has gained far more in recent years from volunteers than its opponents have. The reason for this is the growing discontent with the system inside the Soviet Union, the satellite nations and Communist China. These volunteers are either refugees and defectors who cross over the frontiers to us or they are people who remain "in place" in order to serve us within the Communist societies.

Information from refugees is often piecemeal and scattered, but for years it has added to our basic fund of knowledge about European satellites of Soviet Russia. The upheaval of the Hungarian revolution in 1956 sent more than a quarter of a million refugees fleeing westward. Needless to say, they brought us upto-date on every aspect of technical, scientific and military achievement in Hungary and gave us an excellent forecast of likely capabilities for years to come. Among the hundreds of thousands of refugees who have come over from East Germany, other satellites and Communist China since the end of World War II, many have performed a similar service.

## Defector Term Lamented

The term "defector" I consider to be an unfortunate one. It has become imbedded in the jargon of international relations and intelligence to describe the officials or highly knowledgeable citizens of the Communist bloc who leave their country and come to the West. And the West has had some defectors, too. It is, however, a term that is resented, and properly so, by the persons who come to freedom from tyranny. I do not claim that all socalled defectors have come to the West for ideological reasons. Some have come out of more mundane motives: in certain cases because they have failed in their jobs; in some because they are fearful that a shake-up in the regime will lead to their demotion or worse; some are lured by the physical attractions of the West, human or material. But a large number have come over for highly ideological reasons. They were revolted by life in the Communist world, by the tasks they were assigned by their superiors. They yearned for something better and more satisfying. The term "volunteer" is more suitable for these people, and I avoid calling them defectors whenever possible.

If the one who comes over to us has been part of the Soviet hierarchy, he knows the strengths and weaknesses of the regime that employed him—its factions, its inefficiencies and its corruption. As a specialist, he knows its achievements in whatever was his chosen field—soldiery, science, education, diplomacy or intelligence. The reader of the daily papers in the West knows that among the defectors are soldiers, diplomats, scientists, engineers, ballet dancers, athletes and, not infrequently, intelligence officers.

#### Secret Agents of the West

The fact that behind the Iron Curtain there are many people who seriously consider taking this step is a matter of deep interest to the intelligence services of the West. Our task is to make them understand that they will be welcome and secure once they have come out. Experience has shown that many of them hesitate to take the final step, not because they have qualms about forsaking a detested way of life, but because they are afraid of the unknowns that await them. So an effort is made to show that they are welcome and will be safe and happy with us. Every time a newly arrived defector goes on the air over the Voice of America and says he is glad to be here and is being treated well, countless officials behind the Iron Curtain will take heart and go back to figuring out just how they can get themselves appointed as trade representatives in Oslo or Paris. Short-term visitors to the West from the Soviet bloc would probably defect in far greater num-

bers than is presently the case if it were not for the usual Soviet practice of keeping wives and children of travelers behind as hostages.

On the other hand, the fate of those who have gone from our side over to the other would not serve as a particularly good advertisement for further such defections. Some of these people have recently talked to Western visitors and have admitted, without prompting, that their lot is miserable and that they have no future. The scientific defectors, like the atomic physicist Pontecorvo, who continue to be useful to the Soviet in their technological efforts, seem to fare better than the others. The Burgesses and MacLeans, the Martins and Mitchells have had their day of publicity and now eke out a dull living, sometimes as "propaganda advisors." Some of them still hope one day to be able to return to the West.

It is occasionally the case that defectors from the Communist side are not exactly what they seem. Rather, they have been working "in place" as agents for the West for long periods of time previous to their appearance as defectors, and have come to the West only because they or we feel that the dangers of remaining inside have become too great. In addition, some who come over from the Soviet bloc have never been "surfaced" and remain unknown to the public. The Soviets know, of course, that they have left, but not to what precise location. This concealment is desirable in some cases in order to protect the individuals involved.

#### Mails Safe for Agents

People who volunteer "in place" have many ways of doing so, in spite of the isolation, the physical barriers and the internal controls of the Soviet bloc. There are relatively safe channels of communication with the West, including, surprisingly enough, the mails. As long as the address on a letter looks harmless and the identity of the sender (the agent "in place") remains concealed, there is little danger. Soviet bloc censorship cannot possibly inspect every piece of the great volume of mail passing to and fro over the borders. And even if a letter is intercepted, it need give no clue whatever to the sender if proper security precautions are followed. Various radio stations in western Europe broadcasting to the Soviet bloc can thus solicit comments and "fan mail" from listeners, and receive letters by the thousands from behind the Iron Curtain.

Anyone who knows how the latest filing and sorting machines are used in personnel work will not be surprised to hear that if the intelligence service is looking for a man who speaks Swahili and French, has a degree in chemical engineering, is unmarried, over 35 and under 5'8", all it has to do is push a button and in less than 40 seconds it will know whether a man with these qualifications is available, along with other information about him. The same kinds of machines are used in sorting out and assembling the data of intelligence itself.

But this is a small feat compared with how technology is used in the collection of information. Many targets of contemporary intelligence by their very nature suggest the creation of the technical devices by which they can be observed. If a target emits a telltale sound, then a sensitive acoustical device comes to mind for monitoring it. If the target causes shock waves in the earth, then seismographic apparatus will detect these. Moreover, the need to observe and measure the effects of our own technological experiments, e.g., with nuclear weapons and missiles, has hastened the refinement of equipment which, with some modifications, can also be useful for observing other people's experiments.

Radar and accurate long-range photography are the basic tools of technical collection. Another is the collection and analysis of air samples in the atmosphere in order to determine the presence of radioactivity. Since radioactive particles are carried by winds

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over national borders, it is unnecessary to penetrate the opponent's territory by air or land in order to collect such samples. Beginning in 1948 our government instituted a program calling for round-the-clock monitoring of the atmosphere by aircraft for the purpose of detecting any experimentation with atomic weapons. After this program was installed, the first evidence of a Soviet atomic explosion on the Asiatic mainland was detected in September of 1949. Later refinements in instrumentation enable us to discover not only the fact that atomic explosions have taken place but also the power and type of the atomic device detonated.

Many targets, of course, do not betray their location and nature by any such activity as bomb detonation or a missile launching that can be traced from afar in the upper atmosphere. To observe such targets, one must get directly over them at very high altitudes, armed with long-range cameras. This requirement led to the development of the U-2. It was safer, more accurate and more dependable than anything that could be performed by an agent on the ground. Its feats could be equaled only by the acquisition of technical documents directly from Soviet offices and laboratories. The U-2 marked a new high, in more ways than one, in the scientific collection of intelligence. Thomas S. Gates, Jr., Secretary of Defense of the United States at the time of the U-2 incident, May 1, 1960, testified to this before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on July 2, 1960:

From these flights we got information on airfields, aircraft, missiles, missile testing and training, special weapons storage, submarine production, atomic production and aircraft deployment . . . all types of vital information. These results were considered in formulating our military programs. We obviously were the prime customer, and ours is the major interest.


In more recent days, it was the high-altitude U-2 reconnaissance flights which gave the "hard" evidence of the positioning in Cuba of Soviet medium-range missiles in late October of 1962. If they had not been discovered while work on the bases was still in progress and before they could be camouflaged, these bases might have constituted a secret and deadly threat to our security and that of this hemisphere. Here too was an interesting case in which classical collection methods wedded to scientific methods brought extremely valuable results. Various agents and refugees from Cuba reported that something in the nature of missile bases was being constructed and pinpointed the area of construction; this led to the gathering of proof by aerial reconnaissance.

#### Science Vital to Intelligence

Scientific intelligence collection has proved its value a hundred times over. Winston Churchill in his history of World War II describes British development of radar and its use in the Battle of Britain in September 1940 and their success in bending, amplifying and falsifying by scientific means the directional signals sent to guide the attacking German aircraft. He concludes that "unless British science had proved superior to German and unless its strange, sinister resources had been effectively brought to bear in the struggle for survival, we might well have been defeated, and being defeated, destroyed." Science as a vital arm of intelligence is here to stay. We are in a critical competitive race with the scientific development of the Communist bloc, particularly that of the Soviet Union, and we must see to it that we remain in a position of leadership. Some day this may be as vital to us as radar was to Britain in 1940.

A technical aid to espionage of another kind is the concealed microphone and transmitter, carrying live information in the form of conversations from inside a target to a nearby listening post. What the public knows as "tapping" telephones or as "bug-

San Diego, Calif., naval air station as seen from a plane flying at 70,000 ft. Pres. Dwight D. Eisenhower used this photograph in a television report to the nation in 1960, following the collapse of the Paris summit conference, to illustrate the power of aerial surveillance at great heights





Gift of Soviet citizens to U.S. Ambassador <u>blewellyn Thompson</u> a wooden carving of the Great Seal of the U.S., built in two parts with a microphone nestling between them to act as an electronic spy. Henry Cabot Lodge, U.S. ambassador to the UN, demonstrated the device to the Security council in May 1960

ging" or "miking" offices is called "audio surveillance" in intelligence work. Three things are required for this: excellent miniaturized electronic equipment, clever methods of concealment and a human agent to penetrate the premises and do the concealing.

The public usually hears of this activity only when it is practised by law-enforcement or security organizations in their own locality. But in June of 1960 Ambassador Lodge displayed before the United Nations in New York a plaque of the Great Seal of the United States which had been hanging in the office of the U.S. Ambassador in Moscow. He showed how the Soviets had concealed a tiny instrument in the seal which, when activated, permitted a Soviet listening post to overhear everything that was said in the ambassador's office. The installation of this device was no great feat for the Soviets, since every foreign embassy in Moscow has to call on the services of local electricians, telephone men, plumbers, charwomen and the like.

Performing the same trick outside one's own country is something else. Any intelligence service must consider the possible repercussions and embarrassments that may result from the discovery that an official installation has been illegally entered and its equipment tampered with. As in all espionage operations, the trick is to find the man who can do the job and who has the talent and the motive whether patriotic or pecuniary. There was one instance when the Soviets managed to place microphones

in the flowerpots that decorated the offices of a Western embassy. The janitor of the building, who had a weakness for alcohol, was glad to comply for a little pocket money. He never knew who the people were who borrowed the pots from him every now and then or what they did with them.

There is hardly a technological device of this kind against which countermeasures cannot be taken. Not only can the devices themselves be neutralized, but sometimes they can be turned against those who install them. Once they have been detected, it is often profitable to leave them in place in order to feed the other side with false or misleading information.

#### The Field of Cryptography

An area of intelligence which is only partly a technological matter is that of cryptography. Codes and ciphers have been used throughout history, and attempts have always been made to break them. Today scientific knowledge is used to aid those who work in this field. No nation ever willingly reveals its current successes or failures in cryptography, but there are many instances from the recent past now in the public domain that serve to illustrate the important role that the deciphering of coded messages has played in the collection of intelligence.

The diplomatic service, the armed forces and the intelligence service of every country all use secret codes and ciphers to transmit their long-distance communications between headquarters and posts abroad. For swift transmission they must often use commercial cable lines or radio, in which case they know that any other government can generally obtain copies of the enciphered cables sent from or to its area and can intercept and record radio traffic passing from, to or over its territory. That much is easy; the problem is to decipher such material. Since the contents of official government messages on sensitive subjects, especially in times of crisis, constitute the best and "hottest" intelligence that one government can hope to gather about another, every government goes to great lengths to invent unbreakable codes and to protect its code materials and its cryptographic personnel. For that reason, every intelligence service is continually on the alert for opportunities which will give it access to cryptographic materials of other governments. Should these be obtained, the task of breaking a code is made easier. But there are other, less dramatic, methods, for some codes and ciphers can be broken by mathematical analysis of intercepted traffic.

The uncontrollable accidents and disasters of war sometimes expose to one opponent cryptographic materials used by the other. A headquarters or an outpost may be overrun and in the heat of retreat code books left behind. Many notable instances of this kind in World War I gave the British a lifesaving insight into the military and diplomatic intentions of the Germans. Early in the war the Russians sank the German cruiser "Magdeburg" and rescued from the arms of a drowning sailor the German naval code book, which was promptly turned over to their British allies. British salvage operations on sunken German submarines turned

U.S. marine corps bombers attacking the "Mogami" during the battle of Midway



up similar findings. In 1917 two German dirigibles, returning from a raid over England, ran into a storm and were downed over France. Among the materials retrieved from them were coded maps and code books used by German U-boats in the Atlantic.

Military operations based on breaking of codes will often tip off the enemy, however. Once the Germans noticed that their submarines were being spotted and cornered with unusual and startling frequency, it was not hard for them to guess that communications with their underwater fleet were being read. As a result, all codes were immediately changed. There is always the problem, then, of how to act on information derived in this manner. One can risk terminating the usefulness of the source in order to obtain an immediate military or diplomatic gain, or one can hold back and continue to accumulate an ever-broadening knowledge of the enemy's movements and actions in order eventually to inflict the greatest possible damage.

#### The "Black Chamber"

During World War I the first serious American cryptographic undertaking was launched under the aegis of the War Department. Officially known as Section 8 of Military Intelligence, it liked to call itself the Black Chamber, the name used for centuries by the secret organs of postal censorship of the major European nations. Working from scratch, a group of brilliant amateurs under the direction of Herbert Yardley, a former telegraph operator, had by 1918 become a first-rate professional outfit. One of its outstanding achievements after World-War I was the breaking of the Japanese diplomatic codes. During negotiations at the Washington Disarmament Conference in 1921, the United States wanted very much to get Japanese argeement to a 10:6 naval ratio. The Japanese came to the conference with the stated intention of holding to a 10:7 ratio. In diplomacy, as in any kind of bargaining, you are at a tremendous advantage if you know your opponent is prepared to retreat to secondary positions if necessary. Decipherment of the Japanese diplomatic traffic between Washington and Tokyo by the Black Chamber revealed to our government that the Japanese were actually ready to back down to the desired ratio if we forced the issue. So we were able to force it without risking a breakup of the conference over the issue.

The Chamber remained intact, serving chiefly the State Department, until 1929 when Henry Stimson, who had become Secretary of State under President Hoover, refused to allow his department to avail itself further of its services, after which, it had to close down. "Gentlemen," so Stimson claimed, "do not read each other's mail." Later, however, while serving as Secretary of War under President Roosevelt during World War II, he came to recognize the overriding importance of intelligence, especially cryptographic intelligence.

When the fate of a nation is at stake and the lives of its military men are in the balance, gentlemen do read each other's mail if they can get their hands on it.

#### Japanese Codes Broken

Our navy had, fortunately, begun to address itself to the problems of cryptography in the early 1920s, with particular emphasis on the Japanese, since U.S. naval thinking at that time foresaw Japan as the major potential foe of the United States. By 1941, the year of Pearl Harbor, navy cryptographers had broken most of the important Japanese naval and diplomatic codes and ciphers; as a result, we were often able to foresee Japanese action in the Pacific before it took place. The Battle of Midway in June 1942, the turning point of the naval war in the Pacific, was an engagement our navy sought because it was able to learn from intercepted messages that a major task force of the Imperial Japanese Navy was gathering off Midway. Our information con-

cerning its strength, disposition and intention gave Admiral Nimitz the advantage of surprise. Our successes in breaking Japanese codes were made public after World War II. From the point of view of an intelligence officer this was undoubtedly regrettable.

One of the most spectacular of all cryptographic coups in the field of diplomacy was the British decipherment of the so-called Zimmermann telegram in January 1917, when the United States was on the brink of World War I. The job of decipherment was performed by the experts of "Room 40," as British naval cryptographic headquarters was called. The message had originated with German Foreign Secretary Zimmermann in Berlin and was addressed to the German Minister in Mexico City. It outlined the German plan for the resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare on Feb. 1, 1917, stated the probability that this would bring the United States into the war and proposed that Mexico enter the war on Germany's side; with victory, Mexico would regain its "lost territory in Texas, New Mexico and Arizona."

The famous Admiral Hall, Chief of British Naval Intelligence, had this message in his hands for over a month after its interception. His problem was how to pass its deciphered contents to the Americans in a manner that would convince them of its authenticity yet would prevent the Germans from learning of British competence in breaking their codes. Finally, and without any satisfactory solution having been found, the urgency of the war situation caused Lord Balfour, the British Foreign Secretary, to communicate the Zimmermann message formally to the American Ambassador in London. The receipt of the message in Washington caused a sensation at the White House and State Department, and created serious problems for our government-how to verify beyond a doubt the validity of the message and how to make it public without letting it seem merely an Anglo-American ploy to get the United States into the war. Robert Lansing, who was then Secretary of State, and was an uncle of mine, later told me about the dramatic events of the next few days which brought America much closer to war.

#### Diplomatic Cables Used

The situation was complicated by the fact that the Germans had transmitted the message via their ambassador in Washington, Count Bernstorff, who relayed it to his colleague in Mexico City, and that they used American diplomatic cable facilities to do so. President Wilson had granted the Germans the privilege of utilizing our communication lines between Europe and America on the understanding that messages to their representatives in the western hemisphere would be devoted to furthering the possibility of the peace which Wilson was so earnestly trying to mediate at the time. The President's chagrin was therefore all the greater when he discovered to what end the Germans had been exploiting his good offices. However, this curious arrangement turned out to be of great advantage in what happened next. First of all, it meant that the State Department had in its possession a copy of the encoded Zimmermann telegram which it had passed to Bernstorff—unaware, of course, of its inflammatory contents. Once this copy was identified, it was forwarded to our embassy in London, where one of Admiral Hall's men re-deciphered it for us in the presence of an embassy representative, thus verifying beyond a doubt its true contents. Secondly, the fact that deciphered copies of the telegram had been seen by German diplomats in both Washington and Mexico City helped significantly to solve the all-important problem that had caused Admiral Hall so much worry, namely, how to deceive the Germans about the real source from which we had obtained the information. In the end the impression given the Germans was that the famous message had leaked as a result of some carelessness or theft in one of the German embassies which had received copies of it. They continued using the same codes, which displayed a remarkable but welcome lack of imagination on their part. In March of 1917, the State Department released the telegram to the Associated Press. It hit the American public like a bombshell. In April we declared war on Germany.

I have described some of the manifold activities involved in gathering intelligence. The diverse needs for information and the varying opportunities for acquiring it make it imperative that some orderly system govern the world-wide collection process. Without appropriate guidance, intelligence officers in the field could spend much of their time duplicating each other's work and could exert disproportionate efforts in the attempt to get information in one place that could be obtained much more simply and quickly in another. It is the task of the intelligence headquarters, with its world perspective, to establish the basic guidelines along which intelligence officers in different places try to pattern their work. This is accomplished, for long-range purposes, by setting up a list of priorities that give the order of importance of tasks to be undertaken in any one area. It also often happens that headquarters will assign crash jobs to intelligence officers in areas where it is believed that much-needed information might be available.

The function of headquarters was illustrated when Khrushchev made his secret speech denouncing Stalin to the twentieth Party Congress in 1956. It was clear from various press and other references to the speech that a text must be available somewhere. The speech was too long and too detailed to have been made extemporaneously even by Khrushchev, who is noted for lengthy extemporary remarks. An intelligence "document hunt" was instituted and eventually the text of the speech was found—but many miles from Moscow, where it had been delivered. It was necessary in this case for headquarters to alert all possible sources and to make sure all clues were followed up.

#### Negative Functions

There are also times when headquarters must perform a negative function, warning its agents to avoid material—no matter how valuable it may seem—in order not to jeopardize some other intelligence source. When I was stationed in Switzerland during World War II, I received an instruction not to try to obtain any foreign codes without prior instructions. I did not know it at the time, but shortly beforehand an attempt by our intelligence to get a German code in Portugal had so alerted the Germans that they changed a code we were already reading.

Soon afterward one of my most trusted German agents, who spoke with authority, told me that if I wished, he could get me detailed information about their diplomatic codes and ciphers. This put me in quite a quandary. If I showed no interest, this would have been a giveaway that we had them already; no intelligence officer would otherwise reject such an offer. I expressed great interest and sparred for time to think over how this could best be worked out. The next day I told him that as all my traffic to Washington had to go by radio (Switzerland was surrounded, in late 1944, by Nazi and Fascist forces) it would be too difficult and too perilous for me to communicate what he might give me on the German codes. I said I should prefer to wait till France was liberated-the Normandy invasion had already taken place -so I could send out his code information by diplomatic pouch. He readily accepted this somewhat specious answer. Sometimes even the seemingly ripest apples of intelligence should not be plucked.

In a world where so many countries have some kind of representation abroad and where trade and travel occur in the most unpredictable patterns, no intelligence service and no intelligence officer rules out the possibility of the random and unexpected and often inexplicable windfall. This happens despite the

best-planned general guidance. Sometimes a man who has something on his mind feels safer about talking to an intelligence officer 10,000 miles away from home, so he waits for the opportunity of a trip abroad to seek one out. Suddenly Korea may become the place where one picks up valuable information on Czechoslovakia. It can happen that way.

A final word on the craft of intelligence as it is practised today requires comparison of the open and the closed society. Each in its distinctive way contains weaknesses of which an opposing intelligence service can take advantage, and strengths which make the opponent's job more difficult. Altogether it must be said that in our open society we make it far too easy for our opponents to learn of our military secrets. Much that we can acquire from the Soviets only through an enormous investment of mannower and money, they can get from us merely by reading what we publish.

Some years ago my predecessor as director of the CIA, General Walter Bedell Smith, was disturbed by this situation and decided to make a test. He co-opted the services of a group of able and qualified academicians from one of our large universities for some summer work. He asked them to examine open publications, news articles, hearings of the Congress, government releases, monographs, speeches and the like, in order to determine what kind of estimate of U.S. military capabilities the Soviets could put together from unclassified sources. Their conclusions indicated that in 99 weeks of work by one man on the open literature our opponents could acquire a very good general idea of our order of battle.

But when it comes to clandestine collection of intelligence—and neither side can depend wholly on overt intelligence—then our opponents' agents run up against the FBI and other law-enforcement agencies in this country. Our system also provides other obstacles which are inherent and require no special effort on our part—our free society does not breed deep-set and widespread disaffection, as does the Communist society. Even though we have had a share of "ideological" Communists and cases of entrapment, the Soviets have today no large pool of malcontents and haters of our system from which to draw when they look for resident agents. They know that the local Communist party is too closely watched to recommend it for clandestine work.

#### Communist Mind Isolated

It is also a fact that the closed society produces the kind of isolated mentality that cannot understand the workings and the mentality of a free society. The same "wall" that Soviet citizens carry with them when they go abroad, which makes it difficult for us to get close to them, tends to cut them off from the societies and governments they wish to penetrate. For one thing, they often consider much of the overt intelligence available to them as intentional deception-their own suspicion betrays them. Their judgment of the true loyalties of prospective recruits is often bad. When they approach nationals of western European and North American countries under the impression that they have found a willing source, they often discover that their names are in the papers soon afterwards because the source was not really willing at all. Hundreds of Americans of Russian and east European origin whom the Soviets or their satellites have tried to approach have reported such approaches to our authorities immediately after they were made.

An outstanding case of this kind was that of the Rumanian, V. C. Georgescu. In 1953, shortly after Georgescu's escape from Communist Rumania and while he was seeking U.S. citizenship, a Communist intelligence agent acting under Soviet guidance made a cruel attempt to blackmail him. Georgescu was given to understand that if he would agree to perform certain intelligence tasks in the United States, his two young sons, who were still

being held in Rumania, would be released and returned to their parents. Otherwise he could expect never to see his sons again. Georgescu courageously refused any discussion of the subject, threw the man out of his office and reported the full details to the FBI. The Communist agent, who was in the diplomatic service, was expelled from the United States. The whole case received such wide publicity that Rumania finally sought to repair its damaged prestige by acceding to President Eisenhower's personal request for the release of the boys.

The ease with which the Soviets can place their intelligence officers in Western countries is an enormous advantage for their intelligence work. I have already described how the Soviets use their embassies and trade missions abroad for cover. They also use their mission at the United Nations and have even placed their intelligence personnel in such bodies as the sacrosanct Secretariat of the United Nations, whose employees are supposed to be international civil servants. Recently two Soviets were expelled from this body and from the United States for their attempt to recruit a politician of the state of New York who reported the whole incident to the FBI. To the Soviets, no international organization is sacrosanct.

These advantages which the Soviets have in the West cannot be matched behind the Iron Curtain. There are no immigrants and few long-term visitors to the Soviet Union. So far, no international body has chosen to settle there or has been invited to do so. A Soviet citizen cannot walk into a foreign embassy without having to explain later to the police what he was doing there. The Soviet people are taught to distrust the foreigner (although they do not always follow instructions) and the Soviet internal police have the mission of seeing to it that the foreigner does not get into sensitive areas. Under these conditions, espionage operations are difficult to initiate from scratch behind the Iron Curtain. The possibility that agents can be sought and found and cultivated there without the knowledge of local police is so limited that no intelligence service is going to try to solve many of its problems by this means. Fortunately, there are other ways of achieving the objectives of intelligence collection.

Our free societies, with all their blessings, cannot be made over merely to even the balance sheet of intelligence. But some of the loopholes, some indiscretions, some of the carelessness in our handling of public information can possibly be dealt with more effectively than they are today.

#### V. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

I have emphasized that in today's spy-conscious world each side tries to make the acquisition of intelligence by its opponent as difficult as possible by taking "security measures" in order to protect classified information, vital installations and personnel from enemy penetration. I have also indicated that these measures, while indispensable as basic safeguards, become in the end a challenge to the opponent's intelligence technicians to devise even more ingenious ways of getting around the obstacles.

Clearly, if a country wishes to protect itself against the unceasing encroachments of hostile intelligence services it must do more than keep an eye on foreign travelers crossing its borders, more than placing guards around its "sensitive" areas, more than checking on the loyalty of its employees in sensitive positions. It must also find out what the intelligence services of hostile countries are after, how they are proceeding and what people they are using. It can best accomplish these tasks by penetrating the inner circle of hostile services where the plans are made and the agents selected and trained, and, if the job can be managed, by bringing over to its side "insiders" from the other camp.

Operations having this distinct aim belong to the field of counterespionage and the information that is derived from them is

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called counterintelligence. Counterespionage is inherently a protective and defensive operation. Its primary purpose is to thwart espionage against one's country. Given the nature of Communist aims, however, counterespionage on our side inevitably entails the uncovering of secret aggression, subversion, sabotage, kidnapping, even assassination. Although such information is not, like positive intelligence, of direct use to the government in the formation of policy, it often alerts the government to the nature of the thrusts of its opponents and the area in which political action is being planned. On October 30, 1962, U.S. and Venezuelan officials monitored a secret Cuban radio signal ordering acts of terrorism in Latin America, including action against the Venezuelan oil fields. Saboteurs, believed to be Communists, later knocked out one-sixth of the Venezuelan oil production capacity by means of explosives. In a case such as this, counterintelligence obviously does more than simply collect information leading to the apprehension of foreign agents.

The function of counterespionage is assigned to various U.S. agencies, each of which has a special area of responsibility. The FBI's province is the territory of the United States itself; this organization guards against the hostile activities of foreign agents on our own soil. The CIA has the major responsibility for counterespionage outside the United States, thereby constituting a forward line of defense against foreign espionage—it attempts to detect the operations of hostile intelligence before the agents reach their targets. Each branch of the armed forces also has a counterintelligence arm whose purpose is mainly to protect its commands, technical establishments and personnel both at home and abroad against enemy penetration.

#### Co-ordination of Agencies

The effectiveness of this division of labour depends upon the co-ordination of the separate agencies and on the rapid dissemination of counterintelligence information from one to the other. The case of the Soviet "illegal" Colonel Rudolf Abel supplies an illustration of this co-ordination. A close associate and co-worker of Colonel Abel's in the United States was on his way back to the Soviet Union to make his report. While in western Europe, he decided to defect. He contacted a U.S. intelligence office in a country where he felt it safe to do so, showing an American passport obtained on the basis of a false birth certificate. He told a fantastic story of espionage in the United States, including specifics as to secret caches of funds, communication among agents in his network and certain details regarding Colonel Abel. All this information was immediately transmitted to Washington and passed to the FBI for verification. The agent's story stood up in every respect. He was brought back quietly and willingly to the United States. As soon as he reached our shores, the primary responsibility for handling the investigation and legal procedures of the case was transferred to the FBI and the Department of Justice. The case had originated abroad with CIA which continued to handle its foreign angles.

The traditional purposes of counterespionage are "to locate, identify and neutralize" the opposition. In more specific terms, this means to find out where and who the hostile spy is—and possibly the spymaster, too—in order to thwart his work and eventually to put him out of business. "Neutralizing" can take many forms. Within the United States an apprehended spy can be prosecuted under the law; so can a foreign intelligence officer who is caught red-handed having contact with agents, provided he does not have diplomatic immunity. If he has immunity he can only be expelled. But there are other ways of neutralizing agents, and one of the best is by exposure or the threat of exposure. A spy is not of much further use once his name, face and story are in the papers.

Counterespionage operations are often compared to chess, and



write World Soviet spy Rudolph Abel in his cell in the federal courthouse in Brooklyn, N.Y., after his arraignment in Aug. 1957

the Soviets are notoriously good chess players. These operations require enormous patience and adroitness. They may take months to plan and years to bring to fruition. Our target is massive and diverse, for the Soviets use not only their own intelligence apparatus in their operations against us but also those of their European satellites—Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria—all of whom are old in the ways of espionage. Chinese Communist espionage and counterespionage operations are largely independent of Moscow, though many of their senior personnel were schooled by Soviet intelligence.

The most sophisticated operations of counterespionage, and the most rewarding if they succeed, are directed against the staff and the installations of the opponent's intelligence service. One of the most famous cases in history was that of Col. Alfred Redl, who from 1900 to 1907 was chief of counterespionage in the Austro-Hungarian Empire's military intelligence service, and was later its representative in Prague. From 1902 until the time he was unmasked in 1913, Redl actually had been a secret agent of the Russians and had revealed to them everything he knew of his own country's intelligence operations—in this case, almost everything there was to know. But that wasn't all. As a leading officer of the intelligence service, Redl was a member of the General Staff of the Austro-Hungarian Army and had access to all the General Staff's war plans. These too he gave to the Russians.

Redl had been blackmailed into working for the Russians early in his career on the basis of two weaknesses—homosexuality and overwhelming venality.

Today, when the headquarters of an intelligence service is as "impenetrable" as the best minds assigned to the task can make it, counterespionage usually aims at more accessible and vulnerable targets. These are chiefly the offices and units that intelligence services maintain in foreign countries from which their field operations in espionage and counterespionage are directed. In the case of the Soviets, such offices are often located in embassies, consulates and trade delegations. These locations provide "cover," i.e., they conceal the intelligence unit and at the same time afford its members the protection of diplomatic immunity.

A factor which counterespionage exploits in the Free world is the need and desire of the opposing side for information, for positive intelligence. If a stranger walks into an embassy and with a worried look on his face goes up to the receptionist and tells her in a hoarse whisper that he has some important information which he would like to put into the hands of the "right person," it is likely that he will sooner or later be talking to the "right person." No intelligence service can afford to turn away such an offer of information, not, at least, without giving it careful scrutiny. Some of the most crucial intelligence ever received has been delivered by people who unexpectedly walked into an embassy one day in just this fashion. Therefore, counterespionage often tries to "plant" an agent with the opposing service by fixing him up with information which will make him appear useful. It is hoped that the agent will get himself hired by the opposition on a long-term basis, become more and more trusted and will be given increasingly sensitive assignments.

The Soviets used this method against Allied intelligence offices in West Germany and Austria during the 1950s. Refugees from the East were so numerous at that time that it was necessary to employ the better-educated ones to help in the screening and interrogation of their fellow refugees. The Soviets determined to take advantage of this situation and cleverly inserted agents in the refugee channel, providing them with information about conditions behind the Curtain which could not fail to make them seem of great interest to Western intelligence. As a result, it later turned out that some people employed as interrogators and assistants were Soviet agents. Their task for the Soviets was to find out about our methods and targets, to get acquainted with our personnel and also to keep tabs on the countless refugees who innocently told them their stories.

#### Soviet Planted Agents

This same tactic can be used to quite a different end, namely, provocation, which has an ancient and dishonourable tradition. The term agent provocateur points to its origin in France where the device was formerly used during times of political unrest. But it was the Russians who made a fine art of provocation. It was the main technique of the tsarist Okhrana in smoking out revolutionaries and dissenters and was later taken over by the various Soviet police organs. In tsarist times an agent would join a subversive group and not only spy and report on it to the police, but also incite it to take some kind of action in order to give the police a pretext for swooping down on it and arresting some or all of its members. Since the agent reported to the police exactly when and where the action was going to take place, they had no problems.

Actually, such operations could become immensely subtle, complicated and dramatic. The more infamous of the tsarist agents provocateurs have all the earmarks of characters out of Dostoevski. In order to incite a revolutionary group to the action that would bring the police down on it, the provocateur himself had to play the role of revolutionary leader and terrorist. If the police

wished to round up large numbers of persons on serious charges, then the revolutionary group had to do something extreme, something more serious than merely holding clandestine meetings. As a result, we encounter some astounding situations in the Russia of the early 1900s.

The most notorious of all tsarist provocateurs, the agent Azeff, appears to have originated the idea of murdering the tsar's uncle, the Grand Duke Sergius, and the Minister of the Interior, Plehve. These murders were actually committed by the terrorists at the instigation of Azeff solely for the sake of giving the Okhrana the opportunity of arresting them. One of Lenin's closest associates from 1912 until the Revolution, Roman Malinovsky, was a tsarist police agent and provocateur, suspected by Lenin's entourage but always defended by Lenin. Malinovsky did his share of revealing the whereabouts of secret printing presses, secret meetings and the conspiracies of the revolutionaries to the police, but his main achievement was far more dramatic. Since he openly played the role of an active Bolshevik, he got himself elected, with police assistance and with Lenin's blessing, as representative to the Russian parliament, the Duma, where he led the Bolshevik faction and distinguished himself as an orator. The police often had to ask him to restrain the revolutionary ardour of his speeches. Indeed, there is some question in the cases of both Azeff and Malinovsky as to where their allegiance really lay. Since each played his role so well, he seems frequently to have been carried away by it and to have believed in it, at least temporarily.

#### Provocation Frequently Used

Today provocation is chiefly an operation of security services behind the Iron Curtain directed against foreign intelligence officers and diplomatic personnel. It may also be employed against newsmen or even casual tourists, either to get rid of a reporter who knows too much or to create the image of massive Western espionage against the Soviet Union. It is sometimes even used as a basis for blackmail. The usual method is to provoke the victim into an illegal or degrading act, to expose or blackmail him and make him liable to prosecution or to expulsion if he is protected by diplomatic immunity. Of course, when blackmail is involved there is no disclosure if the target agrees to "play the game."

When you read in the paper that an individual has been expelled from one of the Soviet bloc countries, frequently this is either a case of a completely arbitrary charge being made or else it is the result of a provocation. The routine goes like this: one day the target is contacted at home, in a restaurant, on the street or even in his office by a member of the "underground" or by someone who feigns dissatisfaction with the regime. The provocateur offers important information. If the target bites and takes up contact with the man, he may be unpleasantly surprised during the course of one of his meetings by the sudden intervention of the local security police. The provocateur is "arrested" for giving information to a foreign power. The target himself may find his name in the paper; if he is a diplomatic official his embassy will receive a request from the local foreign office that he leave the country within 24 hours.

What is gained through this technique is that if the victim really was engaged in the collection of intelligence, then the Soviet Union is rid of him and has also served warning that it will not put up with any kind of snooping. His replacement will probably restrict himself accordingly. He will certainly be careful about offers from the "underground." And if the victim is a private citizen knowledgeable in the ways and wiles of Communism, then the Soviet will have deprived the West of another person whose advice and counsel would be useful to us.

The most characteristic tool of counterespionage operations is the double agent, and he comes in many guises. In an area like West Germany, with its concentration of technical and military

installations of both the German Federal Republic and NATO, there is a steady flood of agents from the Soviet bloc spying on airfields, supply depots, factories, United States military posts and the like. Many of these agents are caught. Many give themselves up for a variety of personal motives. Such agents become doubles when they can be persuaded to continue the appearance of working for the Soviet bloc but under Western "control." Soviet agents who are caught by Western officials often agree to become double agents because they find it preferable to sitting in jail for a couple of years.

#### Using the Double Agent

In order to "build up" a double agent of this kind he is allowed to report harmless positive information back to his original employers, the Soviets. It is hoped that the latter, pleased with his success in acquiring information, will give him new briefs and directives. Such briefs in themselves are counterintelligence information because they show us what the opponent wants to know and how he is going about getting it. Sometimes it is possible, through such an agent, to lure a courier, another agent or even an intelligence officer into the West. When this happens, one has the choice of simply watching the movements of the visitor—hoping he will lead to other agents concealed in the West—or of arresting him. If he is arrested, the operation is naturally over, but it has succeeded in neutralizing another person working for the opposition.

A more valuable double for our counterintelligence is the resident of a Western country who, when approached by the Soviet or other bloc intelligence service to undertake a mission for them, quietly reports the encounter to his own authorities. The advantages are twofold. The Soviets rarely approach a Westerner unless they have something serious in mind. Secondly, the voluntary act of the person approached in reporting this event points to his trustworthiness. In such a case the target of Soviet recruitment will usually be told by his own intelligence authorities to "accept" the Soviet offer and to feign co-operation, meanwhile reporting all the activities and missions which he undertakes for the Soviets. He is provided with "reports" which his principals desire to have fed to the Soviets. This game can then be played until the Soviets begin to have some reason to suspect their "agent," or until the agent can no longer stand the strain.

The case of the late Boris Morros, the Hollywood director, was of this kind. Through Morros, who had checked in with the FBI early in the game, the Soviets ran a network of extremely important agents in the United States, most of them in political and intellectual circles. Morros reported on them regularly to the FBI.

#### Surveillance Must Be Covert

"Surveillance" is the professional word for shadowing or tailing. Like every act of counterespionage, it must be executed with maximum care lest its target become aware of it. A criminal who feels or knows he is being followed has limited possibilities open to him. The best he can hope for is to elude surveillance long enough to find a good hiding place. But an intelligence agent, once he has been alarmed by surveillance, will take steps to leave the country, and he will have plenty of assistance in doing so.

The purpose of surveillance in counterespionage is twofold. If a person is only suspected of being an enemy agent, close observation of his actions over a period of time may lead to further facts that confirm the suspicion and supply details about the agent's mission and how he is carrying it out. Secondly, an agent is rarely entirely on his own. Eventually he will get in touch, by one means or another, with his helpers, his sources, and perhaps the people from whom he is taking orders. Surveillance at its best will uncover the network to which he belongs and the channels through which he reports.

The British roundup of five Soviet agents in the Lonsdale ring in January of 1961 owed much to highly professional surveillance. Frederick Houghton, an Admiralty employee, was suspected of passing classified information to an unidentified foreign power. Scotland Yard observed him meeting with another man on a London street, but the encounter was so brief it was impossible to tell for certain whether anything had passed between them or whether they had even spoken to each other. However, the fact that both men acted so furtive and were apparently extremely wary of surveillance convinced the British that they were on the right track. The Yard had enough trained men in the immediate area to have the second man followed as well. He eventually led them, after many days of tireless and well-concealed surveillance, to a harmless-looking American couple who operated a secondhand bookstore. The role, if any, of this couple could not be immediately ascertained.

On a later occasion Houghton came up to London again, this time with his girl friend, who worked in the same naval establishment. While under surveillance, the two of them, walking down the street carrying a market bag, were approached from the rear by the same man as before. He was ready to relieve Houghton and the girl of the market bag, clearly a prearranged method for passing the "goods."

Three at one swoop, all caught in the act, was something the police could not afford to pass up, and the three were arrested on the spot. A few hours later, the American couple met the same fate. The man Houghton met was Gordon Lonsdale, the Soviet "illegal" with Canadian papers who was running the show. The Americans had previously been sought by the FBI for their part in a Soviet net in the United States and had disappeared when things had become too hot for them here. In London they had been operating a secret transmitter to relay Lonsdale's information to Moscow. Microfilms found in their apartment eventually led to the apprehension of John Vassall, another Admiralty employee. Good counterespionage operatives never close in on an agent without first having exhausted all the possibilities of locating and identifying everyone else associated with the agent.

#### A Bonanza for Intelligence

One of the biggest bonanzas for counterespionage is the defection of a staff intelligence officer of the opposition. It provides the equivalent of a direct penetration of hostile headquarters for a period of time. One such intelligence defector can paralyze for months to come the service he left behind. He can describe the internal and external organization of his service and the work and character of many of his former colleagues at headquarters. He can identify some intelligence personnel stationed abroad under cover. Best of all, he can deliver information about operations. He is not likely to know the true identity of a large number of agents, of course, for all intelligence services compartmentalize such information, and only the few officers intimately concerned with a case will know exactly who the agents on that case are.

The West has been singularly lucky in having many of these bonanzas in the course of recent history. In 1937 two of Stalin's top intelligence officers stationed abroad defected rather than return to Russia to be swallowed up in the purge of the N.K.V.D. One was Walter Krivitsky, who had been chief of Soviet intelligence in Holland. In 1941 he was found dead in a Washington hotel, shot by unknown agents, presumably Soviet, who were never apprehended. I shall never accept the story that he committed suicide. The second was Alexander Orlov, who had been one of the N.K.V.D. chiefs in Spain at the time of the civil war. Unlike Krivitsky, he has managed to elude Soviet vengeance.

An early postwar Soviet defection was that of Igor Gouzenko, a member of Soviet military intelligence, who had been in charge



Wide World
Head in shadow is that of Peter
Deriabin, former major in the Soviet
secret police, who sought asylum in
the West in 1954. At left, Associated
Press reporter Ray Shaw. Interviewed
in 1959, Deriabin permitted no pictures of his face, even though he was
wearing a disguise

of codes and ciphers in the Soviet Embassy in Ottawa. Thanks in large part to information Gouzenko brought with him, the most lethal of all Soviet espionage efforts, to procure the secrets of the atom bomb, was stopped.

The years 1954-55 were the occasion of multiple defections. After Stalin's death and the liquidation of Beria shortly afterward, it was clear that anyone prominent in the Soviet security service was in jeopardy. Among the major defections to the West at that time were those of Vladimir Petrov, who had been K.G.B. chief in Australia; Juri Rastvorov, an intelligence officer stationed at the Soviet mission in Japan; and Peter Deriabin, who defected from his post in Vienna. All of these men had at one time or another been stationed at intelligence headquarters in Moscow and possessed valuable information that went far beyond their assignments at the time they defected.

#### Two More Defections

Two defections of a special kind that have occurred in recent years involved Soviet intelligence personnel employed on assassination missions. Nikolay Khokhlov was sent from Moscow to West Germany in early 1954 to arrange for the murder of a prominent anti-Soviet *émigré* leader, Georgi Okolovich. Khokhlov told Okolovich of his mission and then defected. At Munich in 1957, Soviet agents tried without success to poison Khokhlov. In the fall of 1961, Bogdan Stashinskiy defected in West Ger-

many and confessed that on Soviet orders he had murdered the two Ukrainian exile leaders Rebet and Bandera some years earlier in Munich.

Recently, Soviet diplomat Aleksandr Kaznachayev defected in Burma, where he had been stationed. While Kaznachayev was not a staff member of Soviet intelligence, he was a "co-opted worker" and was used in intelligence work whenever his position as a diplomat enabled him to perform certain tasks with less risk of discovery than his colleagues in the intelligence branch. His recent book describing what went on in the Soviet Embassy in Rangoon has done a great deal to debunk the picture of Soviet skill and American incompetence previously impressed on the American public in the book *The Ugly American*.

All the important intelligence defectors have not been Soviets. Numerous high-ranking staff officers have defected from the satellite countries and were able to contribute information not only about their own services but about Soviet intelligence as well, for the Soviets manage and direct the satellite services, not at long range but in person. They do this through a so-called advisory system. A permanent Soviet "advisor" is installed in every department and section of every satellite intelligence service, be it in Prague, Warsaw, Bucharest, or any other satellite capital. This advisor is supposed to be shown all significant material concerning the work being done, and must give his consent to all important operational undertakings. He is to all intents and purposes

No service to the ser

a supervisor, and his word is final.

As a sidelight on Soviet relations to its satellites, and as an excellent example of counterespionage techniques, it is interesting to note that the Soviets do not rely wholly on these advisors to control the satellite intelligence services. This is not because the latter are incompetent, but because the satellite services are evidently not trusted by their Soviet masters. In order to prevent these services from getting away with anything, the Soviets go to the trouble of secretly recruiting intelligence officers of the satellite services who can supply them with information on plans, personnel, conflicts in the local management, disaffection and the like,-which might not have come to the attention of the advisor. Joseph Swiatlo, who defected in 1954, had been chief of the department of the Polish intelligence service which kept tabs on members of the Polish government and the Polish Communist party. Pawel Monat had been Polish military attaché in Washington from 1955 to 1958, after which he returned to Warsaw and was put in charge of world-wide collection of information by Polish military attaches. He served in this job for two years before defecting in 1959. Frantisek Tisler defected to us after having served as Czech military attaché in Washington from 1957 to 1959. The Hungarian Secret Police officer Bela Lapusnyik made a daring escape to freedom over the Austria-Hungary border in May of 1961 and reached Vienna safely, only to die of poisoning, apparently at the hands of Soviet agents, before he could tell his full story to Western authorities.

What has brought all these men over to our side is naturally a matter of great interest not only to Western intelligence but to any serious student of the Soviet system and of Soviet life.

Revelations by Vladimir Petrov, Soviet embassy official who had acted as the Soviet's espionage chief in Australia until he became distilusioned with communism, set off a major investigation in 1954. Petrov and his wife, who had also served as an espionage officer, were granted sanctuary in Australia Wide World





Wide World Jozef Swiatlo, Polish security official who turned against communism in 1954 and was given asylum in the U.S.

Gouzenko, as code clerk for Soviet intelligence, saw all the traffic that passed back and forth between the Soviet Embassy in Ottawa and Soviet intelligence headquarters in Moscow during World War II. He has told how he was gradually overcome by shame and repugnance as he began to realize that the U.S.S.R., while a wartime ally of Britain, Canada and the United States, was mounting a tremendous espionage effort to steal their scientific secrets. The moral revulsion of the man on learning of Soviet machinations against its "friends" eventually led to his defection.

The postwar defectors did not have similar motivation because the Soviets no longer affected friendship with the West after 1946. Every Soviet official was well indoctrinated on this point and could not easily survive in his job if he had any soft feelings about the "imperialists." Nevertheless, feelings akin to Gouzenko's seem to have inspired these defections. Many of these men suffered some kind of disillusionment or disappointment with their own system.

#### Soviet Insiders Disillusioned

When one studies the role the intelligence services play in the Soviet world and their closeness to the centres of power, it is not surprising that the Soviet intelligence officer gets an inside look, available to few, of the sinister and hypocritical methods of operation behind the façade of "socialist idealism." To the intelligent, dedicated Communist, such knowledge comes as a shock. One defector has told us, for example, that he could trace the disillusionment which later led to his own defection back to the day when he found out that Stalin and the K.G.B., and not the Germans, had been responsible for the Katyn massacre (the murder of 10,000 Polish officers during World War II). The Soviet public still does not know the truth about this or most of the other

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crimes of Stalin. This "loss of faith" in the system within which one is working, coupled often with personal disappointments, seems to be the powerful driving factor in defections.

Of course, these names by no means exhaust the list of all those who have left the Soviet intelligence service and other Soviet posts. Some of the most important and also some of the most recent defectors have so far chosen not to be "surfaced." They too have made, and are making, a continual contribution to our inside knowledge of the work of the Soviet intelligence and security apparatus and of the way in which the subversive war is being carried on against us by Communism. There have also been defectors from Communist China.

Every effort is made to see to it that those who leave a Com-

Soviet bombers over Moscow's Red Square during a May Day parade
Tikhomiroff—Magnum



munist service are helped and assisted in every way, whether they openly acknowledge their previous connections or try to preserve the secrecy of their previous affiliations. This country has always been a haven for those seeking to leave tyranny and espouse freedom, and it will continue to be a haven for those who do not wish to continue to work for the Kremlin and against the Free world.

#### VI. CONFUSING THE ADVERSARY

Sir Walter Scott, when he wrote the well-known lines

Oh, what a tangled web we weave, When first we practice to deceive!

was not thinking of intelligence deception, but his words describe quite correctly what this kind of operation frequently entails. When one intentionally misleads, friends as well as foes are sometimes misled, and there is always the danger of subsequently not being believed when one wants to be. Deception is tricky business, especially in time of peace and in the absence of wartime controls. And deception is easier in the closed society, which can manipulate its information media and hide what it wants, where and when it wants.

In intelligence, the term deception covers a wide variety of maneuvers by which a state attempts to mislead another state, generally a potential or actual enemy, as to its own capabilities and intentions. Its best-known use is in wartime or just prior to the outbreak of war, when its main purpose is to draw enemy defenses away from a planned point of attack, or to give the impression that there will be no attack at all, or simply to confuse the opponent about one's plans and purposes. During the kind of peace we call the Cold War, various other forms of deception, including political deception, are practised against us by the Soviets. These involve the propagation of false and misleading information, the faking of documents and the use of forgeries. This is considered important enough so that a special section in the Soviet intelligence service called the "disinformation bureau" is responsible for mounting such operations.

Deception as to military capabilities is chiefly a short-range tactical maneuver gauged to conceal the possession or location of certain weapons-or, sometimes, the lack of them. The Soviets have used military parades to place armaments on display that are intended to draw attention away from other armaments they may have in their arsenal or may plan to have. Mock-ups of planes and other equipment never intended to be operational have also been exhibited. In 1955 the Soviets gave the impression, during an exhibition on Red Aviation Day, that they were emphasizing heavy bomber production, whereas in fact they were shifting their emphasis to missiles. Visiting diplomats and military observers were permitted to see a "fly-by" of heavy bombers in numbers far exceeding what was thought to be the available squadron strength in the area. The impression was thereby given that many more heavy bombers were coming off the assembly lines that we had calculated. Later it was learned that the same squadron of bombers had been flying around in circles, reappearing every few minutes with the intention of misleading the ob-

Deception techniques of this sort were utilized by both sides during World War II. Airfields in Britain were made to look like farms from the air. Sod was placed over the hangars and maintenance shacks were given the appearance of barns, sheds and outbuildings. Even more important, mock-ups were set up in other areas to look like real airfields with planes on them. Elsewhere mocked-up naval vessels were stationed where the real might well have been.

As a strategic maneuver, deception operations generally require lengthy and careful preparation in order to ascertain what

the enemy thinks and what he expects. Their success hangs on the closest co-ordination between the supreme military command and the intelligence service. Thus these operations are always of major stature and are, for the most part, one-time gambles for high stakes. The intelligence problem is to get information into the hands of the enemy by some means and in some form so that he will believe a certain move is to be made by his opponent. The information itself must be plausible and not outside the practical range of plans that the enemy knows are capable of being put into operation.

After the Allies had driven the Germans out of North Africa in 1943, it was clear to all that their next move would be into southern Europe. The question was where. Since Sicily was an obvious stepping stone and was in fact the Allied objective, it was felt that every effort should be made to give the Germans and Italians the impression that the Allies were going to bypass it. To have tried to persuade the Germans that there was to be no attack at all or that it was going to move across Spain was out of the question, for these things would not have been credible. The deception had to point to something within the expected range.

#### The Contrived Accident

For quick and effective placement of plausible deception directly into the hands of the enemy's high command, few methods beat the "accident," so long as it seems logical and has all the appearances of being a wonderfully lucky break for the enemy. Such an accident was cleverly staged by the British in 1943 and it was no doubt accepted by the Germans at the time as completely genuine. Early in May of that year the corpse of a British major was found washed up on the southwest coast of Spain near the town of Huelva, between the Portuguese border and Gibraltar. A courier briefcase was still strapped to his wrist containing copies of correspondence to General Alexander in Tunisia from the Imperial General Staff. These papers clearly hinted at an Allied plan to invade southern Europe via Sardinia and Greece. As we learned after the war, the Germans fully believed these hints. Hitler sent an armoured division to Greece, and the Italian garrison on Sicily was not reinforced.

This was perhaps one of the best cases of deception utilizing a single move in recent intelligence history. It was called "Operation Mincemeat," and the story of its execution has been fully told by one of the main planners of the affair, Ewen Montagu, in the book The Man Who Never Was. It was a highly sophisticated feat, made possible by the circumstances of modern warfare and the techniques of modern science. There was nothing illogical about the possibility that a plane on which an officer carrying important documents was a passenger could have come down, or that a body from the crash could have been washed up on the Spanish shore.

#### A Royal Marine's Corpse

Actually, a recently dead civilian was used for this operation. He was dressed in the uniform of a British major; in his pockets were all the identification papers, calling cards and odds and ends necessary to authenticate him as Major Martin. He was floated into Spain from a British submarine, which surfaced close enough to the Spanish coast to make sure that he would reach his target without fail. And he did.

"Overlord," the combined Allied invasion of Normandy, in June 1944, also made effective use of deception—in this case not an isolated ruse but a variety of misleading maneuvers closely co-ordinated with each other. These succeeded, as is well known, in keeping the Germans guessing as to the exact area of the intended Allied landing. False rumours were circulated among our own troops on the theory that German agents in England would

pick them up and report them. Radio channels to agents in the French underground were utilized to pass deceptive orders and requests for action to back up the coming Allied landings; it was known that certain of these agents were under the control of the Germans and would pass on to them messages received from the Allies. Such agents therefore constituted a direct channel to the German intelligence service. In order to make the Germans think that the landings would take place in the Le Havre area, agents in the vicinity were asked to make certain observations, thereby indicating to the Germans a heightened Allied interest in fortifications, rail traffic, etc. Lastly, military reconnaissance itself was organized in such a way as to emphasize an urgent interest in places where the attack would not come. Fewer aerial reconnaissance sorties were flown over the Normandy beaches than over Le Havre and other likely areas.

There are essentially two ways of planting deceptive information with the enemy. One can stage the kind of accident the British did in Spain. Such accidents are plausible because they do, after all, frequently occur solely as a result of the misfortunes of war. History is full of instances where couriers, loaded with important dispatches, fell into enemy hands. The other way is to plant an agent with the enemy who is ostensibly reporting to him about your plans. He can be a "deserter," or some kind of "neutral." The problem, as in all counterespionage penetrations, is to get the enemy to trust the agent. He cannot simply turn up with dramatic military information and expect to be believed.

#### Captured Radio Put to Use

A wholly modern deception channel came into being with the use of radio. For example, a parachutist lands in enemy territory equipped with a portable transmitter and is captured. He confesses he has been sent on a mission to spy on enemy troop movements and to communicate with his intelligence headquarters by radio. Such an agent stands a good chance of being shot after making this confession; he may be shot before he has a chance to make it. The probability is high, however, that his captors will decide he is more useful alive than dead because his radio provides a direct channel for feeding deception to the opponent's intelligence service. If the intelligence service that sent the agent knows, however, that he has been captured and is under enemy control, it can continue to send him questions with the intent of deceiving the other side. If it asks for a report on troop concentrations in sector A, it gives the impression that some military action is planned there. This was one tactic used by the Allies in preparation for the Normandy landings.

The mounting of strategic deception requires the complete co-operation and the complete security of all parts of government engaged in the effort. For this reason, large-scale deception is difficult for a democratic government except under wartime controls. For the Soviets, of course, the situation is different. With their centralized organization and complete control of the information media within their country they can support a deception operation far more efficiently than a free country can. When a Soviet diplomat drops a remark in deepest confidence to a colleague from a neutral country at a dinner party, he usually does so knowing that the neutral colleague also attends dinner parties with Westerners. The particular remark was contained in a directive sent to him by his Foreign Office. When it is studied in intelligence headquarters somewhere in the West and is found to agree in substance with a remark made by a Soviet military attaché at a cocktail party 10,000 miles away, the two remarks may erroneously be thought to confirm one another.

In reality both originated with the same master source in the Kremlin. Both Russians were acting as mouthpieces for an extremely well co-ordinated and well-timed program of political deception manipulated month by month in smooth conjunction with

the Soviets' ever-shifting aggressive probes and plots in Berlin, Laos, the Congo, Cuba and whatever is next on the program.

One of the most successful acts of long-range political deception ever launched against the West took place before and during World War II. It had the gullible in the West believing that the Chinese People's Movement was not Communistic but was solely a social and agrarian reform. This was not accomplished by open Communist propaganda. Instead the fiction was planted by means of Communist-controlled journalists in the Far East and various "front" or penetrated organizations.

#### The Ambassador's Valet

Any discussion of deception would be incomplete without mentioning how often the fear of being deceived has blinded an opponent to valid intelligence accidentally coming into his hands. If you suspect an enemy of constant trickery, then almost anything that happens can be taken as one of his tricks. A collateral effect of deception, once a single piece of deception has succeeded in its purpose, is to upset and confuse the opponent's judgment and evaluation of other intelligence he may receive. He will be suspicious and distrustful. He will not want to be caught off guard.

On January 10, 1940, during the "phony war," a German courier plane flying between two points in Germany lost its way in the clouds, ran out of fuel and made a forced landing in what turned out to be Belgium. On board were the complete plans of the German invasion of France through Belgium, for which Hitler had already given marching orders. When the Luftwaffe major who had been piloting the plane realized where he had landed, he quickly built a fire out of brush and tried to burn all the papers he had on board, but Belgian authorities reached him before he could finish the job and retrieved enough half-burned and unburned documents to be able to piece together the German plan.

Some of the high British and French officials who studied the material felt that the whole thing was a German deception operation. How could the Germans be so sloppy as to allow a small plane to go aloft so close to the Belgian border in bad weather with a completely detailed invasion plan on board? This reasoning focused on the circumstances, not on the contents of the papers. Churchill writes that he opposed this interpretation. Putting himself in the place of the German leaders, he asked himself what possible advantage there was in perpetrating a deception of this sort. Obviously, none. As we learned after the war, the invasion of Belgium, which had been set for the 16th of January—six days after the plane came down—was postponed by Hitler primarily because the plans had fallen into the Allies' hands.

#### Real Accidents Suspect

Accidents like this are not the only events that raise the spectre of deception. It has already been pointed out that if you send a deception agent to the enemy, you have to make him credible. Thus bona fide windfalls have sometimes been doubted and neglected because they were suspected of being deception. This happened to the Nazis late in World War II in the case of "Cicero," the Albanian valet of the British Ambassador to Turkey. He had succeeded in cracking the ambassador's private safe and had access to top secret British documents on the conduct of the war, and one day offered to sell them to the Germans as well as to continue supplying similar documents.

Some of Hitler's experts in Berlin could never quite believe that this wasn't a British trick, but for more complex reasons than in some cases where deception is feared. The incident is an excellent example of how prejudice and preconception can cause failure to properly evaluate valid intelligence. For one

thing, the Cicero documents gave evidence of the massive offensives to come and the growing power of the Allies-information which collided head on with the illusions cherished in the highest German circles. Secondly, competition and discord among different organs of the German government prevented it from making a sober analysis of this source. Particularly, the intelligence service under Himmler and Kaltenbrunner and the diplomatic service under Ribbentrop were at odds and, as a result, if Kaltenbrunner thought information was good, Ribbentrop automatically tended to think it was bad. An objective analysis of the operational data was out of the question in a situation where rival cutthroats were vying for position and prestige. In the Cicero case Ribbentrop and the diplomatic service suspected deception. The net effect was that, as far as can be ascertained, the Cicero material never had any appreciable influence on Nazi strategy. Of course, at this late date they did not have many alternatives open to them anyway.

A further ironical twist to this famous case is that the Nazi intelligence service paid this most valuable agent in counterfeit English pound notes, and he has been trying ever since to get restitution from the German government for services rendered—in real money.


Certainly one of the most active agencies in the propagation of intentional deception is the office in the Soviet intelligence service (K.G.B.) called the disinformation section. In recent years this office has been particularly busy in formulating and distributing what purport to be official documents of the United States, Britain and other countries of the Free world. Its intention is to misstate and misrepresent the policies and purposes of these countries. In June of 1961 Mr. Richard Helms, a high official of the Central Intelligence Agency, presented the evidence of this activity to a congressional committee. Out of the mass of forgeries available, he selected 32 particularly succulent ones, which were fabricated in the period 1957–60.

#### Long History of Forgery

He pointed out that the Russian secret service has a long history of forging documents, having concocted the Protocols of Zion over 60 years ago to promote anti-Semitism. The Soviets have been adept pupils of their tsarist predecessors. Their forgeries nowadays, he pointed out, are intended to discredit the West, and the United States in particular, in the eyes of the rest of the world; to sow suspicion and discord among the Western allies; and to drive a wedge between the peoples of non-Communist countries and their governments by promoting the notion that these governments are the puppets of the United States.

The falsified documents include various communications purporting to be from high officials to the President of the United States, letters to and from the Secretary of State or high State Department, Defense Department and USIA officials. To the initiated, these documents are patent fabrications; while the texts are cleverly conceived, there are always a great number of technical errors and inconsistencies. Unfortunately these are not apparent to the audiences for which the letters are intended, generally the peoples of the newly independent nations. The documents are prepared for mass consumption rather than for the elite. One of the most subtle, supposedly part of a British cabinet paper, wholly misrepresented the U.S. and British attitude with respect to trade-union policies in Africa.

The forgery technique is particularly useful to the Communists because they possess the means for wide and fast distribution. Newspapers and news outlets are available to them on a worldwide basis. While many of these are tarnished and suspect because of Communist affiliations, they are nevertheless capable of placing a fabrication before millions of people in a short time.



Typical of documents forged for propaganda purposes and made public in media of popular circulation are these two spurious telegrams supposedly sent to the Secretary of State in Washington. Published in an English language newspaper in the Far East, the documents alleged that American official agencies were plotting to assassinate Chlangkal-Shek

The denials and the pinpointing of the evidence of fabrication ride so far behind the initial publication that the forgeries have already made their impact in spreading deception. On the other hand, the technique of forgery is not available to Western intelligence in peacetime, for, quite apart from ethical considerations, there is too much danger of deceiving and misleading our own people.

There is another type of deception that occasionally crops up which does not have its source with Communist intelligence services but which complicates the task of the Western intelligence officer and particularly the analyst. This deception is the product of what are called "papermills" in intelligence parlance. A papermill is a producer of phony intelligence, primarily for profit and not for the sake of the deception.

In the latter days of World War II and in the postwar era when thousands of the intelligentsia of eastern Europe were uprooted from their homes and sought refuge in the West they came to rely on their wits for a living. Many had had important posts in the countries they were forced to leave, and possessed wide education and knowledge of languages and peoples. Some of the less scrupulous among them found that an excellent way to make a living for a time was to fabricate intelligence reports based on supposed contacts with their homeland. These papermill fabrications could be cleverly conceived, well constructed and well

attuned to the desires of prospective purchasers and therefore almost impossible to reject at first glance. Many of them had a good market and brought a good price. Unfortunately for the fabricators, they were often too zealous in seeking more than one market for their product. In time—but it took much time and effort—U.S. and other intelligence services that had been victimized made a common drive to eliminate the papermills. The effort has been very largely successful.

#### VII. HOW INTELLIGENCE IS PUT TO USE

Information gathered by intelligence services is of little use unless it is got into the hands of its "consumers," the policy makers. This must be done in good time and in clear, intelligible form so that the particular intelligence can easily be read and properly related to the policy problem with which it deals.

These criteria are not easily met, for the sum total of intelligence received is immense. Thousands of items come into CIA headquarters every day, directly or through other agencies of government, particularly the State and Defense departments. When we consider all we need to know about happenings behind the Iron Curtain and in over a hundred other countries, this volume is not surprising. Anywhere in the world events could occur which might affect the security of the United States. How

is this mass of information handled by the various collection agencies, and how is it processed in the State Department, the Defense Department and the CIA?

Between these three agencies there is immediate and often automatic exchange of important intelligence data. Of course, someone has to decide what "important" means and determine priorities. The sender of an intelligence report (who may be any one of our many officials abroad—diplomatic, military or intelligence) will often label it as being of a certain importance, but the question of priority is generally decided on the receiving end. If a report is of a particularly critical character, touching on the danger of hostilities or some major threat to our national security, the sender will place his message in channels that provide for automatic dissemination to the intelligence officers in the State and Defense departments and the CIA. The latter, as co-ordinator of foreign intelligence, has the right of access to all intelligence that comes to any department of our government. This is provided for by law.

There is a round-the-clock watch for important intelligence coming into the State and Defense departments and the CIA. During office hours (which in intelligence work are never normal), designated officers scan the incoming information for anything of critical character. Through the long night hours, special watch officers in the three agencies do the monitoring. They are in close touch with each other and come to know each other well, and are continually exchanging ideas about the sorting out of clues to any developing crisis. In the event that any dramatic item should appear in the incoming nightly stream of reports, arrangements have been made as to the notification of their immediate chiefs. The latter decide who among the high policy officials of government-from the President at the top to the responsible senior officers in State, Defense and the CIA-should be alerted. The watch officers also follow the press-service and radio reports, including those of Soviet and Chinese origin. News of a dramatic, yet open, character—the death of a Stalin, a revolt in Iraq, the assassination of a political leader-may first become known through public means of communication. Official channels today have access to the most speedy means of transmission of reports from our embassies and our overseas installations, but these messages must go through the process of being enciphered and deciphered. As a result, news flashes sometimes get through first.

#### Post-Mortem Analyses

After there has been an important incident affecting our security, one that has called for policy decisions and actions, there is usually an intelligence post-mortem to examine how effectively the available information was handled and how much forewarning had been given by intelligence. Incidents such as the Iraqi revolution of 1958 or the erecting of the wall dividing Berlin on August 13, 1961, required such treatment, since neither had been clearly predicted through intelligence channels. The purpose of the post-mortem is to obtain something in the nature of a batting average for the alertness of intelligence services. If there has been a failure, either in prior warning or in handling the intelligence already at hand, the causes are sought and every effort is made to find means of improving future performance.

The processing of incoming intelligence falls into three general categories. The first is the daily and hourly handling of current intelligence. The second is the researching of all available intelligence on a given series of subjects of interest to our policy makers; this might be given the name "basic intelligence." For example, one group of analysts may deal with the information available on the Soviet economy, another with its agriculture, a third with its steel and capital goods production, and still another with its aircraft and missile development. The third type of proc-

essing involves the preparation of an intelligence estimate and judgment based on the whole volume of information on the subject of the estimate.

Of course, there is not time to submit every important item to detailed analysis before it is distributed to the policy makers. But "raw" intelligence is a dangerous thing unless it is understood for what it generally is—an unevaluated report, frequently sent off without the originator of the message being able to determine finally its accuracy and reliability. Hence the policy makers who receive such intelligence in the form of periodic intelligence bulletins (or as an isolated message if its importance and urgency requires special treatment) are warned against acting on raw intelligence alone.

These bulletins—both daily and weekly—summarize on a world-wide basis the important new developments over the preceding hours or days; they include such appraisal as the sender may give or as the CIA is able to add in consultation with representatives of the other government intelligence agencies. These representatives meet frequently for that purpose, going over the items to be included in the daily bulletin. New information may still be added to the daily bulletin up until the early morning hours of the day on which it is issued. When this intelligence is sent forward, explanatory material is often included as to source, manner of acquisition and reliability. Some messages carry their own credentials as to authenticity; most do not.

#### Position Papers

In addition to the current raw intelligence reports and the "basic intelligence" studies, there are the position papers, generally called "national estimates." These are prepared by the intelligence community on the basis of all the intelligence available on a certain subject along with an interpretation of the "imponderables." Here we come to a most vital function of the entire work of intelligence-how to deal with the mass of information about future developments so as to make it useful to our policy makers and planners as they examine the critical problems of today and tomorrow. Berlin, Cuba, Laos; Communist aims and objectives; the Soviet military and nuclear programs; the economies of the U.S.S.R. and Communist China-the list could be almost indefinitely extended and is, of course, not exclusively concerned with Communist bloc matters. Sometimes estimates must be made on a crash basis. Sometimes, particularly where long-range estimates are involved, they are made after long weeks of study.

One of the major reasons why the CIA was organized was to provide a mechanism for co-ordinating intelligence work so that the President, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense could have before them a single reasoned analysis of the factors involved in situations affecting our national security. President Truman, who, in 1947, submitted the legislation proposing its creation, expressed in his memoirs the need for such a mechanism:

The war taught us this lesson—that we had to collect intelligence in a manner that would make the information available where it was needed and when it was wanted, in an intelligent and understandable form. If it is not intelligent and understandable, it is useless.

He also describes the system by which intelligence was co-ordinated and passed on to policy makers:

Each time the National Security Council is about to consider a certain policy—let us say a policy having to do with Southeast Asia—it immediately calls upon the CIA to present an estimate of the effects such a policy is likely to have. The Director of the CIA sits with the staff of the National Security Council and continually informs as they go along. The estimates he submits represent the judgment of the CIA and a cross section of the judgments of all the advisory councils of the CIA. These are G-2, A-2, the ONI, the State Department, the FBI, and the Director of Intelligence of the AEC. The Secretary of State then makes the final recommendation of policy, and the President makes the final decision.

What President Truman refers to as "all the advisory councils of the CIA" was established in 1950 as the Intelligence Advisory

Committee, which later became the United States Intelligence Board (USIB) and is often referred to as "the intelligence community." USIB now has an additional member to those listed above-the head of the newly created Defense Intelligence Agency, which co-ordinates the work of army, navy and air force intelligence and is playing an increasingly important role in the intelligence community. So too is the intelligence unit of the State Department, whose head ranks as an assistant secretary of state. The USIB meets regularly every week and more frequently during crises or whenever any vital new item of intelligence is received. The Director of Central Intelligence is responsible for the estimates arrived at by the board, but if any member dissents and desires his dissent to be recorded, a statement of his views is included as a footnote to the estimate that is finally presented to the President and interested members of the National Security Council.

To facilitate its work in making estimates, the CIA has set up the Board of National Estimates, on which sits a group of experts in intelligence, both civilian and military. The board has no fixed size or term of office but generally comprises about a dozen members. It is an integral and vital part of the agency, and its members are officials of the agency serving on a full-time basis. The military members are eminent retired officers who owe their allegiance to CIA and not to a particular military service. It is the duty of the board to prepare initial drafts of most estimates and to co-ordinate these drafts, at the working level, with representatives from the USIB membership. To deal with highly technical subjects, such as Soviet missiles, aircraft or nuclear programs, competent technical subcommittees of USIB have been established to work with the Board of National Estimates in making early drafts of estimates. And, in certain cases, experts outside of government may be consulted.

#### Suez, a Crash Situation

Obviously, the procedure of making an initial draft, passing it on to the USIB, formulating the report along with any dissenting opinions, and finally submitting it, is a time-consuming process. There are times when "crash" estimates are needed on the spur of the moment. One of these occasions was the Suez crisis of November 1956. I had left Washington to go to my voting place in New York state when I was intercepted early on election eve by a telephone message from General Charles P. Cabell, deputy director of the CIA. He read to me a Soviet note that had just come over the wires. Bulganin was threatening London and Paris with missile attacks unless the British and French forces withdrew from Egypt. I asked General Cabell to call a meeting of the intelligence community and immediately flew back to Washington. The USIB met throughout the night, and early on election morning I took to President Eisenhower our agreed estimate of Soviet intentions and probable courses of action in this crisis.

The contents of this and other estimates are generally kept secret. However, the fact that this mechanism exists and can operate quickly should be a matter of public knowledge. It is an important cog in our national security machinery.

When, on October 22, 1962, President Kennedy addressed the nation on the secret Soviet build-up of intermediate-range missiles in Cuba, the intelligence community had already been receiving reports from agents and refugees indicating mysterious construction of some sort of bases in Cuba. It was a well-known fact that for some time past, Castro—or the Soviets purporting to be acting for Castro—had been installing a whole series of bases for ground-to-air missiles. These, however, were of short range and their major purpose apparently was to deal with possible intruding aircraft. Since the reports received came largely from persons who had little technical knowledge of missile de-

velopment, they did not permit a firm conclusion to be drawn as to whether all the missiles were of the short-range type or whether something more sinister was involved.

The evidence that had been accumulated was sufficient, however, to alert the intelligence community to the need for a more scientific and precise analysis of what was going on. Reconnaissance flights were resumed and the concrete evidence obtained on which the President based his report to the nation and his action. This required, of course, not only the most careful intelligence analysis but immediate intelligence judgments. As the President stated, the air reconnaissance established beyond a doubt that more than antiaircraft installations were being constructed on Cuban soil. This was a case, incidentally, in which it was obviously necessary to give publicity to intelligence conclusions. Khrushchev's subsequent statements and actions testified to their accuracy.

Most of the estimating can be done on a more ordered basis than in such situations, although today there is a sense of urgency in the whole field of intelligence. Some estimates are requested by senior policy officers of government to guide them in dealing with particular problems before them or to get an idea of how others may react to a particular line of action we may be considering. Others are prepared on a regularly scheduled basis, as, for example, the periodic reports on Soviet military and technical preparations. Before some estimates are prepared, a hurry-up call is sent to those who collect the intelligence to try to fill certain gaps in the information required for a complete analysis of a particular problem. Such gaps might be in the military or economic information available, or in our knowledge of the intentions of a particular government at a particular time.

#### Weapon Analysis a Problem

Few fields have proved more difficult of analysis than that of certain Soviet weapons systems. Here one has to deal with Soviet capabilities to produce a given system, the role assigned to the system by the military and its true priority in the whole military field. It is always difficult to predict how much emphasis will be given to any particular system until the research and development stage has been completed, the tests of effectiveness have been carried out and the factories have been given the order to proceed with actual production. While a Soviet system is still in its early stages, our estimates will stress capabilities and probable intentions; as hard facts become available, it is possible to give an estimate of the actual programming of the system.

In 1954, for example, there was evidence that the Soviet Union was producing long-range intercontinental heavy bombers comparable to our B-52s. At first, every indication pointed to the conclusion that the Russians were adopting this weapon as a major element of their offensive strength and planned to produce heavy bombers as fast as their economy and technology permitted. Certain estimates of the build-up of this bomber force over the next few years were called for by the Defense Department and were supplied by the intelligence community. These were based on knowledge of the Soviet aircraft manufacturing industry and the types of aircraft under construction, and included projections concerning the future rate of build-up on the basis of existing production rates and expected expansion of industrial capacity. There was hard evidence of Soviet capability to produce bombers at a certain rate if they so desired. At the time of the estimate, the available evidence indicated that they did so desire, and intended to translate this capability into an actual program. All this led to speculation in this country as to a "bomber gap."

Naturally, however, intelligence kept a close watch on events.

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Production did not rise as rapidly as had seemed likely; evidence accumulated that the performance of the heavy bomber was less than satisfactory. At some point, probably about 1957, the Soviet leaders apparently decided to limit heavy bomber production drastically. The bomber gap never materialized. This became quite understandable, as evidence of progress in the Russian intercontinental missile program was then appearing and beginning to cause concern. Thus, while previous estimates of capability in bomber production remained valid, policy changes had necessitated a new estimate as to future developments in this particular system.

Intentions can be modified or even reversed, and intelligence estimates dealing with them can never be satisfactory. Witness how, just recently, our own intentions concerning the Skybolt missile have changed and how this must affect the calculations of Soviet intelligence.

The Soviet missile program, like that of the heavy bomber, had various vicissitudes. The Soviets saw early, probably earlier than we did, the significance of the missile as the weapon of the future and the potential psychological impact of space achievements. They saw this even before it was clear that a nuclear warhead could be so reduced in weight and size as to be deliverable over great distances by the big boosters which they correctly judged to be within the range of possibility. Given their geographical situation—their strategic requirements differ from ours—they soon realized that even a short- or medium-range missile would have great value in their program to dominate Europe.

The origins of the program go back to the end of World War II, when the Soviet Union, having carefully followed the progress made by the Germans with their V-1 and V-2 missiles, made every effort to gather together as much of the German developmental hardware and as many German rocket experts as they could get their hands on while they were conquering eastern Germany. The Soviets also hired a considerable number of German experts in addition to those they seized and forcibly deported.

#### Don't Underrate Soviets

It is a mistake, however, to credit Soviet missile proficiency today largely to the Germans. The Soviets themselves have a long history in this field and developed high competence quickly. They never took the Germans fully into their confidence but pumped them dry of knowledge, kept them a few years at the drawing boards and away from the testing areas, and then sent most of them back home. While these people proved to be a useful source of intelligence, they had never been brought into contact with the actual Soviet development and could tell only what they had themselves contributed.

The first decade after the end of the war was a period when we had only a scanty knowledge of Soviet missile progress. Drawing boards are silent and short-range missiles make little commotion. As the techniques of science were put to work and the U-2 photographs became available after 1956, "hard" intelligence began to flow into the hands of the impatient estimators. Their impatience was understandable, for great pressure had been put on them by those in the Department of Defense concerned with our own missile programs as well as with our own missile defenses. Planning in such a field takes years, and the Defense Department felt that this was a case in which it was justified in asking the intelligence community to project several years in advance the probable attainments of the Soviet program.

As in the earlier case of Soviet bomber production, the intelligence community, I am safe in saying, would be quite content if it were not called upon for such crystal-ball gazing. But our military planning requires estimates of this nature. The planners say to the intelligence officers: If you won't give us some estimate as to the future, we will have to prepare it ourselves—but you intelligence officers should really be in a better position to make the predictions than we are. For the intelligence service to deny this would be tantamount to saying it was not up to its job.

Thus, early figures of Soviet missile production had to be developed on the basis of estimated production and development capabilities over a period in the future. Once again one had to decide how the Soviet Union would allocate its total military effort. How much of it would go into missiles? How much into developing the nuclear potential? How much into the heavy bomber, as well as the fighter planes and ground-to-air defense to meet hostile bombers? How much into submarines? And, in general, how much into elements of attack and how much into those of defense?

It was due to this measure of incertitude during the late 1950s that the national debate over the so-called missile gap developed. Then, on the basis of certain proved capabilities of the Russians and of estimates of their intentions and over-all strategy, conclusions were reached as to the numbers of missiles and nuclear warheads that would be available and on launchers several years in the future.

There is no doubt that tests of Soviet missiles in 1957 and afterward showed a high competence in the ICBM field. Soviet shots of seven to eight thousand miles into the far Pacific were well advertised and not ignored by our intelligence. Their testing in the intermediate fields must also have been gratifying to them. But would they use their bulky and somewhat awkward "first generation" ICBM—effective though it was—as the missile to deploy, or would they wait for a second or third generation? Were they in such a hurry to capitalize on a moment of possible missile superiority that they would sacrifice this to a more orderly program? The answer, in retrospect, seems to be in the negative, indicating that they chose the more orderly program. As soon as this evidence appeared, the ICBM estimates—as in the case of the bombers—were quickly revised downward.

#### Intelligence Good on Cuba

Today, after the Cuba incident, one may well ask whether their present actions do not indicate a change of attitude toward their missile program. They were willing to take considerable risks to get some IRBM and MRBM bases in Cuba to create the equivalent, as a threat to us, of a considerable additional number of ICBM bases in the heartland of Russia. Now they seem to be more in a hurry.

In any event, the intelligence collected on Soviet missiles was excellent as to the nature and quality of the potential threat. Our intelligence was also both good and timely as to Soviet production of high-thrust engines and the work on Sputnik. And all of this intelligence spurred us to press forward with our own missile and space programs.

When one turns from the military to the political field, the problems for the estimators are often even more complex. Analysis of human behaviour and anticipation of human reactions in a given situation can never be assigned to a computer, and sometimes they baffle the most clever analyst.

More than a decade ago, in the autumn of 1950, this country had to face in North Korea the difficult decision of whether or not to push forward to the Yalu River and reunite Korea. If we did so, what would be the reaction of the Chinese Communists? Would they answer with a direct attack, or would they stay quiescent under certain conditions—if, for example, Korean rather than U.S. and UN troops formed the bulk of the advance or if we did not disturb the Chinese sources of electric power in North Korea?

At that time, we had good intelligence as to the location and strength of the Chinese Communist forces on the far side of the Yalu. We had to guess, or to put it better, estimate the intentions of Moscow and Peking. We were not in on their secret councils and decisions. In such cases it is arrogant, as well as dangerous, for the intelligence officer to venture a firm opinion in the absence of telltale information on the positioning and moving of troops, the bringing up of strategic supplies and the like. I can speak with detachment about the 1950 estimates, for these were made just before I joined the CIA. The conclusions of the estimators were that it was a toss-up, but they leaned to the side that under certain circumstances the Chinese would probably not intervene. In fact, we just did not know what the Chinese Communists would do, and we did not know how far the Soviet Union would press them or agree to support them if they moved.

One cannot assume that a Communist leader will act or react as we would. For example, normally one would not have "estimated" that Khrushchev should choose the opening day of the Unaligned Nations Conference at Belgrade in September of 1961 to announce to the world, without forewarning, that he was breaking the gentleman's agreement on suspension of nuclear testing. Yet, this is exactly what he did. In Cuba in October of 1962 Khrushchev presumably "estimated" that he could sneak his missiles into the island, plant them and camouflage them and then, at a time of his own choosing, face the United States with a fait accompli. Certainly here he misestimated, just as some on our side had misestimated, that, because of the risks involved and the difficulty of maintaining secrecy, Khrushchev would not attempt to place offensive weapons in Cuba, right under our nose.

Whenever a dramatic event occurs in the foreign relations field—an event for which the public may not have been prepared—one can usually count on the cry going up, "Intelligence has failed again." As we have seen, the charge may at times be correct. But there are also many occasions when an event has been foreseen and correctly estimated but intelligence has been unable to advertise its success, at least at the time.

#### Intelligence Knew of Suez

This was true of the Suez invasion of 1956. Here, intelligence was well alerted as to both the possibility and later the probability of the actions taken by Israel and then by Britain and France. The public received the impression that there had been an intelligence failure; statements were issued by U.S. officials to the effect that the country had not been given advance warning of the action. Our officials, of course, intended to imply only that the British and French and Israelis had failed to tell us what they were doing. In fact, United States intelligence had kept the government informed without, as usual, advertising its achievement

On other occasions the press and the public have been mistaken about the actual role of intelligence in certain situations. Having reached their own conclusions about what the intelligence must have been in the light of the official action taken, they have proceeded to attack the intelligence services even though, in fact, there had been no such estimate. I am thinking about the Bay of Pigs episode in 1961. Much of the American press assumed at the time that this action was predicated on a mistaken intelligence estimate to the effect that a landing would touch off a widespread and successful popular revolt in Cuba. Those who had worked, as I had, with the anti-Hitler underground behind the Nazi lines in France and Italy and in Germany itself during World War II, and those who watched the tragedy of the Hungarian patriots in 1956, would have realized that spontaneous revolutions by unarmed people in this modern age are ineffective and often disastrous. While I have never discussed any details of the 1961 Cuban operation and do not propose to do so now, I repeat here what I

have said publicly before: I know of no estimate that a spontaneous uprising of the unarmed population of Cuba would ensue.

Clearly, our intelligence estimates must take into account not only the natural and the usual but also the unusual, the brutal, the unexpected. It is no longer wise to estimate actions and reactions on the basis of what we ourselves might do if we were in Khrushchev's shoes because, as we have seen at the United Nations, he takes off his shoes. Very often Russian policy moves seem almost to be based on the ideas of Ivan Petrovich Pavlov. the noted Russian physiologist who died in 1936. His experiments included inducing certain reflexes in animals and then, by abruptly changing the treatment, reducing the animals to a state of confusion. The Pavlovian touch can be seen in Khrushchev's abrupt changes in attitude and action, intended to give rise to confusion and dismay in his adversary. The scuttling of the Paris Summit meeting in 1960, the surprise resumption of nuclear testing just at the time the nonaligned nations were assembling in Belgrade in 1961, even the famous shoe-thumping episode, were staged so that their shock effect would help produce certain results he desired. He probably hoped for the same shock effects from the missiles in Cuba. Estimates on how Khrushchev will act in a given situation should take this characteristic into account.

Of course, the trouble with estimating is that one rarely has knowledge of all the factors bearing on any given situation. No one can clearly foresee the future or predict with assurance the workings of the minds of the leaders whose decisions make history. As a matter of fact, if we were to set out to estimate what our own policy decisions would be a few years hence, we would soon be lost in a forest of uncertainty. And yet our estimators are called upon to decide what others will do. Unfortunately the intelligence process of making estimates will never become an exact science.

But at least progress has been made in assembling the elements of a given situation in an orderly manner so as to assist our planners and policy makers. It is possible, often, to indicate a range of probabilities or possibilities and to isolate those factors which would influence Kremlin or Peking decisions. In any event, we have come a long way since Pearl Harbor and the somewhat haphazard system of intelligence analysis which prevailed at that time.

#### VIII. INTELLIGENCE IN OUR FREE SOCIETY

From time to time the charge is made that an intelligence or security service is a potential threat to our freedoms and that there is something sinister about the secrecy surrounding its operations that is inconsistent with the workings of a free society. There has been some sensational writing about the CIA's supposedly making national policy on its own, and playing fast and loose with its secret funds. The Soviet Union and its Communist allies have persistently mounted the most vicious attacks on U.S. intelligence by means of press, radio and other means of communication. Many of these attacks occur in non-Communist media and are not immediately recognizable as of Communist origin. Innocently or otherwise, many writers, especially on the left, have taken up the refrain and, at times, more conservative publicists have been misled into repeating a good deal of Communist propaganda on the subject. Of course, I have taken Communist attacks as a compliment and a measure of our adversaries' fear of the CIA.

I have already pointed out that in both tsarist and Soviet Russia, in Germany, in Japan under the war lords and in certain other countries, security services that exercised some intelligence functions were used to help a tyrant or a totalitarian society to suppress freedoms at home and to carry out terrorist operations abroad. This fact has added to the confusion of many about the

exact function of an intelligence service. Quite recently, from a rather unexpected quarter, comes a comment by Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas. He suggests that "the press does not cover the operations of the Pentagon adequately, nor can it report truthfully on the C.I.A.," which, he alleges, generates "policies," the dangers of which "are not known even to many of the informed press." (Freedom of the Mind, American Library Association, Chicago, Ill. [1962], p.—.) It is understandable, of course, that a relatively new organization in our government's structure like the CIA should—despite its desire for anonymity—receive more than its share of publicity and be subject to questioning and to attack.

Harry Howe Ransom, who has written a study of our intelligence service in relation to the nation's security, puts the issue this way:

CIA is the indispensable gatherer and evaluator of world-wide facts for the National Security Council. Yet to most persons CIA remains a mysterious, super-secret, shadow agency of government. Its invisible role, its power and influence, and the secrecy enshrouding its structure and operations, raise important questions regarding its place in the democratic process. One such question is: How shall a democracy insure that its secret intelligence apparatus becomes neither a vehicle for conspiracy nor a suppressor of the traditional liberties of democratic self-government? (Central Intelligence and National Security, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass. [1958], p. vi.)

I propose to answer this and other questions and criticisms. In fact, in writing this article, I have been motivated by the desire to put intelligence in our free society in its proper perspective.

As already indicated, CIA is a publicly recognized institution of government. Its duties, its place in our governmental structure and the controls surrounding it are set forth partly by statute and partly under National Security Council directive. It was set up under an act of Congress on the recommendation of the President after exhaustive congressional hearings and with practically unanimous bipartisan support. The law specifically provides "that the Agency shall have no police, subpoena, law enforcement powers or internal security functions." It does not make policy, and all its actions must be consistent with the government's policy and approved by those responsible for that policy. Like the State and Defense departments, it has certain publicly assigned functions. Also like these departments, it must keep much of its work secret.

#### Foreign Agencies Repel U.S.

This country certainly wants no part of an organization like the Okhrana of the tsars or the N.K.V.D. of Stalin or the K.G.B. of Khrushchev. We have been nauseated by what we have read of Himmler's Sicherheitsdienst and by the military secret service of Japan in pre-World War II days. The very nature of our government and of our society under the Constitution and the Bill of Rights would outlaw such organizations as these. They could never take root in this country. But even if these factors were not enough, there is a whole group of safeguards, both legal and practical, surrounding the work of the CIA.

The Central Intelligence Agency is placed directly under the National Security Council, which, in effect, means that it is under the President. The chief executive himself, therefore, has the responsibility for overseeing the operations of the CIA. The National Security Council directives are issued under the authority of the National Security act of 1947, which provides that, in addition to the duties and functions specifically assigned under law, the CIA is further empowered to

perform for the benefit of the existing intelligence agencies such additional services of common concern as the National Security Council determines can be more efficiently accomplished centrally . . . . perform such other functions and duties relating to intelligence affecting the national security as the National Security Council may from time to time direct.

It is the President who selects and the Senate which confirms the director and the deputy director of the agency, and this choice is no routine affair. In the 15 years since the agency was created it has had four directors: (1) Vice-Admiral Roscoe Henry Hillenkoetter, who had distinguished service in the navy and in naval intelligence; (2) General Walter Bedell Smith, who, in addition to an outstanding military career, had been for almost three years U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union and was later an undersecretary of state; (3) myself, about whom any comment here would be out of place, except for the mention of a long period of government service and many years in intelligence work; (4) John A. McCone, the present director, who has performed outstanding service in both the Truman and the Eisenhower administrations in many important government posts—as a member of the President's Air Policy Commission, as a deputy to the Secretary of Defense, as undersecretary of the air force, and then as chairman of the United States Atomic Energy Commission.

The law provides that a civilian must be either in the position of director or deputy director. While, theoretically, it is possible to have both of these jobs in civilian hands, military men cannot fill both positions as the law now stands. The practice over the past decade has been to split them between a military man and a civilian. The last two directors, both civilians, have had highly experienced military men for deputy directors—General Charles Pearre Cabell during my tenure, and now Lieutenant General Marshall S. Carter under John McCone.

I have gone into these details about the backgrounds of those in positions of leadership in the CIA because one has a right to expect from such men the highest degree of integrity and responsibility.

#### Relations with the President

From my own experience in the agency, under three presidents, I can say with certainty that the chief executive takes a deep and continuing interest in the operations of the agency. During 8 of my 11 years as deputy director and director of the CIA, I served under President Eisenhower. I had many talks with him about the day-to-day workings of the agency, particularly concerning the handling of its funds. I recall his telling me that we should set up procedures in the agency for the internal accounting of unvouchered funds, i.e., funds appropriated by Congress and expendable on the signature of the director, which would be even more searching, if that were possible, than those of the General Accounting Office. While, obviously, many expenditures must be kept secret as far as the public is concerned, the CIA always stands ready to account to the President, to the CIA appropriations subcommittees of Congress and to the Bureau of the Budget for every penny expended, whatever its purpose.

During the earlier years of the agency there were a series of special investigations of its activities. I myself, as I have mentioned, was the head of a committee of three that in 1949 reported to President Truman on CIA operations. There were also studies made under the auspices of two Hoover commissions, one in 1949 and one in 1955. These dealt with the organization of the executive branch of government and included studies on our intelligence structure. The latter survey, conducted in 1955 during my directorship, included a report prepared by a task force under the leadership of General Mark W. Clark; at about the same time, a special survey of certain of the more secret operations of the agency was prepared for President Eisenhower. by a task force under General James Doolittle. It is interesting to note that General Clark's task force, expressing concern over the dearth of intelligence data from behind the Iron Curtain, called for "aggressive leadership, boldness and persistence." We were urged to do more, not less-the U-2 was already on the drawing boards and was to fly within the year.

Following the report of the 1955 Hoover Commission, I discussed with President Eisenhower one of the commission's rec-



ommendations that there should be established a permanent presidential watchdog board staffed by civilians. This would take the place of ad hoc investigation committees from time to time. President Eisenhower agreed completely with this recommendation and appointed a "President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities," the chairman of which for some time was the distinguished head of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, James R. Killian, Jr. President Kennedy, shortly after he took office, reconstituted this committee with a slightly modified membership, but again under the chairmanship of Dr. Killian. The files, the records, the activities and the expenditures of the Central Intelligence Agency are open to this presidential committee, which meets several times a year and whose recommendations and advice I found of inestimable value in my work.

#### Stormy Times in Congress

The other recommendation of the Hoover Commission in this connection—that a congressional watchdog committee should also be considered—has had a somewhat more stormy history. In 1953, even before the Hoover recommendations, Senator Mike Mansfield had introduced a bill to establish a joint congressional committee for the CIA, somewhat along the lines of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. On August 25, 1953, he wrote me a letter to inquire about CIA's relations with Congress and asked the agency's views on the resolution he had submitted. In my absence abroad, General Cabell, my deputy, replied that "the ties of the CIA with the Congress are stronger than those which exist between any other nation's intelligence service and its legislative body."

A few years later this issue came to a vote in the Senate in the form of a concurrent resolution sponsored by Senator Mansfield. It had considerable support, as 35 senators from both parties were co-sponsors and the resolution had been reported out favourably by the Senate Rules Committee in February of 1956, but one vote of strong dissent came from Senator Carl Hayden, who was also the chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee. Senator Hayden was supported by Senator Richard Russell, Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, and by Senator Leverett Saltonstall, the senior Republican member of that Committee. In April the Senate, after a most interesting debate, voted against the watchdog committee resolution by a surprisingly large majority. In opposing the resolution, Senator Russell said: "Although we have asked him [Allen W. Dulles] very searching questions about some activities which it almost chills the marrow of a man to hear about, he has never failed to answer us forthrightly and frankly in response to any questions we have asked him." The issue was decided when this testimony was supported by former Vice-President (then Senator) Alben Barkley, who spoke from his experience as a member of the National Security Council. He was joined in opposition by Senator Stuart Symington, who had intimate knowledge of the workings of the agency from his days as Secretary of the Air Force. On the final vote of 59 to 27, 10 of the measure's original co-sponsors reversed their positions and joined with the majority to defeat the proposal. They had heard enough to persuade them that, for the time being at least, the measure was not needed.

#### Congress Holds Pursestrings

Possibly the strongest argument against a special congressional watchdog committee is the fact that procedures have been set up—and have been functioning well for almost a decade—whereby Congress exercises its legislative control over what is, after all, very distinctly a function of the executive branch. Congress, of course, holds the purse strings and, through the House and Senate Armed Services committees, also oversees legislative and other requirements of the agency. Appropria-

tion of funds, obviously, gives the legislators a certain amount of control over the scope of operations—how many people CIA can employ; how much it can do; and, to some extent, even what it can do. Obviously, the entire CIA budget cannot be thrown open to general knowledge either in Congress or in the executive branch. But any general public impression that the senators and representatives can exert no power over the CIA is quite mistaken.

The procedures for dealing with the CIA budget are worked out by the Congress itself. Even before a congressional subcommittee sees the CIA budget, moreover, there is a review by the Bureau of the Budget, which must approve the amount set aside for it. This, of course, includes presidential approval. Then the budget is considered by a subcommittee of the Appropriations Committee of the House, as is the case with other executive departments and agencies. The only difference is that the amount of the CIA budget is not publicly disclosed outside of the subcommittee hearings.

This subcommittee includes three members of the majority and two members of the minority from the Appropriations Committee. The present chairman of the committee, Clarence Cannon, is also chairman of the CIA appropriations subcommittee. Until his recent retirement, the senior minority member of the subcommittee was John Taber. Two men with longer experience in congressional procedure and two more careful watchdogs of the public treasury could hardly be found. This subcommittee is entitled to see everything it wishes to see with regard to the CIA budget and to have as much explanation of expenditures, past and present, as it desires.

All this was clearly brought out in a dramatic statement that Mr. Cannon made on the floor of the House on May 10, 1960, just after the failure of the U-2 flight of Francis Gary Powers:

The plane was on an espionage mission authorized and supported by money provided under an appropriation recommended by the House Committee on Appropriations and passed by the Congress.

He then referred to the fact that the appropriation and the activity had also been approved and recommended by the Bureau of the Budget and, like all such expenditures and operations, was under the aegis of the chief executive. He discussed the authority of the subcommittee of the Appropriations Committee to recommend an appropriation for such purposes and also the fact that these activities had not been divulged to the House and to the country. He recalled the circumstance's during World War II when billions of dollars were appropriated, through the Manhattan project, for the atomic bomb under the same general safeguards as in the case of the U-2, i.e., on the authority of a subcommittee of the Appropriations Committee. He referred to the widespread espionage by the Soviet Union, to the activities of their spies in stealing the secret of the atomic bomb. Alluding to the surprise attack by the Communists in Korea in 1950, he justified the U-2 operation in these words:

Each year we have admonished . . . the CIA that it must meet situations of this character with effective measures. We told them "This must not happen again and it is up to you to see that it does not happen again" . . . and the plan that they were following when this plane was taken, is their answer to that demand.

He took occasion to commend the CIA for its action in sending reconnaissance planes over the Soviet Union for the four years preceding Powers' capture and concluded:

We have here demonstrated conclusively that free men, confronted by the most ruthless and criminal despotism, can under the Constitution of the United States protect this Nation and preserve world civilization.

I cite this merely to show the extent to which even the most secret of the CIA's intelligence operations have, under appropriate safeguards, been laid before the representatives of the people in Congress.

In addition to the scrutiny of CIA activities by the House



#### THE CRAFT OF INTELLIGENCE

Appropriations Committee, there is also a subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee. The chairman of this subcommittee is Carl Vinson, who for years has been head of the Armed Services Committee itself. To this body the agency reports its current operations to the extent and in whatever detail the committee desires; here the interest lies not so much with the financial aspects of operations but with all the other elements of our work. In the Senate, there are comparable subcommittees of the Appropriations and Armed Services Committees.

Fifteen years ago, when the legislation to set up a central intelligence agency was being considered, the congressional committees working on the matter sought my views. In addition to testifying, I submitted a memorandum, published in the record of the proceedings, in which I proposed that a special advisory body for the new agency should be constituted to include representatives of the President, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense. This group should, I proposed, "assume the responsibility for advising and counseling the Director of Intelligence and assure the proper liaison between the Agency and these two Departments and the Executive." This procedure has been followed.

#### Open to Public Criticism

Of course, the public and the press remain free to criticize the actions taken by intelligence, including those which are exposed by mishap or indiscretion. This holds just as true for intelligence activities as for any government operations, except where the national security is involved. When an intelligence operation goes wrong and publicity results, the intelligence agency and particularly its director must stand ready to assume responsibility wherever that is possible. There have been times, as in the cases of the U-2 descent on Soviet territory and the Cuban affair of April 1961, where the chief executive has publicly assumed responsibility. Here, if the CIA had attempted to take the position that it had planned and carried out the action unguided and alone it would have been fantamount to admitting that the executive branch of the government was not on the job. Of course, in intelligence operations, silence is the best policy where silence is possible. It is not possible when it cannot be maintained without calling into grave question the vigilance of the executive.

There are many safeguards prescribed within the agency itself to protect against its meddling in policy matters. In addition, the established practice is that no one in the agency, from the director on down, may engage in political activities of any nature, except to vote. A resignation is immediately accepted—or demanded—whenever this rule is violated; any member with political aspirations is given to understand that re-employment—in case his plunge into the political arena is unsuccessful—is un-

likely.

These are some of the safeguards—executive, legislative and other—which surround our intelligence work and help to ensure that the CIA under our government operates solely within established policies.

In the last analysis, however, the most important safeguards are the kind of leadership the intelligence service has and the character of the people who work for it. The efficacy of our laws and regulations depends upon the respect of our citizens for them, as well as upon the courts which enforce them. The hopes or fears which our citizens may have with regard to U.S. intelligence and its operations must centre on the integrity of those on the job—their respect for the democratic processes and their sense of duty and devotion in carrying out their important and delicate tasks.

After ten years of service, I can testify that I have never seen a group of men and women more devoted to the defense of our country and its way of life than those who are working in the Central Intelligence Agency. Our people do not go into the intelligence service for reasons of financial reward or because the service can give them, in return for their work, high rank or public acclaim. Their accomplishments must remain, as President Kennedy has remarked, largely unsung. They are there because of the fascination of the work and the belief that through their service they can personally make a contribution to our nation's security. Most of the senior officers have had long years of service; the new recruits, from whose ranks the agency of the future will be built, are chosen with utmost care and given thorough training before they begin work.

I do not believe that there is need for more controls on our intelligence work. Rather, one should stress the need for all of us to be more alert, more aggressively prepared to meet the requirements of this age. It is not by our intelligence organization that our liberties will be threatened, but rather by our failure to understand the nature of the dangers facing us throughout the world today. If we have more Cubas, if some of the countries of the non-Communist world that are in jeopardy today are further weakened, then we could well be isolated and our liberties, too, could be threatened.

We understand the military threat in the age of nuclear missiles, and we are spending billions—properly so—to counter it. It is the invisible war that we must meet—Khrushchev's wars of liberation, the subversive threats orchestrated by the Soviet Communist party with all its ramifications and fronts, supported by the vigorous penetration activities of secret agents and espionage. We cannot afford to put intelligence in chains; we must continue to support it and enable it to play its protective and informative role in preparing us to meet the dangers of this era.



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ALLEN DULLES CITES ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE, DEFENDS SECRECY

WASHINGTON, Feb. 17. - Intelligence expert Allen Dulles, former director of the Central Intelligence Agency, broke a long silence with the publication of a book-length article in the 1963 edition of the <u>Britannica Book of the Year</u>, published by Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc.

In his article, "The Craft of Intelligence," Dulles:

- 1. Defends CIA secrecy, opposes more congressional controls.
- 2. Denies that the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion was based on a CIA estimate that a popular Cuban uprising would ensue.
- 3. Warns that the U.S.S.R. will step up its espionage efforts against the West.
- 4. Urges wider public understanding of intelligence operations in the cold war era.

In the illustrated 41,000 word article, part of which will appear in the April issue of Harper's magazine, Dulles said:

"I do not believe there is need for more controls on our intelligence work. Possibly the strongest argument against a special congressional watchdog committee is the fact that procedures have been set up - and have been functioning well for almost a decade - whereby congress exercises its legislative control over what is, after all, very distinctly a function of the executive branch.

(MORE)

"Congress, of course, holds the purse strings, and through the
House and Senate armed services committee, also oversees legislative
and other requirements of the agency. Appropriations of funds, obviously,
gives the legislators a certain amount of control over the scope of
operations...Obviously, the entire CIA budget cannot be thrown open to
general knowledge either in Congress or in the executive branch. But
any general public impression that the senators and representatives can
exert no power over the CIA is quite mistaken."

Referring to the unsuccessful 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion, Dulles said:

"Much of the American press assumed at this time that this action was predicated on a mistaken intelligence estimate to the effect that a landing would touch off a widespread and successful popular revolt in Cuba. Those who had worked as I had with the anti-Hitler underground behind the Nazi lines in France and Italy and in Germany itself during World War II, and those who watched the tragedy of the Hungarian patriots in 1956, would have realized that spontaneous revolutions by unarmed people in this modern age are ineffective and often disastrous.

"I know of no estimate that a spontaneous uprising of the unarmed population of Cuba would ensue."

Characterizing Soviet intelligence as "one of the most tightly structured organizations" of its kind in the world, Dulles warned:

"In the Soviet Union, we are faced with an antagonist that has raised the art of espionage to an unprecedented height, while developing the collateral techniques of subversion, deception and penetration into a formidable political instrument of attack. No other country has ever before attempted espionage on such a scale."

Dulles, speaking of the future of U. S. intelligence, said:

"We have learned the importance of secrecy in time of war...but it is well to recognize that in the "Cold War" our adversary takes every advantage of what we divulge openly or make publicly available... It is necessary that the public should come to share in the conviction that intelligence operations can help mightily to protect the nation." The Dulles article is believed to be the first inside, comprehensive description of how a modern intelligence system operates.

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Note to eds: Dulles quotes are attached.